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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Historical Sociology, World History 
and the ‘Problematic of the International’
Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin
The classical sociology tradition has long been criticised for offering a con-
ception of ‘the social’ abstracted from its wider intersocietal context. The 
‘methodological internalism’ inherited from this intellectual tradition has in 
turn lent itself to Eurocentric modes of enquiry in which modernity is con-
ceived as endogenously and autonomously emerging within Europe—or even 
more narrowly, England—from which it subsequently spread to the rest of 
the world at varying times and tempos. From such perspectives, we find the 
flowering of the Renaissance (Burkhardt 1990), the emergence of absolutism 
and the modern state system (Teschke 2003), the origins of capitalism and the 
‘rise of the West’ (Jones 1981; Brenner 1985; Landes 1998) as exclusively 
European phenomena: immanent properties of the uniqueness of European 
development itself. Europe is thus not only conceived as auto-generative and 
self-sustaining, but also as the permanent ‘core’ and ‘prime mover’ of world 
history. This is a view of European development as autopoietic. As a result, 
dominant theoretical understandings of world history have been constructed 
with non-European societies and agents largely absent, even when they are 
recognised as being empirically important to the stories we tell (cf. Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu 2015). Missing in these Eurocentric accounts, then, is any 
theoretical comprehension of ‘the international’ as a thick space of intercon-
nection and co-constitutive societal differentiation: a conception of intersoci-
etal systems as necessarily marked by, and generative of, alterity, hybridity 
and non-linear forms of development.
Recently in the fields of international relations (IR) and historical sociol-
ogy, a thriving new research program has emerged specifically addressing 
these two intersecting problematics of ‘the international’ and Eurocentrism 
building upon Leon Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined development. 
This volume brings together a number of scholars working within these 
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fields in offering critical reflections on the potential of uneven and combined 
development as an intellectual basis for a non-Eurocentric social theory of 
‘the international’. It does so through a series of theoretically informed and 
empirically rich analyses of socio-historical change, political transformation 
and intersocietal conflict in world history over the longue durée.
In what follows, we further flesh out the issues and debates revolving 
around the twin problematics of ‘the international’ and Eurocentrism in 
Sections I and II, respectively. In Section III, we offer an exposition of the 
theory of uneven and combined development, while addressing some of the 
central lines of debate within the contemporary literature. We then move in 
Section IV to position the various chapters in relation to the above-noted 
problematics.
It is worth noting here that in putting together this volume we aim to pur-
sue two main goals. The first, more explicit one is that the volume should act 
as a catalyst for further critical discussion and debate on and theoretical re-
articulations of the central role of intersocietal relations—and extra-European 
societies in particular—in the making of world history. Our second, more 
implicit goal is to show the intellectual potentials of the idea of uneven and 
combined development for acting as a bridge between the fields of historical 
sociology and world history. For although contemporary world historians 
have also been centrally concerned with intersocietal interactions and differ-
entiation in history there has been little dialogue between world history and 
historical sociology in IR as distinct but cognate fields. We reflect on the roots 
of this problem and the ways in which uneven and combined development 
can contribute to its solution in the concluding chapter.
To these ends, we offer the idea of uneven and combined development 
as a framework uniquely suited to theoretically and empirically ‘re-orient’ 
(Frank 1998) extant conceptions of world history and ‘the international’. 
In particular, we argue that uneven and combined development provides a 
generative research programme that opens up new theoretical and empirical 
vistas through which to analyse world history anew.
THE LEGACy AND LACUNA of THE 
CLASSICAL SoCIoLoGy TRADITIoN
Over the past four decades or so, scholars of historical sociology have pro-
vided a wealth of new and exciting works analysing world history. From 
multi-volume studies, such as those provided by Perry Anderson (1974a; 
1974b), Michael Mann (1986; 1993; 2012; 2013), Immanuel Wallerstein 
(1974; 1980; 1989; 2011), W. G. Runcimen (1983; 1989; 1997) and Kees 
van der Pijl (2007; 2010; 2014), to the many works of Jack Goldstone 
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(1991; 2002; 2008), Theda Skocpol (1979; 1994), John M. Hobson (1997; 
2004; 2012) and Charles Tilly (1984; 1993; 2004), historical sociological 
approaches have offered a number of important insights and novel analytical 
frameworks for examining world history over the longue durée. Particu-
larly significant here is the persistent question of the theoretical standing of 
intersocietal relations—or ‘the international’—that many of these historical 
sociological works have sought to address and the zones of engagement and 
cross-fertilisation this has inspired with the field of IR.1
Engagements with the ‘problematic of the international’ have time and 
again taken centre stage in historical sociology and IR as they have sought to 
overcome the problems bequeathed by classical sociology’s singular notion 
of ‘society’ conceived in abstraction from the conditions of societal multiplic-
ity and interactivity (see, among others, Nisbet 1969; Berki 1971; Skocpol 
1973; Barker 1978; Giddens 1985; Mann 1986; Halliday 1987; Bertram 
1990; Linklater 1990; Hobson 1998; Hall 1999; Teschke 2005; Rosenberg 
2006; van der Pijl 2007; Davenport 2013). As far back as 1965, Gianfranco 
Poggi noted how modern sociology had primarily taken shape around the 
‘study of the inner structure and dynamics of social units’. It was therefore 
marked by a ‘learned incapacity’ to theoretically incorporate the distinct 
causal dynamics and behavioural patterns emergent from the interactive co-
existence of multiple societies and states (Poggi 1965, 284). For the guiding 
methodological assumption of the classical sociology tradition was that the 
growth and change of society ‘should be explained with reference to its inter-
nal constitution’ (Tenbruck 1994, 74). While the interactions between soci-
eties may not be viewed as entirely ‘inconsequential’, they are ‘in principle 
insignificant for sociology, since its effects on the essential process [are] seen 
as negligible’. It was this ‘conception of the internal history of societies that 
underlies the rise of sociology’ (Tenbruck 1994, 74, emphasis added). Simi-
larly, surveying the vast field of classical sociologists from Karl Marx and 
Ferdinand Tönnies to Émile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, Richard Bendix 
(1967, 306–7) concluded that ‘[f]or all their diversity’ the classical sociology 
tradition has tended to ‘treat societies as “natural systems”’ whereby ‘social 
change consists of a process that is internal to the society changing’. This 
absence of any intellectual tradition of international theory is replicated in 
Classical Political Philosophy, rousing Martin Wight’s (1966) oft-cited ques-
tion: ‘Why is there no international theory?’
The problem of how to theorise international relations inherited from the 
classical sociology tradition has led a number of contemporary historical 
sociologists and IR scholars to abandon any unitary notion of society. They 
have instead invited us to revisualise processes of long-term social change 
and transformation in terms of intersecting ‘webs’ and ‘flows’ operating 
across, and irreducible to, individual societies, or contextualising social 
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development within wider ‘intersocietal systems’ (see, for example, Giddens 
1985; Mann 1986; Runciman 1989; Shaw 2000). While marking definite 
advances in approaching macro-historical analysis, such moves towards 
assigning a more central status to intersocietal relations and dynamics have 
all too often involved either an ‘extra-social’ or reductionist conception of 
‘the international’. In other words, existing historical sociological approaches 
have oscillated between realist2 reifications of ‘the international’ as a time-
less supra-social sphere or reductive theorisations of its distinct causal 
properties through some form of ‘domestic analogy’: a visualisation of ‘the 
international’ as a reimagining of domestic society writ large (Bull 1966). 
Consequently, the theoretical divide between ‘sociological’ and ‘geopolitical’ 
modes of explanation persists as neither perspective theoretically transcends 
classical sociology’s original conception of society in the ontologically 
singular (cf. Rosenberg 2006). This methodological dichotomy and the 
myriad problems it has generated have been at the heart of recent debates 
within the field of IR, where historical sociology has secured a vocal, albeit 
still marginal, place (see, inter alia, Hobson 1998; Buzan and Little 2000; 
Halliday 2002; Rosenberg 2006; Bigo and Walker 2007; Matin 2007; van der 
Pijl 2007; Chernilo 2010; Bhambra 2010; Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 
2010; Teschke 2014; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015; Bieler, Bruff and 
Morton 2015; Buzan and Lawson 2015).
While historical sociologists have provided new vistas from which to revi-
sualise grand-scale social change and development over the longue durée, 
the intellectual lacuna of ‘the international’ persists as few scholars have 
offered any systematic theoretical apparatus capable of incorporating the co-
existence and interaction of multiple societies as a distinct sphere of devel-
opmental dynamics and social causality (but see van der Pijl 2007). As such, 
intersocietal relations remain theoretically undigested since it is not clear 
what is ‘the international’ rendered in substantive historical and sociological 
terms. That is to say, we have yet to see the formulation of a genuinely inter-
national historical sociology (Rosenberg 2006 and chapter in this volume).
MISSING: A NoN-EURoCENTRIC SoCIAL 
THEoRy of ‘THE INTERNATIoNAL’
The residual methodological internalism of historical sociological approaches 
entailed in this continuing absence of ‘the international’ in theory intersects 
with a second key line of debate within the contemporary social sciences: the 
problem of Eurocentrism.3
 Indeed, one can arguably view the latter as a con-
sequence of the former in the sense that the conception of social change and 
transformation as an immanent property of societies has led to interpretations 
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and theoretical analyses of the predominant sites and driving forces of such 
historical processes as an exclusively European affair. Relatedly, through the 
comparative method, we find the distinct forms and paths of European devel-
opment posited as ideal-type abstractions and/or normative benchmarks with 
which all other examples are contrasted and ultimately judged a ‘deviation’. 
Consequently, the particularities of European development are projected in 
one form or another on to the ‘extra-European’ world, thereby elevating the 
European experience into a universal stage of development through which 
all societies must pass, albeit at different times, places and velocities. The 
false sense of universality generated by such Eurocentric modes of enquiry 
has been the bane of social theory since its inception (cf. Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu 2015).
So what then constitutes Eurocentrism as such? At the core of Eurocen-
trism lies the claim that modern development across the world consists of a 
series of discrete re-enactments of modernity’s endogenous development in 
Europe. This is a view of modern world history as a play with one stage and 
one actor. As noted, this claim is rooted in classical sociology’s foundational 
assumption that the character of a society’s development is determined by its 
internal structures and agents. The self-contained conception of autopoietic 
development—the autonomous emergence and reproduction of particular 
social orders—embedded in the ‘pernicious postulate’ (Tilly 1984) of this 
singular abstraction of ‘the social’ simultaneously entails both an internali-
sation and globalisation of modern capitalist development in Europe (Amin 
1989). This is effectuated by the subordination of space to time through a 
double-movement.4
 Different geopolitical spaces are conceptually decoupled 
from the particularities of their internal developmental processes, while being 
simultaneously enclosed and homogenised within an abstract universal his-
tory derived from the concrete internal history of one such geopolitical space: 
Europe. The constitutive and causal significance of political multiplicity is 
thereby dissolved into a European temporality refashioned as ‘the universal’. 
In this respect, Eurocentrism combines ‘internalism’ (Tenbruck 1994) and 
‘historicism’ (Chakrabarty 2008) producing what can be termed ‘monadic 
sociology’ (Matin 2007)—a mode of analysis that arguably remains hege-
monic within the social sciences, operating across a wider variety of different 
theoretical traditions despite its many critics.
Two critical alternative approaches to Eurocentrism that have become 
particularly influential include ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000) and 
‘late postcolonialism’ (Bhaba 1994; Spivak 1994). Both approaches reject 
European development as the epitome of modernity, whilst emphasising the 
fundamentally plural nature of the modern experience. These are two crucial 
components to the formulation of a non-Eurocentric perspective which reso-
nates with the framework of uneven and combined development offered in 
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this volume. However, the ‘multiple modernities’ and ‘late postcolonialism’ 
perspective each face real difficulties in fully transcending Eurocentrism. 
The Weberian sociological framework of the multiple modernities approach 
retains the static comparative methodology fitted with ideal-type abstrac-
tions that renders ‘the international’ a contingent externality to its theoretical 
premises. This in turn attenuates the constitutive role of (geo)politics and 
intersocietal relations attendant to the globalisation of modern world his-
tory. The approach therefore lends itself to a culturalist/relativist mode of 
inquiry that is preoccupied with questions pertaining to the specificity of each 
instance of modernity leaving Eurocentrism’s internalist method largely intact 
(Eisenstadt 2000, 2; Masud and Salvatore 2009, 45).5 By contrast, late post-
colonialism interrogates the interactive construction of ‘colonial modernity’ 
through an explicitly internationalist method (Dabashi 2006, xi–xii). Yet, 
its poststructuralist hostility towards general theory and universal categories 
arrests the translation of its powerful critique of Eurocentrism into an alterna-
tive non-Eurocentric social theory (Dirlik 1999, 1994; Matin 2013a; Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu 2015). Thus, while multiple modernities and late postcolo-
nial scholars have been highly successful at impeaching Eurocentrism, they 
have not yet decisively supplanted it (cf. Matin 2013b, 2–3).
foUND: THE IDEA of UNEvEN AND 
CoMbINED DEvELoPMENT
The long forgotten idea of uneven and combined development, we argue, 
offers a theoretical framework that avoids these pitfalls and overcomes 
Eurocentrism. The term was first coined by the Bolshevik revolutionary 
Leon Trotsky (2008) to explain the ‘peculiarities of Russian development’ 
which led to the world’s first socialist-inspired revolution—a revolution 
which took place within the most economically ‘backward’6 and ideologi-
cally reactionary state in Europe at the time. Trotsky’s views on the pos-
sibility of Tsarist Russia moving straight to socialism were in stark contrast 
to predominant positions within the Second International that the socialist 
revolution in Tsarist Russia had to wait for the bourgeois ‘stage’ to complete 
itself (Davidson 2015a).7 And, for Trotsky, the ability of Russian society to 
‘skip’ a few stages of the historical process was inherently conditioned by 
its international context (what Trotsky termed the ‘whip of external neces-
sity’). The ‘law’ of uneven and combined development essentially constituted 
the historical sociological foundations for Trotsky’s strategy of permanent 
revolution, capturing both a real historical process and its conceptual com-
prehension in thought (cf. Davidson 2012 and this volume). But, moreover, 
implicit in Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined development was a 
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fundamental redefinition of the very logic and concept of development itself: 
one embedded with a ‘more-than-one’ ontological premise.
This long hidden potential of Trotsky’s concept in furnishing a historical 
sociological theory of ‘the international’ was taken up by Justin Rosenberg 
in his Deutscher Prize lecture of 1994 entitled ‘Isaac Deutscher and the Lost 
History of International Relations’ (Rosenberg 1996) and, more systemati-
cally and ambitiously, over a decade later in an article titled ‘Why Is There 
No International Historical Sociology?’ (2006).8 Over the subsequent two 
decades since Rosenberg introduced the idea as the basis for a social theory 
of ‘the international’, it has witnessed an unprecedented intellectual renais-
sance representing, as Neil Davidson puts it in this volume, ‘perhaps the most 
dramatic reversal of fortune ever undergone by any concept from within the 
Classical Marxist tradition’. Having been lifted from a relatively obscure 
concept confined to the Trotskyist left, where even there it remained at the 
outer-margins of discussion, ‘uneven and combined development is now part 
of the standard theoretical apparatus available to those working in Interna-
tional Relations and to some extent in the social and political sciences more 
generally’ (Davidson, this volume).9 Indeed, the idea’s revival has not only 
been witnessed in IR and historical sociology,10 but also within—and often 
in dialogue with—other fields such as history (van der Linden 2007; Tooze 
2014; 2015; Eley 2015), world literature and cultural studies (cf. Mukherjee 
2009; Brennan 2014; Warwick Research Collective 2015; Christie and 
Degirmencioglu 2016). So what is uneven and combined development?
The conceptual core of uneven and combined development, as further 
elaborated upon by Rosenberg (2006), is threefold.11 First, unevenness posits 
multiplicity and differentiation as a general ontological condition of social 
existence. Second, unevenness ipso facto conditions and is reconditioned by 
processes of change within and across interacting societies. This interactive 
process ontologically blurs the analytical distinction between the ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’, and by extension the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, as it necessar-
ily generates particular ‘combinations’ of its own component parts, continu-
ously generating new iterations and dynamics of unevenness.
Crucially, combined development is an open-ended and politically charged 
process. It involves lived agents, differentially located within a complex struc-
ture of uneven power relations, borrowing and adapting available resources 
in order to create ‘new’ social orders or reform existing ones—a process 
wrought with unintended consequences. The category of combination thereby 
denotes how social structures and relations within particular human geogra-
phies are shaped by and constituted through their interactions. Such interac-
tions are in turn generative of unique amalgams of ‘native’ and ‘foreign’, 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, social forms. Third, this intrinsically ‘uneven’ 
and ‘combined’ character of social change finds its concrete expressions in 
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historical processes of ‘development’. Development is, of course, among the 
most controversial and Eurocentric concepts in the social sciences (cf. Nisbet 
1969; Escobar 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 2001). In Trotsky’s formulation, 
however, development is neither unilinear nor homogenous/homogenising 
but interactively multilinear. In this respect, the theory reconceptualises the 
(re)productive activities of human collectivities that are implicated in their 
mutually constitutive relations. These relations in turn produce differentiated 
societal outcomes and underpin ‘processes of directional change over time, 
which can be theorised by analysing the causal properties of particular struc-
tures of social relationships’ (Rosenberg 2007, 330).
A few important clarifications are in order here. Uneven and combined 
development has been often used interchangeably and conflated with the 
concept of ‘uneven development’ (see also, Davidson chapter in this vol-
ume). However, the two categories are quite distinct. ‘Uneven development’ 
conceptualises differential development within different parts of a country, or 
between different countries, regions and economic sectors. It has been exten-
sively used to describe the unequal pace and depth of economic and politi-
cal ‘modernisation’ in the Global South (cf. Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1977; 
Arrighi 2007), as well as in examining the differential production of space—
uneven geographical development—under capitalism (e.g. Harvey 2006; 
Smith 2008). But there are two crucial differences between the two concepts. 
First, ‘uneven development’ is derived from the internal dynamics of capital-
ism. It therefore obscures the causal significance of societal multiplicity and 
international relations central to uneven and combined development. And 
second, ‘uneven development’ does not capture conditions of hybridity. In its 
more complex renditions it connotes the ‘articulation of modes of production’ 
whereby capitalist and non-capitalist forms hierarchically coexist but remain 
internally coherent (Foster-Carter 1978; Laclau 1971).
Relatedly, the order of the concepts uneven and combined is quite signifi-
cant as a number of scholars often refer to Trotsky’s idea as ‘combined and 
uneven development’. But, again, the two are in fact distinct. As Trotsky 
himself made clear (1979, 556, emphasis ours), ‘I would put uneven before 
combined, because the second grows out of the first and completes it’. The rea-
soning behind this order is drawn out by Davidson (2012, 295) when discuss-
ing the specific theoretical innovation of ‘combined development’ which 
Trotsky coined in seeking to overcome the ‘inability of uneven development 
to fully encapsulate’ a number of phenomena (such as the hyper-fusion of the 
most ‘archaic and contemporary forms’ within a society), which ‘appears to 
have made Trotsky search for a new concept, with a new name, starting from 
and incorporating uneven development but deepening its content’. The impli-
cations of this point are particularly relevant in the contemporary debates on 
uneven and combined development vis-à-vis theorising ‘the international’. 
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For the more commonly used term combined and uneven development, as 
Rosenberg notes (2005, 68–69fn28), ‘invokes a general condition in which 
a range of societies, at different levels of development, interact (or are 
“combined”) in a single geopolitical system’. This interactive component of 
combined development is important, but it does not by itself capture the ‘yet 
deeper’ dimension entailed in Trotsky’s original use of the concept which 
captured how the unevenness of development became a ‘causal mechanism of 
“combined development”’: that is, the production of a ‘hybrid’ social forma-
tion consisting of ‘a changing amalgam of pre-existent “internal” structures 
of social life with external socio-political and cultural influences’ (Rosenberg 
2005, 68–69fn28; 2006, 324). Hence, while ‘combined and uneven develop-
ment’ describes a general condition, it does not theorise it.
By contrast, the notion of uneven and combined development draws atten-
tion to, and theorises how, forms and patterns of combination are conditioned 
by and rooted within the overall unevenness of human development. As such, 
the combinations of different modes of production do not simply denote their 
co-existence within a concrete social formation, but rather their reproductive 
interpenetration and fusion in ways violating any preformed theory of their 
‘laws of motion’. That is to say, a combined development represents more 
than the sum of its parts: Tsarist Russia, to take Trotsky’s classic example, 
was neither feudal nor capitalist, but both and more. Taking Trotsky’s con-
cept of combined development seriously means that there has never existed 
any pure or ‘normal’ model of development since each and every society’s 
development has always already been interactively ‘overdetermined’, cre-
ating a plurality of different sociological amalgamations. The universal 
condition of combined development in effect means there has never been a 
‘pre-combined’ social formation (Rosenberg 2006). Hence, the very uneven-
ness and combination of historical development resists any kind of abstracted 
conceptions of European history—or any history, for that matter—that can 
be used as the privileged ‘benchmark’ to normatively judge or comparatively 
contrast with others.
The question of whether ‘unevenness’ and ‘combination’ are universal 
conditions also lies at the heart of current debates over the spatio-temporal 
range and theoretical and explanatory remit of the idea of uneven and com-
bined development. This debate has broadly split between two positions: one 
that restricts uneven and combined development to the industrial-capitalist 
period and primarily applicable to ‘late-developing’ states (e.g. Ashman 
2009; Davidson 2009; Kiely 2012; Davidson this volume; Evans this vol-
ume); and, a second that extends the idea to include the pre-capitalist epoch, 
whilst maintaining the qualitative variations uneven and combined develop-
ment takes in different historical eras (Matin 2007; Rosenberg 2006; 2010; 
Anievas 2014, chapter 2; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015; Allinson 2016; 
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and see the chapters by Rosenberg, Miller, Cooper, Hobson, and Chase-
Dunnand Grell-Brisk in this volume). This second approach, its advocates 
argue, is both more consistent with Trotsky’s original idea (Matin 2013b, 17; 
Rosenberg 2013b; cf. Davidson this volume) and, more importantly, provides 
a deeper theoretical foundation for a non-Eurocentric international histori-
cal sociology; one that challenges the idea of the endogenous formation of 
capitalist social relations in England (e.g. Brenner 1985) by highlighting 
the constitutiveness of ‘the international’ to the emergence and expansion 
of capitalism. Such approaches do not deny the specifically European form 
of capitalist modernity nor that capitalism first took root in Europe (cf. 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015). Rather, they argue that to truly ‘provincial-
ize Europe’ (Chakrabarty 2008) requires not simply a theory of capitalist 
modernity, but a general social theory that goes beyond a mere phenomenol-
ogy of capital’s expansion and comprehends capital itself as a product of the 
interactive multiplicity of the social (Matin 2013a). While there is growing 
empirical support for such claims regarding the fundamental significance 
of intersocietal relations and non-Western agency in explaining the rise of 
capitalist modernity (Hodgson 1993; Moore 1997; Hobson 2004; Bhambra 
2007), critics nonetheless argue that such processes more properly belong to 
the realm of ‘uneven development’ not ‘combined development’, which is a 
phenomenon that only emerged after capitalism was established (Davidson 
2009; Davidson this volume).
In the above-noted ways, the idea of uneven and combined development 
offers a potential means of theoretically and methodologically displacing 
Eurocentrism (cf. Matin 2007; 2013b; 2013c; Shilliam 2009a; Hobson 
2011; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013; 2015; Nişancioğlu 2014; Nilsen 
2015; Allinson 2016). By positing the differentiated character of develop-
ment as its ‘most general law’, Trotsky’s concept of unevenness provides 
a necessary corrective to any ontologically singular conception of society 
and resulting unilinear conceptions of history that underpin Eurocentric 
accounts. By positing the intrinsically interactive character of this multiplic-
ity, combined development in turn challenges the methodological internalism 
of Eurocentric approaches propounding there has never existed any pure or 
normative model of development (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015). As such, 
the theory rejects Eurocentrism’s reified conceptualisation of the universal as 
an a priori property of an immanently conceived homogeneous entity. For 
the ‘historical reality’ of uneven and combined development (Trotsky 1972, 
116) is a universally operational causal context whose ontological fabric is 
simultaneously generative of, and shaped by, intersocietal difference (Matin 
2013a). A world in which the specificities of any given society represents 
‘an original combination of the basic features of the world process’ (Trotsky 
1962, 23)—a ‘social amalgam combining the local and general’ (Trotsky 
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1969, 56) that is ‘nothing else but the most general product of the unevenness 
of historical development, its summary result, so to say’ (Trotsky 1962, 24). 
Such a perspective thereby allows for a conception of ‘the universal’ that is 
radically amenable to and constituted by alterity (Matin 2013a).
oRGANISATIoN of THE book
In their different ways, the contributions to this book build upon the 
framework of uneven and combined development in confronting the twin 
problematics of ‘the international’ and Eurocentrism highlighted in this 
introduction. In chapter 2, Justin Rosenberg sets out the historical context 
and general parameters of the intellectual and real-world challenge of ‘the 
international’ and the way in which it was confronted by Trotsky who 
responded by formulating the notion of uneven and combined development. 
Rosenberg then considers the proper scope of the concept’s spatial and tem-
poral remit and argues for a more general conception of the idea that extends 
beyond the capitalist epoch. He contends that it is only through this more 
general conception that uneven and combined development can fundamen-
tally reabsorb ‘the international’ into social theory and decisively supplant 
Eurocentrism. The chapter concludes with an examination of the relevance 
of the idea of uneven and combined development for twenty-first century 
world politics.
In contradistinction to Rosenberg’s transhistorical conception of uneven 
and combined development, in chapter 3 Neil Davidson makes the case 
for a more historically limited understanding of Trotsky’s idea. He does so 
through an investigation of the historical origins of uneven and combined 
development—a process fundamentally rooted in the rise and violent spread 
of industrial capitalism to ‘late’ developing states—and Trotsky’s attempt at 
comprehending this process in theory, which distinguished his idea from ear-
lier notions of ‘uneven development’. Davidson concludes by addressing the 
argument that the historically restricted conception of uneven and combined 
development is inherently susceptible to Eurocentrism.
In chapter 4, Owen Miller traces the emergence and consolidation of the 
Korean state over the course of some 1,600 years. Moving beyond prevailing 
Eurocentric and ‘stagnation/progress dichotomy’ approaches characterising 
the existing historiography, Miller demonstrates how the Korean state was 
shaped and strengthened through a process of uneven and combined devel-
opment in which ideas, institutions and technologies were transmitted and 
adopted from neighbouring polities and were combined into novel forms and 
at varying tempos. Miller shows how this internationally sensitive account 
of Korean state formation provides significant insights into the historical 
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evolution and transformation of tributary modes of production and the dif-
ferentiated trajectories of non-European processes of state formation.
In chapter 5, Kerem Nişancioğlu problematises conventional Eurocentric 
approaches to the study of the Ottoman Empire which neglect its dynamism 
and invoke essentialist conceptions of its history derived from its purport-
edly internal sui generis characteristics. Critically deploying the theory of 
uneven and combined development, Nişancioğlu provides an alternative non-
Eurocentric account of the origins and evolution of the Ottoman state and 
society that reveals a far more complex, dynamic and historically contingent 
process marked by a complex amalgam of social relations derived from a mul-
tiplicity of geographically distinct yet interactive origins. More specifically, 
Nişancioğlu demonstrates the causal significance of ‘the international’ in the 
formation of the Ottoman Empire and the ways in which the geopolitical flux 
of thirteenth- to fifteenth-century Anatolia was marked by the interactive 
combination of the sociological remnants of Inner Asian nomadism, Seljuk 
Empire and the Byzantine Empire, which generated the developmental condi-
tions in which the peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman Empire emerged.
In chapter 6, Jamie Allinson turns to late Ottoman history and the ‘social 
origins of the Middle East’ through a critical examination of the complex 
impact of Ottoman reforms during the early to mid-nineteenth century on 
the regions that became part of southern Syria and Jordan. Allinson shows 
how the Ottoman’s recourse to mimetic reforms under the whip of capitalist 
Europe gave rise to a particular form of combined development in which a 
(geo)politically inflected process of primitive accumulation transformed the 
central extractive relationship of the taking of ‘brotherly’ tribute (khuwwa) 
by pastoral nomads without polarising the vertical institution of the tribe. 
The chapter thereby demonstrates the significance of non-European agency 
within a process of mimetic but mediated primitive accumulation consciously 
articulated and implemented by the Ottoman rulers themselves.
While Miller, Nişancioğlu and Allinson’s analyses problematise Eurocentric 
approaches to histories outside ‘the West’, Luke Cooper’s chapter examines 
a crucial non-Western dimension of the rise of British imperial power, which 
was a key coercive force behind the internationalisation of industrial capital-
ism. Through a critical deployment of the idea of uneven and combined devel-
opment, Cooper’s revisionist account uses the story of the Mysorean rocket 
to show how in confronting the power of Indian polities Britain appropriated 
and adapted their antecedent military technologies, which came to partially 
underpin Britain’s imperial ascent. British emulation of the rocket following 
their defeat by the Indian Kingdom of Mysore in 1780 was key to their subse-
quent decimation of Qing naval forces in 1841 leading to victory in the First 
Opium War and the consequent ‘opening of China’ to colonial-commercial 
interests. Highlighting the importance of Asia for Britain’s developmental 
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‘leap-frogging’ during the 1780–1840 period, Cooper’s analysis foregrounds 
the causal significance of interactions with the non-capitalist world for the 
formation of capitalism as a genuinely global system.
In chapter 8, Jessica Evans examines migration as a crucial mechanism 
of the differential incorporation of non-capitalist societies into the capitalist 
world market. Drawing on the theoretical insights of Political Marxism and 
uneven and combined development, Evans offers a potent critique of the 
‘staples thesis’ of economic development in settler colonies. In doing so, she 
demonstrates how the Great Atlantic Migrations of the nineteenth century 
served as a distinct mechanism of ‘combined development’ in which migrant 
populations’ reproductive strategies interacted with those conditioned by the 
prevailing social property relations in the colony, resulting in differential pro-
cesses of class formation while inducing different incentives to revolutionise 
the production process. Evan therefore argues that migration must be under-
stood in terms of both the social relations of production that conditioned vari-
able paths of emigration as well as those which prevailed in and varied across 
New World destinations, thus contributing to the divergent and amalgamated 
trajectories of capitalist transformations amongst the settler colonies.
In chapter 9, William Brown intervenes in recent debates on Britain’s 
post-1997 Africa policy, which have focused on the continuities and parallels 
between Britain’s contemporary ‘liberal imperialism’ and its nineteenth-
century forays into Africa, which has informed comparisons between 
China’s contemporary involvement on the continent and the late-nineteenth-
century ‘scramble for Africa’. Brown demonstrates that these debates under-
emphasise the developmental dynamism of the relationship between Africa 
and the wider world. He shows that the interactive developmental processes 
resulting from Europe’s domination of Africa altered the context and at least 
some of the content of the intersocietal relations involved. Thus, Brown 
argues, contemporary studies repeat earlier debates about imperialism, which 
located its causes either in the geopolitical machinations of European powers, 
or in the inner logic of (capitalist) European societies thereby excluding the 
role of African societies in shaping the pathways of European imperialism. 
Building upon key components of the theory of uneven and combined devel-
opment, the chapter shows how contemporary policy conundrums have their 
roots in these international dimensions of African history.
In chapter 10, Barry Buzan and George Lawson focus on the impact of the 
nineteenth century ‘global transformation’ on the process of uneven and com-
bined development and draw on the concept in fashioning a non-Eurocentric 
account of macro-historical change. Buzan and Lawson show how the global 
transformation led first to a much more uneven and combined world order, 
and subsequently to a less uneven but increasingly combined world order. 
This intense period in the history of uneven and combined development 
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produced a highly centred, core-periphery global order during the nineteenth 
century and much of the twentieth century. However, during the late twenti-
eth and especially early part of the twenty-first century, this order has, they 
argue, been giving way to an increasingly decentred global order, still highly 
combined, but with a marked diffusion in the distribution of the modern 
‘mode of power’. The result, Buzan and Lawson claim, is a reduction in the 
extreme unevenness of power, wealth and status that characterised the initial 
phases of global modernity.
In chapter 11, Fouad Makki provides an international account of the 
Ethiopian revolutions of 1974 and 1971, which transformed the social and 
political structure of the country, respectively. Makki challenges the nation-
alist-culturalist frameworks of the existing literature on the revolutions and 
provides an alternative account based on the idea of uneven and combined 
development that foregrounds the international dimensions of these revolutions 
and thus theoretically re-casts the disjuncture between the consciously socialist, 
anti-capitalist project of the key revolutionary agents and the actual outcomes 
of the revolutions, which embodied the basic contours of capitalist modernity. 
This disjuncture, Makki argues, was itself an outcome of a world-historical 
context strategically marked by material and cultural interconnections.
In chapter 12, Christopher Chase-Dunn and Marilyn Grell-Brisk marry the 
insights of World-Systems Analysis with uneven and combined development 
in analysing the sociocultural evolution of particular world-systems over the 
longue durée. Focusing on interpolity interaction networks (world-systems) 
central to semiperipheral development, Chase-Dunn and Grell-Brisk show 
the centrality of semiperipheral polities to the adaptation of technologies 
and organisational forms that facilitated conquest and empire-formation and 
expanded and intensified exchange networks. Sociocultural evolution can 
thus only be explained if polities are visualised in their interactive (uneven 
and combined developmental) relations with each other since the Palaeolithic 
Age. This is substantiated through an analysis of the differential forms 
of semiperipheral development in two small worldsystems in prehistoric 
California. The chapter also surveys various cases of semiperipheral ‘marcher 
states’ that conquered older core polities and formed larger empire states. The 
chapter concludes with an examination of contemporary forms of semiper-
ipheral ‘catch-up’ development catalysing innovative systemic change with 
reference to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which 
have recently come to challenge the centrality of the United States, Europe 
and Japan, thus demonstrating the continuing impact of processes of uneven 
and combined development within the modern world-system.
In chapter 13, John M. Hobson focuses on the potential problems of 
Eurocentrism and ahistoricism in the contemporary IR literature on uneven 
and combined development through a critical reading of the works of Anievas, 
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Nişancioğlu and Matin. In so doing, Hobson engages with the above-noted 
debates on the historical scope of uneven and combined development and 
their bearings on the issue of Eurocentrism/non-Eurocentrism, on the one 
hand, and whether a ‘non-Eurocentric Trotskyism’ remains within or breaks 
with Trotsky’s original conception of uneven and combined development, on 
the other. Hobson defends an extended conception of uneven and combined 
development as key to fully transcending Eurocentrism. He concludes with 
an analysis of various ‘West-East’ interactions during the Medieval epoch 
in demonstrating that while in this period there was no singular global logic 
of uneven and combined development, it did nonetheless operate at various 
regional and trans-regional levels.
Commenting upon the chapters in this volume and the broader debates sur-
rounding them, David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah reflect in chapter 14 
upon the potentials and pitfalls of the theory of uneven and combined devel-
opment in fully overcoming the problem of Eurocentrism. They recognise 
the importance of the insights gleaned from this perspective in superseding 
analytically ‘internalist’ and normatively Eurocentric conceptions of develop-
ment. Nonetheless, they take issue with the retention of the concept of devel-
opment in Trotsky’s idea. This move, they argue, risks replacing the logic of 
capitalism with a broader notion of human development, which potentially 
effaces the presence of multiple and different cosmologies and forms of life in 
the cultural encounters involved in, and constitutive of, capitalist modernity. 
They therefore propose ‘cultural encounters’ as a better conceptual anchorage 
for the study of historical change and call for a more direct engagement with 
the ethical and political implications of uneven and combined development.
In the concluding chapter, Anievas and Matin take ‘stock’ of the contribu-
tions to this volume in furthering a more explicit and constructive dialogue 
and exchange between the fields of historical sociology and world history. 
Reflecting upon the deeper sources of their mutual neglect, they show how 
the relational and plural ontology of uneven and combined development might 
act as productive bridge between these two intellectual traditions, which have 
recently converged around a shared concern in displacing the methodological 
internalism and Eurocentrism of earlier approaches to world history and his-
torical sociology. With these concerns and more in mind, Anievas and Matin 
then outline a number of new and promising avenues for future research.
NoTES
1. For good surveys of the relationship between historical sociology and IR, see 
Hobden and Hobson (2002), Bhambra (2010) and Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg 
(2010).
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2. By ‘realism’ we are referring to realist IR theory not the philosophy of science.
3. For overviews of the debates on Eurocentrism in social and IR theory, see 
Gruffydd Jones (2006), Bhambra (2007) and Hobson (2012).
4. The following paragraphs partly draw on Matin (2013b, 2).
5. As M. Kamal Pasha (2010, 220) suggests, this problem also marks the ‘alterna-
tive modernities’ approach (Gaonkar 1999).
6. According to Baruch Knei-Paz (1978, 63), Trotsky’s use of the concept of 
‘backwardness’ was not intended as a ‘moral judgement’. Rather, for Trotsky, ‘back-
wardness’ demarcated a ‘clear social and historical uniqueness’ which terms such as 
‘less developed’ or ‘under-developed’ do not convey (see further Matin 2013b, 18). 
Whether Trotsky fully overcame the Eurocentric assumptions so often inscribed in 
the use of the idea of ‘backwardness’ is nonetheless open to debate (see, for example, 
Cooper’s chapter in this volume). For a recent attempt to reformulate the concepts 
of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ on firmer non-Eurocentric grounds, see Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu (2015, 55–56).
7. But see the collection of contemporary Marxist writings in Day and Gaido 
(2009) that somewhat problematises the view that Trotsky was alone in arguing for 
the strategy of permanent revolution.
8. Justin Rosenberg’s PhD supervisor, Fred Halliday, must also be given credit as 
he had also used uneven and combined development in conceptualising modern revo-
lutions (esp. Halliday 1999). Nonetheless, within Halliday’s work, the idea remained 
something of an after-thought; Halliday never systematically integrated the concept 
into his theoretical understandings of revolutions thereby never realising the potential 
of uneven and combined development as a social theory of ‘the international’. As far 
as we are aware, the first IR scholar to explicitly draw on Trotsky’s idea in theorising 
world politics was Robert Gilpin (1981, 177–80)—though in his work the concept 
played a marginal role.
9. For some notable discussions of uneven and combined development over the 
intervening period, see Horowitz (1969), Mandel (1970), Novack (1972), Romagnolo 
(1975), Knei-Paz (1978), Deutscher (1984), and Elster (1986).
10. For an extensive list of this contemporary literature, see https://unevenandcom-
bineddevelopment.wordpress.com/.
11. The following paragraphs partly draw on Matin (2013a, 370).
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Chapter 2
Uneven and Combined Development
‘The International’ in Theory and History
Justin Rosenberg
The idea of uneven and combined development (UCD) was originally for-
mulated by the Russian revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, in the early twentieth 
century.1 Largely neglected for several decades, it has recently undergone a 
significant revival, with over 70 articles about it being published in the last 
ten years alone.2 Arguably this newfound popularity reflects the properties of 
the idea itself—for it is at once both simple and yet profound. The simplicity 
can be grasped if one considers the phrase itself, which draws together three 
claims about the human world.
•	 The world is uneven: it contains not one but many societies of many dif-
ferent kinds, different levels and stages of development, some stronger and 
richer than others and so on;
•	 This is not just a comparative fact about the world. Because these societies 
co-exist, they also interact with each other—their existence is combined;
•	 And this interaction is itself a key driver of historical development and 
change. So much so, that we cannot understand the world if we do not 
factor it in.
This summary perhaps also makes it clear why the current revival has been 
occurring predominantly in the field of international relations (IR). After all, 
it would be hard to imagine an idea that does more to emphasise the impor-
tance of IR for understanding the world around us. And yet, stated on its own 
in this way, the idea can also appear to be simply obvious. How then is it pro-
found? Why all the fuss about ‘uneven and combined development’? In order 
to answer these questions, we need to recall the context of the idea: we need 
to know what problems it solves, so that we can see how powerful it can be.
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This chapter seeks to meet these needs by setting out the idea in four parts. 
First, we shall provide the general context, so we can see what the problem 
is that this idea addresses—the problem of the international. Then, we shall 
recall how this problem first presented itself to Trotsky and how it led him to 
produce the idea of uneven and combined development. Third, we must con-
sider the question of how big an idea this is: does it relate only to the modern 
world, or did Trotsky stumble upon something that applies to human history 
as a whole? And finally, we shall return to the present day and ask what this 
idea can tell us about the world in the twenty-first century.
THE PRobLEM of THE INTERNATIoNAL
The international dimension of human affairs is all around us. Nobody who 
read the newspapers in 2014 could have missed the souring of relations 
between Washington and Moscow over Syrian chemical weapons, or the 
Edward Snowden affair, or events in Ukraine; they could watch the wran-
gling among Eurozone states over economic policy and bail-outs; they would 
know about French military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa and so on. 
International politics, it seems, are always in the news.
But the international dimension is not only something ‘out there’ in the 
military and political struggles between states. It is also part of a population’s 
domestic public consciousness of itself as a national society. This too can be 
readily seen in the media. It shows up in the endless stream of comparisons 
through which people are continually placing their own society in an interna-
tional setting in order to criticise it, or boast about it or make demands on it 
in some way. People compare: rates of economic growth, or manufacturing 
productivity or monetary inflation; standards of education or other public ser-
vices; and levels of social justice and democracy. In all these cases, and more 
besides, politicians, think tanks, academics and campaigning organisations of 
all kinds are continuously comparing how things are done in other societies, 
and what can be copied and applied to improve things in their own society to 
prevent it from falling behind.
And of course societies do not relate to each other only through com-
parison. They are also materially interdependent in all kinds of ways. Even 
the fresh fruit and vegetables in a typical supermarket come from all over 
the world. But that is only the start. Modern industrial economies depend 
extensively on both importing and exporting goods and services of all kinds. 
Indeed, globally, ‘[t]he sum of exports and imports is now higher than 50% of 
global production’ (Nagdy and Roser 2015). Cut these off, and many societ-
ies would grind to a halt.
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Finally, even the things that appear as most distinctively national achieve-
ments often turn out to be in part the result of interactions between societies. 
Nothing could seem more English than the English language: and yet we know 
that it is actually a mixture of the Latin, Saxon, Norse and French languages 
among others. And those different ingredients are not just linguistic influ-
ences: they are the sedimentation in language of the influence of the Romans, 
Saxons, Vikings and Normans on British social and political history too.
And this point can apply to some very large things indeed. In 1620, Francis 
Bacon, the English philosopher and father of modern scientific method, wrote 
that the modern world was marked off from the past by the impact of three 
main inventions: gunpowder, the printing press and the magnetic compass. 
Between them, he wrote, these inventions had done more than any empire or 
religion to lift Europe out of the darkness of the Middle Ages (Bacon 1960, 
118). Unknown to Bacon, all three of these had originated in China and had 
been transferred to Europe through processes of indirect trade and communi-
cation (Hobson 2004, 123, 185, 186). So, even the rise of the West that did so 
much to shape the modern world was in part interactively produced.
Now, all these examples suggest three basic things about the significance 
of the international dimension. First, the fact that the world is divided into 
many countries is a major and enduring feature of social reality. Second, the 
consequences of this fact reach right down into making individual societies 
what they are internally too. And finally, it therefore follows that if one sets 
out to build a social theory to explain what happens in the world, then these 
two facts—that society is multiple and interactive—should be part of the 
theory itself.
Once again, all this must appear simply obvious: who could possibly be so 
remiss as to build a general theory of social change without explicitly incor-
porating this interactive dimension? And yet if we try to answer this question, 
we soon discover what is meant by ‘the problem of the international’.
There are many different approaches to social theory, but most of them rest 
in some way on ideas produced by the tradition of Classical Social Theory, 
which in turn is dominated by three thinkers in particular: Karl Marx, Max 
Weber and Emile Durkheim. These authors knew, of course, that the world 
contained many countries. And Marx in particular wrote a great deal about 
the international politics of his day. And yet none of them, not even Marx, 
made the co-existence and interaction of multiple societies part of their 
model of what societies are and how they change. Nor is this just a point 
about Classical Social Theory. Many writers today argue that as a result of 
that original lacuna, modern social science continues to suffer from what 
is called ‘methodological nationalism’—that is, unwittingly thinking about 
societies as if they really were self-contained entities. The most famous 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   19 7/13/2016   9:55:59 PM
20 Justin Rosenberg
post-war historical sociologist, Theda Skocpol, launched her career with an 
article that was partly about this problem, and which contained a section 
entitled: ‘Wanted: an Intersocietal Perspective’ (1973, 28). Twenty years 
later, Zygmunt Bauman argued that this remained ‘a most urgent task faced 
by sociology’ (1992, 65). And in 1994, Friedrich Tenbruck pointed out—no 
doubt for the hundredth time—that by failing to include the international, 
modern social theory was hopelessly contradicted by what he called ‘the 
well-known, massive facts of history’, because we all know that societies do 
not exist in isolation (1994, 87).
Now, one might expect that this problem would have been solved long 
ago by the existence of IR as a discipline. After all, IR is all about relations 
between societies. Unfortunately, however, IR has allowed itself to become 
part of the problem. How so?
Kenneth Waltz, arguably the most influential international theorist since 
the Second World War, put it like this: ‘Students of international politics have 
had an extraordinarily difficult time casting their subject in theoretical terms’ 
(Waltz 1990, 21). IR students today might think this claim outdated. For it 
was made at the very moment when IR was experiencing a dramatic widening 
of its theoretical horizons. From the late 1980s onwards, traditional realist, 
liberal and Marxist approaches were being joined on the stage by numerous 
new theories: critical theory, constructivism, neo-Gramscianism, feminism, 
post-structuralism, postcolonialism and so on. As a result, IR theory today 
is a very crowded field. And yet Waltz never changed his mind. For him, 
most of the approaches studied as ‘international theories’ were nothing of the 
kind. Instead they were theories of domestic society that people were using to 
think about international affairs. Such theories, argued Waltz, are not useless, 
because domestic factors do play a large role in how governments behave 
internationally. But they cannot be the whole story, because at the interna-
tional level states also have to deal with each other. And if one’s basic model 
of reality excludes that political multiplicity and its effects, then it cannot 
avoid wrongly reducing those effects to purely domestic causes.
What Waltz was identifying here is of course the knock-on effect in IR 
of the original problem of ‘methodological nationalism’ that goes all the 
way back to Classical Social Theory. But how (apart from importing numer-
ous ‘reductionist’ theories) did IR itself become part of the confusion? The 
answer is that when Waltz saw there was a problem with social theories 
and the international, his response was not to fix the problem. It was to turn 
away and produce a completely separate theory of what they had excluded—
namely geopolitics. And he advised everyone else to do the same: ‘Students 
of international politics will do well to concentrate on separate theories of 
internal and external politics until someone figures out a way to unite them’ 
(Waltz 1986, 340).
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The trouble was that, brilliant though his new theory was, it was as incom-
plete in its own way as those he had criticised. They comprised theories of 
society without the international; and he now produced a theory of the inter-
national without society. As a result, there now existed two self-contained 
kinds of theory, neither of which was able to connect to the other. And yet 
even Waltz agreed that they must be put back together at some point: ‘I don’t 
see any logical reason why this can’t be done…. However, nobody’s thought 
of how to do it. I’ve thought about that a lot. I can’t figure out how. Neither 
can anybody else so far’ (Waltz 1998, 379–80).
UNEvEN AND CoMbINED DEvELoPMENT
One could be forgiven for thinking that this problem—of how to integrate the 
international into a theory of social change—is a purely intellectual one with 
no bearing on the challenges people face in the real world. That, however, 
would be a mistake. For Leon Trotsky, growing up in nineteenth-century 
Russia, it had a directly political consequence. At the turn of the century, 
Trotsky joined the movement for radical change. But this movement was 
caught up in a mismatch between theory and reality that had a paralysing 
effect on its political strategy.3 This mismatch in turn was all about the miss-
ing international dimension. And it was Trotsky’s response to it that produced 
the idea of UCD.
For any political movement that wishes to change the world, it helps to 
have a theorisation of the existing situation—a roadmap that explains both the 
dynamic of change and how the political movement fits into it. The Russian 
Marxists had such a map, which they took from the Communist Manifesto of 
1848. There, Marx and Engels, using England as an example, had mapped out 
how the industrial revolution was transforming society and what that meant 
about the future. All societies, they wrote, contain within them the seeds of 
change. In England in the seventeenth century, this had produced a revolu-
tion that ended feudalism and introduced a new kind of society—capitalism, 
presided over by a liberal state. Over time, capitalism was transforming 
society into two opposing classes of people: owners and workers (bourgeois 
and proletarians). The struggle between these two would eventually create 
the conditions for a further revolution through which a third kind of society, 
socialism, would emerge.
For Trotsky and his fellow Marxists, this socialist revolution was already 
imminent in the West. And the Russian state too was on the verge of col-
lapse. And yet Russian society did not look anything like it was supposed to 
according to the roadmap. The Russian state was still under the control of a 
semi-feudal ruling class, because Russia had never experienced a bourgeois 
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revolution. The bourgeoisie, which ought to have overthrown it long ago, was 
far too weak to do so, not least because, in a bizarre twist of history, it was 
the semi-feudal state that was leading the process of industrialisation. The 
Russian working class was far too small to play the revolutionary role envis-
aged by Marx, and yet, partly because its employers were not liberal capital-
ists but a highly repressive police state, it was already more revolutionary 
than its counterpart in more advanced England. Russian industry, meanwhile, 
still had a long way to go to catch up with England, and yet what there was 
of it, having being very recently built, was actually more technologically 
modern than most English industry. And yet this super-modern industry was 
sprouting up in the midst of a sea of peasants who still made up the vast 
majority of the population.
It is no wonder that the Russian Marxists were paralysed: the roadmap 
could not tell them where they were. Right up to April 1917, Lenin, who six 
months later would be leading a communist revolution, was convinced that 
such a thing was impossible in Russia because it had not even experienced its 
bourgeois revolution yet (Davidson 2015a, 302).
It was this practical conundrum that Trotsky solved by adding the inter-
national into social theory. He argued, in effect, that the contrasting social 
structures found in the Communist Manifesto and the early twentieth-century 
Russian state were not unrelated to each other. Not only were they based on 
actual societies that had interacted with each other in real time; but it was the 
interaction that produced the differences between them. And by tracing out 
how this had happened, Trotsky not only resolved the political dilemma of 
the Russian Marxists; he also produced what Theda Skocpol called ‘an inter-
societal perspective’, and what Kenneth Waltz could not work out how to put 
together: a theory of society that was at the same time an international theory.
Before going any further, it is important to pre-empt a possible misunder-
standing. Marxism has often been criticised for possessing a teleological (and 
hence unilinear) view of history.4
 And it might therefore be assumed that 
overcoming this limitation would be of purely local significance, devoid of 
any wider implications beyond Marxism itself. Nothing could be more mis-
leading. In the early post-war decades, Modernisation Theory was probably 
the most influential social theory in the US social sciences. One of its most 
famous early exponents was Walt Rostow who published a book in 1960 
called The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. And 
it was just that: a blueprint for how Third World societies could modernise 
and become like the West. The major criticism that has always been made 
of Modernisation Theory is that it was a unilinear roadmap that could not 
understand how Third World societies were actually changing. And in fact 
a strong critique of this unilinearity grew up around the work of a Russian 
émigré called Alexander Gerschenkron.
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Now, Gerschenkron never references Trotsky, but their arguments are so 
similar that it is very hard not to conclude that Trotsky’s writing formed a 
major unacknowledged influence on Gerschenkron’s most famous work, 
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Gerschenkron 1962; 
see also Selwyn 2012). Meanwhile, Walt Rostow went on to become US 
National Security Advisor during the Vietnam War. And another modernisa-
tion theorist, Samuel Huntington, published an article which claimed that 
American carpet bombing of the Vietnamese countryside was historically 
progressive, because it was forcing people off the land and into the cities, 
which was a necessary step in the modernisation of societies (Huntington 
1968a). What all this shows is that, on the one hand, the politics of unilinear 
theories of history do not belong to the Marxists alone. And on the other, 
Trotsky’s idea may already have played an undercover indirect role in the 
critique of unilinear thinking in the West.
Let us turn now to the original idea itself. Trotsky’s exposition of ‘uneven 
and combined development’ is scattered across his writings.5 But we can use 
these fragments to reconstruct the core of the idea as follows. His foundational 
move was to change the starting point of social theory. Instead of focusing on 
a single society—as in the roadmap—he began instead with the unevenness 
of world development: namely the fact that the world is made up of many 
different societies of different sizes and kinds and levels. And he pointed out 
that when industrial capitalism first emerged in Western Europe at the end of 
the eighteenth century, its first effect was to radically deepen this unevenness 
by suddenly making European states much more powerful than the rest. And 
because all these societies co-existed concretely in real time, this deepen-
ing unevenness produced a ‘whip of external necessity’ (Trotsky 1932, 5) 
that compelled the ruling elites of other societies to change course and try 
to follow the path of development now pioneered by the industrial societies.
But how could they ever catch up in time? Russia was so far behind that 
it would take several hundred years for it just to arrive at the conditions that 
had produced the industrial revolution in England. However, it turned out 
that Russia did not need to repeat English development, because unevenness 
also produced a second international effect that Trotsky (1932, 5) called 
‘the privilege of historic backwardness’. Once again, precisely because late 
developers co-exist with more advanced societies, they can directly import 
the achievements of those other societies and use them without having to 
reinvent them for themselves. In this way, they leap over intermediate stages 
of development that would otherwise have been necessary, massively com-
pressing and accelerating the process.
Thus we now have two sources of change that render unilinear change 
impossible; indeed they break all the rules of how development would happen 
if there was only one society in the world. And sure enough, as a result of 
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these two sources, Russia’s industrialisation (like China’s today) was pro-
ceeding much faster than England’s had done. However, Russia was not 
turning into another England. And this brings us to the third effect of multiple 
societies, namely ‘combined development’.
Recall that unevenness involves the co-existence of societies that might be 
at completely different stages of internal development. What this meant in the 
case of Russia was that the ‘whip of external necessity’ imposed itself at a 
time when there did not even exist a politically independent middle class that 
was strong enough to overthrow the semi-feudal Czarist state. But someone 
had to respond to the external pressure. And when the Czarist state used the 
‘privilege of historic backwardness’ to build a modern industrial sector, its 
purpose was not to create a Western liberal society. It was to extend its own 
survival. Thus, the techniques of capitalist industry were now (quite unlike 
in England) being combined with an anti-liberal, semi-feudal form of state. 
A quite new kind of society was being produced. And Trotsky called this 
interactive process of change: ‘combined development’.
Once Trotsky grasped the logic of this situation—the way that different 
temporalities of development were being spliced unpredictably into each 
other—he was able to use it to explain all the peculiarities of Russian devel-
opment that had so confused the Marxist revolutionaries. But how did that 
solve the political dilemma they were faced with?
The answer is that combined development turned out to have three mean-
ings. There was the combination of different stages of development that 
resulted from the importing of advanced technologies into a pre-industrial 
society. There was also the combination of different types of society, as capi-
talism fused with different pre-existing social structures in different coun-
tries. But there was also a kind of combination of these different countries 
themselves into a larger whole. For by importing all these ideas and resources 
and technologies, Russia was unavoidably becoming integrated into a wider 
interconnected structure of capitalist world development—but one that was 
itself now modified by the inclusion of Russia into it.
Trotsky (1962, 9) called this wider structure ‘the social structure of human-
ity’. And what he saw was that the more capitalism expanded beyond its 
original heartlands, the more its global structure was coming to include unstable 
hybrids like Russia. Thus, instead of the world as a whole turning into an enor-
mous version of the Marxist roadmap, it was itself becoming an unstable, inter-
connected hybrid. And although there was indeed no way a revolution in Russia 
could produce a socialist society, it might, thought Trotsky, because of all these 
interconnections, trigger the long overdue revolution in the advanced countries.
In effect, Trotsky was arguing that just as the global transition to industrial 
capitalism was uneven and combined, so too would be the further transition 
beyond capitalism. In that scenario—an intersocietal scenario—the Russian 
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revolution, which was unstoppable anyway, finally made political sense. And 
all the vicissitudes and horrors of twentieth-century ‘communism’ should not 
blind us to the intellectual achievement of this idea: for Trotsky had produced 
an intersocietal theory of social change.
bACkWARDS INTo WoRLD HISToRy
How big an idea is ‘uneven and combined development’? The question must 
be faced because most writers argue that it applies only in the modern period 
of capitalist development that it was initially designed to explain (Ashman 
2009; Davidson 2009). But if UCD applies only to one kind of society, then 
it would not be a general solution for incorporating international relations 
into social theory. And we do need such a general solution, because we know 
that throughout history societies have interacted with each other in all kinds 
of ways. Written records of interactions between political entities are among 
‘the oldest legible documents’ that survive, dating from over four thousand 
years ago (Bozeman 1994, 21; Watson 1992, 24ff). And in fact Trotsky 
(1932, 5) himself says at one point that ‘unevenness is the most general law 
of the historic process’. Trotsky never elaborated on this comment, but we 
can see what it means if we simply take a snapshot of world development at 
any point in history.
Imagine, for example, a map of the world in 1530 which used different 
colours to indicate the different kinds of society co-existing at the time.6 
The irregular pattern of colours would immediately reveal that the biggest 
fact about this world, viewed as a whole, really is its radical unevenness. 
For it would form a tapestry in which several different kinds of human soci-
ety, which had emerged at different points in history, are co-existing in real 
time. One colour might denote the great state-based power centres of the day 
(European, Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, Ming, etc.), each of them rooted in 
a different regional civilisation, having different histories, different cultural 
worldviews and different ways of organising politics and society. But the 
world was not only composed of states and empires. A second colour would 
mark the vast areas of Asia, Arabia and North Africa that were occupied by 
nomadic pastoralists—tribal societies in constant motion with the seasons, liv-
ing off their herds of livestock. A third would indicate those parts of the world 
still covered by communities of settled farmers organised in family and tribal 
groupings of the kind that preceded the original emergence of state organisa-
tions. And a fourth would be needed for the huge areas (especially in the 
Americas and Australasia) that were still composed of hunter-gatherer groups.
And of course these different societies were interacting with each other. 
The nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppe-lands periodically erupted 
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in great campaigns of conquest that could overwhelm the surrounding 
civilisations—a perennial ‘whip of external necessity’ (Wolf 1982, 32–4). 
When Marco Polo visited China in the thirteenth century, he found it had 
been completely conquered by the Mongol nomads.
And there were also interactions among the civilisations of the time. The 
transmission of inventions indirectly from China to Europe has already been 
mentioned. But by the time of this snapshot, Europe had also received an 
infusion of ancient Greek learning from the Arab world that helped stimulate 
the Renaissance. And in 1530, the Iberians were conquering America and 
unlocking huge resources of silver and gold that would buy them into the 
Indian Ocean trade of Asian societies that were still much wealthier than 
Europe. So, multiplicity and interaction played a major role in the rise of 
the West (Hobson 2004; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015). And Trotsky’s 
idea therefore provides an antidote to Eurocentric versions of modern world 
history (Matin 2013a).
Going further back, Trotsky’s own society of Russia originated in a fusion 
between two completely different types of society. In the tenth century, a 
branch of the Scandinavian Vikings called the Rus settled in what is now 
Ukraine, in order to secure their trade with Constantinople, the capital of the 
Byzantine Empire. It was from this relationship that the first Russian state was 
born, and from which it received the Cyrillic alphabet, the Greek Orthodox 
religion and the Byzantine code of commercial law. Kiev did not have to rein-
vent these artefacts of Byzantine civilisation—it accessed them ready-made 
through the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ (Bozeman 1994, 327ff).
In fact, the importance of interaction reaches all the way back to the very 
earliest known civilisation. Ancient Sumer was built on a flood plain, which 
was ideally suited to agriculture but was completely lacking in the metals 
and timber and precious stones that became central to Sumerian city life. All 
these had to be imported through interactions with surrounding communities 
(McNeil and McNeil 2009, 50; Smith 2009, 25).
Why go back so far? And what do all these examples tell us? First, they 
tell us that Trotsky was right: uneven and combined development really is a 
universal in human history, and should therefore always have been part of 
our basic model of the social world. Second, they also show that the whip of 
external necessity and the privilege of historic backwardness are repeatedly 
generated across history as routine effects of the multiplicity of societies. 
Through these effects, uneven development underlies two of the most 
elemental problematics in human affairs: the problematic of security and the 
problematic of cultural difference.
And finally, what does all this show us about IR? Here we must be careful. 
We cannot say it shows that international relations extend all the way back 
in history, because nation states are modern. But the claim that needs to be 
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made here is actually even bigger than this. These examples show us what 
the international really is. It is not just a by-product of modern capitalism. It 
is the form taken today by a central feature of human history: namely the fact 
that social existence has been multiple and interactive right from the start.
foRWARDS To ToDAy
How then is Trotsky’s idea relevant to the world in the twenty-first century?
We need not look far to find really striking examples of combined devel-
opment today. In Saudi Arabia, a tribal system of politics has been grafted 
onto an industrialising society, so that the state, which owns the wealth of 
society, is itself the property of a 7,000-strong extended family of princes. 
The forcing together of the old and the new rarely comes in more extreme 
forms than this. And yet a significant fraction of the world’s energy sup-
ply rests on this peculiar political hybrid (and the events of 9/11 and after 
showed just how unstable and destabilising this hybrid could be). In China, a 
Communist government presides over the most rapid and enormous process 
of capitalist industrialisation ever seen—creating in the process the second 
largest industrial economy in the world. And in Iran, a theocratic revolution 
that has no precedent in Shia Islam, let alone the textbooks of Western social 
theory, has been locked in a confrontation with the great powers over its use 
of advanced nuclear technology. Because we live with these examples every 
day, we forget how truly remarkable they are. Their peculiarities could never 
be explained by internal development alone—intersocietal pressures and 
opportunities have created these hybrids and woven them into ‘the social 
structure of humanity’. They are a sign of the need for Trotsky’s idea in con-
temporary social analysis.
But what about ‘the social structure of humanity’ itself? What is the overall 
shape of uneven and combined development in the world today? Arguably, 
the key here remains what it has been for more than two centuries now: 
namely the radical unevenness in space and time of industrialisation as a 
global process. In the nineteenth century this unevenness suddenly unbal-
anced world development and led to an unprecedented world domination by 
one region—Europe. But it also created a geopolitical roller coaster inside 
Europe as late developers like Germany and Russia caught up with Britain, 
but on the basis of very unstable socio-political structures created by their 
combined development. In the twentieth century, the contradictions of this 
regional unevenness produced first the two world wars and then, as a direct 
outgrowth of the case first analysed by Trotsky, the Cold War which domi-
nated world politics right up to the 1990s.7 In the twenty-first century, with 
the long-delayed industrialisation of the Asian giants, this same historical 
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unevenness of world development is finally bringing an end to the Western 
Age of world history as we have known it (Buzan and Lawson 2015).
At the centre of this process is China, a country that endured a whip of exter-
nal necessity so intense and prolonged that it has been named ‘the century of 
humiliations’. Using the privilege of historic backwardness, Chinese industri-
alisation is now occurring on an even more accelerated, compressed scale than 
the other late developers before it. And like others before it, Chinese combined 
development is also scrambling and reshuffling the sequence of stages set out 
in the roadmap. Capitalist industrialisation organised by a semi-feudal Czarist 
monarchy was peculiar enough. But capitalism presided over by a Communist 
state is surely the most peculiar, most paradoxical combination so far.
Furthermore, its impact on the social structure of humanity today is one of 
the central themes of contemporary world affairs, in at least two key ways. 
By producing the sudden rise of China as a great power, uneven development 
is driving a geopolitical revolution as the United States hurries to disentangle 
itself from Europe and the Middle East in order to concentrate on its famous 
‘pivot to Asia’. At the same time, a new structure of economic interdepen-
dence has grown up that has already had major consequences for world 
development. As we know, from the 1990s onwards, China’s export-oriented 
model of development produced a tidal wave of cheap products that coun-
teracted inflationary tendencies in Western economies. In addition, Chinese 
purchases of US treasury bonds helped to keep US interest rates lower than 
they would otherwise have had to be to finance the trade deficit. The net result 
of this was surely an extension of the global economic boom of the 1990s, 
and arguably much higher levels of sovereign and private debt when that 
boom finally collapsed in 2007–2008. The claim is not that China caused the 
crash. It is rather that international uneven development, with its deflationary 
effects and global trade imbalances, is a key ingredient of the economic crisis 
we are still living through today.
It is in the nature of UCD that complex, dialectical relationships form 
between advanced and rapidly developing societies. Through these rela-
tionships, different social formations are both newly produced and woven 
together into a historically specific ‘social structure of humanity’. And the 
future of world affairs then arises not from a pure model of any single type 
of society but from the shape and consequences of these global patterns of 
combined development.
In the light of all these examples (ancient as well as modern) we can now 
formulate UCD not just as a claim about the nature of historical process but 
also as a distinctive method of analysis. The elements of this method are given 
in the sequence of terms making up the phrase itself: uneven, combined, 
development. Thus, when seeking to explain any given event or phenom-
enon, we first use the concept of unevenness to invoke the international 
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dimension: what is the wider intersection of different forms and temporalities 
of development that frames the context of this event or phenomenon? Second, 
we specify the empirical consequences of that intersection. What pressures of 
‘external necessity’ does it produce for the societies involved? Conversely, 
what additional possibilities does it generate for social change, over and 
above those arising from their internal structures? And how are the particular 
features and temporalities of different societies therefore being concretely 
combined by the historical process? Third, we ask what unique dynamic of 
combined development arises from this dialectical process, and how far its 
‘peculiarities’ explain the event or phenomenon we are trying to understand.
But has this method not simply replaced the false logic of ‘internalism’ 
(Tenbruck 1994) with an equally false ‘externalist’ assumption (that ‘the 
international’ explains ‘the domestic’)? Worse, does it not detach external 
factors from any historically specific context and ‘ontologize’ them into 
transhistorical logics that operate independently of the kinds of society 
involved? By asserting a ‘universal law of unevenness’, and deriving a 
general ‘whip of external necessity’ and ‘privilege of historic backwardness’, 
has UCD not simply reifed ‘the international’? (Teschke 2014).
The danger looks real—until we hold it up to the actual method of UCD 
just outlined. For every conjuncture of uneven development is necessarily 
made up of the particular social formations themselves, with their unique 
‘domestic’ characteristics as they co-exist at a given point in their own inner 
histories. The causes arising from these internal structures are not replaced by 
external ones; instead, they are rescued from the fallacy of unilinear thinking 
by being relocated in a wider field of causation that now includes the con-
junction of social formations, as well as their inner make-up. In this respect, 
UCD leads to more historical specificity, not less: for it requires the empirical 
identification not only of a particular social formation itself but also of the 
shifting configurations formed at any moment by its co-existence with others.
Who truly wishes to return to a form of theorising that does not include the 
interactive dimension that arises from these configurations? And yet how can 
this be avoided unless we incorporate the fact of multiplicity and interaction 
into our conception of social development itself?
CoNCLUSIoN
One final point remains to be made. It is a point that carries us away from 
the global political economy. And yet it is also, if anything, even larger in its 
implications. We suggested earlier that international relations is the distinc-
tive form that UCD takes in the modern world. But the logic of the idea is 
that it cannot be the only such form—or to put it another way, UCD enables 
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us to track the significance of the international far beyond the normal subject 
matter of IR itself. This is because the multiplicity of societies entails inter-
actions not only of politics and economics and technologies, but of every 
other dimension of social existence too. It includes ideas, religions, literature, 
music, cinema and all the other ways that humans construct their worlds cul-
turally as well as in physical and organisational ways.
It follows that some version of Trotsky’s idea can be used to map the role 
that intersocietal influences play in all the different national traditions of 
these cultural processes. And if we use it in this way, it will surely reveal 
that—culturally as well as politically—the interactive multiplicity of human 
societies is not only a constraint and (sometimes) a threat, but it is also a fun-
damental source of creative change and innovation in human history.
Like World-Systems Theory or Postcolonial Theory, UCD is thus an idea 
whose application is not limited to any one field. In principle, it can speak 
right across the social sciences and humanities. For all these disciplines study 
social practices and processes that are formed in the context of multiple 
interacting societies. And this thought points to an ironic conclusion: the final 
wisdom of the idea of UCD, an idea which can do so much to make intelli-
gible the subject matter of IR, may be that to grasp the full significance of the 
international, we shall have to embrace much more than the discipline of IR.
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Chapter 3
The Conditions for the Emergence of 
Uneven and Combined Development
Neil Davidson
Two of the most important contributions of Leon Trotsky to Marxism are his 
strategy of ‘permanent revolution’ and what he called the ‘law’ of ‘uneven 
and combined development’. The two are connected in that the latter was 
intended to explain the conditions of possibility under which the former could 
take place, first in Russia, then other countries in which similar conditions 
prevailed, starting with China. Above all, uneven and combined develop-
ment was intended to explain the unprecedented revolutionary militancy of 
the working classes in these countries (Trotsky 1977, 907). Until recently, 
however, these innovations had not received comparable levels of scrutiny. 
Trotsky’s version of permanent revolution—there were several others—was 
the subject of intense controversy since he proposed it in 1905–1906; his own 
concept of uneven and combined development, first unveiled in 1932, was 
barely discussed at all. Why did it receive so little attention hitherto? Why is 
it receiving that attention now?
Trotsky stated his position relatively briefly in The History of the Russian 
Revolution (1932) and never systematically returned to the subject in sub-
sequent writings. Indeed, apart from a handful of fragmentary comments, 
usually in the context of other subjects, his entire theoretical discussion can 
be found in chapter 1 and appendix 2 of History. There are, of course, per-
fectly comprehensible reasons for the priorities which Trotsky adopted in 
relation to his literary activities. He was trying, with minimal resources, to 
build opposition to the overwhelming dominance of Stalinism in the world 
socialist movement, and his subject matter was largely dictated by the practi-
cal requirements of that task. His commitment to rebuilding the revolutionary 
movement, however, deprived him of the opportunity to elaborate several 
theoretical positions, of which uneven and combined development was the 
most important. There is therefore some truth in the comment by two critics 
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that, ‘Trotsky’s concept of uneven and combined development … remained 
only a sketch’ (Post and Wright 1989, 35).
This would have mattered less if, after Trotsky’s death, the movement he 
left behind had shown any inclination to develop his theoretical legacy. The 
problems of political direction which it experienced were partly due to a post-
war situation objectively unfavourable to revolutionary politics. But many 
Trotskyists compounded their difficulties by combining extreme departures 
from Trotsky in practice, notably in their seemingly endless search for substi-
tutes for the working class as a revolutionary agency, with an equally extreme 
unwillingness to develop the theoretical positions adopted by Trotsky at the 
end of his life: to do so was ‘revisionism’.
Not all of Trotsky’s followers displayed such an un-Marxist fidelity to the 
letter of his work; but even those who did not tended to focus on permanent 
revolution at the expense of uneven and combined development. Again, this 
emphasis is perfectly comprehensible in the political context of the time. 
For over 40 years after the Second World War liberation movements in the 
colonial and neo-colonial world were dominated by Stalinist, nationalist and 
populist politics. The most urgent task for revolutionaries was therefore to 
argue for permanent revolution as a strategic alternative, rather than devote 
scarce intellectual resources into further exploring the process which made 
it possible, the existence of which could be taken for granted. Typical in this 
respect is an otherwise important book by Michael Löwy called The Politics 
of Combined and Uneven Development. The first part is perhaps the most 
accurate and detailed exposition ever made of permanent revolution, but the 
promise of the title remains unfulfilled. Löwy devotes precisely three out of 
two hundred and thirty-one pages to the subject—unmentioned in the index—
whose political implications he seeks to discuss (Löwy 1981, 52, 89–90).
Outside of the ranks of Trotskyism proper, a type of academic Marxism 
influenced by it emerged late in the 1970s, largely around the New Left 
Review (NLR), where a number of the editors were members of the 
International Marxist Group, the British organisation recognised by the 
Fourth International. Editor Perry Anderson himself posed Trotsky as an 
alternative to Western Marxism in his book on that subject, but famously used 
an Afterword to point to problematic concepts within the Classical Marxist 
tradition, among which was permanent revolution, the possibilities of which 
Anderson described as ‘unproven’. Uneven and combined development, 
however, did not even feature as a problem (Anderson 1976, 96–97, 118–19). 
For many academic Marxists even this level of critical engagement seemed 
extraordinary, while non-Marxist academics either treated Trotsky’s theories 
with hostility or else never registered them at all (see, e.g., Hirst 1985, 5; 
Nisbet 1969, 296–97; Wertheim 1974, 23, 69). Since the very few academics 
to have discussed uneven and combined development conspicuously failed to 
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understand it, their collective neglect of the subject may seem no great cause 
for regret; but the need to defend revolutionary thinkers from misrepresen-
tation has often provided the necessary stimulus to clarify and extend their 
thought. In the case of uneven and combined development, this was rarely 
necessary.
Or at any rate, it was rarely necessary until the last decade of the twentieth 
century, when the status of uneven and combined development began to 
change out of all recognition. Quite unexpectedly, the source of the revalua-
tion was precisely the world of academic Marxism which had hitherto largely 
ignored it. Awarded the Deutscher Memorial Prize in 1994 for The Empire of 
Civil Society, Justin Rosenberg took the occasion of the Prize Lecture to argue 
that uneven and combined development provided no less than ‘the key to the 
lost history of international relations’ (Rosenberg 1996, 9, and 6–10 more 
generally). The two subsequent decades have seen perhaps the most dramatic 
reversal of fortune ever undergone by any concept from within the Classical 
Marxist tradition, much of it due to the efforts of Rosenberg. From being a 
concept confined to the Trotskyist left, and on the margins of discussion even 
there, uneven and combined development is now part of the standard theoreti-
cal apparatus available to those working in international relations (IR) and to 
some extent in the social and political sciences more generally.
The efflorescence of interest in uneven and combined development has 
not of course gone unchallenged, with some scholars denying that there is 
anything distinctive or even Marxist about it at all:
Trotsky’s theory of combined and uneven development, which has recently 
been revived to deal with the phenomenon of ‘the international’ … remains 
anchored in an economic reductionism. The very notion of ‘backwardness’ is 
only acceptable and meaningful as an economic category, and once the com-
ponent of permanent revolution is removed, what remains is a de-subjectified 
sociology of catch-up industrialisation for which we do not need Marxism. 
(Van der Pijl 2010b, 19)
I will in due course try to show that these criticisms of uneven and combined 
development are wrong, but Van der Pijl has nevertheless correctly identi-
fied the role it is now expected to play. Even before Rosenberg’s initial 1996 
intervention, Michael Burawoy argued that uneven and combined develop-
ment was valuable as a general exemplar, demonstrating ‘the superiority of 
the methodology of research programmes over the methodology of induction 
as a mode of advancing social science’ (Burawoy 1989, 796). For Rosenberg, 
it offers the more specific possibility of overcoming two symmetrical 
absences within the social and political sciences, that of ‘the international’ 
from historical sociology and that of ‘the historical’ from IR (Rosenberg 
2007, 479). More recently, two key figures in the current debates, Alexander 
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Anievas and Kerem Nişancioğlu, have found uneven and combined devel-
opment itself to be a methodology ‘or set of epistemological coordinates’, 
which both draws on a prior ‘ontology of human development … irrespective 
of historical context’ and points towards a theorisation of ‘concrete historical 
processes, be they epochal or conjunctural’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 
58). Is there anything that this super-concept cannot do? Trotsky himself 
did not make such excessive claims for it and seems to have regretted even 
describing it as a ‘law’. Shortly after the term appeared in print for the first 
time in 1932, he himself shied away from doing so, writing: ‘As a law it is 
rather vague; it is more of a historical reality’ (Trotsky 1972a, 116). The new 
enthusiasts for his concept have been less willing to recognise that it has any 
limits in space or time.
More than anything else, Marxists in IR have seen uneven and combined 
development as providing, not only historical sociology, but Marxism itself 
with a hitherto missing theory of ‘the international’. It is not clear what 
such a theory could involve from any theoretical perspective, given that 
intersocietal interaction has taken radically different forms and has produced 
radically different results in different historical periods. Is there a single 
theory of ‘the international’ which could account for them all? As we shall 
see, uneven and combined development is something much more specific and 
chronologically bounded, but in any case it is being proposed as an imaginary 
solution to a non-problem. For while it is true that Marxism does not have a 
theory of the international, it is not evident to me that it requires one. Like 
his Enlightenment forerunners, above all Adam Smith, Marx was perfectly 
aware that societies did not exist in isolation from each other and, as we shall 
see in the discussion of uneven development below, took account of this in 
his substantive analyses. Marxism can provide a solution to methodological 
or ontological deficiencies of the social and political sciences, but it is neces-
sary to first recognise that these are inevitable given the very existence of the 
academic disciplines themselves.
At its best, the Enlightenment was able to present an integrated view of 
human development, above all through its master-discipline, political econ-
omy. The turn away from science in bourgeois thought, which Marx dated 
to the 1830s, saw the splintering of that unity into a series of more or less 
arbitrarily defined subject disciplines, with ‘sociology’ attempting—from 
the very beginning in consciously anti-Marxist ways—to replace the aban-
doned wholeness of Enlightenment thought. But from the moment it was 
conceded that a subject called ‘economics’ could be isolated and treated as 
a separate area of knowledge this attempt was doomed to fail as an explana-
tion of the social world, although it was of course a tremendous success in 
providing ideological justifications for it (Davidson 2005b, 11–12; Davidson 
2015c, 160–65).
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Classical Marxism attempted to resist the fragmentation, which is why, as 
David Harvey points out, ‘disciplinary boundaries make no sense whatsoever 
from the Marxist standpoint. The technical division of labour is obviously 
necessary but its social representation is to be rejected’. Marx, for example, 
‘did not disaggregate the world into “economic”, “sociological”, “political”, 
“psychological”, and other factors. He sought to construct an approach to the 
totality of relations within capitalist society’ (Harvey 2001, 77–78).
Perhaps the clearest explanation of the concept of totality has been given 
by Bertell Ollman: ‘Few people would deny that everything in the world is 
related to everything else—directly or indirectly—as causes, conditions, and 
results; and many insist that the world is unintelligible save in terms of such 
relations. Marx goes a step further in interiorising this interdependence within 
each element, so that the conditions of existence are taken to be part of what 
it is’ (Ollman 2003, 139). Ollman makes his case in highly abstract form, but 
it can be concretised. Take ‘international relations’ or, to be more precise, 
take one of the subject areas which is discussed under this disciplinary head-
ing: the relationship between the nation-state system (a ‘part’) and capitalism 
(the ‘whole’). As I have argued elsewhere, it is possible to work through the 
mediations from the two basic components of the mode of production, the 
exploitation of wage labour by capital and the competition between many 
capitals, to the nation-state system without reductionism, or recourse to 
theories of either historical contingency or intersecting but separate logics 
(Davidson 2016, 187–220).
What, if anything, does totality have to do with uneven and combined 
development? The latter concept was an attempt to give concrete expression 
to what totality might mean within particular ‘backward’ territories at the 
moment when industrial capitalism was pushing outwards from the core of 
the system under the pressure of inter-imperialist rivalry. Combined devel-
opment is not a process in itself, so much as the result of the prior process 
of uneven development. The latter does indeed operate at the level of the 
international; but the former cannot because part of what determines the form 
taken by any particular example of combined development is the response to 
it by the state and—for better or worse—states are multiple and territorially 
demarcated from each other, and not international, far less global entities.
THE CLAIMS of TRANSHISToRICITy
Anievas and Nişancioğlu have written that ‘history and theory … are mutu-
ally intertwined and reinforcing’ (2015, 58). I agree, and this is particularly 
relevant in the case of uneven and combined development, since the term 
signifies both a historical process and a conceptualisation of that process. 
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In this chapter I am concerned with the circumstances in which the former 
emerged, but, to write of ‘emergence’ is to assume that there was a time in 
history during which uneven and combined development did not exist, that 
a moment occurred when it became possible, and that a period followed in 
which the process could—and perhaps still can—be observed in operation.
Trotsky’s own views are ambivalent on the subject, although in his most 
substantive discussions he takes a ‘modernist’ position, in which uneven and 
combined development is given a highly restricted chronological compass. In 
chapter 1 of History Trotsky describes combination as involving a mixture of 
‘archaic and more contemporary forms’. The latter term could conceivably 
be interpreted in relative terms, except that in the context ‘contemporary’ 
clearly means, ‘the recent past and present’. Elsewhere in the same work, 
however, he is more explicit, describing the ‘combined development of back-
ward countries’ as ‘a peculiar mixture of backward elements with the most 
modern’ (Trotsky 1977, 27, 72). But it is precisely this limited conception of 
uneven and combined development which is being challenged in some of the 
most interesting contemporary work on the subject (for a rare exception, see 
Ashman 2009). It is of course perfectly possible for a more capacious notion 
of uneven and combined development to be valid regardless of Trotsky’s own 
views on the subject one way or the other: theories have an internal logic 
independent of the theorist. The issue here is whether this is actually the case.
I do not believe that it is. Until the advent of capitalism, societies could 
borrow from each other, influence one another, but were not sufficiently 
differentiated from each other for elements to ‘combine’ to any effect. In fact, 
it was the advent of industrial capitalism which initiated both ‘the great diver-
gence’ between West and East, and—for the first time in history—the over-
whelmingly unidirectional impact of the former on the latter which followed. 
As Rosenberg himself makes clear: ‘Imperial China sustained its develop-
mental lead over several centuries; yet the radiation of its achievements never 
produced in Europe anything like the long, convulsive process of combined 
development which capitalist industrialization in Europe almost immediately 
initiated in China’ (Rosenberg 2007, 44–45). The detonation of the process 
of uneven and combined development certainly required sudden, intensive 
industrialisation and urbanisation. Burawoy is therefore right to describe 
uneven and combined development as a product of ‘the timing of industri-
alisation in relation to the history of world capitalism’ (Burawoy 1985, 99). 
The immense difference between industrial capitalism and previous modes 
of production meant that, from the moment the former was introduced, 
combination became possible in a way that it had not been hitherto; but the 
structural dynamism of industrial capitalism compared to previous modes of 
production also meant that combination became inescapable, as all aspects 
of existing society registered the impact on them, to differing degrees, of this 
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radically new means of exploitation. ‘In contrast to the economic systems 
that preceded it’, wrote Trotsky, ‘capitalism inherently and constantly aims 
at economic expansion, at the penetration of new territories, the conversion 
of self-sufficient provincial and national economies into a system of financial 
interrelationships’ (Trotsky 1974b, 15). What is decisive is that former levels 
of stability are disrupted by the irruption of industrial capitalism and all that it 
brings in its wake: rapid population growth, uncoordinated urban expansion, 
dramatic ideological shifts.
Rosenberg’s position on this has significantly changed since his first 
intervention in 1996, his more recent work treating the process of uneven 
and combined development as transhistorical, rather than confined to one 
period: ‘because historical development has always been both plural and 
interactive, Trotsky’s idea may be applied much more widely in historical 
analysis’ (Rosenberg 2013b, 572). Using examples from the Russian state 
after 800 CE, he has highlighted what he regards as three aspects of combina-
tion. First, how ‘the course of Russian development was “combined” in the 
sense that at every point it was causally integrated with a wider social field of 
interacting patterns of development’. By this he means that Russia was sub-
ject to ‘inter-societal causality’, an environment in which the endless inter-
play of other states or social forces shaped the country’s internal structure 
in a way that could never be completed. Second, combination also involved 
‘structures’ which ‘extended beyond Russia itself’. Among such structures 
Rosenberg includes ‘regional political orders, cultural systems and material 
divisions of labour’. The third, ‘yet deeper’ dimension is the consequence of 
the first two, the creation of a ‘hybrid’ social formation in which ‘a chang-
ing amalgam of pre-existent “internal” structures of social life with external 
socio-political and cultural influences’. Consequently, there ‘never existed a 
“pre-combination” Russia’; at every point its existence was traversed by these 
influences: ‘combined development identifies the inter-societal, relational 
texture of the historical processes within which the shifting meanings of the 
term “Russia” crystallized and accumulated’. In general terms, Rosenberg 
invites us to ‘abandon at the deepest theoretical level any notion of the con-
stitution of society as analytically prior to its interaction with other societies’ 
(Rosenberg 2006, 321–25).
Anievas and Nişancioğlu (or at least the former) have also changed their 
position over the years, although they have always agreed with Rosenberg 
that uneven and combined development should be seen as a ‘general abstrac-
tion’ applicable throughout human history like ‘labour’ or ‘class’—which 
is, of course, precisely the point at issue. They do, however, prefer the term 
‘transmodality’ to ‘transhistoricity’, as this ‘highlights the ways in which it 
only operates in and through historically distinct modes of production, which 
provide the explanations for the specific dynamics, scales and qualitative 
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forms of unevenness and combination’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 61, 
62). The overall conclusion is, however, effectively the same as Rosenberg’s: 
uneven and combined development is not specific to the capitalist era—
although Anievas has qualified this assessment in an individually written 
study, where he notes that in the pre-capitalist period ‘occurrences were 
qualitatively different: irregular, episodic, and thus often not systematized’ 
(Anievas 2014a, 53).
What, concretely, is being claimed here? Take the three components of 
uneven and combined development set out in Rosenberg’s argument from 
Russian history, but considered in more general terms: societies never exist in 
isolation at any point in human history, but always interpenetrate each other 
through, for example, conquest, trade or migration; societies exist in interna-
tional relationships, for example, as subjects of an empire, as components of a 
military alliance, or through adherence to a common faith; and consequently, 
societies always embody fusions of quite different institutions and practices, 
embodying different levels of development. These are all defensible claims 
and Anievas and Nişancioğlu show how they can be put to work in the excel-
lent historical case studies of which most of their book, How the West Came 
to Rule, consists. I regard their substantive arguments as having enriched our 
understanding in a number of fields, and this is also true of other writers who, 
from similar positions, have made detailed case studies of individual states, 
notably the recent works by Jamie Allinson (2016) on Jordan and by Kamran 
Matin (2013c) on Iran. The difficulty I have is that virtually all the conclu-
sions reached in these works would remain unaltered even if every reference 
to uneven and combined development was removed. On this basis a concept 
intended to encapsulate a particular international historical process becomes 
transformed into a term applicable to virtually any situation in which societ-
ies interact with and mutually influence each other, as in this discussion of 
the Neolithic by David Steel: ‘In Europe the phase was based on the spread 
of exogenous technological elements that had for a long time developed 
elsewhere, hence CAUD [i.e. uneven and combined development—ND] is 
applicable’ (Steel 2010, 149–51).
Are we then simply dealing with an example of conceptual overstretch? 
Extension is not necessarily overextension. The concept of ‘hegemony’, 
for example, evolved from being a long-standing description of geopo-
litical domination by a particular state, to being a strategy of Russian Social 
Democracy by which the working class would lead the peasantry in the 
‘bourgeois-democratic’ revolution, to being Gramsci’s much more general 
term for the way in which the bourgeoisie was able to maintain its rule over 
the working class by securing its acceptance of the existing order (Anderson 
1976–77, 15–34; Thomas 2009, 56–71, 220–28). But across these modifica-
tions in meaning, a common theme is still retained, developing rather than 
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abandoning the original concept: leadership, whether exercised by a state 
over other states, or a revolutionary class over its allies, or a ruling class over 
the subordinate classes. Contrast the fate of ‘hegemony’ with that of ‘capital’, 
a concept from bourgeois political economy which was similarly adopted and 
modified by Marxists, initially by Marx himself. In recent years, it has been 
subject to fundamental extensions through the attachment of pre-fixes such as 
‘social’, ‘cultural’, ‘intellectual’, ‘natural’ or ‘human’, to the point where it 
no longer has any connection to the original object of competitive accumula-
tion, but is simply a metaphor for anything of emotional or reputational value 
(Fine 2010; Hodgson 2014).
But if uneven and combined development has been subject to overexten-
sion then, as I suggested earlier, Trotsky himself is at least partly responsible. 
For Rosenberg, Anievas and Nişancioğlu could legitimately point to a small 
number of texts in which Trotsky endorses a subordinate transhistorical or 
transmodal interpretation. The most famous of these is in his last major work, 
The Revolution Betrayed, where he wrote: ‘The law of uneven development is 
supplemented throughout the whole course of history by the law of combined 
development’ (Trotsky 1937, 300). But this would not be the only time in 
the history of historical materialism where a Marxist theoretician has been 
subjected one of their own concepts to inappropriate overextension. More 
or less contemporaneously with Trotsky, Gramsci was doing precisely this 
to his notion of ‘passive revolution’. From a relatively narrowly focussed 
means of identifying bourgeois revolutions from above, such as the Italian 
Risorgimento of the 1860s, it came to encompass virtually any regime of 
capitalist reorientation, such as Fascism in Italy, or transformation of the 
labour process, such as Fordism in the United States. But as Alex Callinicos 
points out, there are real difficulties in applying the same term to both revo-
lutions leading to the domination of the capitalist mode of production and to 
subsequent changes which do not lead to any ‘systematic transformation’ but 
which, like Fascism and Fordism, are ‘counter-revolutionary projects which 
seek to manage the structural contradictions of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion’. By referring to different phenomena under the same name, Gramsci’s 
own multiple uses of passive revolution render the concept incoherent. 
Extended still further by his followers, it loses all specificity and ‘runs the risk 
of just becoming another way of referring to the dynamism and flexibility of 
capitalism’ (Callinicos 2010, 498, 505).
Trotsky did far less stretching of uneven and combined development 
than Gramsci did of passive revolution but, in any event, Rosenberg does 
not rely on the handful of passages in which Trotsky takes a similar view 
to defend his interpretation of the former concept. Instead, he effectively 
argues that Trotsky did not understand, or at least pursue, the logic of his 
own position:
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Trotsky asserted that combined development was an intrinsic, emergent 
property of uneven development. And he also claimed (rightly, we decided) 
that uneven development was a ‘universal law’. The phenomenon of combined 
development must therefore also have a more general existence. If so, however, 
it is not one that Trotsky ever fully explicated. (Rosenberg 2006, 319)
Elsewhere Rosenberg claims that Trotsky’s position involves a ‘two-step 
process of abstraction’ whose proper subject is ‘the laws of history in 
general’, but that this has been obscured. How?
During the first step, the general significance of inter-societal interaction for 
historical development appears to have been momentarily conflated with the 
specific (dynamic and universalising) properties of capitalism. And the con-
sequences of interaction, which in fact can be observed across human history, 
have then appeared (quite misleadingly) to derive their very existence from 
characteristics particular to capitalism. But universality and interaction are 
not the same thing. The fact that capitalist society has uniquely universalising 
(and technologically dynamic) properties does not at all entail that precapitalist 
development was not interactive. On the contrary, it is the fact that all devel-
opment—even capitalism—includes this interactive dimension arising from 
unevenness which explains the phenomenology of modern combined devel-
opment here apparently derived by Trotsky from capitalism alone. And sure 
enough, Trotsky himself, despite the apparent conflation, proceeds to take the 
second step by now invoking ‘the laws of history’. (Rosenberg 2013b, 587)
At this point, Rosenberg partially quotes what is probably the most famous 
passage in History. Here is the passage in its entirety:
The privilege of historic backwardness—and such a privilege exists—permits, 
or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified 
date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages. From the universal law of 
unevenness thus derives another law which for want of a better name, we may 
call the law of combined development—by which we mean a drawing together 
of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam 
of archaic with more contemporary forms. (Trotsky 1977, 27–28)
Rosenberg then continues: ‘Modern combined development must therefore 
be a particular, if particularly intense, instance of a phenomenon (arising from 
societal multiplicity) which is generic to the historical process per se. This 
clarification is the only way to make Trotsky’s observations about different 
historical periods consistent with each other’. He then adds in footnote: ‘After 
all, Trotsky himself presents Russian development as having been shaped by 
both a “whip of external necessity” and a “privilege of historic backward-
ness” long before the emergence of capitalist society in the West’ (Rosenberg 
2013b, 587).
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As a general rule, when writers begin to argue that, although a particular 
thinker appears to be taking one position, they are really taking another, a 
degree of scepticism is usually in order. This is a strategy regularly used by 
writers in the Political Marxist tradition, for example, when they assert that 
Marx actually meant the opposite of what he repeatedly said about the pri-
macy of the productive forces in social development (e.g. see Davidson 2012, 
155–58). Rosenberg’s position is more defensible, given the ambiguities in 
Trotsky’s own writing to which I have already referred, but is nevertheless 
misleading. For one thing, Rosenberg reverses the order in which Trotsky 
presents his argument. As the above quotation shows, the latter begins with 
‘a law of history’ (uneven development) and ends with an outcome of that law 
(combined development). Rosenberg effectively argues that, because uneven 
development produces ‘combination’ throughout history, the formation of the 
latter also constitutes a universal ‘law’. Now it is perfectly correct to say that 
(to use Rosenberg’s term) ‘interaction’ between societies takes place through-
out history—it is highly unlikely that anyone has ever seriously doubted 
this—but ‘interaction’ is not what Trotsky means by ‘combination’. It is 
rather that, in a particular and historically unprecedented (‘contemporary’, 
‘modern’) context, uneven development produces a social form (‘uneven 
and combined development’) which has not previously existed: universal 
processes can give rise to singular outcomes.
CAPITALISM, EURoCENTRISM AND 
UNEvEN DEvELoPMENT
Virtually everyone engaged in these debates accepts that, throughout his-
tory, ‘the whip of external necessity’ in the form of economic or military 
competition has forced those societies capable of doing so to adopt certain 
manufacturing technologies, military techniques, or state structures at their 
highest levels of existing development, rather than undergo the entire process 
of development which led to that point. This is precisely what constitutes ‘the 
advantages of backwardness’. In this respect, uneven development is a genu-
inely transhistorical process. It was first identified, if not named, by figures 
in the eighteenth-century German, French and Scottish Enlightenments, then 
picked up in the nineteenth-century by both Russian Populists and Marx and 
Engels, before becoming a generally accepted component of Second Inter-
national thought around the time Trotsky was entering political life. Given 
that the first articulation of uneven development in this sense that I have been 
able to discover (a 1712 letter by Leibniz to Peter the Great), was written 220 
years before Trotsky took it as the starting point for his concept of combined 
development, it is remarkable how many commentators continue to conflate 
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the two (e.g. see Davidson 2006, 10–20; Davidson 2012, 287–89; Davidson 
2015b, 155–65). The current over-extensions of uneven and combined devel-
opment repeat the same error by fixing that label on processes which properly 
belong to the province of uneven development.
For Marx and Engels, unevenness had two aspects. One should by now be 
familiar. In his 1847 review of a book by Frederick List, Marx specifically 
rejected the idea that every nation had to repeat the same experience and 
argued instead that it might be possible for nations to draw on what others 
had accomplished in their areas where they were most advanced: ‘To hold 
that every nation goes through this development [of industry in England–ND] 
internally would be as absurd as the idea that every nation is bound to go 
through the political development of France or the philosophical develop-
ment of Germany. What the nations have done as nations, they have done for 
human society’ (Marx 1975, 281). The other was where relatively advanced 
societies either conquered the more backward or colonised empty territories, 
but in both cases imposed the highest level of development possible at the 
time, higher than those societies they left behind. For example, Marx noted 
that in terms of ‘completeness and systematic elaboration’, ‘the feudalism 
introduced into England [i.e. by the Norman Conquest] was more perfect in 
form than that which arose spontaneously in France’ (Marx 1973, 490). After 
1066 England went from being a territory which had barely emerged out 
of the Asiatic mode to being the most rigorous and centralised feudal state 
in Europe. In one of his last letters Engels pointed out that ‘the ephemeral 
kingdom of Jerusalem’ established by the Crusaders in the twelfth century 
was ‘the classic expression of the feudal order’ precisely because it had been 
planted in a territory where feudalism had no native roots (Engels 2005, 565). 
They do not seem to have considered that capitalism might also develop in 
this way. Why not?
In his preparatory notes for Capital, Marx wrote: ‘Some determinations 
belong to all epochs, others only to a few’ (Marx 1973, 85). As an example 
of this, Marx and Engels noted that ‘history becomes world history’ only as a 
result of the spread of capitalism (Marx and Engels 1976, 50–51). There have 
been relatively few modes of production. The illusion of multiplicity is gener-
ated by treating variations among those ‘Asiatic’ societies transitional from 
primitive communism to class society—‘nomadism’ for example—as if they 
were based on fully fledged modes of production. In fact, with the exception 
of the very few societies based on the slave mode of production, there were 
only two other types of pre-capitalist society and these both involved modes 
of production in which a surplus was extracted from a class of peasants: the 
feudal and tributary modes. There were important differences between them, 
both in the nature of the respective ruling classes—local landowners in the 
case of the former and a state bureaucracy in that of the latter—and in terms 
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of how these ruling classes organised themselves; but, because they were 
both based on the exploitation of the same class, most pre-capitalist societ-
ies seem to have involved elements of both, with one or the other achieving 
dominance at different times (Davidson 2012, 539–551; Davidson 2015b, 
xii–xvii, chapters 2 and 3; Haldon 1994, 63–69; Wickham 2005, 57–61). 
Those cases which were the purest examples of one variant or the other 
(e.g. feudal England or tributary China) had quite different possibilities for 
capitalist development.
Some theorists have argued that to argue in this way is Eurocentric, since 
it allegedly ignores both the timing and extent of the Eastern influence on 
Western development, perhaps even the way in which Western capitalism 
was only made possible by colonialism (Bhambra 2011, 678; Hobson 2011, 
164). These claims lack all specificity in outcomes as we are ushered across 
the centuries from England, to Britain, to Western Europe, to Europe as a 
whole, and to the West in general. But the central claim is in any case factu-
ally wrong. On the one hand, some Western European states, notably Spain 
and Portugal, certainly plundered South American and parts of Asia from the 
late fifteenth century onwards, but they were not the original sites of capitalist 
development for much the same reason that the Chinese, Mughal and Ottoman 
tributary empires were not: the existing states—absolutist in the Peninsular 
cases—were strong enough to block or, as in the case of Spanish rule over 
Catalonia, at least temporarily retard capitalist development. On the other 
hand, modernising elites in Italy, Germany and Japan (the latter of which is 
of course in ‘the East’) were able to overthrow the existing states in the 1860s 
and make the transition to capitalism in highly compressed timescales, but 
they only acquired their empires after the transition was complete. Only for 
a handful of states or territories in Western Europe—sequentially, the United 
Netherlands Provinces, England, Catalonia, Scotland and France—could it 
seriously be argued that their initial development on a capitalist basis was 
aided by expansion beyond Europe.
One of these authors, John M. Hobson, has adopted the transhistoric inter-
pretation of uneven and combined development—and inadvertently revealed 
some of the problems with this approach—to argue that it applies to Britain, 
which should be seen as ‘the classic case of late industrialisation’, rather 
than Russia. By ‘late’, Hobson means that, down to 1800, Britain was less 
developed than China and by ‘uneven and combined development’ he means 
this: ‘Britain was only able to industrialise because it actively borrowed 
and imitated so much of that which had underpinned China’s industrial and 
agricultural revolutions some 700 and 1100 years earlier, respectively. And it 
also emulated various methods that had been pioneered in India, which was 
enabled in large part through the British colonial presence there’. He con-
cludes that ‘at no point in the rise of European capitalism in its longue durée 
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(800–1800) could we describe its development as purely “self-made” under 
conditions of “even and separate development”’ (Hobson 2011, 163–65).
Hobson constantly elides the distinction between development and 
capitalist development—his vagueness about the latter is illustrated by the 
outlandish notion that the transition to capitalism in Europe began in 800, at 
a time when feudalism had still to be consolidated across most of the conti-
nent. But Britain was not ‘developing’ in some generic sense, but in terms 
of the way in which it was increasingly dominated by the capitalist mode 
of production, which China was not. It is important to know the number of 
Africans transported to the Americas as slaves, or to know the amount of 
cotton transported from India to the North of England as material for manu-
facture; but these did not lead to changed social relations of production in a 
handful of areas in Western Europe where this actually took place. On the 
contrary, they were able to feed expansion in these areas only because social 
relation of production had already been transformed. External factors may 
have allowed space for these changes to take place without interruption—this 
is precisely what Anievas and Nişancioğlu argue (2015) in relation to the 
conflict between the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires—but that is an enabling 
condition, rather than a causal factor.
The emergence of the original group of capitalist states extended for the 300 
years between the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt in 1567 and the completion 
of German Unification in 1870. Comprising less than twenty states in all, very 
few of them made the transition to industrial capitalism, as it were, ‘organi-
cally’: ‘Only a minority of countries has fully gone through that systematic 
and logical development from handicraft through domestic manufacture to 
the factory, which Marx subjected to such detailed analysis’ (Trotsky 1940, 
41). And some of these ‘countries’ were either stateless nations like Catalonia 
or federal territories like the northeastern states of the United States. Of the 
remainder, only England—the second capitalist state to emerge, following the 
United Netherlands Provinces—shows the pattern of capitalist development 
in its classic form, which is why Marx used it to illustrate his abstract model 
of capitalist production in Capital (Marx 1976, 90, 876).
Capitalism in England was certainly a product of uneven development. 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu have argued that the ‘privilege of backwardness’ 
and the ‘disadvantages of priority’ were respectively allocated to Europe—
or at least North-Western Europe—and the Ottoman Empire (Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu 2015, 104–6, 146). Like these authors, I reject Political Marxist 
claims for the supposedly unique development of capitalism in England, but 
it is clear that capitalism developed more powerfully than anywhere else 
in Europe, the most relevant comparison being with France. ‘Sufficiently 
near to the most advanced feudal societies to have high levels of technical 
resource at her disposal’, writes Guy Bois, ‘[England] was also sufficiently 
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underdeveloped to have escaped the consequences of the fossilization of 
social relations which feudal reorganization induced’. As Bois explains 
(1985, 114), ‘the relative backwardness of England’s social evolution as com-
pared to France was to prove its trump card in the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism’. Far from England being emblematic of Western uniqueness or 
superiority, it was backward even within Europe.
Marx himself drew attention to the way in which England was then able to 
benefit from the experience of countries which had earlier undergone incom-
plete transitions to capitalism, starting with the Italian city-states:
The different moments of primitive accumulation … are systematically com-
bined together at the end of the seventeenth century in England; the combination 
embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and the system 
of protection. These methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the 
colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and 
organised force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transforma-
tion of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the 
transition. (Marx 1976, 915–16)
Both the date (‘the end of the seventeenth century’) and the reference to the 
role of the state are central here. The capitalist state in England was consoli-
dated at the completion of the bourgeois revolution in 1688, at a time when 
its economy was still dominated by agrarian, mercantile and financial capital. 
The significance was twofold: industrial capitalism arose within the context 
of a society where the state was already dedicated to the accumulation of 
capital; and that state had a far greater capacity for absorption and renovation 
under pressure than rival pre-capitalist states (Stone 1983, 18–19). In other 
words, the extent to which Britain, or perhaps England, appeared to represent 
an ancien régime was an indication of its adaptive modernity, rather than the 
opposite.
The internal pressures to which England was subject were in any case 
containable because of the extended timescale in which industrialisation took 
place. But the experience of subsequent countries was not just different from 
that of capitalist England, the difference was caused by its prior existence, 
which altered the conditions under which subsequent capitalist industrialisa-
tion took place. Their pace of development was also relatively faster, partly 
because of the urgency of acquiring the attributes of capitalist modernity, 
partly because the long period of experiment and evolution, characteristic of 
the Dutch and English pioneers, could be dispensed with. The gradual, dis-
persed and unplanned nature of the process in England had implications for 
both the structure of the working class and the nature of the class struggle, 
both of which are in stark contrast to the forms these took later under actual 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   45 7/13/2016   9:56:00 PM
46 Neil Davidson
conditions of uneven and combined development. Workplaces remained rela-
tively small, until very late in the nineteenth century. As a result, trade union 
struggles were typically defensive of traditional or at least transitional forms 
of labour (Calhoun 1982, 55, 60, 140; Zmolek 2013, 509–792).
The experience of the second wave of capitalist industrialisation was quite 
different. By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the pressure of 
military and commercial competition between the actual or aspirant great pow-
ers forced at least some of those which were still absolutist or tributary states 
to adopt the current stage of development achieved by their already capitalist 
rivals, if were to have any chance, not only of successfully competing, but of 
surviving at the summit of the states-system. In very compressed timescales 
they had been able to adopt the socio-economic achievements of Britain to the 
extent that they became recognisably the same kind of societies, without nec-
essarily reproducing every characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon pioneer: where 
backwardness remained it tended to be in the nature of the political regimes 
led by monarchs or emperors supported by a landowning aristocracy.
The process of industrialisation and, consequently, the character of the 
class struggle took respectively more intense and explosive forms. In the 
first wave, which consisted of the United Netherlands, England and possibly 
France, class differentiation took place prior to industrialisation. In the sec-
ond wave, which included Germany and Japan, the transition to capitalism 
was ‘virtually contemporaneous’ with industrialisation which was forced 
on the state by external pressures, leaving the bourgeoisie relatively weak 
and with less room for manoeuvre in terms of making concessions to work-
ing class movements (Looker and Coates 1986, 98–101, 112–13). Compare 
Scotland and Prussia to England. By the early nineteenth century, the enor-
mous tension produced by industrialisation was heightened in both cases by 
undemocratic state forms, and expressed itself in moments of sharp class 
struggle, above all the 1820 general strike in the former and the 1848 revolu-
tion in the latter. ‘Scotland entered on the capitalist path later than England,’ 
wrote Trotsky in 1925, ‘A sharper turn in the life of the masses of the people 
gave rise to a sharper political reaction’ (Trotsky 1974a, 37). Similarly, he 
wrote of the consequences ‘when the productive forces of the metropolis, of 
a country of classical capitalism … find ingress into more backward coun-
tries, like Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century’ (Trotsky 1972b, 
199). But because these societies did make the transition to the ranks of the 
advanced societies, either as a component part of another national formation 
(Scotland/Britain) or the centre of one (Prussia/Germany), these moments 
passed with the tensions that caused them. The key point is that in both cases 
the state was transformed, along the same lines as in England, but over a 
much more compressed period of time, in order to direct rapid industrialisa-
tion and contain the social tensions which it produced.
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But not even the impact of industrial capitalism is sufficient to explain 
the historically unique, combined outcome of uneven development in the 
nineteenth century. By the outbreak of the First World War membership of 
the dominant states was essentially fixed. Those states which were capable 
of achieving parity with, or even superiority to those which had undergone 
first wave industrialisation, had done so. But there were two other aspects of 
uneven development, both identified by Lenin in Imperialism: The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism (1916). One was the ongoing rivalry between the great 
powers, which involved them constantly trying to overtake each other in a 
contest for both economic and geopolitical supremacy that would continue as 
long as capitalism itself. This rivalry led in turn to the other aspect: the devel-
oped imperialist states collectively but competitively asserting their domi-
nance over two other types, described by Lenin as ‘the colonies themselves’ 
and ‘the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically are formally 
independent but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic 
dependence’, like Argentina and Portugal (Lenin 1964, 263–64). It was only 
at this point in history that the limits of uneven development were reached.
THE TIMES AND SPACES of CoMbINATIoN
The final factor leading to the emergence of uneven and combined develop-
ment was the response to this irruption within those areas which were soon 
to be designated as ‘backward’, the extent to which they could take advantage 
of the ‘privilege of backwardness’. ‘Historical backwardness does not imply 
a simple reproduction of the development of advanced countries, England 
or France, with a delay of one, two, or three centuries’, noted Trotsky: ‘It 
engenders an entirely new “combined” social formation in which the latest 
conquests of capitalist technique and structure root themselves into relations 
of feudal or pre-feudal barbarism, transforming and subjecting them and 
creating peculiar relations of classes’ (Trotsky 1976b, 583). Unlike Italy or 
Germany in the 1860s, these areas were unable to complete the process of 
‘catching up and overtaking’ the earliest group of capitalist states.
The process is perhaps best illustrated by the only Asian country to 
undertake comparable development during that period. ‘In Japan’, Trotsky 
wrote in the 1930s, ‘we observe even today … correlation between the bour-
geois character of the state and the semifeudal character of the ruling caste’ 
(Trotsky 1976a, 66). The former outweighed the latter. Indeed, Christopher 
Bayly (2004, 104) has drawn attention to the similarities between the 
British and Japanese states after 1868. Between 1870 and 1914, both con-
sciously emphasised the role of their monarch-emperors, the pre-existing 
symbolism of the crown being used to represent national unity against 
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two main challenges: external imperial rivalry and internal class divisions. 
Both were capitalist states that could be strongly contrasted with feudal-
absolutist Austria-Hungary or Russia, even down to the role of the emperor 
and empresses: ‘Russia represented the opposite pole to Japan within the 
spectrum of authoritarian monarchy—no corporate regime strategy, much 
depending on the monarch himself’ (Mann 1988, 200). The state structure 
was crucial, as in many respects Japanese development was far more rapid 
than Russia’s, as Trotsky himself noted:
Even late-developing Russia, which traversed the same historic course as the 
West in a much shorter length of time, needed three centuries to get from the 
liquidation of feudal isolation under Ivan the Terrible, through the Westernizing 
of Peter the Great, to the first liberal reforms of Alexander II. The so-called 
Meiji Restoration incorporated in a matter of a few decades the basic features 
of those three major eras in Russia’s development. At such a forced pace, there 
could be no question of a smooth and even cultural development in all fields. 
Racing to achieve practical results with modern technology—especially military 
technology—Japan remained ideologically in the depths of the Middle Ages. 
The hasty mixture of Edison and Confucius has left its mark in all Japanese 
culture. (Trotsky 1972c, 291)
Backward areas were able to ‘unblock’ themselves to the extent of making 
sectional advances in quite specific areas, but were unable to reproduce the 
overall experience of the advanced; above all the pre-capitalist state remained 
untransformed. Trotsky emphasises the partial nature of these adoptions 
throughout History:
Russia was so far behind the other countries that she was compelled, at least 
in certain spheres, to outstrip them…. The absence of firmly established social 
forms and traditions makes the backward country—at least within certain 
limits—extremely hospitable to the last word in international technique and 
international thought. Backwardness does not, however, for this reason cease to 
be backwardness. (Trotsky 1977, 507, 906, my emphasis)
But within these spheres and limits backward societies could attain higher 
levels of development than in their established rivals: ‘At the same time that 
peasant land-cultivation as a whole remained, right up to the revolution, at 
the level of the seventeenth century, Russian industry in its technique and 
capitalist structure stood at the level of the advanced countries, and in certain 
respects even outstripped them’ (Trotsky 1977, 30; my emphasis).
There were essentially three ways by which combined development came 
into effect. The first was where feudal-absolutist or tributary states, like 
Russia or Turkey, were forced under pressure from the Western powers to 
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partially modernise for reasons of military competition. As Trotsky noted, 
‘the Great War, the result of the contradictions of world imperialism, drew 
into its maelstrom countries of different stages of development, but made 
the same claims on all the participants’ (Trotsky 1972b, 199). In Russia this 
involved both partial agrarian reform and limited industrialisation. Factories 
using the manufacturing technology characteristic of monopoly capital-
ism were established in order to produce arms with which to defend feudal 
absolutism. Here the state acts as an obstacle to the ‘revolutions from above’ 
necessary to allow ‘catch-up’ development in any overall sense. Trotsky 
noted as a general proposition: ‘The [backward] nation … not infrequently 
debases the achievements borrowed from outside in the process of adapting 
them to its own more primitive culture’ (Trotsky 1977, 27). In some cases, 
adaptation is merely decorative, as the Balkan states which were formerly 
part of the Ottoman Empire (Trotsky 1980b, 83); but even in Russia, ‘the 
state, which was largely staffed by landlords, could never displace those 
landlords and reallocate the agricultural surplus to industry’ (Schwartz 2000, 
96). As a result, while ‘modern bourgeois republics … manage their internal 
tensions … backward Russian society bursts apart, with contending upper 
classes and raging lower classes’ (Stinchcombe 1978, 76).
The second space of uneven and combined development was occupied by 
states like China or regions like the post-Ottoman Arab Middle East that had 
been broken by imperialist pressure. Instead of being directly colonised, these 
were allowed to disintegrate while the agents of foreign capital established 
areas of industrialisation under the protection of either their own govern-
ments or local warlords. Colonial rule often throws societies backward, as in 
the case of British-occupied Iraq. Ruling through the Hashemite monarchy 
after 1920, the regime deliberately rejected any attempts at modernisation, 
except in the oil industry. Instead, it reinforced disintegrating tribal loyalties 
and semifeudal tenurial relationships over the peasantry (Gowan 1999, 167). 
Nevertheless, even within this overall context of enforced backwardness, 
combined development was visible in the urban centres of oil production 
(Batatu 1978, 481–2). Combined development was not only experienced in 
the workplace, but in the entire texture of urban life where capitalism took 
hold. Shanghai was in the vanguard in terms of both production and con-
sumption. It had textile mills before anywhere in the Southern states of the 
USA and by 1930 was home to the largest mill in the world; the first cinema 
in Shanghai opened only 5 years after the first large cinema opened in San 
Francisco (Pye 1981, xv).
The third space comprised the actual colonies. Not every colonised country 
experienced uneven and combined development, although ironically, those 
that did not tended to be those that had escaped colonisation. Ethiopia, for 
example, ‘was a social formation that contained social relations analogous to 
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feudalism’, but until the Italian invasion of 1935 and the British occupation 
of 1941, ‘this pre-capitalist system remained almost untouched’ (Halliday and 
Molyneux 1981, 65 and 54–74 more generally). Once the race of imperial ter-
ritory began in earnest during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, 
it became necessary for strategic reasons to seize territories which were often 
of no value in themselves—indeed, which were often net recipients of state 
expenditure—but which were necessary in order to protect those territories 
which were of economic value, like India (Hobsbawm 1987, 67–69). These 
territories tended to remain untransformed. But in the latter type of territory, 
‘transformation’ often simply involved consolidating pre-capitalist forms in 
more easily governable ways, rather than establishing capitalist social relations 
in any sense: ‘Nomads, herdsmen, hunter-gatherers, or even peasants who 
moved around frequently or indulged in practices such as “slash and burn” 
cultivation were a nuisance to colonial states and other emerging political 
authorities which wanted regular taxation’ (Bayly 2004, 299). By 1914, these 
ways of life had been ‘eroded’ and many of these peoples ‘uprooted’:
In some cases, as in the Pacific and the Americas, populations had been slaugh-
tered by white invaders and reduced by disease in a broader replay of the devas-
tation of the conquista of the sixteenth century in Spanish America. Elsewhere, 
as in South and East Asia and parts of Africa, former nomads and ‘tribal’ people 
had been forced to settle either as poor share-croppers or penned in to become 
a pool of migrant labour. (Bayly 2004, 481)
But even in this type of context, industrialisation took place. The British in 
India were unwilling to allow full-scale industrialisation in case it produced 
competition for its own commodities, but was prepared to sanction it in 
specific circumstances for reasons of military supply or where goods were not 
intended for home markets—a form of ‘licenced industrialisation’, particu-
larly in textiles (Bayly 2004, 182; Osterhammel 2014, 663).
For Trotsky, the most important consequence of uneven and combined 
development in all three spaces, but especially in the first two, was the 
enhanced capacity it gave the working classes for political and industrial 
organisation, theoretical understanding and revolutionary activity: ‘When 
the economic factors burst in a revolutionary manner, breaking up the old 
order; when development is no longer gradual and “organic” but assumes the 
form of terrible convulsions and drastic changes of former conceptions, then 
it becomes easier for critical thought to find revolutionary expression, pro-
vided that the necessary theoretical prerequisites exist in the given country’ 
(Trotsky 1972b, 199). As an example of this he drew attention to the greater 
implantation of Marxism among the working classes of Russia than in that 
of Britain. In the case of Russia itself, ‘the proletariat did not arise gradually 
through the ages, carrying with itself the burden of the past, as in England, 
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but in leaps involving sharp changes of environment, ties, relations, and a 
sharp break with the past. It was just this—combined with the concentrated 
oppressions of czarism—that made Russian workers hospitable to the boldest 
conclusions of revolutionary thought—just as the backward industries were 
hospitable to the last word in capitalist organization’ (Trotsky 1977, 1220). 
Describing the situation prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917, Gareth 
Stedman Jones has contrasted ‘the revolutionary maturity of the Petrograd 
proletariat, uniquely concentrated in the most advanced factories of the capi-
talist world’ with Britain, ‘the most advanced capitalist country’, where ‘the 
structure of the metropolitan working class still looked back to pre-industrial 
divisions of skill and status’: ‘A few large plants were lost in an ocean of 
small workshops’ (Stedman Jones 1984, 346). Tim McDaniel is therefore 
correct to note that the militancy of Russian workers was ‘the product of 
leadership by a militant proletarian core of advanced workers employed in 
modern industry’, not ‘traced largely to disorientated workers of peasant ori-
gin and to young recruits into industry’ which emphasises the ‘“spontaneity” 
and unpredictability of worker militancy … denying to it the coherence and 
ultimate rationality ascribed by Trotsky’ (McDaniel 1991, 125).
CoNCLUSIoN
In conclusion, I think it is impossible to treat uneven and combined devel-
opment seriously without foregrounding what it was intended to explain. 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu point out (2015, 300–1fn64) that Rosenberg and 
I have both argued that it can be detached from the strategy of permanent 
revolution. We do so, however, for rather different reasons. In Rosenberg’s 
case, it is because he has a transhistorical conception of uneven and combined 
development in which permanent revolution is plainly irrelevant for the vast 
bulk of human history in which capitalism, and consequently a combination 
of the bourgeois and socialist revolutions was not in prospect anywhere. In 
my case, it is because I see permanent revolution as involving two factors, 
uneven and combined development and an unaccomplished bourgeois revolu-
tion; but now that the bourgeois revolutions have all been accomplished—by 
which I simply mean that there are no longer any pre-capitalist states awaiting 
transformation into centres of capital accumulation—then the era of perma-
nent revolution has also passed. Socialist revolution per se is still feasible and 
it is likely that it is more likely to break out where conditions of uneven and 
combined development prevail, but it is difficult to conceive of how one can 
talk of leaping over stages when there are no longer any pre-capitalist stages 
left (Davidson 2015b, 140–44). Does uneven and combined development not 
usually involve what Burawoy calls ‘the combination of the capitalist mode 
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of production with pre-existing modes’ (Burawoy 1985, 99)? It can, but it 
can also involve the destabilising effect of capitalist industrialisation and 
urbanisation on hitherto relatively stable agrarian communities. ‘A political 
prognosis cannot pretend to the same exactness as an astronomic one’, as 
Trotsky once noted (1973, 73). Nevertheless, if I was asked to predict where a 
future revolution was most likely to erupt, it would be the state where Trotsky 
first detected uneven and combined development outside Russia, and which 
is now experiencing its second coming: China (Davidson 2015b, 179–87). 
To historicise the emergence of combined development does not mean that 
we should assume it will come to an end, since this seems unlikely as long 
as capitalism and consequently uneven development persist; it does mean, 
however, that our primary focus should be, as Trotsky’s was, on its effects.
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Chapter 4
The Uneven, Combined and 
Intersocietal Dimensions of korean 
State formation and Consolidation 
over the Longue Durée 
300–1900 CE
Owen Miller
Until recently attempts to analyse the history of Korea prior to the twentieth 
century have tended towards two frameworks: stagnation or progress. In 
response to this there has been a tendency to abandon any form of long-term 
historical analysis or to argue that concepts developed to analyse the history 
of Europe or other parts of the world cannot be applied to East Asia. This 
chapter will instead argue that the analytical concepts of unevenness, com-
bination and intersocietal development can be usefully employed to develop 
a historical sociology that moves decisively beyond the stagnation/progress 
dichotomy and Eurocentric historiography.
Korean history represents a relatively small part of human history, taking 
place on a peninsula at one end of the Eurasian continent, in certain ways 
peripheral to the core zones of human civilisation over the last two thousand 
years. However, its wider relevance will hopefully be apparent in the fact that 
certain similar problems arise when studying any country or region outside of 
Europe. The central problem that has confronted historians of Korea over the 
past 120 years has been how to account for Korea’s apparent backwardness 
and, ultimately, its fall into the clutches of Japanese imperialism. While this 
problem might be a near universal one for countries that experienced colonial 
rule in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, what makes the Korean expe-
rience somewhat unusual is that the immediate counterexample with which 
it was repeatedly compared was not Europe but rather its neighbour, Meiji 
Japan. By showing that it was possible for a non-European country to escape 
colonialism and find its own route to capitalist modernity, the Japanese case 
threw Korea’s perceived failure into sharper relief.
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Furthermore, for Japan as an aspiring imperial power, the apparent back-
wardness and stagnation in Korean history provided ample justification for its 
annexation of the country in 1910. Subsequently, after liberation from colo-
nial rule in 1945, for nationalists in both North and South Korea, the stigma 
of backwardness was something to overcome. It is significant that these 
different approaches to the problem of Korean backwardness all remained 
firmly locked within the framework of methodological nationalism and were 
either implicitly or explicitly Eurocentric, in that they assumed Europe as the 
source of modernity and progress and measured Korea (like other parts of the 
world) against that yardstick. They also both remained fixed in the simple 
and dichotomous framework of advanced/backward, which implied, either 
implicitly or often quite explicitly, a set of fixed historical stages that must be 
followed in a certain order.
How then do we step outside of the simplistic paradigm of advanced and 
backward, stagnation and progress, to build a picture of human societies 
developing over time in both their specific complexity and universality? This 
chapter will seek to reconceptualise the problem of backwardness within a 
different methodological framework; that of uneven and combined develop-
ment, although here I will also use the terms divergence and convergence, 
which I think better capture the nature of long-term historical processes. 
Alongside this methodology I will employ a particular understanding of 
Marx’s concept of mode of production—centred around the concept of the 
tributary mode of production—which has important implications for uneven 
and combined development in the premodern world. After outlining the 
problem at hand within this new framework, I will use it to examine a series 
of events and processes over the course of 1,600 years of Korean history, 
from the early state formation period to the late nineteenth century, paying 
particular attention to the patterns of divergence and convergence between 
the premodern historical trajectories of Korea, Japan and China.
Before moving to that analysis, however, this chapter will examine how 
historians, and particularly Korean Marxists, have tried to address the prob-
lem of backwardness, in order to provide a historiographical basis for the rest 
of my argument.
THE AbNoRMAL HISToRy of koREA
By the late nineteenth century, the paradigm of Eurocentrism and Oriental-
ism was firmly established in Europe, but it was also being replicated in new 
forms around the world (Amin 1989). Thus, beginning in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, Japanese ideologues and historians sought to create a 
version of the Europe/Asia dichotomy within East Asia itself, based on what 
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one might call a ‘Little Divergence’ between the supposedly progressive, 
feudal, market-oriented history of Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868) and the 
stagnant, Asiatic, state-dominated history of Qing China and Chosŏn Korea. 
This intellectual project coincided with two streams in nineteenth-century 
Japanese thought and policy: the desire to ‘leave Asia’ (Datsu-A ron) and 
the desire for empire, the latter of which was realised in 1895 with Japan’s 
acquisition of Taiwan as its first modern colony.1
Thus the context in which Korean Marxists sought to understand Korean 
history was one where they were faced with a choice between two forms of 
Eurocentric theory. On the one hand, there was the contradictory Eurocentric-
but-universalist paradigm of ‘five stages’, inherited from Second International 
Marxism, and later given Stalin’s seal of approval. On the other, there was 
the Eurocentric-but-particularist Asiatic mode of production (AMP), which 
turned out to be very influential in East Asia (Fogel 1988).2 In the 1930s and 
1940s, most Korean Marxists took the latter option and focused on explain-
ing what they saw as the particularity and backwardness of Korea’s historical 
society via its ‘Asiatic’ features.
In the 1930s, a local version of the international AMP debate developed 
within colonial Korea among a number of Marxists, including Yi Ch’ŏngwon, 
Kim Kwangjin, Yi Pungman, Chŏn Sŏktam, Moritani Katsumi and Paek 
Namun, the man now considered by many to be the ‘father’ of Korean 
Marxist historiography. Essentially their views came down to two positions. 
One, advocated by Yi Ch’ŏngwon, and to some extent Paek Namun, was that 
Korean history prior to capitalism had passed through all the necessary stages 
(primitive communism, slavery, feudalism) but that these stages were in some 
way untypical and had an ‘Asiatic’ character. Paek, for example, argued that 
the primitive communist stage in Korean history was abnormally long, while 
feudalism developed slowly and had an ‘Asiatic form’ (Paek 1933, 25). Yi 
argued that the term Asiatic was ‘not a geographical category’ but rather 
a ‘special historical category’ developed by Marx that could be applied to 
Russian history as much as to Korean. However, when he lists the attributes 
of an Asiatic society as ‘a feudal or semi-feudal social formation based on 
patriarchal agriculture; stagnating development; general ignorance; poverty; 
autocracy; and serfdom’ his argument becomes circular. The term Asiatic is 
supposed to provide a scientific explanation for stagnation, but at the same 
time stagnation becomes one of its main characteristics (Yi Ch’ŏngwon 1935).
The second position, advocated by historians like Yi Pungman and Chŏn 
Sŏktam, argued that the lack of progress in Korean history could be explained 
by its lack of a fully fledged slave stage. Chŏn claimed that despite slavery 
being a prominent feature of most of Korea’s premodern history from the 
Three Kingdoms period (c. fourth century CE to 668 CE) onward, in all peri-
ods slave labour was only one form of labour and never the dominant form 
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(Chŏn 1949, 22; cf. Miller 2011). The significance of this was that in Europe 
slave-owning societies such as ancient Greece and Rome had destroyed the 
remnants of the communal mode of production through the enslavement of 
a large part of the population. In Korea meanwhile, according to Chŏn, this 
process was much delayed and led to a backward form of feudalism. Yi 
Pungman also claimed that the reasons lay ‘in the incomplete nature of the 
transition from primitive communal society to slave society and the similarly 
malformed transition from slavery to feudalism which meant that feudal 
society was not able to develop sufficiently’. Like Yi Ch’ŏngwon, he tended 
to use the Marxist term Asiatic as an explanation for backwardness, writing 
that it was ‘precisely this “Asiatic stagnation” that forced Korea to bear the 
fate of a backward society’ (Yi Pungman 1948, 1).
After liberation in 1945 historians in both North and South Korea shifted 
towards approaches to the Korean past that attempted to erase backward-
ness altogether in favour of some form of ‘internal development’ (naejaejŏk 
palchŏn). As in other postcolonial countries, North Korean Marxists adopted 
the Stalinist orthodoxy, asserting the law-governed ‘normality’ of Korean 
history and searching not for the origins of backwardness but for the ‘sprouts 
of capitalism’. These historians—including some such as Chŏn Sŏktam who 
had previously held a completely opposite view—now argued that Korea had 
passed through all necessary stages prior to capitalism and had been indepen-
dently developing its own indigenous capitalism and even showing signs of 
social change that would lead to a bourgeois revolution (Petrov 2006). Not 
only North Korean historians but South Korean nationalist and progressive 
historians too saw Korean history as having followed a ‘normal’ path that was 
then thrown off course and ‘distorted’ by Japanese imperial aggression and 
colonisation. Still today in both countries the search for evidence of Korean 
history’s progressive character and the signs of internal social and economic 
development that can match the European model are fundamental to contem-
porary Korean historiography.3
While their aims in writing the history of Korea were diametrically opposed, 
the explanations for Korean backwardness advanced by Japanese colonial 
historians and Korean Marxists were surprisingly similar. In both cases they 
located the ‘abnormality’ of Korean history in the lack or underdevelopment 
of a historical stage, whether Stadtwirtschaft, feudalism or the slave mode 
of production. For the Marxists this abnormality and backwardness could 
be explained more ‘scientifically’ with the use of the term Asiatic, derived 
from a small fragment of Marx’s writing. However, their argument tended 
to become circular, with the existence of stagnation itself explaining stagna-
tion. What colonial historians, Korean Marxists and post-liberation national-
ist or progressive historians all had in common was a Eurocentric notion of 
what was a ‘normal’ historical pathway. This path consisted of a fixed set of 
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historical stages that could not be skipped, with a definite end point (capitalist 
modernity, the modern nation state or communism). All these approaches 
reveal a paradigm, centred around rigid dichotomies of progress/stagnation 
and normal/abnormal, that is ill-suited to grasp the rich complexity of a single 
country’s history, let alone that of a region or larger field of human history.
RECoNCEPTUALISING THE PRobLEM of koREAN HISToRy
In this section I will draw on elements of Marxist historical thought in order 
to build a framework for approaching Korean history, while eschewing the 
tropes of abnormality, lack and backwardness. I will do this with reference to 
the Korean case before moving on to a more concrete examination of some 
of the processes and dynamics of Korean history up to the late nineteenth 
century. However, my intention is that the framework I outline here can be 
a useful contribution to the more general discussion of Marxist historical 
sociology and pre-capitalist societies outside of the north Atlantic region.
First of all, what is the core problem that a new methodological and theoreti-
cal framework for pre-capitalist Korean history seeks to address? While for Yi 
Pungman the key question was how to account for Korean backwardness, from 
our current standpoint this is inadequate, largely because it tends to reinforce 
the rigid and static dichotomy of advanced/backward. Moreover, when we 
consider that since 1945 both Koreas achieved remarkable industrial develop-
ment and accelerated social change, to focus only on backwardness in this way 
seems anachronistic. If we are fundamentally seeking to understand Korea’s 
particular historical trajectory, a more apposite research question might be, 
how did Korean, Japanese and Chinese historical trajectories diverge from each 
other over the 1,600-year period from 300 CE to 1900 CE? The framework 
underlying this question is one that assumes the universality of unevenness, and 
human history as a constant pattern of divergences and convergences within 
fields of interconnected polities and societies at different scales. In other words, 
it is a framework founded on the method of uneven and combined development 
(Trotsky 1962), supplemented by the concepts of divergence and convergence, 
which help to capture the historicity of unevenness and combination.
However, the starting point of my framework will not be uneven and 
combined development but rather Marx’s concept of mode of production, as 
this is crucial to any development of Marxist historical sociology. In the first 
half of the twentieth century, this analytical concept was much abused, and 
generally came to be understood as a theory of historical stages, much like 
the theories developed by other nineteenth-century historians and sociologists 
such as Karl Bücher. Once Marxist historians discovered that it was difficult 
to apply a fixed set of five historical stages to all of human history, various 
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debates over periodisation ensued, such as the one between advocates of 
the five stages model and partisans of the Asiatic mode of production. One 
response to this problem has been for historians to make the mode of produc-
tion concept more descriptive and less analytical, giving rise to a plethora 
of modes—beyond primitive communism, slave, feudal and capitalist—that 
match more closely the actual political and institutional features of historical 
societies.4 The response of John Haldon and Eric Wolf, on the other hand, has 
been to take the concept in the other direction, to emphasise its utility as an 
abstraction that serves to guide a research programme rather than describe a 
concrete society (Haldon 1995, 93–94). This is the approach I will take here.
The formulation of the tributary mode of production (TMP) advanced by 
Haldon, Wolf and Samir Amin returns to Marx’s core definition of a mode 
of production as the means by which surplus is extracted from the direct 
producers.5 The TMP concept strips away institutional and political aspects 
of a particular society and focuses on the fact that in pre-capitalist class soci-
eties surplus was appropriated from the direct producers by ‘non-economic’ 
coercion.6 This serves to avoid the problems inherent in a concept of mode of 
production that might be understood to include particular culturally or geo-
graphically specific features (Asiatic mode of production) or could be misun-
derstood to encompass political and institutional forms, as the feudal mode of 
production often is. However, this particular concept of mode of production 
does more than provide terminological clarity: what is most significant is the 
role it plays as a guide for a research programme.
What this means in practice is that it encourages the historian to ask certain 
historical questions and pushes us to look for the answers in certain places. 
So, if all pre-capitalist class societies have essentially been shaped and con-
strained by the same fundamental social relations, centred around coercive 
extraction, then how do we account for the great unevenness of pre-capitalist 
societies, their constant divergence and convergence? Wolf argued that the 
different forms of class society found in the few thousand years of human 
history before capitalism occupy a ‘continuum of power distributions’, with 
relatively centralised, bureaucratic states at one end, decentralised ‘feudal’ 
societies at the other and many possible forms in between (Wolf 1982, 80). 
Haldon has gone a step further than this in showing how such an insight can 
become the basis for a research programme, since for him the differences 
in the way ruling class power is distributed in different societies and the 
constantly shifting balance of different forms of extraction within societies 
reflects the ongoing struggle over surplus among different elements of the 
ruling classes (Haldon 1995).7 The most obvious way in which this takes 
concrete historical form is through struggles between states and aristocra-
cies, something that will be amply illustrated in the next section. Rather than 
focusing on the question of whether tax or rent might represent two different 
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modes of production, this conception of the TMP sees tax and rent as forms of 
extraction within a constantly shifting struggle between different parts of the 
non-producing class. In fact, in most historical class societies, the situation 
has been very complicated, with tax, rent and other forms of coercive extrac-
tion, such as slavery and corvée labour, all co-existing. In addition, each of 
these forms of extraction can themselves be complex and diverse, being paid 
in cash, in kind or in specialised tribute goods; with aristocrats farming taxes, 
or paying them themselves; states collecting rents on state or royal-owned 
estates; and both aristocracies and states owning slaves and levying corvée. 
All of these forms have existed at various points in Korean history, and for 
most of Korean history prior to capitalism, they have co-existed. The particu-
lar complex of forms of extraction that can be found at a particular point in 
the history of a society therefore reflects the current state of the struggle for 
surplus among the segments of the non-producing class. Here Jamie Allinson 
has pointed out an analogy with the way that capitalist societies are shaped 
and driven by the constant competition among many capitals, the difference 
being that in tributary societies the ‘division lies not between units competing 
via the market but between central and local control of the coercive power by 
which surplus is extracted’ (Allinson 2016, 46).
How then does this understanding of premodern class societies, as funda-
mentally based on forms of coercive tribute, combine with the approach of 
uneven and combined development (UCD)? UCD starts from what Löwy 
has called ‘the viewpoint of totality’; that is, what in the modern capitalist 
context might be termed the international (Löwy 2006a, 31–32). This means 
that the UCD approach is based on the premise of intersocietal development, 
or the recognition that states and societies always develop in interaction with 
one another, from the earliest period of state formation up to the present 
day.8
 However, there is always an ‘asynchronicity of development’ (Allinson 
and Anievas 2009), meaning that the tempos and types of development in 
interacting societies are usually divergent. This gives rise to a second aspect, 
which is that of combination; or, in other words, the intersocietal adoption of 
technologies, ideas, cultures, institutions etc., resulting in their implantation 
within social settings very different to their origins, bringing together elements 
often understood as belonging to different levels of development.9 We can 
thus understand the intersocietal development of human history as taking the 
form of a series of divergences and convergences among societies at different 
geographical scales, whether local (e.g. between the northern and southern 
regions of the Korean peninsula) regional (e.g. Korea and Japan) or continen-
tal (between ‘East’ and ‘West’). So, in answer to the question posed above, the 
continuous struggle over surplus, which usually takes its spatial form as a con-
flict between central and local power, is always mediated by intersocietal rela-
tions (war, trade, cultural and intellectual exchange). New social combinations 
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are constantly forming as a result of intersocietal contact, and thus constitute 
the terrain on which intra-class conflict over surplus takes place. In turn, this 
conflict over surplus drives the most fundamental form of divergence between 
pre-capitalist societies, between those dominated by a central tax collecting/
redistributing state and those in which power is decentralised among local 
lords, giving rise to such heterogeneous neighbours as Japan and Korea.
THE TRAjECToRy of koREAN HISToRy 
ovER THE LonguE DuréE
In the following I will show how the framework outlined in the previous 
section can be used to analyse the particular trajectory and characteristics of 
Korean history over the long term. To do this I will examine in chronological 
order some of the important turning points and processes in Korean history 
over the last two thousand years. However, having already argued that neither 
the trope of ‘abnormal stagnation’ nor that of ‘European-style progress’ have 
much explanatory value for Korean history, it is necessary to define what those 
particular characteristics of Korean history are. As I have indicated before, it is 
useful to understand the ways in which Korean (or in fact any) history is diver-
gent, not just from such distant (not to say abstract) comparators as Europe, but 
also from Japan, and to an extent, China too. While Korea did not shift towards 
political fragmentation (‘feudalism’) in the way that Japan did in the centuries 
either side of 1000 CE, neither did its hereditary aristocracy give way to an 
appointed bureaucracy to the same extent as occurred in imperial China. In 
the phrase coined by James Palais, Korean dynasties instead established, over 
a number of centuries, an ‘aristocratic/bureaucratic balance’ (Palais 1984). 
This characteristic was itself closely related to a series of other features. First, 
Korean history between 668 and 1910 was dominated by three long-lasting 
dynasties—Silla, Koryŏ and Chosŏn—with only one short interregnum period 
(892–936), culminating in the exceptionally long-lasting Chosŏn dynasty 
(1392–1910). Second, aside from some brief, atypical periods, Korean society 
did not develop a dominant military culture or military class, as happened in 
Japan. Third, the social status structure was relatively rigid and did not allow 
for substantial movement between status groups, meaning that slavery sur-
vived for a long time and there was comparatively little interchange between 
the aristocracy proper (the yangban) and the secondary status groups.10
from Early State formation to Silla Conquest
State formation on and around the Korean peninsula was intersocietal from 
the beginning.11 In fact, it could not have been anything but, as Korean state 
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formation was an example of the universal phenomenon of secondary state 
formation, taking place on the periphery of Chinese civilisation. This inter-
societal interaction took the form of both hierarchical influence from China 
and peer polity interaction with neighbouring polities to the north and on the 
Japanese islands. By the late first millennium BCE, at the latest, there existed 
on the Korean peninsula and in the region to the north (what is now usu-
ally referred to in English as Manchuria), agricultural societies based on the 
farming of rice and other grains, with class differentiation and simple poli-
ties centred around chieftains. There is evidence that at times they coalesced 
into larger confederations (Old Chosŏn, Koguryŏ), but a decisive change 
came with the conquest of the northern part of the Korean peninsula (the 
Taedong and Yalu River basins) in 108 BCE by the Chinese Han Dynasty 
under Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BCE). The Han empire then proceeded to 
create a commandery system in the region that would last for more than 
400 years. This set up a sphere of interaction where the peoples and polities 
of the Korean peninsula, and by extension the Japanese archipelago, came 
into direct contact with Chinese civilisation. Within the main commandery, 
Lelang, which was centred on what is now Pyongyang in the DPRK, a new 
hybrid culture developed with the extensive importation of Chinese intel-
lectual and material culture (Oh 2008). The Han commanderies also fought, 
traded and negotiated with the emergent polities surrounding them. To the 
north and east was Koguryŏ, often seen as a bona fide ancestor of ‘Korea’ 
(especially by the modern North Korean state), which repeatedly went to war 
with the commanderies and which eventually overwhelmed Lelang in the 
fourth century CE. To the south were the confederations of statelets known as 
the Three Han (Samhan) which traded with the commanderies, especially in 
iron. Rulers of early Korean polities were frequently enfeoffed by the leaders 
of the Han commanderies, giving them a form of legitimacy that came from 
the Chinese emperor. With the commanderies there arrived on the peninsula: 
the Chinese writing system, Chinese-style bureaucracy and official ranks, 
attire, architecture, philosophy, weaponry, arts and so on.
However, it was not just a matter of emergent local polities interacting (or 
converging) with a stronger and more advanced neighbouring society. As 
Michael Seth argues (2011, 46), it was the weakening of that stronger neigh-
bour after the fall of the Han Dynasty (220 CE) that allowed the space for 
autonomous peripheral states to develop, just as the somewhat later decline 
of the Roman Empire did at the other end of the Eurasian continent. It was 
the space created by the decline of Chinese hegemony that allowed not only 
for the outright adoption of Chinese culture and forms of class rule but also 
their combination with indigenously generated forms to create new central-
ised monarchical states. This process culminated in the late fourth century 
CE with the beginning of Korea’s Three Kingdoms period, dominated by 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   61 7/13/2016   9:56:01 PM
62 Owen Miller
Koguryŏ in the north, Paekche in the southwest, Silla in the southeast, along-
side the small confederation of Kaya in the central south. This led to a new 
phase of intersocietal development in which multiple Korean states interacted 
with multiple Chinese states and also with multiple emerging polities in 
the Japanese islands, the most prominent of which was Yamato in southern 
Honshu (Barnes 2007; Pai 2000).
In the period from the late fourth century onward, missionary Buddhism 
became an increasingly important vector of Chinese civilisation (and to a 
lesser extent Indian cultural influence) and it is very likely the case that Bud-
dhism was key to the establishment on the Korean peninsula of such impor-
tant technologies as the Chinese writing system and architecture (Seth 2011, 
33). However, Buddhism, Confucianism and other cultural imports were not 
necessarily adopted wholesale or without adaptation in the Three Kingdoms, 
and this is where the issue of combination arises. Indeed, we do not have to 
look far to find combinations of pre-existing forms of rule and culture with 
newly arrived Chinese forms within the Three Kingdoms. Silla provides 
some of the best examples, partly because it was the latest developer among 
the Three Kingdoms,12 but it was by no means unique. As Seth notes (2011, 
38), even the institution of kingship itself ‘had to contend with strong, local, 
tribal and aristocratic traditions’ pushing Sillan kings to ostentatiously seek 
legitimacy in Buddhism by taking Buddhist names and lavishing money on 
the building of temples.
Two institutions in particular stand out as examples of earlier social forms 
that survived into the centralised monarchical Silla state and combined with 
the new social forms. The Hwabaek was a council of aristocrats that made 
important decisions on the basis of unanimity, alongside the monarch, even 
convening to elect the king himself. Such councils of ministers staffed by 
members of prominent aristocratic lineages would continue to be a feature of 
governance in Korea throughout the premodern period, resulting in a monar-
chy that was very rarely all-powerful. A second Sillan social institution was 
the kolp’um or ‘bone rank’ system that theoretically organised the whole of 
Silla society into a series of ascriptive ranks based on birth. At the top were 
two ‘bone ranks’: the ‘sacred bone’ from which kings and queens could be 
chosen and the ‘true bone’ who were the most exalted aristocrats, hailing 
from branches of the royal family and closely related clans. Below these 
were six further head ranks that encompassed the lower ranking aristocrats 
and the commoner class. Like Paekche and Koguryŏ, Silla also introduced a 
system of bureaucratic ranks based on the Chinese model that ran in paral-
lel to the kolp’um system, creating a complex enmeshing of ascriptive and 
bureaucratic status within the aristocracy. We do not know much about the 
internal dynamics of the Sillan ruling class nor its preferred forms of surplus 
extraction, but we can speculate that the kolp’um system was in part a way of 
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controlling both the ascription of privilege and the distribution of surplus, as a 
strategy in the struggle for surplus among non-producers. It also seems likely 
that it had a legacy for later Korean history, with its institutionalisation of 
clear, codified status distinctions and its emphasis on hereditary lineages over 
meritocratic bureaucracy (Seth 2011, 40). There is no doubt that the Three 
Kingdoms period also saw the development of new and more systematic 
forms of class rule and surplus extraction, most notably the introduction of 
formal taxation and the rapid expansion of slavery, spurred by near constant 
warfare between the kingdoms. While it is hard to know just how far state tax 
collection capacities developed, the discovery of Silla village census records 
indicates that, by the eighth or ninth century at least, the Silla state had intro-
duced a complex bureaucratic system for classifying arable land and people 
in order to extract agricultural surplus and labour power (Lee 1984, 80).
The shifting alliances and inter-kingdom warfare of the fifth, sixth and 
seventh centuries also dragged in Japanese polities and eventually became a 
full-scale international war in the late seventh century when Silla allied with 
the Chinese Tang Dynasty to overcome its rivals. Once again the intersoci-
etal stage was decisive in the process of Korean state consolidation as the 
intervention of the newly established Tang at the behest of Silla allowed the 
Korean kingdom to overcome its rivals in 668 and then expel the Chinese, 
creating by 676 the first state encompassing the majority of the Korean 
peninsula.
The fall of Silla and Reconsolidation Under koryŏ
Silla’s conquest of the Korean peninsula south of the Taedong River in the 
late seventh century did not mean that an all-powerful centralised state had 
suddenly been established. Historically, as states such as Silla have expanded 
their territory and attempted to incorporate elements of ‘foreign’ ruling 
classes, it has become more difficult for them to control the distribution of 
surplus and, by extension, to prevent the emergence of alternative power 
centres. By the late eighth century, such centrifugal tendencies were already 
beginning to arise in Later Silla with the rise of a social group described in the 
sources as ‘castle lords’ (sŏngju). The situation worsened in the ninth century 
as resources flowed away from the central state, a process that was also occur-
ring in Tang China and in Heian Japan at the same time. This led to the only 
significant interregnum period in Korea’s premodern history after 676, with 
the breakdown of the kingdom into what became known as the Later Three 
Kingdoms (901–936). This was also a period of rebellion and banditry, the 
new rival kingdoms of Later Koguryŏ and Later Paekche both being founded 
with the help of bandit-rebels. The period saw a repeat of the warfare that had 
dogged the peninsula prior to 676 and ended with the collapse of Silla, and 
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the defeat of Later Paekche by a general named Wang Kŏn. He founded the 
Koryŏ Dynasty, whose rule over the whole peninsula began in 936 and would 
last for over four centuries.
This cycle of consolidation and fragmentation is clearly a universal feature 
of premodern state societies and not in itself particularly remarkable.13 What 
is significant then is the way in which this cycle can cause similar, sometimes 
neighbouring, societies to diverge over the medium term. It is thus worth exam-
ining how Wang Kŏn achieved a reconsolidation of the Korean polity within 
a relatively short space of time and avoided the long-term decline of central 
authority that was experienced in Japan during this period. Certainly, the 
proximity of the Korean peninsula to China allowed Koryŏ, and later Chosŏn, 
to absorb influences from Tang and Song administrative models relatively 
quickly. But the founder Wang Kŏn also pursued some more down to earth 
consolidation strategies, including marrying 29 wives from various warlord 
families and old Silla aristocratic clans. However, the reality was that during 
the first few decades of Koryŏ, while there was a unified overarching political 
authority, a strong centralised state did not yet exist and aristocratic clans and 
warlords still maintained their authority and walled towns in the countryside 
(Duncan 2000, 14). This changed gradually over the next couple of centuries 
as successive Koryŏ kings worked to consolidate the centralised state via vari-
ous means. Some of the most important of these included: the superimposition 
of a bureaucratic administration over local areas; the collection of taxes from 
smaller aristocratic families; the establishment of a large army loyal to the 
royal family; the reorganisation of central government institutions on the Tang 
model; the purging of aristocrats who challenged royal power; and, the halting 
introduction of a meritocratic civil service examination system.
Two particularly notable victories were scored by the state in the ‘struggle 
for surplus’ during this period. The first was a move to reduce the slave 
holdings of aristocrats in the 950s, since slaves were a source of significant 
economic and political power. The second was perhaps the most important 
of all: the introduction of a prebend system called chŏnsi-kwa in which state 
officials were given incomes from non-inheritable grants of land; an by the 
state to bring much larger swathes of surplus under its direct control.14
 As in 
the earlier state formation/consolidation phase of the fourth to fifth centuries, 
it is not the case that Chinese ‘technologies of rule’ were adopted in an unme-
diated fashion; they were instead combined with local institutions and adapted 
to local circumstances, creating new hybrid social institutions. By the twelfth 
century, Koryŏ state consolidation had produced a strong central state, but it 
was by no means a perfect replica of a Chinese model. Instead, sovereignty 
in the countryside took a nested form, with a hierarchy of aristocratic power 
under the central royal power (Seth 2011, 84). Of course, these victories were 
neither complete, nor did they last all that long.15
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The koryŏ–Chosŏn Transition
The transition from the long-lived Koryŏ dynasty to the even longer-lasting 
Chosŏn dynasty took place in the late fourteenth century without any sig-
nificant breakdown of the central state and with relatively minor bloodshed. 
However, over the preceding two centuries the state had been weakened by 
a series of major challenges to the Koryŏ polity. The first of these was a 
military takeover in the late twelfth century that put the Ch’oe family in the 
seat of power for 88 years, leaving the monarchy in place, but powerless. 
The second challenge came from outside the country, with the arrival of the 
Mongols in 1231. A period of bloody upheaval ensued, resulting in Koryŏ 
becoming a client state of the Mongol Yuan dynasty from 1270 until the late 
fourteenth century. Meanwhile, at a molecular level, other processes were 
at work with the emergence of what Duncan terms the ‘central bureaucratic 
aristocracy’ and the appearance of large landed estates owned by aristocratic 
clans. This meant the development of a new aristocracy whose power lay in 
gaining official appointments in the central government, while at the same 
time accumulating large private landholdings, often in other parts of the 
country to a clan’s original ancestral seat. This then created a new form of 
compromise between state and aristocracy in which ‘meritocratic principles 
and bureaucratic procedures were applied within a generally aristocratic 
framework’ (Duncan 2000, 96). However, the source of aristocratic wealth 
remained basically the same during this period and into the early Chosŏn: 
landed estates worked by rent-paying tenants or by slaves. The central 
bureaucratic aristocracy did begin to become a drain on the state in the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries as they both increased the size of their estates 
and their level of control over the peasant population, thus depriving the state 
of revenues from taxes, tribute goods and corvée (Duncan 2000, 185).
This situation of a state weakened by Mongol domination and the draining 
of resources by a powerful bureaucratic aristocracy led to an existential crisis 
for the Koryŏ dynasty and a coup by the Koryŏ general Yi Sŏnggye in 1388. 
As well as putting himself on the throne and declaring a new dynasty in 1392, 
Yi and his supporters set about carrying out a programme of reform in order 
to reconsolidate state power and control over resources. The key moment in 
this process was the Rank Land Law (Kwajŏn Pŏp) of 1391 which attempted 
to re-establish a prebend system and return land outside of the capital region 
to state control. However, it did nothing about the private landholdings of the 
central aristocracy, and this class, now coalescing as the yangban class of the 
Chosŏn dynasty, continued to coexist with the central state in a precarious 
equilibrium. As John Duncan writes (2000, 213): ‘The result was a perennial 
struggle between the Chosŏn state and its yangban officials for access to the 
country’s resources’.
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   65 7/13/2016   9:56:01 PM
66 Owen Miller
Another dimension of the transition from Koryŏ to Chosŏn was ideological, 
as the reformers who allied themselves with Yi Sŏnggye (later King T’aejo) 
were keen adherents of Neo-Confucianism, who believed in the re-ordering 
of both state and society along moral lines laid down by Confucius and by the 
founder of Neo-Confucian thought, Zhu Xi. In practice this meant combining 
abstract ideas about the hierarchical nature of social relations between people, 
with the reality of Korean social and cultural practices. As well as arguably 
aiding in the consolidation of the Korean state after the fourteenth century, 
over a few centuries this brought profound changes to Korean society, push-
ing Buddhism into the margins, diminishing the power of women within the 
family and changing the way in which clans and inheritance were organised.16
The ‘Long Dynasty’: Chosŏn’s 500 years
The Chosŏn dynasty was not only exceptionally long, it was also relatively 
peaceful. The Korean peninsula was left largely undisturbed by the succes-
sive Chinese dynasties of Ming and Qing, provided that Chosŏn accepted 
their suzerainty. At the same time, China was prepared to come to Chosŏn’s 
aid when necessary, in order to protect its own flank, as it did in the 1590s 
when the Japanese under Toyotomi Hideyoshi embarked on two devastating 
invasions of Korea. The peninsula also remained relatively isolated from 
maritime trade routes and the encroachment of European merchants into East 
Asia, beginning in the seventeenth century. While this international setting 
goes some way to explain the longevity and relative stability of the dynasty, 
it was also the outcome of the preceding phases of state consolidation, and 
the particular compromise between state and aristocracy that emerged from 
the Koryŏ–Chosŏn transition. Of course, the struggle for surplus between 
state and aristocracy did not cease during the Chosŏn period, but it was 
contained within certain boundaries, largely through the establishment of 
what Palais called the ‘aristocratic/bureaucratic balance’. This meant that the 
ruling yangban class was defined both by aristocratic status and landholding 
and by the ability of individuals to pass the civil examinations and become 
office holders. Thus the state was able to tie members of the elite to central 
institutions and closely align the fate of individual aristocratic clans with the 
state itself. According to Palais, this was closely related to the absorption and 
implementation of Confucian ideology, leading to an ‘increased emphasis 
on knowledge, writing, and the civil arts through the use of the examination 
system for recruitment, and a decrease in inherited status’ (Palais 1984, 430).
Although contained, the struggle over surplus clearly did continue dur-
ing Chosŏn, and, as in the Koryŏ period, there was a long-term tendency for 
resources to drain away from central control and for private landholdings and 
slaveholdings to increase at the expense of central tax revenues. This struggle 
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could take various forms in different periods and circumstances. For example, 
in the century after the Hideyoshi invasions of 1592–1598, the slave popula-
tion became a locus of conflict between the state and the yangban.17 On the one 
hand, the yangban wanted to increase, or at least maintain, their holdings of 
slaves, as they were one of their main sources of wealth. On the other, the gov-
ernment wished to control and reduce yangban slave holdings, as slaves did not 
pay tax or provide corvée and were thus a drain on state resources. To increase 
their holdings of slaves the yangban encouraged mixed slave-commoner mar-
riages, while in response, the state enacted laws that would emancipate the 
children of such marriages (Palais 1996, 231–32). The state also attempted to 
gain closer control over the population and prevent the slave population from 
increasing by carrying out regular censuses and enforcing an identity tag sys-
tem called hop’ae in the mid-seventeenth century (Seth 2011, 150).18
The more conventional push and pull between tax and rent also continued 
into the late Chosŏn period and, in fact, intensified. This mostly took the form 
of an increasing area of land that lay outside of taxation because yangban 
clans found ways to keep their landholdings off the tax registers, through 
bribery and official forms of tax exemption. Besides the landholdings of 
yangban clans, there also arose the problem of increasingly rich and powerful 
Confucian Academies (sŏwon) that had come to have a position analogous to 
the Buddhist church in the Koryŏ dynasty, or perhaps the Christian church in 
medieval Europe. With their own large holdings of land and slaves, they had, 
by the mid-nineteenth century, become another locus of surplus extraction 
and redistribution outside of the control of the state. Thus, as Palais notes 
(1991, 61), even in the mid-eighteenth century, 150 years after the devasta-
tion of the Hideyoshi invasions, the Chosŏn state had not been able to recover 
the tax base it had before the war. During the nineteenth century, the tax base 
continued to narrow and tax revenues decreased drastically over the course 
of the century, giving rise to a full-blown fiscal crisis by the 1870s–1880s, 
when the government was effectively insolvent (Pak and Pak 1988; Miller 
2016, 85–86).
Much effort has been expended by Korean historians to locate progressive 
tendencies in the late Chosŏn period (1598–1910) in order to make the argu-
ment that Korea was moving decisively towards capitalism and modernity 
under its own steam. The evidence for this is weak, but this does not mean 
that the adjective ‘stagnant’ can be applied to this period of Korean history 
(Miller 2007, 23–29). Korean society continued to have its own dynamic, 
shaped by the struggle over surplus and its relations with its neighbours, that 
cannot be reduced to either side of the stagnation/progress binary. After the 
Hideyoshi invasions some new elements were added to this dynamic, most 
significantly a clear tendency towards commercialisation of aspects of the 
economy, which aided economic recovery but also added new elements of 
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instability to the social system as a whole. However, even in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, after some four centuries in existence, the Chosŏn 
state retained a formidable capacity to extract and redistribute surplus, which 
meant that merchants relied on the state in a multitude of ways and commerce 
itself was firmly embedded in the tributary social system. This embedding 
of commerce and the stalemate achieved by the state in its struggle with the 
yangban aristocracy seem to be the two main factors that led early modern 
Japanese observers to label Korea as stagnant.
Premodern Korean history over the long durée was, therefore, a story of 
state formation and consolidation, punctuated by crises that were repeatedly 
resolved in favour of a stable central state with increasing powers of surplus 
extraction. This process, mediated constantly by Korea’s intersocietal rela-
tions with its neighbours, led to a particular form of state-aristocracy compro-
mise not seen in either premodern China or Japan, that has been termed the 
‘aristocratic/bureaucratic balance’.
CoNCLUSIoN
In this chapter I have set out to argue for a different way of approaching 
Korean history over the longue durée that moves decisively away from the 
Eurocentric starting point implied by both sides of the stagnation/progress 
dichotomy. I have also attempted to show how this approach could work in 
practice when applied to some key events and processes over the course of 
1,600 years of Korean history. In doing this I positioned myself explicitly 
against the theory of ‘Asiatic’ stagnation propounded in various forms by 
Japanese colonial historians and Korean Marxists alike, demonstrating how 
these approaches tended towards circularity of argument and were based 
largely on the notions of historical abnormality and lack, when compared to 
the European model. Moreover, I also rejected the idea of an inherent and 
inevitable progress in Korean history, as advocated by many postcolonial 
Korean historians. This model too is founded on Eurocentric, method-
ologically nationalist assumptions and suffers from a weak empirical basis. 
Instead, I argued for a reconceptualisation of Korean history—like all histo-
ries—as fundamentally constituted by unevenness and combination within 
a field of heterogeneous societies and polities, at different spatial scales, in 
constant relations with one another.
As shown above, this approach brings to the fore certain features of Korean 
history over the longue durée. First, over this long period the trend was con-
sistently towards the consolidation of the central state, despite inter-dynastic 
crises and devastating wars and invasions. However, this does not mean that 
the Korean state settled once and for all the struggle over surplus. Instead it 
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would be more accurate to say that the struggle raged on for the whole period 
over the collection of tax and rent and the ownership of land, over slavehold-
ings and over the provision of corvée labour. But through various means, 
most prominently the adoption of a Chinese-style bureaucracy and examina-
tion system with its accompanying Confucian ideology, successive Korean 
states were able to at least contain the struggle over surplus and in the process 
create the aristocratic/bureaucratic balance that characterised the Korean 
ruling class prior to the twentieth century. Along with this came a series of 
other features that set Korea apart from Japan, including, but no limited to, 
the non-development of a distinct military culture or military class; a rela-
tively rigid ascriptive status hierarchy with a large slave population; and the 
embedding of commerce within tributary social relations. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean there is anything abnormal about Korean history, it is rather, 
a completely normal sub-unit of the wider picture of human history and no 
doubt many other histories can be found that display similar characteristics.
I have aimed to outline above the way in which the history of a particular 
society is a continuous pattern of divergence and convergence (or unevenness 
and combination) within a wider field of polities. In premodern societies like 
the one examined here this pattern was deeply intertwined with the question 
of coercive surplus extraction and distribution. On the one side, the struggle 
over surplus between state and elite was decisively shaped by intersocietal 
relations, including wars, transfers of ideas, institutional forms and technolo-
gies, tribute, trade and diplomacy. In other words, ‘the international’ was con-
stitutive of the ‘internal’ social structure and the balance between central and 
local power in a particular society. On the other side, the changing shape of 
state-aristocracy (central-local) relations within a society produced uneven-
ness at the intersocietal level, bringing about the divergence of neighbouring 
societies such as Korea and Japan over the long term. 
NoTES
1. The key figure in establishing the backwardness of Korean history was 
Japanese economist Fukuda Tokuzō (1874–1930), who had studied under Karl 
Bücher and Lujo Brentano in Munich. See: Miller 2010, 4–5.
2. Perry Anderson (1974, 462–72) has identified the key features of the AMP as: 
(1) state ownership of land; (2) independent village communities; (3) servile social 
equality; (4) lack of a nobility; (5) state hydraulic works; (6) influence of geography 
and climate; and (7) stagnation.
3. For previous critiques in English of the South Korean historiography, see 
Palais (1998) Duncan (2000, 3–6) and Eckert (1991, 1–6).
4. In his Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, Perry Anderson argues for a 
distinct ‘nomadic mode of production’ as well as slave, ‘tribal-communal’ and feudal 
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modes (218). His understanding of the concept of mode of production is also clearly 
set out in the conclusion to his Lineages of the Absolutist State.
5. For Samir Amin’s original description of the tributary mode of production, 
see Amin (1976, 13–58). Eric Wolf’s chapter on modes of production in Europe and 
the People without History (1982, 73–100) is one of the most concise and illuminat-
ing pieces on the concept. For Wolf, human societies have been dominated by three 
MOPs: kin-ordered, tributary and capitalist, although he deliberately refuses to see 
these three as part of an ‘evolutionary sequence’, preferring to talk of ‘historical rela-
tions’ between them.
6. As Marx wrote in Capital, Volume III: ‘The surplus labour for the nominal 
owner of the land can only be extorted from them by other than economic pressure, 
whatever the form assumed may be’ (quoted in Wolf 1982, 80).
7. See in particular Chapter 5 (‘State Formation and the Struggle for Surplus’) 
where Haldon examines a number of different tributary social formations.
8. Many would argue that the intersocietal character of human development goes 
back much earlier than this, but for the purpose of the argument here it is sufficient to 
note that it dates from at least the period of early state formation.
9. For a discussion of UCD in pre-capitalist societies, see Matin 2007, 428–29.
10. By secondary status groups here I mean those groups or social layers who were 
not members of the yangban aristocracy and could not participate in the higher exami-
nations but were nonetheless more privileged than commoners and slaves and had 
formed long-lasting lineages with access to their own privileges. Examples include 
the chungin class of technical specialists, the local clerks called hyangni, the military 
class called muban and the officially sanctioned merchants.
11. Talking about early Korean state formation is immediately fraught with dif-
ficulties due to the fact that it is impossible at this time to define anything as being 
‘Korean’ in the sense that we mean it today. However, here I will use the working 
definition of any emerging polity, whether existing on the Korean peninsula proper 
or to its north, that was clearly a historical antecedent of the first generally accepted 
‘Korean’ states of the Three Kingdoms period (c. fourth century CE–668 CE).
12. Because Silla eventually conquered the other kingdoms subsequent historiog-
raphy has been heavily slanted in its favour. Thus the traditional date for the founding 
of Silla is the earliest (57 BCE) even though it did not emerge as a state until centuries 
after Koguryŏ.
13. In an interesting section on Silla's rise and fall in global perspective, Michael 
Seth notes that ‘The eighth century was a period of political centralization and 
outward trade and prosperity in most of Eurasia, while the late ninth was a period 
of political fragmentation and decline’. He goes on to note that Korea, while on 
the periphery, was obviously already integrated into the wider Eurasian or even 
Afro-Eurasian world (Seth 2011, 73).
14. Palais wrote of this system that it was ‘an ambitious attempt by the central 
government to assert its control over the income of the ruling class, to increase its 
strength at the expense of the aristocrats of Korean society’ (Palais 1982, 185).
15. Palais estimated (1982, 184) that prebendal land only made up one fifth of all 
arable land in the mid-Koryŏ period.
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16. The classic work on this process of social change is Deuchler (1992).
17. There has been considerable debate over the character of slavery in premodern 
Korea. As was the case in many premodern societies, the term used for slave—nobi 
奴婢—can cover a great variety of different modes of existence and degrees of 
unfreedom. This could range from people who lived and worked in the household 
of their yangban owner to others who resided far away from their owner, living and 
working independently on their land much like tenant farmers or serfs.
18. This brief discussion of the struggle over slaveholdings is indebted to an MA 
dissertation by Sangwon Shin (2015).
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Chapter 5
Combination as ‘foreign Policy’
The Intersocietal origins of 
the ottoman Empire
Kerem Nişancioğlu
The study of the origins of the Ottoman Empire is an inherently ‘specula-
tive and perilous’ (Goffman 2002, 29) exercise, limited by a ‘black hole’ 
(Imber 1987) of historiography that is deprived of reliable first hand 
sources yet bursting with politically charged historiographical propagandis-
ing (Abou-El-Haj 1991, 23–25; Tezcan 2011, 83).1 Written during the period 
of Ottoman imperial decline, the first-wave of modern Ottoman historiogra-
phy tended to emphasise the political and institutional weaknesses of Turkic 
and Muslim people as part of a wider political project of imperial penetration 
into the Middle East. In 1916, Herbert Adams Gibbons argued that Ottoman 
administrative forms were appropriated from Byzantium, through the con-
quest and defections of Christians (Gibbons 1916; see also Diehl 1957 
[1920]). In a study that would inform the orientalism of modernisation theory 
(see e.g. Huntington 1968b; Landau 1984; Lewis 2002; Zurcher 1993), Paul 
Wittek (2012) argued that it was the proselytising zeal of Muslim ghazi 
bands that was the motive force behind Ottoman expansion. The essence of 
the Ottoman Empire was therefore to be found in the religious-ideological 
identity of Islam. In the context of the Kemalist project of state building in the 
1930s Fuat Köprülü sought to challenge Western approaches by rearticulat-
ing Ottoman history through the methodological straitjacket of nationalism 
(Köprülü 1992a; 1992b; 1999). He therefore emphasised the morphology of 
the Oğuz tribe, via the Seljuks, into the Ottoman Empire by tracing a lineage 
of political leadership that was ethnically Turkish in essence.
Historical materialist accounts were at the forefront of the second wave of 
Ottoman historiography, providing a much-needed corrective to the essential-
ism that pervaded the first-wave by placing an emphasis on social relations of 
production. Whether conceptualised as tributary (Banaji 2011; Haldon 1993), 
feudal (Avcıoğlu 1968, 15–16; Berktay 1987; 1990; Boratav 1983; Haldon 
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1991), or Asiatic (Divitçioğlu 1967, 34; Islamoğlu-Inan and Keyder 1976; 
1977; 1987; Nalbantoğlu 1978, 65–66)2 certain social relations were identi-
fied as crucial to understanding the Ottoman Empire—a division between 
the ruling askeri class and the ruled peasant reaya class on the one hand; 
and an intra-ruling class division between a central patrimonial authority and 
provincial landed elites on the other. Surplus was appropriated through taxes 
that were paid by peasants to local landed elites, who either transferred them 
to the Ottoman patrimonial centre—the sultan and the devsirme—or kept 
them in return for military service, as institutionalised in the tımar system. 
The logic of Ottoman power was therefore rooted in a tributary relationship, 
wherein the Ottoman state obtained control over the means of production and 
the ruling class. Thus, built into historical materialist accounts was a social 
relational understanding of the functioning of Ottoman power.
However, historical materialist accounts generated their own peculiar—
very much materialist—essentialisation and ossification of Ottoman history 
by replicating an image of the empire as static and incapable of change. They 
have therefore been unable to account for how social relations between the 
peasantry, landed elite and patrimonial ruler were reconfigured, especially 
from the eighteenth century onwards (Tansel 2015; Tezcan 2010). Such 
accounts were moreover unable to explain how and why the Ottoman Empire 
was constructed around these particular social relations, and were unable to 
provide an account for the origins of their particular configuration (Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu 2015).
When taken together these differing approaches show that there is an 
enduring problem of essentialisation and ossification in the way the Ottoman 
Empire has been theorised, whether in terms of Islam, Turkish ethnicity, 
Byzantine institutions or social relations of production. This chapter dem-
onstrates that the source of this problem is rooted in a social ontology that 
derives some foundational essence of the Ottoman Empire from within, be it 
cultural, ethnic, institutional, or social. That is, each of the above approaches 
is guilty of a pervasive internalism, where the history of the empire is 
explained exclusively through its own internal features (Nişancioğlu 2014).
It seems, then, in order to free the study of the Ottoman Empire from the 
shackles of essentialism and ossification, we must break out of the inter-
nalist straitjacket that has for too long informed Ottoman historiography. 
In this chapter I argue that the idea of uneven and combined development 
(UCD)3
 provides a particularly apposite framework through which we can 
move beyond internalism and in so doing de-essentialise theorisations of the 
Ottoman Empire. The ‘uneven’ of UCD demands that we cannot approach 
the question of how the Ottoman Empire came into being from an onto-
logically singular perspective (i.e. as the single legacy or morphology of a 
particular society, say Muslim, Turkic, Seljuk or Byzantine). It must rather 
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be understood as occurring within a developmentally differentiated social 
totality—an intersocietal world—which in turn necessitates a broader syn-
chronic viewpoint—a world-historical perspective that incorporates studies 
of Anatolian, Inner Asian and Byzantine history is required. The ‘combina-
tion’ of UCD demands we incorporate, rather than overlook, points of inter-
action between these differentiated units and their combinatory consequences 
as constitutive pieces of the Ottoman puzzle.
In particular, I seek to show that the historically specific class configurations 
(between peasantry, patrimonial authority and landed aristocracy) and the logic 
of power (state control over the means of production and the ruling class) that 
made up the Ottoman Empire were constituted and determined, in large part, 
by international conditions. These relations between peasantry, patrimonial 
authority and landed aristocracy were not formed solely through the unfolding of 
an internal Ottoman dynamic, but were the products of an interactive—that is, an 
uneven and combined—form of development. More specifically still, I seek to 
show that the institutions through which these class relations were expressed—
the reaya-askeri distinction, tımar land allocations and the central functions of 
the devşirme and sultan—were all products of combined development.
In the first section I will elucidate the unevenness of the Anatolian geopo-
litical milieu in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This section demon-
strates how a multiplicity of social formations was constitutive of Anatolian 
history in this period with a particular focus on the Inner Asian nomads, the 
Seljuk Empire and the Byzantine Empire. I argue that the ebb and flow of 
these social formations, and their attendant interactions, created a peculiar 
geopolitical condition rife with a multiplicity of social relations, identities 
and institutional forms. Then, in the second section I will turn to how these 
conditions intersected and interacted. I argue that it was out of the flux of 
the north-western Anatolian corner of Bithynia that the Ottoman emirate 
emerged and expanded into an empire. As such, it was deeply imbued with 
the traditions of this geopolitical context and came to draw on the heteroge-
neous heritages of these different influences in its period of state building. 
The genesis of the Ottoman state, from semi-nomadic tribe into sedentary 
empire, was in turn defined by a series of responses to this specifically inter-
societal context, and that an Ottoman ‘foreign policy’ of combination—of 
combining the developmental achievements of these various actors—was 
constitutive of the Ottoman state as such.
UNEvENNESS IN ANAToLIA
Our starting point is therefore the social unevenness of the Anatolian milieu in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This was a period in which the flow and 
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ebb of Mongol invasions had opened the region to migrations of Turkic pas-
toral nomads from Inner Asia. These invasions precipitated the fall of Seljuk 
rule, while in the West the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade 
eventually inspired the Byzantines to turn their imperial attention to reconsoli-
dating their western territories. This left Anatolia, the lands in the middle of 
this geopolitical vacuum, in a highly fragmented state of flux, comprised of a 
multiplicity of nomadic, semi-nomadic and sedentary communities, dynasties 
and statelets. There was a large Christian Byzantine sedentary population that 
had remained in Asia Minor despite the breakdown in Byzantine rule. There 
were nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkic tribes, most typically wedded to the 
traditions of the Inner Asian steppe and Ilkhanid structures of rule. There were 
wandering Muslim literati of the former Seljuk administration searching for 
employment. In addition, there were sizable traces of Christian crusaders such 
as Franks and Catalans, and pockets of Jewish communities.
Inner Asian Nomadism
The source of much of this unevenness can be found in the geopolitics of the 
Eurasian steppe from the thirteenth century onwards. Marked by the persis-
tent opposition and interaction between nomadic and settled peoples (Matin 
2007) the steppe proved conducive to the establishment of vast nomadic 
empires, capable of waves of conquest that spread from China in the East to 
Byzantium in the West. The geopolitical conflicts between nomadic and sed-
entary groups would often create internecine conflicts over access to land or 
over spoils of raids. This meant that ‘when one group triumphed over another, 
the latter would flee and push aside a third to secure for itself an area for graz-
ing’ (Chaliand 2006, 3). Waves of nomadic empire building would therefore 
tend to create ‘chain reactions’ of displacement, migration and resettlement 
that transmitted the peoples and traditions of nomadism throughout Inner 
Asia to its hinterlands.
Among the inheritors of such transmissions and combinations was the 
Ottoman Empire. We see this in a series of westward demographic shifts, 
brought about by three waves of Inner Asian nomadic migrations and empire 
building between the tenth and thirteenth century, that drove Turkic nomads 
into Anatolia. The first at the beginning of the tenth century witnessed large-
scale migrations westwards that culminated in the advancement of the Seljuks 
across Asia Minor. The Seljuk victory over the Byzantines in the Battle of 
Manzikert in 1071 firmly established the dynasty in Asia, and opened the 
pastures of Anatolia to waves of Turkic nomadic migrations from the east 
(Cahen 2001, 14; Turan 1970, 233). With the second wave of migrations 
from 1230 to 1270, the Mongols established an administrative hold over cen-
tral Asia and Asia minor, forcing existing populations to migrate westwards 
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(Lindner 1983, 15; Melville 2009, 53). It is in the context of this second wave 
of migrations that the arrival of the Ottomans in Bithynia must be placed. 
The Noghai, a Pontic nomadic community, were driven to Bithynia to escape 
the Mongolian expansion (Heywood 2000, 109–14; Kafadar 1995, 44–45). 
Through relations of war and alliance with Byzantine and Bulgarian princes, 
the Noghai became important actors in the region, developing knowledge 
of the new and abandoned lands on the Byzantine marches in the process 
(Zachariadou 1978, 262). Following Noghai’s death, his followers settled 
in Bithynia, forming the embryonic Ottoman state. Indeed, Heywood argues 
that the very name ‘Osman’ evolved from the Pontic term for leader of a tribe 
– Ataman (Heywood 2000, 113).
Finally, a third wave intersected with the growth of the Ottoman Empire at 
the turn of the fifteenth century. Under the rule of Timur, the Ilkhanid Empire 
poured westwards, defeating the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I in Ankara (1402) 
and establishing administrative control over much of Anatolia. The Ottomans 
were placed under Ilkhanid suzerainty, while many of the Anatolian nomadic 
leaders (beys) that had become vassals of the Ottomans switched allegiance 
to Timur who restored them to their original autonomy (Lindner 2009, 109). 
This instantiated a temporary reform of Ottoman state practices (İnalcık 2000, 
17–21), in particular raising the significance of maintaining a centralised state 
that could withstand the fragmentary tendencies of nomadic empires. The 
significance of this for the emergence of the tributary mode of production will 
be elaborated in the final section.
These developments also precipitated the transmission of the Inner Asian 
traditions into Asia Minor, firstly by Inner Asian nomads, then the Seljuks 
and Mongol Tümen and then later by the Ottomans (Lindner 2009, 116). The 
development of the Khan’s household armies, pioneered by Chenghis Khan’s 
cerig army, was directly appropriated in the Ottoman case, with the recruit-
ment of the yeniceri (‘new cerig’) standing army (Togan 1991, 196). Many 
Ilkhanid practices in land regulation and tax appropriation were directly 
copied by the Ottomans; in the case of extraordinary taxes (avariz), and taxes 
levied in kind for military purposes (ulufa), the Ottomans used exactly the 
same terms as the Ilkhanids (Shinder 1978, 509–510). Ottoman coins were 
modelled on Ilkhanid predecessors, adopting the monetary unit akçe (Lindner 
2007, 96). Like the Mongols, the Ottoman conception of law making was 
defined in the secular terms of the supreme ruler’s will. The secular Ottoman 
legal code, the Kanun was in many ways referential to the Mongolian jasagh 
(Togan 1991, 195). And like the Ilkhanids, this secular code co-existed with 
the Şeriat Islamic law (Shinder 1978, 510).
It was not just the institutional principles of nomadism that continued 
once the Ottomans became a more sedentary polity. The mobility of nomad-
ism itself was a constitutive feature of Ottoman society well up until the 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   77 7/13/2016   9:56:01 PM
78 Kerem Nişancioğlu
eighteenth century. Indeed, nomads constituted 27 percent of Anatolian 
population as late as the 1520s (Kasaba 2009, 66–74). But moreover, the 
practice of sürgün (‘obligatory transfer’) required the migration of sedentary 
and nomadic communities in order to settle in newly conquered territories. 
This could be used either to coerce rebellious tribes, or to generate consent 
by offering improved living standards in newly annexed lands and frontiers. 
In short, the very mobility of nomadism constituted a crucial plank in the 
mediation of relations between patrimonial authority, landed nobility and the 
peasantry.
The early Ottoman ‘state’ was therefore deeply imbued with the character-
istics of the nomadic mode of production, which is central to grasping how 
and why it was able to successfully conduct its own imperial formation. A 
key ‘value’ of nomadic state formation in this regard was the way in which it 
responded to incorporating the ‘incremental complexity’ of territorial expan-
sion and conquest through an ‘expanding range of solutions to issues of 
governance’ (Di Cosmo 1999, 28). The peculiarity of Ottoman state building 
therefore lies in its distinctive solution to the growing complexity of social 
relations that came with its territorial expansion—that is, how these inher-
ited nomadic tendencies were combined with and refracted through social 
relations whose origins came from spatial settings distinct from the Inner 
Asian norms. It is therefore necessary to trace the influence of these other 
influences—Seljuk-Islamic and European-Christian.
The breakdown of the Seljuk Empire
The Seljuk state itself was built precisely through the nomadic ‘laws of 
motion’ elucidated above, involving a synthesis of sedentarised hierarchi-
cal institutions with nomadic horizontal ones. As the Seljuks passed from 
nomadic confederation to sedentary tributary state ‘new elements were added 
en route or absorbed in the new homeland’ (Golden 1992, 207). At its core 
was an egalitarian structure of regional rulers—maliks or emirs—each of 
whom had a legitimate claim to the title of Sultan or Supreme Sovereign 
(Golden 1992, 220; İnalcık 1976, 10). (Geo)political competition both 
within the empire (among competing regional rulers) and without (primarily 
Mongolians and Byzantines, but also Christian crusades), necessitated the 
maintenance of a military structure that could withstand these centrifugal and 
centripetal forces (Cahen 1968, 35–36; Golden 1992, 207).
First, the Seljuks utilised conscription—ghulam (Bosworth 2010, 51). 
Through this system, slaves were levied from conquered lands, converted 
to Islam and transferred to the Seljuk palace to form a standing army which 
at its peak numbered 12,000 men (Turan 1970, 254). Secondly, in order to 
meet the double challenge of supporting ghulam and appeasing Turcoman 
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nomadic marchers, the Seljuks granted iqta—non-inheritable pieces of land 
in which all ownership and governance was deferred to the Seljuk palace 
(Amitai 2010, 546). Smaller iqta were granted to ghulam commanders 
(Cahen 1968, 39) and conferred the right of tax collection in exchange for 
military service to the central authority (Findley 2004, 70–71). Larger iqtas 
were usually assigned to the most powerful Turcoman commanders—emirs 
or maliks—on the frontiers of the empire, thereby serving a triple purpose: 
to mobilise against external threats; to carry out increased expansion; and to 
mitigate against any provincial challenge by these commanders to central 
authority (Bosworth 2010; Turan 1970, 232). Thirdly, Seljuk rule depended 
heavily on akhis—urban confraternities organised around heterodox Islam 
and linked by solidarity and comradeship. These were fraternal organisations 
for the regulation of work, production and trade, and groups of social activ-
ists that could at times challenge and undermine ruling aristocracies, gov-
ernments and the orthodoxy of the Caliph (Cahen 1968, 199–200; Lindner 
2009, 106). They could also be deployed as supplementary military forces to 
defend towns in the event they came under attack (Cahen 1968, 337–41). In 
certain towns where no regional rulers lived, akhis would function as de facto 
governors, maintaining law and order, engaging in charitable exercises and 
providing local infrastructure such as hospices and communal shelter (Golden 
1992, 356). In this context akhi-dominated cities appeared as proto-city-state 
republics, semi-independent of any religious authority or sovereign (Lowry 
2003, 71–72). These were sufficiently powerful groups that maintained social 
cohesion in the aftermath of Seljuk collapse, and thus formed a vital basis of 
political and economic power that the Ottomans would have to come to terms 
with during their own period of expansion.
Finally, these practices were underpinned, legitimised and codified through 
the cultivation of Muslim scholar-administrators—either members of the 
ulema or more heterodox dervishes—to its imperial centre. In particular, the 
Seljuks were the first to give centres of Islamic scholarship—medresses—
real importance; the scale and institutionalisation of them under the Seljuks 
was unprecedented (Cahen 1968, 43). Moreover, the ulema were able to 
acquire great wealth and institutionalise their power through waqfs, which 
were pious foundations, primarily established to benefit a religious institu-
tion such as a mosque, school or hospital (Cahen 1968, 178). Between waqfs 
and medresses, the Seljuks cultivated Islamic officials—kadıs—to admin-
ister state functions through the application of Şeriat. Seljuk state building 
also involved the provision of conquered towns with their own kadı (Cahen 
1968, 152) who would legitimise Seljuk rule (and rulers), administer ordi-
nary justice, occasionally perform some military and diplomatic tasks, act as 
judicial consultancy and supervision of trade, crafts and land titles (Ephrat 
2002, 34–37; Rogers 1976, 71).
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By the end of the thirteenth century the Seljuks proved incapable of 
sustaining the empire. Confronted by the geopolitical pressure of Mongol 
expansion and prone to internal divisions, the Seljuks eventually collapsed 
following the fatal defeat to the Golden Horde in the battle of Köse Dağı 
in 1243 (Lindner 1983, 12). Subsequently, the geopolitics of the Anatolian 
region became defined by the tumultuous relations between a multiplicity of 
statelets (beyliks) that emerged out of the ashes of Seljuk rule (Turan 1970, 
251)—Germinyans, Karamans Mentese, Aydin, Saruhan, Karasi and Osman 
(Golden 1992, 354–55).
In addition to these beyliks, the collapse of Seljuk rule had left in its wake 
akhis, kadıs and dervishes who carried the institutional and cultural memory 
of Seljuk statecraft. With the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia in 
the fourteenth century, these institutions would become assimilated into the 
Ottoman state, eventually becoming a part of the administrative backbone of 
the proto-Ottoman state. Medresse educated Islamic schoolmen and former 
kadıs migrated to Ottoman territories where their clerical capabilities were 
required to govern sedentary polities. Akhis remained in towns and villages 
throughout Anatolia, providing social and economic ties and administra-
tive continuity between beyliks (Lindner 2009, 115). Dervishes would be 
patronised in order to consolidate and unify ideologically diverse and het-
erodox communities (Golden 1992, 359). These were agents of combined 
development that were central to transmitting and developing Islamic legal 
codes and institutional features to the Ottomans. The use of Arabic codes 
in early waqf entitlements (Lowry 2003, 79), the extensive presence of akhi 
taverns, hospitals and soup kitchens in Ottoman towns and the marriage of 
Osman with the daughter of a dervish (Golden 1992, 359) all point to a strong 
Seljuk influence in the early Ottoman state. Later, as sedentarisation became 
a necessity, the Ottomans would repeat the Seljuk practice of drawing on 
slave recruits—kul—from its conquered territories to furnish a standing 
army—Janissaries—and the state bureaucracy—devşirme (Shaw 1976, 27). 
This central administration was counter-posed with tımar land grants which 
would support frontier marchers and Janissaries in much the same way as 
Seljuk iqtas functioned. Thus, ‘seemingly, within two generations of their 
emergence the Ottomans had taken on many of the administrative trappings 
of earlier Islamic dynasties via the medium of the Seljuks’ (Lowry 2003, 86).
The Ebb of the byzantine Empire
The flux of the Anatolian milieu was additionally complexified by develop-
ments that affected the other remaining imperial power in the region—the 
Byzantine Empire. Despite very different origins, rooted in the breakdown 
of Roman imperial power, the Byzantines shared many similarities with the 
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Seljuks with whom they competed over the territories of Anatolia. Central to 
Byzantine social reproduction was control over land and its taxation, in which 
the landlord-tenant relation was subsumed under a state that could exercise a 
high degree of control over the local aristocracy (Frankopan 2009, 113–15). 
Imperial authorities controlled provincial magnates, denying them any real 
autonomy—‘born out of service to the sovereign’ the position and reproduc-
tion of the aristocracy ‘never ceased to be linked to him’ (Cheynet 2006, 42). 
The state was also responsible for setting the levels of peasant taxation and 
protecting their status as formally free of any ties to local magnates (Harvey 
2003, 46–47).
Consequently, imperial involution took hold as the central authority lost 
both its internal coherence and its control over provincial functionaries. 
The impulse for this breakdown was intersocietal. The combined effects of 
Frankish conquests, Bulgarian wars, demographic pressure from Slav, Bulgar 
and Turkic migrations, Mongol invasions and Seljuk incursions meant that by 
the late eleventh century, the Byzantine Empire had lost substantial amounts of 
political authority in Asia Minor and South Eastern Europe (Chrysostomides 
2009, 6, 9–10, 21–22, 29). In this period, state control over its rural magnates 
weakened to the point that provincial armies were dismantled and internal 
court conflicts and civil wars became a persistent feature of imperial politics 
(Anderson 1996, 277). The weakening of central authority reached an apex 
in the Komneni era (1081–1185), when provincial magnates gained control 
of the state and institutionalised pronoia land benefices (Oikonomides 2002, 
1042). These gave pronoia holders extensive autonomy in local provinces, 
with control over fiscal and military powers, in return for military service to 
the empire. Decentralisation became the norm as pronoia was extended so 
that holders could appoint non-state managers in place of state officials to 
administer new holdings (Lindner 1983, 12). When Constantinople was cap-
tured by the Fourth Crusade in 1202, a weakened Byzantine imperial centre 
resorted to multiplying and expanding pronoia in its remaining territories until 
eventually many of these landholdings became hereditary (Harvey 2003, 71; 
Oikonomides 2002, 1056). Moreover, numerous typically feudal practices 
were imported into the region by Frankish crusaders, further undermining 
central authority (Anderson 1996, 282). With these developments, ‘free peas-
ants were increasingly degraded into dependent tenants or paroikoi’, whose 
enserfment caused growing social stratification and deterioration in their 
social wellbeing (Harvey 2003, 37). In Asia Minor this process was especially 
intense. The loss of Constantinople and the relocation of the imperial capital 
to Nicaea precipitated the subordination of Anatolian peasants to new pronoia 
landowners that had moved into the region from the west (Harvey 2003, 77).
The Nicaean period (1204–1261) also saw the emergence of akritai border 
guards. These were semi-independent auxiliary troops that were established 
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as part of an extensive frontier defence system designed to protect Nicaea 
from Turkic nomadic marchers—akıncıs or ghazis. Akritai were exempt from 
taxation and entitled to full disposition of booty acquired through border 
raids (Lindner 1983, 11). Some were entitled to small non-hereditary pronoia 
landholdings, while all were supplemented by an annual wage intended to 
maintain loyalty to the imperial centre (Oikonomides 2002, 1044). But under 
the reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus (1259–1282) their independence was 
circumscribed as they were assimilated as campaign troops. This had a nega-
tive impact on their material position in Byzantine society, often resulting in 
interruptions in their pay and restrictions on land entitlements (Bartusis 1997, 
304). The decline in material standing of akritai in Anatolia occurred largely 
because following the recapture of Constantinople in 1261, the Byzantine 
Empire’s attention turned almost exclusively to maintaining and expand-
ing its western territories. Michael VIII reordered the social organisation 
of Anatolia by neglecting akritai upkeep and re-garrisoning his armies in 
Europe from which he would conduct further military campaigns. Breaking 
these military ties created a lack of security in Anatolia, leading to military 
decay and economic breakdown (Imber 2009, 6–7; Vryonis 1975, 47).
The recession of Byzantine rule in Anatolia left in its wake a neglected mil-
itary class and a discontented local population that had become distrustful and 
disobedient of Byzantine tax burdens (Anderson 1996, 292; Sugar 1993, 3). 
It was the Byzantine’s failure to protect Bithynia and subsequent restlessness 
of its Anatolian subjects that opened numerous geopolitical possibilities for 
Turkic expansion into Byzantine territories. As Turkic nomads overwhelmed 
Byzantine landholdings through migration and predation, there was little or 
no resistance from local peasant populations (Anderson 1996, 292). In the 
context of widespread imperial collapse—both Byzantine and Seljuk—the 
loyalty of local populations came to be based less on imperial allegiance 
or ideology and more on mutual advantage (Goffman 2002, 33). Many 
Christian lords and akritai became socially closer to Turkic akıncıs than their 
Byzantine compatriots and switched allegiance to tribal groupings—such as 
the Ottomans—that offered better prospects of social and material security 
and gains (Bartusis 1997, 304). As the Ottoman Empire expanded westwards, 
Greek, Armenian, Slav and Albanian nobility became prominent members of 
the early Ottoman ruling class (Vryonis 1969, 269).
The symbiosis of Christian and Turkic communities demonstrates not 
only the efficacy of Inner Asian norms of empire building practiced by the 
Ottomans in this Christian setting, but also the fact that Christians were 
crucial to the construction of the Ottoman state. The importance of this fron-
tier syncretism in Ottoman state formation was personified in the figures of 
Köse Mihal and Gazi Evrenos, two cofounders of the early Ottoman state 
alongside the eponymous Osman (Lowry 2003, 64). Both were originally 
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Christian. Mihal was a Byzantine frontier lord (Lowry 2003, 8) and Evrenos 
was most likely of Aragonese or Catalan origin, and had travelled to the 
Levant as part of a mercenary army conscripted to fight in Byzantine civil 
wars (Lowry 2003, 59).
The frontier syncretism between Turks and Christians extended beyond 
the mutual benefit of the raid. Diplomatic marriages also formed a crucial 
mechanism through which the Ottomans managed to maintain and hasten 
their imperial expansion into Christian territories. In 1343, Sultan Orhan 
married the daughter of a member of the Byzantine royal family to garner 
political leverage in inter-dynastic Byzantine feuds. Mehmed II’s stepmother 
was the daughter of a Serbian prince. Suleyman the Magnificent’s mother 
was the daughter of the Crimean Khan. Suleyman’s wife, Hurrem, was origi-
nally from Ukraine (then part of Poland) and exercised considerable power 
in foreign policy (Kasaba 2009, 44–45). The Ottomans also made use of 
pre-existing administrators and rulers in territories that had heavily resisted 
Ottoman expansion. Following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, two 
nephews of Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos and potential 
heirs to his throne, were captured, linguistically and religiously assimilated, 
and then appointed to high positions in the Ottoman state. Mehsi Pasha 
became Sancak Bey (governor) of Gallipoli before being promoted to Grand 
Vizier. His brother, Murad Pasha was anointed beylerbey (district governor) 
of Rumelia (the Balkans). These weren’t exceptions; a number of bureaucrats 
were drawn from indigenous Balkan populations through the practice of levy-
ing children from conquered Christian communities. Several of these were, 
moreover, members of already existing aristocracies whose lands had been 
conquered by the Ottomans (Lowry 2003, 116–17). Byzantine scribes were 
crucial to the development of the Ottoman state’s clerical practices. And the 
overwhelming majority of the devşirme were recruited from Christian lands, 
forming a central plank of the Ottoman administrative and military system 
(Vryonis 1969, 272–276). Through these processes, the Ottomans were able 
to subsume ‘members of the Byzanto-Balkan aristocracy into the Ottoman 
ruling class’ (İnalcık 1954, 112–22; Lowry 2003, 115–30).
These were all agents of combined development—the swathes of former 
Christian warriors, princes, princesses, administrators, governors and peas-
ants that were assimilated into the Ottoman state all brought with them their 
own political, economic and cultural traditions that were appended onto pre-
existing Ottoman institutions. Local laws in conquered territories were often 
reproduced and sometimes appropriated into the Sultanic code (Sugar 1993, 
6). By leaving existing agrarian relations intact, there emerged a significant 
degree of institutional continuity between the pronoia land grants and the 
tımar system that replaced it (Cahen 1968, 182–83; Imber 2009, 194; Vryonis 
1969, 273).
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THE oTToMAN ‘foREIGN PoLICy’ of CoMbINATIoN
The preceding argument has sought to delineate three interrelated spatio-
temporal vectors of uneven and combined development that coalesced in the 
conjuncture of fourteenth century Bithynia to create the conditions for the 
emergence of the Ottoman state. Having thus far identified these institutional, 
social, political and economic forms of other societies that were appropriated 
by the Ottomans, it is necessary to demonstrate why these were systematically 
and successfully brought together in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
under the aegis of the Ottoman state. In doing so, this section demonstrates 
the centrality of intersocietal relations in the making of the reaya-askeri and 
centre-province relations that undergirded the Ottoman social formation.
As we have seen, with the breakdown of imperial authority among the 
Seljuks and Byzantines, and the persistent waves of nomadic pressure from 
Inner Asia, fourteenth-century Anatolia was characterised by multiple and 
overlapping forms of social relations and ‘layers of authority’ (Kafadar 1995, 
125). In addition to the remnants of Seljuk and Byzantine rule, nomadic 
raiders and semi-nomadic beyliks combined with towns dominated by akhi 
organisations. These communities crisscrossed with wandering dervishes, 
displaced peasants, merchants and former members of the ulema. These dif-
ferent social groupings, communities and individuals lived in a ‘precarious 
symbiosis’ of syncretic interaction and understanding—‘multi-ethnic, multi-
religious, nomadic, and sedentary, conflict-ridden and peaceful all at the same 
time’ (Barkey 2008, 41). This was a ‘world of dizzying physical mobility’ 
(Kafadar 1995, 61) in which information, customs, laws and social relations 
were persistently uprooted, transmitted and re-formed. Consequently, the 
success of any state building was heavily dependent on how far any of these 
particular groups were able to manage relations with each other. The success 
of the Ottomans must therefore be located in large part in how they negotiated 
precisely such a ‘foreign policy’ with the ‘outside world’. This took place in 
two stages (İnalcık 1954)—first, through the assimilation, or ‘caging’4
 of sur-
rounding populations through a mixture of coercion and consent; secondly, 
by institutionalising the subordination of these surrounding communities 
through the development of the tributary mode of production.
In the first phase of Ottoman expansion, the conquest, raiding and pillag-
ing of sedentary communities formed the basis of imperial expansion. Many 
towns and cities were completely or partially destroyed in the process of con-
quest, allowing Ottoman raiders to appropriate significant amounts of surplus 
through extortion and looting (Lindner 1983, 24; Vryonis 1969, 253–66). The 
effects of these conquests were exacerbated by the planned and unplanned 
migration of Turkic nomads into newly conquered territories, adding sub-
stantial demographic pressures on sedentary communities (İnalcık 1954, 
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122–24; Kiel 2009, 155–56). Both migration and predation caused significant 
displacement as pre-existing communities sought security in well-guarded 
towns and cities (Lindner 1983, 26; Vryonis Jr. 1975, 56–57). But coercion 
was not the only mechanism through which the Ottomans expanded. Consent 
was developed on the basis of inclusivity that was afforded by horizontal and 
egalitarian relations between marcher bands, typical of Inner Asian nomadic 
traditions. Sources from the early period of Ottoman expansion show that 
predation was relatively free of religious or ethnic connotations (Kafadar 
1995, 86). Instead, secular and egalitarian terms such as akıncı and yoldaş 
(‘comrade’) were used to mobilise Muslim, Turkic and Christian marchers 
(Lowry 2003, 52).
On this basis the House of Osman proved adept at mobilising waves of 
conquest throughout Anatolia and South East Europe. As the leader of a 
post-Seljuk ghazi movement, Osman carried a reputation for conquest which 
attracted neighbouring beyliks and Turkmen tribes to his territories (İnalcık 
1976, 15). Former Byzantine akritai clans also found the prospects of equal-
ity in decision making and distribution of booty a major attraction. Thus 
the ‘togetherness’ of different groups was ultimately based on the common 
interests of social reproduction—pastoral migrations, predation of sedentary 
communities and existential survival (Lindner 1983, 24). It was the material 
benefits of alliance, rather than any ethnic, lineal or religious identity that 
buttressed Ottoman growth.
Such consent generation through material reward extended beyond (semi-)
nomadic bonds to encapsulate relations with sedentary societies. Byzantine 
institutional and economic weakness meant that many local Byzantine gov-
ernors decided to join the Ottoman tribe as a better guarantee of security 
and income, safe in the knowledge that Osman would grant them continued 
control over their land. Indeed, by the mid-fifteenth century, the majority of 
Ottoman tımar holders were descendants of pre-Ottoman military classes or 
nobility, with over half of them of Christian descent (İnalcık 1954, 113–15). 
Local peasant populations also found that the Ottomans offered greater secu-
rity and fiscal leniency in comparison to the dwindling Byzantine authority 
(Kafadar 1995, 131; Lowry 2003, 57). Subsequently, many turned to the 
tribe of Osman for justice and support against nomadic predation from other 
beyliks (Lindner 1983, 26; Lindner 2007, 79).
Similarly, the conquest of former Seljuk towns tended to leave akhi admin-
istrative structures, legal practices and economic practices intact, generating 
consent among Muslim urban communities (Lowry 2003, 53). So important 
were they in the early stages of Ottoman expansion that Orhan’s succession 
from Osman was secured by creating waqf endowments for akhis and Sufi 
orders (Shaw 1976, 15). The Ottomans, rather than acting benevolently, were 
acutely aware of the material benefits of maintaining local populations for 
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the purposes of political security and high economic productivity (Shinder 
1978, 514). Undergirding the material benefits of accepting Ottoman rule 
was an ideology especially suited to the indeterminacy of frontier identi-
ties. Dervishes under Ottoman patronage converted people to Osman’s tribe 
through an admixture of tribal mysticism and Islam. Osman himself cemented 
this important power base by marrying the daughter of a Sufi sheikh which 
allowed him to cultivate relations with, and prestige among, Sufi groups and 
akhi organisations (Barkey 2008, 51–52). The Ottomans thus acted as a hinge 
connecting post-Byzantine Christian lords, akritai and peasant populations, 
Turkmen tribes, post-Seljuk beys and akhis, and wandering members of the 
ulema and dervishes.
Why was it that Osman, and not any other ghazi leader, that emerged as this 
pivot of combination? For Rudi Linder (2009, 35), it was Osman’s personal 
ability as a leader in negotiating ties between social groupings as diverse as 
Inner Asian nomads, former Seljuk beys and former Byzantine akritai and 
peasantry. For Halil İnalcık (1977, 267), it was the accident of geography, the 
proximity of the Ottomans to the Byzantine frontier. Even bracketing these 
contingent factors, it is clear that the development of the Ottoman dynasty 
in this period was determined by its ability to negotiate a set of international 
determinations—the condition of unevenness in Bithynia—through allure-
ment and accommodation of different communities and the combination of 
various social forms. Osman, and more broadly the Ottomans, were agents of 
combined development par excellence.
Because imperial expansion was predicated on the social rewards of such 
combination, success bred success. Through the conquest of the Byzantine 
settlements of Bursa (1326), Iznik (1329) and Izmit (1331), Orhan became 
pre-eminent among the beys of the marches. The incorporation of the Karasi 
bands into Ottoman service provided the impulse for an extension of the 
raids into the Balkans prefiguring the capture of Thrace and Gallipoli. The 
Ottomans thus achieved a permanent foothold in Europe opening further 
possibilities for expansion in the region. By 1371 Serbian, Macedonian and 
Byzantine princes acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty. Simultaneously, the 
Ottomans consolidated in Anatolia, seizing Ankara and Konya and defeating 
the Karaman beylik in the process (İnalcık 2000, 21–24).
Such expansion led to a significant complexification of Ottoman politics as 
it sought to come to terms with how to maintain the unity of diverse groups 
under a single political unit. The Ottomans thus became subject to the ‘con-
tradictions of sociological amalgamation’ (Allinson and Anievas 2010b) com-
mon to the nomadic mode of production. As the reach of Ottoman-led raids 
expanded they required forms of social and military organisation that could 
meet the challenge of siege warfare with sedentary communities, namely a 
reliable and constant levy of manpower and supplies (Hall 1991, 43; İnalcık 
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1977, 285). This meant moving away from the nomadic horse archer as the 
primary military unit, to the development of a reliable levy of troops—the 
Janissaries—that could engage in the protracted campaigning of siege warfare 
(Fodor 2009, 223). Politically and socially this meant that the old system of 
independent and equal warriors that partnered in raiding became increasingly 
obsolete (Di Cosmo 1999, 36; İnalcık 1992, 247). Resources required for 
the upkeep of infantry troops necessitated the concomitant employment of 
bureaucrats that were, unlike nomadic marchers, well versed in sedentary tra-
ditions of administering systems of taxation, tribute and law (Bromley 1994, 
40). The Ottomans made use of former members of unemployed ulema who, 
following the collapse of the Seljuk Empire, were migrating through Anatolia 
in search of patronage. Administrators of former Byzantine territories were 
also incorporated to perform these functions so that by 1324–62 there were 
numerous Christians involved in the running of the Ottoman state, serving as 
judges, police, military officers and bureaucrats (Lowry 2003, 86–89).
As centralisation loosened bonds of power sharing between the Ottomans 
and ghazi beys, the empire became subject to the dangers of involution asso-
ciated with the nomadic-sedentary dialectic (Di Cosmo 1999, 36; Lindner 
1983, 32). Ottoman expansion afforded conquering beys land and sources 
of revenue in new territories, enabling them to establish themselves as 
autonomous centres of power (Shaw 1976, 23). In the face of growing cen-
tralisation, beys sought to retain the privileges associated with horizontalist 
norms, claiming autonomy of rule and surplus extraction within the frontier 
territories (Imber 2009, 129). Briefly in the 1370s (Kafadar 1995, 138), and 
again at the turn of the fifteenth century under geopolitical pressure from 
Ilkhanids (Hodgson 2009, 435), these centrifugal forces threatened to frag-
ment the Ottoman polity. That the Ottomans were able to survive, and then 
reconsolidate and expand, was largely down to their ability to co-opt rebel-
lious beys and, where necessary, coerce and subjugate them. Both methods 
were ultimately dependent on the emergence of a centralised administrative 
system and political unity that could conduct these tasks through coercion, 
and wealth appropriation and its redistribution (Kafadar 1995, 139). In short, 
combination was acting as both a compulsion and opportunity for the forma-
tion of a centralised state apparatus.
The development and crystallisation of such a state form constituted the 
second phase of Ottoman expansion. Under the reign of Murad I, the slave 
levy of Christian boys, the devşirme, became an institutionalised practice, 
reflecting the need for a central patrimonial army and administrative bureau-
cracy loyal to the sultan (Barkey 2008, 76). Recruited from among men with 
no ties to the Anatolian Turkic families, the devşirme was from the start an 
attempt to consolidate a centralised state as a counterweight to provincial 
forces (Kafadar 1995, 141).
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As hierarchical state structures crystallised, the Ottoman centre increas-
ingly laid claim to land, revenue, slaves and booty appropriated from the 
frontiers in the process of ghaza conquest (Lindner 1983, 32). Through the 
appointment of the first kadı-asker Murad I created a centralised treasury, 
which established land survey registers, and organised the distribution of 
revenue and collections of taxes through land allocations (mukatah) such as 
the tımar (Kafadar 1995, 146). Also under Murad I’s reign, the Ottomans 
established a formal distinction between the askeri ruling class and reaya 
subject class, codifying legally and ideologically the appropriation of surplus 
through taxation rather than through raids (Di Cosmo 1999, 36). Taxation 
was systematised by developing extensive inventories of taxable resources 
on tımar lands. These formed official tax registers that set the rate of agrar-
ian exploitation (Imber 2009, 196; İnalcık 1954, 103). Consequently, surplus 
appropriation that had previously been confined to localities of pre-existing 
pronoia or iqta was redirected to feed a burgeoning Ottoman imperial centre. 
Through the regulation of tımars the Ottomans were also able to cultivate 
social stratification between the old beys of the marches and the central 
administration, wherein the latter established control over the former. The 
institutionalisation of the tımar thus went hand in hand with the develop-
ment of the Ottoman centre, as agrarian surplus generated by the reaya was 
siphoned off to the imperial centre. The establishment and consolidation of 
tımars against an expanded state was a function of the subordination of dif-
ferent sections of the Ottoman community—but in particular the ruling class 
and means of production—under the tributary mode of production.
The reigns of Sultans following Murad I demonstrated a concerted attempt 
to deepen the institutionalisation of tributary rule. Under the rule of Bayezid, 
provincial land and population surveys, a central treasury and a bureaucracy 
established the absolute authority of the sultan in the provinces. In par-
ticular, the slaves of the kapıkullar proliferated throughout the institutions of 
Ottoman power becoming the predominant holders of tımars (İnalcık 1976, 
28). In 1453, following the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmet II attained 
the prestige and territorial basis through which he could consolidate the insti-
tutionalisation of the tributary mode. He increased the size and strength of the 
Janissaries by recruiting 5,000 new men and providing them with improved 
weaponry and wage increases. Meanwhile, old Turkic notables from the 
marches that had acquired private property in land were dispossessed. The 
land was reclassified as state land and distributed as tımars among Janissaries 
(Barkey 2008, 77–79). A similar dispossession of the beys took place in the 
sultan’s household. The higher echelons of the Ottoman state—such as the 
Grand Vizier and kadı-asker—were henceforth drawn almost exclusively 
from the sultan’s personal slaves instead of from the beys of the frontiers. 
In contrast to other Muslim empires, state law—Kanun—was established as 
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a distinct body of law alongside Şeriat that maintained the preponderance 
and absolute authority of the sultan, allowing him to promulgate law without 
the intervention of the ulema (İnalcık 1976, 47–48). Finally, the practice of 
fratricide (wherein the new sultan executed his siblings during the process 
of succession) was institutionalised, thus limiting the potential for drawn out 
civil wars though which ruling-class conflict could destabilise the Ottoman 
centre (Kafadar 1995, 153).
The reign of Mehmet II thus witnessed the emergence of ‘the idea … that 
an amir was a natural necessity in human society, that he who was strongest 
had the obligation to extend his sway as far as possible in order to increase 
the area of social order and peace’ (Hodgson 2009, 562). In short, this crys-
tallised notions of Sultanism and patrimonial authority as such—the heirs of 
Osman were more than first among equals, and a higher entity standing above 
the differentiated communities that had gravitated around or been conquered 
by the Ottomans. Moreover, this emergent notion of Sultanism exhibited 
traits of the developmental combination that had created it. Thus, Mehmed 
II expressed his supremacy by linking himself to the khanate genealogy of 
Inner Asia, the heir of Islamic imperial traditions, and now also the inheritor 
of the Roman seat of power. By presenting himself at once as ‘xan, gâzi and 
Caesar’ (Golden 1992, 365), Mehmed II articulated patrimonial authority as 
the living embodiment of the processes of uneven and combined development 
that brought the Ottomans to imperial preponderance on a tributary basis.
CoNCLUSIoN
This chapter has argued that developmental difference, multiplicity and thus 
intersocietal interactivity are necessary parts of understanding how the clas-
sical Ottoman Empire came into being. Specifically, the emergence of the 
basic social relations of the tributary mode were determined by relations of 
unevenness in Anatolia, brought about by nomadic migration, the collapse 
of the Seljuk Empire and the ‘western turn’ of the Byzantine Empire. It was 
the combined development of the institutional and social remnants of these 
disparate communities that the Ottomans had to negotiate in their process 
of state formation. This occurred in two steps: first, through the process of 
incorporating the multiplicity of political communities into a loosely unified 
confederation. Secondly, through the political response to the contradictory 
complexification of social relations brought about by this incorporation. The 
outcome of this combined development was the social stratification between 
askeri and reaya, on the one hand, and between members of the old and 
new ruling class, on the other, through the creation of a standing army, the 
emergence of a centralised bureaucracy and the elevation of the sultan as 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   89 7/13/2016   9:56:02 PM
90 Kerem Nişancioğlu
absolute and hereditary ruler. In short, uneven and combined development 
in fourteenth-century Anatolia gave rise to the forms and configurations of 
social stratification typical of the tributary mode, wherein the Ottoman state 
obtained control over the means of production and the ruling class.
This chapter also offers an alternative to the essentialist characterisation 
of the Ottoman Empire in the Orientalist terms of Islam or nationalist con-
ceptions of Turkic ethnicity. This chapter has shown that early Ottoman his-
tory was only loosely attached to religion and ethnicity in terms of political 
identity or ideology. The period of Ottoman expansion (and indeed beyond) 
was instead marked by extensive collaboration with (as well as conquest of) 
Christian and non-Turkic communities, in line with nomadic structures of reli-
gious inclusivity. The very absence of a central and coherent authority, or an 
embedded culture, in the Anatolian milieu meant that religious identities were 
heterodox, fleeting and malleable. From the very beginning of the empire, 
all sections of Ottoman society—patrimonial authority, landed nobility and 
peasantry—were composed of actors from a multiplicity and indeed hybridity 
of ethnic backgrounds. And, in line with the nature of uneven and combined 
development typical of the tributary mode, it was largely after 1517, with the 
conquest of Egypt and Syria, and later Baghdad, that the demography of the 
empire became predominantly Muslim. With this change came new pressures 
of ruling-class reproduction and legitimation which entailed the subsequent 
move away from social heterogeneity towards a more prominent use of Muslim 
state practices and ideology (Barkey 2008, 102; Lowry 2003, 96, 113). This 
increased the influence of the ulema, strengthened the claims of the sultan as 
head of the Caliphate and gave rise to the emerging European perception of 
the Ottomans as a specifically Muslim threat. As Simon Bromley argues, the 
Islamic composition of the Ottoman Empire was not a fixed essence, but ‘a 
contingent feature of the necessary intermediation in tributary forms of rule 
and appropriation’ (Bromley 1994, 40). That this ‘necessary intermediation’ 
was, again, determined by international relations suggests that the internalist 
essentialism of Orientalist and nationalist approaches is historically untenable 
and thus theoretically partial. But moreover that the framework of uneven and 
combined development can provide an explanation for the apparent contin-
gency of the Ottomans’ turn to Islam further demonstrates its analytical power 
in comparison to essentialised and static approaches to world history.
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Chapter 6
Revisiting the Transformation 
of the Nineteenth Century 
and the ‘Eastern Question’
uneven and Combined Development 
and the ottoman Steppe
Jamie Allinson
The history of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire provides particularly 
fertile ground for scholars examining the historical sociology of global 
change. The vision of the empire presents a series of paradoxes emblematic of 
the period of the ‘Great Transformation’ as a whole: simultaneously a crucial 
player in the European Great Power system, and Islamic Empire; object of 
pseudo-colonial management in the guise of the ‘Eastern Question’; ultimate 
source of, or nostalgic contrast to, the hecatombs of the contemporary Middle 
East. It is surely no accident that the last years of the Sublime Porte during the 
nineteenth century have come to be loaded with such discursive valence—for 
the empire formed a particular variety of ‘inside outside’, straddling and con-
stituting the ‘seam of the encounter’ between Europe as its imagined exterior.
Late Ottoman historiography has thus come to inform a part of the debate 
around the theory of ‘uneven and combined development’ (UCD), with 
which this volume is concerned. This interest derives from the particular 
place occupied by the Ottoman Empire within the process of uneven and 
combined development, understood as the multilinear interactions of differ-
ent patterns of social relations at a global level such that the distinct character 
of social relations in a given society feeds back into the interaction itself.1 
The history of the Ottoman reforms from above concentrates broader experi-
ences mapped in the nineteenth century by Barry Buzan and George Lawson 
(in this volume) among others: the way in which the confluence of economic 
transformation, rationalised state administration and progressive modernity 
became the index of Great Power status. In this transition from a multi-actor 
and multi-civilisation world to one of states, the nineteenth-century Ottoman 
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experiences play a crucial role. The key debates in Ottoman historiography, 
around the two axes of ‘decline versus expansion’ and ‘internalism/ exter-
nalism’, have become intertwined with crucial debates in the enterprise of 
uneven and combined development as international relations (IR) theory: the 
question of the transhistorical status of UCD, and associated with that, the 
potential pitfalls of Eurocentrism. The interaction of the Ottoman Empire 
with a European states system, and the wholesale reforms undertaken by the 
Ottomans in the nineteenth century have been used to underpin the argument 
that UCD functions best as a transhistorical concept shorn of Eurocentric 
trappings that undermine accounts of extra-European agency.2
In this chapter, I intervene in this debate. I take up the case, not of the 
Ottoman Empire’s Anatolian heartland but of the sub-Damascene steppe 
lands that would, after the First World War, become Transjordan. I maintain 
that, although critiques that point out the significance of Ottoman agency 
and the centrality of diffusion, hybridity and geopolitical pressure from the 
‘non-West’ in the making of European modernity are certainly correct and 
well-taken, these points of critique are compatible with a view of UCD as 
both invested with a Marxian content in the form of modes of production 
and dependent for its full activation on the transition to one such mode—
capitalism. Following Robbie Shilliam (2004), I argue that this transition, the 
process of ‘primitive accumulation’, gives substance to processes of uneven 
and combined development.
UCD therefore finds common ground with a certain version of the postco-
lonial endeavour, studying, in Partha Chatterjee’s (2013) words, ‘primitive 
accumulation under different historical conditions’. In particular I argue that 
the predominant mode of production in the Ottoman Empire was tributary: 
in this aspect the empire did not differ from pre-capitalist Europe except in 
that the typical crisis dynamic of the tributary mode, between centralisation 
and decentralisation, were settled in different ways. European feudalism and 
the ‘fractured tributary mode’ characteristic of the relations between pastoral 
nomads and sedentary agriculturalists in the Arab steppe were thus points 
on a continuum rather than opposite poles. The nineteenth-century reforms, 
although certainly reflecting tendencies internal to the Ottoman social forma-
tion, were nonetheless aimed at the extension of Ottoman ‘infrastructural’ 
power into the steppe representing an attempt to bring about mimetic primi-
tive accumulation. This statement does not imply an absence of agency how-
ever: I seek to demonstrate how the conflict between centralising state and 
tribute-taking formations in the empire’s Arab provinces provided the basis 
for a particular kind of combined development with consequences for the 
later politics of the region. In so doing, I attempt to engage with, and take 
on board, the arguments of critics who have pointed to the lack of extra-
European agency in UCD.
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This chapter proceeds in the following steps. In the first section I review 
the linked questions of the transhistorical status of UCD and the risk of 
Eurocentrism, and how these relate to research on the historical sociology 
of the external relations of the late Ottoman Empire. I then present my own 
theoretical position, viewing the nineteenth-century reforms of the empire 
as the response of a fundamentally tributary social formation to the ‘whip 
of external necessity’. The subsequent historical narrative of this response 
seeks to demonstrate how local agency and the ‘whip of external necessity’ 
interacted in the conflict between the extension of state power and the tribute-
claiming Bedouin of the Ottoman steppe.
THE oTToMAN NINETEENTH CENTURy AND 
UNEvEN AND CoMbINED DEvELoPMENT
The series of fiscal, agrarian and governmental reforms undertaken by the 
Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century have long formed a fulcrum for 
historical accounts of the Middle East (see, e.g., Islamoglu-Inan 1987; Gerber 
1987; Khoury and Kostiner 1990; Bromley 1994; Inalcik 1994). In recent 
years, the key debates in Ottoman historiography centering around the two 
axes of ‘declinism’ and ‘internalism/externalism’ have become intertwined 
with lines of division in the enterprise of uneven and combined develop-
ment as IR theory (Nişancioğlu 2014) and with criticisms of UCD as run-
ning the risk of Eurocentrism (cf. Hobson 2011; Tansel 2015). The role of 
the Ottoman Empire in the emergence and operation of the European states 
system, and the nature of the programme of attempted social transformation 
by the nineteenth-century Porte, have been given as examples of how UCD 
is applicable across historical epochs, and capable on that basis of explicating 
non-European agency in the making of global capitalism.
The interweaving of these debates is visible in the presentation of UCD 
as an answer to perennial questions in late Ottoman historiography. The first 
of these debates runs between the once orthodox position that the Ottoman 
Empire fell into secular decline at some point after the sixteenth century 
(Lewis 1987; Bromley 1994; Inalcik 1994) versus the challenge that there 
was no such secular trend, or at least not a predetermined one (Keyder and 
Islamoglu-Inan 1987; Gran 1987; Sunkar 1987). The second aspect of the 
debate concerns whether the main forces in the decline (or transformation) 
of the empire were external or internal to it. As Kerem Nişancioğlu argues 
(2014), UCD does indeed present a possible route out of this impasse by 
taking as its point of departure the sociological unity of these two forms of 
explanation. However, in presenting a theoretical framework in which the 
‘external whip of necessity’ plays such a large role in producing the Ottoman 
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reform process, does one not risk obscuring the historical agency of Ottoman 
actors (Tansel 2015)?
The objection that the idea of the ‘whip of external necessity’, as well as 
being a highly ill-chosen metaphor, obscures the agency of non-European 
actors, is a powerful one. In Trotsky’s usage, it refers to the means by which 
pre-capitalist ruling classes were impelled to adopt social forms characteristic 
of the capitalist powers that posed a geopolitical threat to them (Trotsky 
1997, 2). In both its content (the compulsion coming from the ‘West’ towards 
non-Western ruling classes) and its textual context (the discussion of ‘back-
wardness’) the concept of the ‘whip of external necessity’ therefore seems 
at ever-present risk of collapsing into Eurocentrism. In the following pages, 
I attempt to demonstrate that this objection can be overcome, by providing 
an account that demonstrates non-European agency within a process that 
was nonetheless fundamentally directed towards mimetic primitive accumu-
lation—a process that therefore cannot be understood without the threat of 
‘external necessity’ as consciously articulated by the Ottoman rulers them-
selves. This argument does not require a conception of European uniqueness: 
as pointed out above the tributary nature of the empire did not differ from 
pre-capitalist Europe except in that the typical crisis dynamic of the tributary 
mode between centralisation and decentralisation were settled in different 
ways. European feudalism and the ‘fractured tributary mode’ characteristic 
of the relations between pastoral nomads and sedentary agriculturalists in the 
Arab steppe were thus points on a continuum rather than opposite poles.
In making this argument, I rely upon a conception of the late Ottoman 
periphery as dominated by the ‘fractured tributary state’. Tributary relations 
are those in which the direct producers control the means of production but do 
not appropriate the surplus themselves. Therefore, by contrast with the capi-
talist state form, the relations between the (usually agrarian) direct producer 
and the exploiter are ‘political’ rather than ‘economic’ in that they are based 
on ‘non-economic compulsion’—contrasted by Marx with the (notionally) 
free bargaining between capitalist and wage-worker in a capitalist economy’ 
(Hilton 1990, 5). The agrarian direct producers of the tributary mode thus 
have the means to reproduce themselves but render some portion of the sur-
plus to a ruling class that exercises ‘actual or potential violence, that is … 
physical force and ideology’ to appropriate this surplus (Haldon 1993, 77). 
The transition from this form to one in which direct producers are market 
and wage-dependent constitutes the primitive accumulation process. In the 
work of both Marx and later Marxists, primitive accumulation has come to 
take on two distinct meanings: the former sense in which the term is used in 
this chapter and, in a distinct but related usage, the ‘letters of blood and fire’ 
in which the history of capital is written, the historical accumulation through 
plunder, empire and slavery by which England (and other European powers) 
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acquired the means of capitalist take-off.3 The programme of reform under-
taken by the Sublime Porte was mimetic in this sense—not that it was any less 
‘real’ than the experience of England or France but in conscious emulation 
of the separation of the direct producers from the means of production and 
with the aim of increasing the empire’s readiness to defend itself against the 
threat from the West.
The advantage of the above framework lies in seeing (‘Western’) feudalism 
and (‘Eastern’) tribute-paying societies not as different modes of production 
rendering the respective geographical areas dynamic or stagnant but rather in 
placing these empirically observable relations along a continuum generated 
by the dynamic of the tributary mode itself. Such a conception allows us to 
escape the supposedly sui generis nature of European society contrasted with 
a stereotypical vision of a stagnant Eastern despotism into which Europeans 
expanded. I follow Samir Amin (1976, 14) and John Haldon (1993, 64) in 
accepting that European feudalism was a variant of tributary social relations. 
Whether surplus is appropriated by (feudal) rent or (tributary) tax is not a 
fundamental difference but a variation in the ‘control exercised by the ruling 
class, or the state or state class over the community’ and ‘while this certainly 
affects the rate of exploitation, it does not affect the actual nature of the mode 
of surplus appropriation’ (Haldon 1993, 65). The degree of fragmentation of 
centralisation of power is a historical result—not foreordained in advance—
of the contest between the central and peripheral parts of the exploiting state 
class. The basis of these contests lies in the two central divisions of the tribu-
tary mode. One is the horizontal one between direct producer and the appro-
priator of the surplus: the appropriation ‘resisted more or less strongly and in 
many different ways, ranging from labour service inadequately performed to 
open rebellion … [that is] the conflict of classes, central to Marxist theory’ 
(Hilton 1990, 5). The tributary mode’s unity of economic and extra-economic 
coercion, however, means that a second, vertical division, lies not between 
units competing via the market but between central and local control of the 
coercive power by which surplus is extracted. This explains the constant ten-
sion in tributary systems between a central node of ‘despotic power’ and its 
functionaries who seek to transform their local control over the tribute into 
longer-lasting claims to exploitation. Topography and geography may help 
such a result come about (deserts, mountains and other impassable terrain 
can give an advantage to the local exploiters) but do not determine it. The 
attempted centralisation of Ottoman power, the ‘parcellized sovereignty’ 
(Anderson 1974, 397, 407) of feudal Europe, the han of the Japanese samurai 
and so on represent historical outcomes of this struggle.
This framework also allows us to understand the basic social relations of 
the Ottoman Arab steppe as those of an extreme example of the fragmented 
tributary mode. The core of these social relations was, on the one hand, the 
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practice of khuwwa, the taking of tribute by pastoral nomads (for whom 
the term ‘bedouin’ is retained here, although its meaning is contested) from 
settled cultivators (fellahin) and, on the other, musha’, collective agricultural 
tenure. Khuwwa was levied on those cultivators (and travellers) who fell 
within the tribe’s effective zone of control, the dirah. It was these relations 
that the Ottomans attempted, in response to what Trotsky called the ‘whip 
of external necessity’, to transform into tax-paying private property (i.e. 
mimetic primitive accumulation), which produced the unintended outcome 
of a combined social formation.
The practice of mushʿa, although not universal and co-existing beside 
practices interpreted by later scholars as simple private property (Fischbach 
2000), necessarily involved some communal control over production. In 
musha’ villages the individual household cultivated its lands as a private 
unit but the quality and quantity of that land was periodically redistributed 
through the community—which is to say the heads of households—to ensure 
a rough equality across time. The cultivators in musha’ villages at least did 
not hold absolute alienable rights over their land, this being subject to a moral 
economy negotiated at the level of the community as a whole and producing 
a surplus accruing eventually to the sheikh, the state or the local bedouin. 
Certainly there were wide variations in this system in the amount and method 
of partition (Fischbach 2000, 39) and in the spread of the system itself. Often 
tribal relationships passed across the distinction between pastoral nomadism 
and settled agriculture. However, it was fellahin who paid tribute to bedouin, 
not the other way around. The nomadic tribal unit was both more mobile 
and more attuned to military conflict than most settled communities. In a 
social formation based on coercive surplus extraction, the bedouin therefore 
possessed a strategic advantage over settled cultivators, which they used to 
obtain surplus in the form of khuwwa.
The taking of khuwwa by nomads from settled communities (as well as 
anyone seeking to pass through their territory) thus reflects the form of surplus 
extraction in a fractured tributary system. A technologically advanced stand-
ing army, of the sort that the Ottomans later brought to bear, may be able to 
defeat mobile warriors (although even then only in certain areas). However, 
a smaller settled community of cultivators, unprotected by hills or rivers, 
would be no match for the mobility of the nomads. The greater the range of 
the nomads, based on the hardiness of their type of livestock, the greater the 
strategic advantage they derived, an advantage secured by the predominance 
of the camel (Hamarneh 1985). The relationship was reversed only when a 
settled community was wealthy and established enough to send a permanent 
military force against the bedouin (Marx 1993, 349). Thus, sedentary culti-
vation was most advanced in those communities protected by mountainous 
landscapes from bedouin raids, or the Jordan river (Rogan 2002, 24, 27).
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The pre-capitalist social relations were thus tributary but fragmented and 
were reflected in two social practices—mushaʿ and khuwwa—the transcen-
dence of which would represent a process of primitive accumulation initiated 
by Ottoman and later British authorities. However, the result of this process 
was not the replication of an ideal-type of capitalist social relations but rather, 
as Trotsky outlined for Russia, a combined social formation whose trajectory 
to certain alignments can be traced back through these social processes. The 
remainder of this chapter provides the empirical substance of this process, 
beginning with the story of the attempted Ottoman reforms due to what 
Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity’.
oTToMAN MIMETIC REfoRM AND THE 
‘WHIP of ExTERNAL NECESSITy’
The integration of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘zone of dependent support’ 
into a ‘single capitalist world’ (Migdal 1994, 10), which was to transform 
the coercive social symbiosis of settled and nomadic communities around 
the Jordan river, was embodied in the body of reforms and extension of the 
empire’s central coercive power in the later nineteenth century (Quataert 
1994, 762). This body of measures, collectively discussed under the head-
ing of the ‘Tanzimat’, represented a similar process to that of the Russian 
emancipation of the serfs or the Japanese Meiji Restoration (cf. Allinson and 
Anievas 2010a): attempts by tributary ruling classes to catch up and compete 
with the capitalist states. This was the ‘whip of external necessity’ produced 
by unevenness leading to the attempt to ‘turn foe in tutor’, which then led to 
combination.
As noted above, recent scholarship on Ottoman economic history has con-
scientiously questioned the idea that the empire’s economy stagnated in the 
nineteenth century (Quataert 1994, 843) and furnished us with evidence of 
the development of a native Ottoman bourgeoisie. Although these qualifica-
tions are important and caution against any notion of the empire as a purely 
passive recipient of imported European techniques, it is difficult to view the 
reform of the Ottoman land code and administrative re-organisations of the 
Tanzimat as anything other than an instance of how ‘[i]nternational relations 
intertwine with “internal relations” to bring about ‘new, unique and histori-
cally concrete combinations’ (Gramsci 1971, 182). In this section I seek to 
demonstrate how the feedback loop of uneven and combined development 
worked on the Ottoman Empire. I show how the competitive advantage of 
European states produced by the uneven development of capitalist social 
relations manifested itself in the disintegration of the outer provinces, fiscal 
crisis and consequently the compulsion to emulate capitalist social relations.
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The Ottoman Empire under Sulayman the Magnificent was not merely a 
successful tributary state in a world of tributary states: it was the pre-eminent 
power west of the Himalayas, its revenue double that of the bloated Habsburg 
domains (Anderson 1974, 365). Yet by the late nineteenth century a gap—
perceptible to and evident in the conceptions and actions of Ottoman rulers 
themselves—had opened up between the empire and Western European states 
(Issawi 1980, 1). The ‘internal’ aspects of this gap, such as the tendency 
of Ottoman tribute-taking structures to become local tax-farming rackets 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, cannot be separated from 
its ‘external’ aspects, such as the imposition of unequal trade concessions and 
the secession of outer provinces under European protection or control (Issawi 
1980, 1–3). As a result, the empire was engaged in near constant defensive 
warfare of some kind, being at war for fully 53 of the years between 1800 
and 1918 (Quataert 1994, 789). This feedback loop between geopolitical and 
social relations provides us with the beginning of the social trajectories along 
which the future Jordanian state would travel: a process of attempted trans-
formation engendered by the collapse of Ottoman manufacture in the face 
of Western European competition, the decreasing relative level of income 
gained through the tributary system and the loss of the empire’s most produc-
tive territories. The attempt to extend—or rather to invent—the Ottoman state 
as an ‘infrastructural’ state, the buttress of an autopoietic system of capitalist 
property relations was thus a conscious response to this crisis.
Where is the historical substance for this claim? A strong case has been 
made that the Ottoman Empire itself was a significant factor in the rise of 
capitalist social relations in Europe (Nişancioğlu 2014; see also Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu 2015). Yet an empirically visible change in Ottoman fortunes is 
closely correlated with the shift in trade away from the cross-Anatolian routes 
to the trans-Atlantic and Indian Ocean transport of specie and commodi-
ties (Issawi 1980, 2). It was in the second quarter of the nineteenth century 
that the ‘influx of European goods began in earnest—hand manufactures 
made in labour-intensive Western workshops as well as the more familiar 
machine-made cotton yarn and cloth’ (Quataert 1994, 762). The Anglo-
Ottoman trade convention, signed in 1838 in partial recompense for British 
aid in the campaign against Muhammad Ali, prohibited the granting of state 
monopolies and provided a model for the favourable treatment of merchants 
(Keyder 1987, 29). The empire was ‘peripheralised’, becoming increasingly 
dependent on agricultural tribute (Keyder and Islamoglu-Inan 1987, 60–62). 
Thus the empire was losing out in a process of ‘coercive comparison’ (Barker 
2006, 78) with those states in which capitalist social relations of production 
prevailed. As a result, the central state sought desperately to remove or mar-
ginalise ‘its domestic rivals—urban guilds, tribes and provincial notables—
while maintaining its place in the new world order’ (Quataert 1994, 762).
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The success of this attempt was mixed. The military superiority of Western 
capitalist powers such as Britain and France over the Ottoman Empire both 
reflected and fed back into the crisis of the tributary system. As Eugene 
Rogan writes, using Michael Mann’s concept of ‘infrastructural power’:
[T]he penetration of society which infrastructural power allowed for an even 
greater share of production to be collected in taxes, which was essential for the 
maintenance of large-standing armies. While such changes were more charac-
teristic of the nation-states of Western Europe, even multi-national Empires 
such as Russia and Austria had developed the infrastructural power to finance 
the modern armies which menaced Ottoman domains. (Rogan 2002, 2)
Throughout the nineteenth century the empire lost its most productive agri-
cultural provinces either directly to European imperialism or to local seces-
sionist movements aspiring to emulate the French revolutionary model. The 
earliest and most instructive example can be found in the Napoleonic inva-
sion of Egypt in 1798 (Mitchell 1988, 17). The French occupation spurred 
the rise to power of Muhammad Ali, a local military commander, whose 
leadership combined the centrifugal tendency of tributary extraction with the 
aspiration to build a new mimetic order. Ali seized the Syrian provinces from 
Ottoman control, only to be frustrated by the Western powers (Rogan 2002, 
2). Algeria was lost to French invasion a few years afterwards.
Worse was yet to come, as the most productive European provinces were 
lost from the 1820s onwards. These provided the bulk of Ottoman revenues 
and their loss was ‘devastating’ to the empire’s economy (Quataert 1994, 
768). The empire was losing the provinces most productive of the agricultural 
tribute upon which the entire structure was based, and therefore losing further 
the capacity to govern other provinces. The case can be overstated: revenue 
actually increased from 1809 to 1885. However, the increase did not keep 
pace with the rate of increase in expenditure, leading to the crippling effective 
loss of fiscal sovereignty in 1881 (Issawi 1980, 361). This cycle of budget-
ary crisis stimulated the Ottoman drive to extend taxable cultivation (Rogan 
2002, 45). This would inevitably bring a clash with the system of khuwwa, the 
central relationship of the fragmented tributary relations of production that 
prevailed in the lands that became Jordan. The process of Ottoman reform, 
instigated to ‘turn the foe into tutor’, was embodied in the Gulhane Rescript 
of 1839, the revised land code of 1858 and the expeditions to re-assert author-
ity over the steppe and desert of southern Syria.
The Rescript and the Land Code were two faces of the same coin—or 
rather they represented the unfolding of unified tributary power into the divi-
sion of economic and extra-economic coercion characteristic of those societ-
ies that had trounced the Ottoman Empire in geopolitical competition. The 
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Gulhane Rescript established the general prospectus of change that would be 
carried out in the 1858 Land Code (Mundy and Smith 2007, 14). The 1839 
Rescript established the principle of individual liability, equality before the 
law and security of private property (Anderson 1974, 389). The Land Code 
introduced a version of such principles into the economic base of the empire, 
which would also require the extension of effective governance into those 
areas beset by fragmented tribute-taking authorities such as the khuwwa-
taking nomads.
Interpretations of the Land Code vary as to whether it was a success, 
derived from a process of agrarian change or served to impose it and whether 
it actually altered practices on the land (Mundy and Smith 2007, 3–4). How-
ever, the code introduced different principles of registration and taxation 
introduced to increase revenue along the lines of the successful capitalist 
states that were in conflict with the khuwwa system. The code thus sought to 
promote the process of mimetic primitive accumulation. The code established 
the right of individuals as legal owners of previously collective usufruct lands 
provided they could demonstrate their registration in a ‘tapu’ deed (Rogan 
2002, 13). The individual rather than the community thereby became respon-
sible for the payment of taxation (Rogan 2002, 13). Designed to maximise 
revenue through taxing every piece of cultivable land (Issawi 1988, 286), the 
code established a means under which uncultivated land reverted to state con-
trol. This implied, of course, that productively cultivated land and its fruits, 
after tax, were the alienable property of the registered owner. This is a dif-
ferent conception of property to that of musha’, evidence of continuity with 
the pre-Land Code period notwithstanding (Fischbach 2000, 35), and one that 
would lead to inevitable conflict with the khuwwa system: the premise of the 
Land Code being the separation of economic extraction and coercive power. 
Donald Quataert’s (1994, 857) apt characterisation of the Land Code as bear-
ing a ‘capitalist trunk and a mercantilist foot’, which reflects ‘the transitional 
nature of the state itself’, indicates the utility of considering this period as the 
starting point of a combined social formation.
bREAkING TRIbUTARy PoWER
The Ottomans thus adopted a twofold strategy to promote taxable cultivation 
by breaking the unity of economic and extra-economic coercion. Although 
the Ottoman administrators may not have expressed themselves in such 
terms, their twofold approach to the problem perfectly reflected this require-
ment. On the one hand, the Ottomans sought to inflict exemplary defeats on 
the bedouin tribes; on the other, to induce settlement by stipulating that land 
registration (under the terms of the 1858 code) would be permitted only to 
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those who actually cultivated their lands, and by introducing communities—
mainly Circassians and Christians—who would not pay khuwwa. The settle-
ment and registration of land by these communities led bedouin tribes such as 
the Bani Sakhr to register their own dira (Fischbach 2000, 46).
For the Ottomans to assert control over the steppe meant a change of both 
personnel and policy, one that was only reached some years into the Tanzimat 
reforms. As part of the reforms, the Porte appointed the efficient Mehmet 
Rasid Pasha to the position of wali (provincial governor) in Damascus 
(Rogan 2002, 48). Rasid’s remit was to extend the reorganised governance 
of the Ottoman state in its sub-Syrian hinterland, and he set about this work 
with vigour. Damascus sent military expeditions south to break the power of 
the Bani Sakhr and ʿAdwan tribes (Rogan 2002, 51). That military power, of 
course, formed the precondition for the extraction of khuwwa. Rasid Pasha 
reversed the strategic imbalance that had hitherto guaranteed extractive rights 
to the pastoral nomadic tribes. In the campaigns against the ʿAdwan, the 
Ottoman forces were aided by their adversaries’ attachment to recently cre-
ated areas of cultivation and short-range livestock pastures, undermining the 
advantage of easy flight into the Eastern desert (Hamarneh 1985, 62).
The Pasha moved his forces gradually southwards, from the most exten-
sively settled and cultivated zones (which submitted to central authority more 
easily) down into the Balqaʾ valley (Rogan 2002, 49). The expeditionary 
force was more sizeable and technologically advanced than previous Ottoman 
attempts, comprising three infantry battalions, nine cavalry squadrons and 
several artillery pieces (Rogan 2002, 49). We can judge the impressiveness 
of the force by the reaction of the people of Salt, who soon submitted to the 
Pasha, and rendered 3 million piastres in tax arrears to him (Rogan 2002, 
50). Having established a base in the only town of the Balqaʾ, Rasid thrust at 
the ʿAdwan encampment, killing 50 of their number, driving them from their 
tents and livestock and capturing their paramount chieftains (Rogan 2002, 
52). This marked a serious blow not just for the ʿAdwan and their allies but 
for the practice of khuwwa as a whole.
The khuwwa takers could not simply tolerate this turn of events. The Bani 
Sakhr reversed their traditional rivalry with the ʿAdwan—demonstrating 
perhaps the consciousness of a systemic threat to their practices of surplus 
extraction—and allied with them to raid Ramtha in 1869, reasserting their 
rights to khuwwa under Rasid’s nose in the cultivated district of the Hawran 
(Rogan 2002, 51). Rasid could no more accede to this bedouin provocation 
than the Bani Sakhr could willingly give up their extractive rights: two sys-
tems of surplus extraction were in conflict. Weakness on the Pasha’s part 
could have endangered the entire project of the new Ottoman power in the 
steppe (Rogan 2002, 51). Accompanied by the British and French consuls, 
Rasid’s 4,000 Ottoman soldiers bested the Bani Sakhr and obtained their 
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submission and 225,000 piastres to pay for the expedition: ‘[i]f the first 
Balqaʾ expedition introduced direct Ottoman rule to the district, the second 
campaign confirmed that the Ottomans were in Jordan [sic] to stay’ (Rogan 
2002, 51–52).
Rasid Pasha’s campaigns were not the end of khuwwa, however. The topo-
graphical division between Southern Hawran and Northern Hijaz revealed 
itself in the limits to Ottoman power. Sharply conscious of the threat posed by 
the increase of British interests in Egypt, culminating in the 1882 occupation 
of the country, the Ottomans engaged in a number of schemes to establish 
an administrative centre in Maʿan ruling over the sparsely populated steppe 
surrounding the Haj route (Rogan 2002, 54). The choice of Maʿan reflected 
the intertwining of geopolitical and sociological factors that characterised 
the Ottoman modernisation project as a whole, which was ‘motivated by 
economic and strategic concerns: the sedentarisation of the tribes, the exten-
sion of cultivation, linkage with the Arabian Peninsula and, after 1882, from 
potential British incursions’ (Rogan 2002, 54).
Yet the Ottomans found themselves still circumscribed by the limits of 
a despotic rather than infrastructural power. Maʿan was too remote and its 
inhabitants too used to making their own bargains with the local bedouin, 
to be governed, let alone become a centre of governance (Rogan 2002, 34). 
The Damascene pashas had somewhat more success when they shifted focus 
to Karak. However, they were only able to establish themselves thanks to a 
rift between the local Bani Sakhr and the Al-Majali, the ruling clan of Karak. 
Even then the Ottomans entered Karak in 1893 only after a week-long siege 
and an agreement to make the Majalis governors of the new Karak district 
(Rogan 2002, 55). The frailty of central Ottoman power was demonstrated by 
the Karak revolt of 1910. The further south and east the Ottomans proceeded, 
the more frustrated their schemes tended to become.
The scope of Ottoman re-engagement was therefore geographically cir-
cumscribed as its predecessors had been. Nonetheless, the Ottoman efforts in 
the Balqaʾ and northward districts were no mere repetition of the temporary 
raids of the pre-Tanzimat era—tentative jabs of the tributary state into its hin-
terland. Rather the pashas sought to make productive tax-paying cultivable 
land out of the steppe and desert. This meant abolishing khuwwa relations 
(implying the military operations described above) and installing communi-
ties that could bear tax-paying market relations. The second track of Ottoman 
policy in doing so was to settle or resettle such communities in the more 
fertile areas of the territory: a common policy across the empire (Quataert 
1994, 849).
The Ottomans settled Circassian refugees from the Balkans and the 
Caucasus in the Balqaʾ valley, heartland of the Bani Sakhr, in two waves; 
between 1878 and 1884 and again between 1901 and 1906 (Rogan 2002, 
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73). The authorities granted them land, tax-free, to settle and farm around 
Amman. The Ottoman motive was to use these sturdy farmer-fighters to put 
an end to khuwwa relations. The Circassians, culturally remote incomers to 
the region, would have no truck with paying tribute to bedouin—on whose 
dirah, moreover, they had settled—resulting in frequent clashes and occa-
sional alliances between the two (Rogan 2002, 75–76). They also introduced 
cut roads and wheeled transport. Such settlements had a knock-on effect, 
leading the khuwwa-taking tribes to register their land in the Balqaʾ within 
the terms of the 1858 Land Law (Fischbach 2000, 46). The settlement of 
Christians, fleeing an inter-clan dispute in Kerak, produced a similar effect 
around Madaba (Rogan 2002, 82). These Christians engaged in permanent 
agriculture and paid taxes but not khuwwa. Against the protests of Sattam 
al-Fayiz, the paramount chief of the Bani Sakhr whose men had mounted 
raids for khuwwa against the Madaba Christians, the Ottomans awarded the 
lands to the Christians. The award further alerted ‘the powerful tribes of the 
region that they risked losing lands held by customary rights unless these 
were registered with the government land offices, put under cultivation and 
taxes regularly paid’ (Rogan 2002, 81).
The preceding survey of the origins and process of Ottoman reform, 
undertaken to render that tributary empire fit to fend off the ‘whip of external 
necessity’, indicates the beginning of the trajectory of Jordan as a combined 
social formation. The Ottomans sought to imitate the dual separation of direct 
producer from means of production (or at the very least, conferring legal title 
to those means) and of economic and non-economic coercion: in other words, 
primitive accumulation as a means to ‘catch up’. What were the important 
results of this process for these later developments?
The following aspects, which were later deepened by the British Mandate, 
can be identified as providing the social basis on which certain alignments 
were chosen and implemented: a topographical division in the campaigns 
against khuwwa-taking; a relatively more egalitarian landholding structure in 
parts of the territory; and the emergence of division between khuwwa takers, 
or former khuwwa takers, and the actual cultivators of lands they registered. 
These are all aspects of the transformation of one form of surplus extraction 
into another but without the decisive replacement of the older form. What 
emerged from this process was a combined social formation, rather than any 
purely ‘capitalist’ or ‘tributary’ one: a formation in which the vertical unity of 
the tribute-taking pastoral nomads was preserved, but based upon sharecrop-
ping by landless labourers attracted to the newly registered lands.
One must first note the geographical, or rather topographical, division. 
Land registration in the Tapu registers under the terms of the 1858 Land Code 
was only fully carried out in ‘Ajlun. In the Balqaʾ the Bani Sakhr and others 
participated in the competitive registration detailed above. Further south the 
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Ottomans did not intervene strongly, although a market in land does seem to 
have existed in some districts (Rogan 2002, 92). Elements of the tribe as an 
economic unit were preserved—by social distinction of the kind described 
above or by the persistent geographical division above and below the valley 
of Wadi Mujib at the lower end of the Dead Sea. Khuwwa continued to be 
taken in these areas and the sharecropping arrangements on Bani Sakhr ‘plan-
tation villages’ retained elements of coercive subordination (Rogan 2002, 
89). In the areas under full Ottoman control the taxes on the newly registered 
lands, although regularised and set at a maximum (Quataert 1994, 846), were 
still collected by tax farming. The Ottomans tried repeatedly to abolish tax 
farms but lacked the infrastructure to replace them (Quataert 1994, 854).
The renewed attempt at tax collections undertaken in the later nineteenth 
and early twentieth century provoked a series of revolts, the most serious of 
which occurred at Karak in 1910 (Hamarneh 1985, 87). These revolts might 
be said to have reflected the ‘moral economy’ consciousness of direct culti-
vators under a tributary system: they would pay tribute either to the central 
state or to nomadic incursion but not to both (Rogan 2002, 185). A reason-
able inference from the Karak revolt ‘is that the effective boundary of direct 
Ottoman rule in Syria in 1910 was the massive canyon of Wadi Mujib, which 
divided the districts of Salt and Karak’ (Rogan 2002, 215). This distinction 
took on even greater relevance under the British Mandate after the First 
World War as officials sought to govern both a ‘tribal zone’, characterised by 
what the colonial administrators saw as a warlike backwardness, and an area 
potentially at risk of infection by excessively modern doctrines of equality 
and anti-colonialism.
Within these distinct zones further aspects of the transformation of the 
agrarian political economy distinguished the lands that would become Jordan. 
The first of these was the confirmation of a relatively egalitarian balance of 
landholding. This was not an inevitable outcome but it did affect the later 
trajectory of the state in its relations with the populist Arab nationalism of the 
1950s. In the areas registered and subject to the Tapu land registers according 
to the Land Code of 1858, the resulting distribution was fairly egalitarian: a 
marked contrast to other future Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria, in 
which the late nineteenth century saw a marked polarisation between landlord 
and cultivator (Issawi 1982, 138). Land was for the most part ‘owned … by 
the cultivators who lived on it’ (Fischbach 2000, 55). There were some large 
landholdings, certainly, such as the ‘entire village’ in the northern Jordan 
Valley ‘owned by a man from Tiberias and the Beni Sakher shaykh who 
settled there with his clan’ with ‘[t]he tribesmen … reduced to sharecroppers’ 
(Hamarneh 1985, 89). Thus effendis and absentee landlords were present but 
not dominant (Fischbach 2000, 54–55). Musha’ lands were not for the most 
part forcibly partitioned but voluntarily divided into fractions (Rogan 2002, 
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54). Norms of partition and cultivation varied, particularly between hill and 
plains villages (Mundy and Smith 2007, 236). This distribution can only be 
described as relatively egalitarian, however. It was common for one group 
(shuyukh, or some such term) to gain at the expense of the fellahin (Fischbach 
2000, 52). Nonetheless, this inequality in land did not extend to the domina-
tion of the countryside by effendis, the resentment of which formed the social 
context for nationalist officers’ movements in Egypt, Iraq and Syria (Be’eri 
1970, 456). Again this process was reinforced in the mandate period.
bEGINNINGS of A CoMbINED SoCIAL foRMATIoN
Perhaps the most significant feature of the late Ottoman period for the emer-
gence of the Jordanian combined social formation was the change in social 
relations of production among the pastoral nomadic tribes. The Ottoman 
re-extension of the state produced a tendency—only that—for the fractured 
tributary relationships of the previous period to be replaced by something 
closer to capitalist social relations but with a crucial distinction that the hori-
zontal ties of the tribe remained. This partial move from khuwwa to waged or 
semi-waged exploitation on the land was embodied in the so-called ‘planta-
tion villages’ that emerged in particular among the Bani Sakhr and ʿAdwan. 
The plantation village was an agricultural settlement registered in the name of 
the tribe but worked by sharecropping tenants, often fellahin fleeing Palestine 
or Egypt (Rogan 2002, 90).
These developments represented something of the ‘combining of sepa-
rate steps’ as the ‘material content’ of uneven and combined development 
(Trotsky 1997, 27). The ʿAdwan and the Bani Sakhr were the predominant 
tribes in the central areas east of the Jordan river. A few decades previously 
both had practiced pastoral nomadism and khuwwa-taking fairly extensively. 
The ʿAdwan, as mentioned previously, had taken up settled agriculture to 
a greater degree than the Bani Sakhr but their domains, even in 1880, were 
reported to hold countless droves of camels covering the plains (Hamarneh 
1985, 61). The Bani Sakhr were ‘fully nomadic camel herding bedouin’ at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century (Lewis 1987, 124). Their dirah (ter-
ritory) stretched mainly from summer grounds in the Eastern Balqaʾ in the 
central area of Jordan roughly from Amman to Karak, to winter grounds in 
the Wadi Sirhan around the ‘right angle’ in the post-mandate Saudi-Jordanian 
border (Lewis 1987, 124). They lived by camel herding, khuwwa from Salt 
and Karak and from the passage of the haj through their territories—the 
pilgrims with camels and guides and were paid by the Ottomans to give 
haj caravans safe passage (Lewis 1987, 124). As discussed below, although 
the 1858 Land Code allowed the Bani Sakhr and their paramount chiefs to 
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become significant landowners, they were not fully settled cultivators even in 
the twentieth century. The plantation village was part of the solution to this 
conundrum. By the 1930s many of the Bani Sakhr (and other tribes such as 
the Huwaytat) migrated with camels for part of the year while also control-
ling cultivated land (Bocco and Tell 1994, 123). They were no longer deep 
desert camel herders but neither were they settled yeomen. Even as late as 
1952 the Department of Lands and Surveys found that of 2,404 Bani Sakhr 
households, 1,935 (81 percent) lived in goat-hair tents, 352 in stone houses, 
87 in wooden or other houses and 30 in caves (Lewis 1987, 140).
These tribute-exacting pastoral nomadic confederacies adapted to the 
mimetic modernisation drive of the Ottomans by means of sharecropping 
plantations. The ʿAdwan and the Bani Sakhr did register lands but parti-
tioned them: in the case of the Bani Sakhr in a geographical division of 
musha’ land into southern, northern and central sections. The area east of 
the Balqaʾ valley, extending into the Wadi Sirhan, was left as common dirah 
pasture, allowing the tribe’s members to continue their pastoral nomadic 
lifestyle (Hamarneh 1985, 61). The settled lands were mostly farmed by 
Palestinian or Egyptian sharecroppers. Title was assigned to named shaykhs 
in a fairly consensual process involving heads of household within the 
tribe—by contrast, the relationship with the fellahin sharecroppers was 
based on the sharecropper providing a fifth or more of the crop as rent, 
usually increasing as time passed (Lewis 1987, 130). A British traveller in 
1876 reported that:
[The bedouins] send across the Jordan, or to the few villages in the Gilead hills, 
and hire Christians to till their lands for them. Some Moslems [sic] go out for 
this purpose…. These laborers are called fellahin. We should call them small 
farmers, or more properly, peasants. The farmer, at the beginning of the season, 
or when the contract is made is given four, five, or six dollars as the case may 
be. He receives also a pair of shoes, and has seed furnished him. But, besides 
these things, he receives nothing. He must provide his own men, cattle and 
implements. He must pay his own help and do all the work from ploughing to 
threshing. (Joseph Merrill in Hamarneh 1985, 90)
This form seems to have spread quite rapidly. By 1883 there were nine 
tax-paying bedouin villages in the Salt district, traditionally the domain of the 
ʿAdwan, and by 1908 there were 19 such villages around Madaba in the orbit 
of the Bani Sakhr (Rogan 1994, 45). There were reported to be 19 villages 
around the district of Jiza in the 1880s and 25 in the 1890s; by the formation 
of the state of Jordan most of the land between Amman and Madaba and 
some beyond the Hijaz railway seems to have been cultivated (Lewis 1987, 
131). This phenomenon is important because it established a pattern that 
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was later reinforced and transformed by the military subsidy of the British 
Mandate: the decline of tribute taking but its replacement by another form of 
surplus extraction that did not lead to the breakdown of the pastoral nomadic 
tribe seen, for example, in Iraq.
The mimetic reforms of the Ottomans generated contradictory dynamics, 
however. The extension of cultivated land and the suppression of khuwwa 
had begun to tell against bedouin livelihoods. Rogan delineates the effects of 
the Ottoman reform period thus:
The documentary evidence supports a working hypothesis that the poorer, more 
sedentarized tribes, whose members drew a greater share of their subsistence 
from agriculture, tended to communal tenure of tribal properties. Their shaykhs 
were less likely to hold vast, individual tracts of land because the tribesmen 
could ill afford such concentration…. It is only among the wealthier, more 
powerful tribes that the sheikhs accumulated vast individual holdings. The 
tribesmen of the Bani Sakhr, with their great herds, drew ample subsistence 
from pastoralism and preserved their disdain for agricultural pursuits. This 
freed their shaykhs to register vast tracts of land without dissent from the rank-
and-file, whose livelihood was not adversely affected so long as they enjoyed 
access to good pasturelands. (Rogan 2002, 188)
These dynamics seemed to return with the period of disorder in the post-
First World War era and could have led to the primitive accumulation of rural 
landed property and impoverished labour seen elsewhere, but this was only 
a potential outcome: the make-up of the Jordanian combined social forma-
tion owed much of its origin to the way in which the strategic relationship of 
surplus extraction was transformed in the late Ottoman period.
CoNCLUSIoN
What does the preceding discussion tell us about the nineteenth century and 
the position of ‘the Great Transformation in the Historical Sociology of IR’? 
To be sure, the tributary social relations prevalent in the Ottoman Empire pos-
sessed their own dynamic—outlined in this chapter as the unity of economic 
and extra-economic coercion. As such, it was prone to crises of centralisation 
and decentralisation, and to the fraying and fracturing of the system in areas 
beyond the penetrative reach of the central authority. These did not result in 
different social relations of production but, rather, in a fragmented version of 
tributary relations. The sub-Syrian steppe was dominated by relations of this 
kind and most especially by the payment of tribute in the form of khuwwa by 
settled cultivators and weaker pastoralists to the large and powerful pastoral 
nomadic tribes.
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The tributary system was not a static one, but uneven and combined devel-
opment offers us an insight into how the ‘whip of external necessity’ brought 
about an attempt at mimetic modernisation by the Ottoman Empire—a strat-
egy with significant legacies for later states. These were primarily in the geo-
graphically distinct distributions of social relations on the land, the relatively 
egalitarian distribution of that land among cultivators and the replacement in 
some areas of relations of tribute not directly by wage labour and profit but 
by a form of sharecropping that allowed pastoral nomadism to continue. It 
was this form of social relations—the replacement of khuwwa by an alterna-
tive that was neither capital accumulation nor wage labour that comprised the 
heart of a combined social formation in Transjordan.
What might this extensive discussion of one historical experience, in the 
somewhat liminal lands of the sub-Damascene steppe add to debates on 
UCD? This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the above outcome 
derived both from a conscious attempt to emulate primitive accumulation, 
carried out by the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, and from the resistance to—
in some cases, adoption of—that programme by tributary power-holders. In 
so doing, this chapter will hopefully have contributed a historically-grounded 
instance of the emergence of a combined social formation through ‘primitive 
accumulation under different historical conditions’ (Chatterjee 2013).
NoTES
1. For a more extended discussion of the concept based on this definition, see 
Allinson (2016). For related but distinct uses of UCD, see Matin (2013c), Anievas 
(2014a) and Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015).
2. The key interventions in this debate are Nişancioğlu (2014) and Tansel (2015).
3. The clearest statement of the former interpretation is in Marx (1987, 97–98). 
The latter is found in the famous passage in Marx (1990, 873–76). The two forms of 
the concept are merged in Federici (2004) and Harvey (2003).
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Chapter 7
Asian Sources of british 
Imperial Power
The role of the Mysorean 
rocket in the opium War
Luke Cooper
One of the main controversies raised in the lively discussions over the theory 
of uneven and combined development in international relations (IR) (Allinson 
and Anievas 2009; Davidson 2009; Matin 2007; Rosenberg 2006; 2010) has 
concerned its allegedly Eurocentric (Bhambra 2011; Sabaratnam 2011) or 
non-Eurocentric nature (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013; 2015; Hobson 2011; 
Matin 2013a; Matin 2013c; Nişancioğlu 2014). Like the wider debate, the 
latter argument has focused on the relationship of the concept to temporal 
change (Allinson and Anievas 2009; Davidson 2009; Rosenberg 2006; 2010). 
However, while the broader conceptual argument has concerned whether the 
theory applies in equal measure to capitalist and pre-capitalist intersocietal 
relations, the postcolonial critique of uneven and combined development 
accuses it of failing to break with a stadial conception of history (Bhambra 
2011; Sabaratnam 2011). As Gurminder Bhambra puts it, ‘We were all seen 
to be headed in the same direction and Europe, or the West, simply provides 
the model of where it is that the rest of the world would arrive’ (Bhambra 
2011, 12).1 In Leon Trotsky’s original incarnation, the theory does appear to 
retain such a teleological view rooted in an implicit notion of the ‘historical 
priority’ (Nişancioğlu 2014, 328) of a select few culturally advanced Western 
states. For whereas the contemporary literature largely, with some exceptions 
(Davidson 2006; 2009), has viewed uneven and combined development as a 
spatially universal dynamic, insofar as its effects are felt in all modern societ-
ies, Trotsky, in contrast, argued that it was primarily applicable to societies of 
a ‘second, third or tenth cultural class’ (Trotsky 1967, 23).
While such culturalist formulations add considerable grist to the mill of 
the postcolonial critique of uneven and combined development, they might 
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be dismissed as reflecting the values of the time were it not for the manner in 
which Trotsky put the claim on methodological grounds. ‘The theory of the 
repetition of historic cycles’, he wrote, crediting the Enlightenment philoso-
pher Giambattista Vico (1984) with its invention, ‘rests upon an observation 
of the orbits of old pre-capitalist cultures [in which] … a certain repetition of 
cultural stages in ever new settlements was … bound up with the provincial 
and episodic character of that whole process’ (Trotsky 1967, 22). Despite 
Trotsky conceiving of the concept of uneven and combined development as 
a challenge to this ‘repetitious’ view of history, this critique of Vico clearly 
remains partial. For he appears to endorse his view of pre-capitalist societies 
as ‘provincial and episodic’, and thus subject to the repetitious evolution of 
endogenous stages, but argues that capitalism intensifies relations between 
countries and, in so doing, creates the possibility of multilinear, i.e. non-
stadial, patterns of development. Although Trotsky’s view on whether com-
bined development applied to pre-modern social forms was often ambiguous 
(Barker 2006), he clearly implies that ‘skipping stages’ emerges only once 
capitalism had transformed the pace and scale of interaction between societ-
ies globally. As such, his break with a stadial conception of development, and 
with it the unilinear view of history, arguably remained incomplete.
These remarks of Trotsky need not, however, confirm the postcolonial cri-
tique of uneven and combined development. Of these two processes, uneven-
ness and combination, the second arguably presupposes a multilinear view 
of history. Most historical materialists critical of Trotsky’s theory still see 
unevenness as a quality of all human social development (e.g. Smith 2006). 
But recognising this alone is insufficient to properly capture the multilinearity 
of societal change. The peculiar development trajectories characteristic of a 
multilinear view of history occur in part due to the interchanges between mul-
tiple societies, i.e. their existence ‘in combination’ with one another, and this 
in turn gives rise to ‘the international’ as a social phenomenon (Rosenberg 
2006; 2010). The interaction this multiplicity entails results in experimenta-
tions in development, the outcomes of which cannot be known in advance 
(Cooper 2013).
If these assumptions can be drawn from the theoretical underpinning of 
uneven and combined development, then perhaps Trotsky’s teleological 
digression should be seen as conflicting with the deeper conceptual insight he 
brought to historical materialism. A revision of Trotsky’s theory can therefore 
move away from the Eurocentric teleology that Bhambra rightly holds to be 
problematic (Bhambra 2011). In its non-Eurocentric conception, the theory 
offers a dynamic and shifting picture of the world as emulation, competition, 
alliance forging and cultural and social interchange which, in all its forms, 
serve to reproduce change rather than stasis in the ‘combined’ global order. In 
short, this view of combined development implies that there are no schematic 
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stages or preconceived norms (Sabaratnam 2011), but multiple, co-existing 
levels of social development in a world of intersocietal interactions.
As this outline suggests, my own use of uneven and combined develop-
ment (Cooper 2013; 2015) is based on a more ‘open’ version of Trotsky’s 
idea, which avoids a priori claims about the nature of the intersocietal inter-
action found in a specific historical conjuncture. This casts the researcher as 
an explorer of the concrete relations and causes found within any specific 
moment of historical development. But I also maintain following Rosenberg 
(2006; 2010) that whether we are concerned with analysing the conjuncture 
or entire historical epochs, they should be visualised in their societal multi-
plicity, i.e. involving social dynamics that are particular to, and reflective of, 
the interactive coexistence of many societies. While this has too often been 
overlooked by accounts rooted in the theoretical vocabulary of ‘society’ in 
the singular (Rosenberg 2006), these intersocietal processes have arguably 
provided a central impetus to social change and political transformation 
across the long durée of human history.
The Opium War provides a suitable testing ground for these theoretical 
coordinates. While it was undoubtedly a watershed moment for East-West 
relations (Arrighi, Ahmad and Shih 1999, 233), the scale of Britain’s victory 
has fostered misleading conclusions on the long-term state of development in 
the Qing Empire. The war has tended to be read in Eurocentric terms as the 
totemic representation of the decline of Asia and the culmination of hundreds 
of years of European ascendency. While the British did decisively defeat 
the Qing, the claim that China had experienced many centuries of decline is 
wrong but still widespread. For instance, one popular history has described 
the war as an example of ‘the Medieval Era fighting the Industrial Age’ 
(Hanes and Sanello 2002, 65; see also Adas 1990, 186–87; Crossley 1991, 
117–18; Rawlinson 1967, 110). Others have been more circumspect, but still 
argue that by the time of the conflict China’s armaments were ‘outdated by 
one or two centuries’ (Headrick 1981, 90).
In this chapter, I demonstrate the empirical problems with this assessment. 
Focusing on the special role played by Britain’s mimicking of the Indian 
Kingdom of Mysore’s rocket technology, I draw out the knowledge trans-
fers which underpinned Britain’s victory. But British development was not 
only socially combined with Asia, the impetus to modernise also arose from 
the hostile nature of the world order—that is, the geopolitically combined 
eighteenth-century international system. Recognising the way that this drove 
Britain’s colonial ascent allows for a more nuanced account of British impe-
rialism, which stresses the period from 1780 to 1840 as a decisive one for the 
emergence of the polity’s hegemony over Asia. Importantly, these empirical 
realities demonstrate how Britain encountered a ‘whip of external necessity’ 
(i.e. competitive geopolitical pressures) in which the direction of the causality 
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proceeded, at least in part, from the Asian to the European and from the 
non-capitalist to the capitalist. As such, the implications of the analysis go 
beyond simply recognising the role of Asia as a ‘shaper’ of Britain’s devel-
opment, because they point to the causal significance of interaction with the 
non-capitalist world for the historical formation of capitalism as a genuinely 
global system.
bRITAIN, CHINA AND PoST-MUGHAL ASIA AT 
THE TURN of THE NINETEENTH CENTURy
Conceptualising the interconnected nature of European and Asian develop-
ment is central if existing explanations of the Qing’s defeat to Britain are 
to be challenged. By superimposing two temporal eras, the ‘medieval’ and 
‘industrial’ (Hanes and Sanello 2002, 65) onto the space of the Orient and 
Occident respectively, Eurocentric accounts assume the regions had an 
endogenous development that could be legitimately ‘tested’ by success or 
failure of their leadings states in war. In other words, it is taken for granted 
that ‘any given trajectory of development is the product of … immanent 
[internal] dynamics’ (Nişancioğlu 2014, 328). This problematic view is 
present in many mainstream accounts of the Opium War (Hanes and Sanello 
2002, 65; see also Adas 1990, 186–87; Crossley 1991, 117–18; Rawlinson 
1967, 110). It underpins analyses despite the fact that nearly all scholars now 
recognise the social and technological achievements of the Chinese empire, 
which was, for most of its lifetime, more advanced than the European poli-
ties (Amin 2011; Elvin 1973; 2002; Goldstone 2008; Hobson 2004; Mielants 
2008; Needham 1987). But many researchers who argue this still tend to 
locate the Middle Kingdom’s decline in the face of a ‘rising Europe’ at 
around the sixteenth century. As Giovanni Arrighi put it (2009, 43): ‘The 
century long eclipse that China and the surrounding region suffered from the 
end of the Opium Wars to the end of the Second World War can be traced to 
a fundamental asymmetry in East-West relations during the preceding five 
hundred years’.
John M. Hobson (2004) and Kenneth Pomeranz (2000) have, however, 
challenged this position by advancing the claim that Britain did not surpass 
Chinese levels of development until circa 1800 or even later.2
 These writers 
choose to eschew theorisation of the class and social structure underpin-
ning the British and Chinese cases, preferring instead to analyse empirical 
indices of development comparatively. But their arguments challenge the 
social relations-based approach in its various manifestations (Arrighi, Ahmad 
and Shih 1999; Anderson 1974; Brenner 1976; Sweezy 1954; Wood 2002; 
Wallerstein 1974) by implying that capitalist England only surpassed the 
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levels of material wealth found in the polities of South and East Asia when it 
had transformed into industrial-capitalist Britain.
By the turn of the nineteenth century, processes of state and class forma-
tion in Britain, nonetheless, contrasted sharply with those found in the Qing 
polity. Contrary to the Eurocentric theories of the ‘Asiatic mode of produc-
tion’ (Bailey and Llobera 1981) or ‘Oriental despotism’ (Wittfogel 1957), 
markets were always a component part of the imperial Chinese tributary 
system. Private wealth holders who lacked a position within the state were, 
however, a secondary strata—in both class and political terms—to the schol-
arly officialdom (Abu-Lughod 1989, 340; Anderson 1974, 462–550; Myers 
and Wang 2002; Needham 1969, 197; Rowe 2002). In contrast, European 
geopolitics since the sixteenth century had witnessed a ‘sequence of ever 
more powerful states that … identified with capitalism’ (Arrighi 2009, 29). 
The British mercantilist state that militarily challenged Qing moves to curtail 
its merchants’ lucrative trade in opium, was only the latest to see securing the 
interests of its traders through colonial means as a central pillar of its overseas 
policy (Arrighi 2009, 29). A British merchant petition to parliament calling 
for military action, forming part of the drive for war with the Qing, sum-
marised this disposition thus: ‘trade with China can no longer be conducted 
with security to life and property, or with credit or advantage to the British 
nation’ (quoted in Hanes and Sanello 2002, 79, emphasis added).
This symbiotic relationship between the nation-state and capital contrasted 
sharply with the economic and political features of the dynastic land empire 
ruled by the Qing. Under the Qing, markets expanded and commercialisation 
was rapid, but the form this took was of extensive, Smithian growth based 
on land-reclamation and proto-industry (Pomeranz 2000, 211–85). Capacity 
for further extensive growth of this kind was reaching its limits by the close 
of the eighteenth century (Pomeranz 2000). While the polity was wealthy its 
rentier social structure inhibited investment in the industrial sectors key to the 
transformation underway in Britain: ‘Landlord rents, usury and official taxes 
supported upper class parasitism, leisure and luxury consumption including 
much personal service. Most important, government lacked the strength, the 
ideas and the impulse to shatter tradition and lead toward economic develop-
ment’ (Fairbank 1978, 19).
Bureaucratic obstruction, rather than a lack of means, was thus argu-
ably central to the Qing failing to escape the Smithian growth cul-de-sac 
(Wallerstein 2002, 53–56). In short, what Ramon Myers and Yeh-chien 
Wang call the ‘[Qing] reticular market economy’, because of its combina-
tion of command/state, customary and market elements, ‘was not hospitable 
to either Western-style capitalists or capitalism’ (Myers and Wang 2002, 
645). Britain therefore had both the Western capitalists with an incentive, 
and a strong capitalist state with the capability, to intervene militarily in Asia 
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to ultimately impose capitalism in a highly exploitative form, based on the 
extraction of rentier-colonial rights for its merchant classes.
This brief comparative analysis of the distinctive political economies of the 
two polities draws out the significance of state formation for the development 
of particular typologies of ruling class power. In neither the Qing Empire 
nor the British realm was the class structure formed endogenously, however. 
Both had been socio-economically combined through the development of an 
international trading economy from the sixteenth century onwards (Hobson 
2011, 162; Myers and Wang 2002, 587, 627–28). Geopolitical relationships 
also shaped the domestic processes of class and state formation in the two 
societies. The European order was chiefly characterised by intense armed 
conflict between imperial-dynastic states across the eighteenth century, 
notably the rivalry between the House of Bourbon and House of Hanover, 
which saw their respective French and British realms almost permanently in 
conflict. Internal stability and social order required the external use of armed 
force to secure the commercial and colonial interests necessary for domes-
tic prosperity (O’Brien 2010, 29). It was thus a mercantilist order in which 
‘war and preparation for war’ (Tilly 1993, 14) were essential ingredients of 
economic growth. Military success opened up new markets for exports and 
raw materials, catalysed domestic demand and with it private sector invest-
ment and, ultimately, created an impetus for institutional change favourable 
to an intensive economic model (Hudson 2014, 56–57; O’Brien 2010, 29). 
Trotsky saw in such geopolitical circumstances the creation of a ‘whip of 
external necessity’ (Trotsky 1967, 23) owing to the way it placed states in 
a competitive interrelation, impelling them to undertake institutional and 
economic modernisation to succeed. In the eighteenth-century context, this 
fostered a political economy based on commercial-colonialism. European 
geopolitical conflicts driven by mercantilist economics thus implied a rela-
tionship between state and merchant different to the one seen in the Qing. As 
R. Bin Wong explains:
Both Chinese and other traders in Asia expected little from their governments 
and in return did little for them. This lack of connection between merchant 
and government was fundamentally altered by the European merchant empire. 
Irrespective of the particular institutional mechanisms deployed by a particular 
European country’s merchants, all held a fundamental belief that state and 
merchant shared a common interest in exploiting economic opportunities. 
(Wong 2002, 458)
However, while the Qing was clearly not a mercantile state of the type seen in 
Europe, it would be Eurocentric to consider a competitive geopolitical envi-
ronment per se to be a quality of European politics alone. Indeed, the Qing 
oversaw a rapid military expansion into the Asian interior in the eighteenth 
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century that militarily defeated its major local rivals. Partly in recognition of 
Qing power, Britain did not make military moves in East Asia until it was in 
a much stronger global position, with its initial focus on the Indian subcon-
tinent reflecting the opportunities afforded to the realm by the de facto col-
lapse of Mughal rule and the long history of commercial success European 
maritime empires enjoyed in the Indian Ocean. As a result, the Indian sub-
continent was a central theatre in both the Seven Years’ War (Danley and 
Speelman 2012) and the American War of Independence (Stoker, Hagan and 
McMaster 2011), not only for the French and British colonial forces, but also 
for the subcontinent’s post-Mughal statelets.
In terms of the latter, arguably the most important was the Kingdom of 
Mysore. A long-standing tributary state of the Mughal Empire it emerged as a 
de facto independent polity out of the Carnatic Wars (1744–1763). However, 
in doing so, it also illustrated the complex web of sovereign claims which the 
European colonial powers were seeking to manipulate. Haidar Ali, a military 
officer who rose to power in the polity and assumed executive control in 
1761, did not seek to replace the Kingdom’s raja, even when the incumbent 
holder of the position died in 1766 (Habib 2002, xx). Instead, Haidar drew his 
political legitimacy from the dying Mughal political system. By obtaining the 
title of ‘Haidar Ali Khan and the office of the faujdar of Sira’ from Basalat 
Jang, a claimant to the office of the Viceroy of the Deccan, Ali was able to 
use the notional framework of Mughal sovereignty to establish himself as the 
political superior of the Mysorean raja (Habib 2002, xx). Haidar’s exposure 
to Western military technique during the Carnatic Wars convinced him of 
the need to rapidly modernise the polity and he undertook fiscal reforms that 
allowed him to fund a large standing army (Habib 2002, xx–xxi).3
 While he 
was careful to ground these new relations of class and state in Mughal prec-
edents, the centralisation of power these reforms entailed implied a highly 
modern approach to state formation. In the series of wars Haidar fought with 
the British East Indian Company4 during the second half of the eighteenth 
century his enemy’s main advantage lay in the war-readiness of their army 
personnel.5 But the very nature of war making meant that the Company’s bid 
for hegemony in the subcontinent was far from irresistible—indeed, victory 
often looked far from certain amid several setbacks.
This contingency of outcome to Britain’s geopolitical conflicts in Asia 
can also be seen in the contrasting fortunes of Qing and British power into 
the 1780s. While Britain had emerged strongly from the Seven Years’ War, 
the American Revolutionary War dealt a serious blow to its imperial stand-
ing (Hobsbawm 1996, 24–25). The settlers’ victory was aided by Mysore’s 
initially successful war on the British East India Company, which was spon-
sored by the primary ally of the dissident American states, France (Reeve 
2011, 91–92)—a fact that affirms the highly ‘combined’ nature of the late 
AQ: Please 
check the 
sentence “In 
the series of 
wars ...” for 
clarity.
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   117 7/13/2016   9:56:03 PM
118 Luke Cooper
eighteenth-century world order. In 1783, Britain’s political and social elite 
was thus lamenting the polity’s loss of influence and openly discussed a new 
period of British imperial decline. One commentary captured this mood with 
a series of dark prophesies for the future state of Britain’s global power: ‘The 
stagnation of external commerce, the consequent destruction of our naval 
force, the decay of our manufactures, the consequent depopulation of the 
country [due to emigration to the new world] the transplanting of our manu-
factures into other countries, [and] the diminution of our resources [territori-
ally and economically]’ (anon 1783, 20).
This anonymous author’s bout of colonial melancholy was summed up 
with the phrase: ‘the sun of Great Britain must set never to rise no more’ 
(anon 1783, 20). Others similarly spoke of how the country was ‘in the most 
critical situation she had ever experienced’ and warned of economic ruination 
if parliament were to launch further hostilities (Day 1783, 3–4). These fears 
proved unfounded as Britain retained an ‘economy strong enough and a state 
aggressive enough to capture the markets of its competitors’ (Hobsbawm 
1996, 33). However, the dependency of the economic model on warfare made 
expansion highly risk-prone with the polity’s eventual triumph in the Napole-
onic wars by no means guaranteed. In other words, it would be wrong to view 
Britain’s unparalleled nineteenth-century hegemony as an almost inevitable 
outcome of its industrialisation, because the latter was in large part driven for-
ward by geopolitics, and thus subject to reversals and setbacks experienced 
on this terrain, as well as the opportunities for commercial expansion military 
victory promised.
In several respects, Britain’s position contrasted sharply with that of the 
Qing state in the last two decades of the eighteenth century. Whereas for 
Britain the territorial losses of the 1780s fostered fear of the polity’s decline, 
Qing complacency reflected the success of their military expansion into their 
western interior. The ‘Ten Great Campaigns’ established Qing rule over 
Xinjiang, consolidated control of the Dalai Lama in Tibet as a tributary pol-
ity and, in doing so, decisively defeated the rival Zunghar state in Mongolia 
(Perdue 1996, 757–59; 2010a). Military conquest was followed by rapid colo-
nial settlement, which boosted agricultural output, encouraged inter-regional 
trade and commerce, and was also accompanied by state-developmental 
mining and irrigation projects (Perdue 2010a, 324–408). Success was, how-
ever, not entirely uniform and long prior to the Opium War, the Qing failed 
in its campaign to subordinate Myanmar (1765–1770), which had the effect 
of forcing it to accept greater independence of other South East Asian poli-
ties, notably Siam (Dai 2004). Settler colonialism fostered prosperity, but the 
dependency of the Qing economy on this form of economic development left 
it vulnerable to stagnation once territorial expansion ran up against its limits. 
As this transpired towards the close of the century, it brought instability in 
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its wake as ‘subjects routinely engaged in processes of aggressive mutual 
struggle over issues of food, land, water rights, market access, rents, wages, 
women, gravesites, status, and countless other scarce resources’ (Rowe 2002, 
555). These domestic difficulties meant the Qing considered internal disor-
der, not external security, their main security concern (Jones and Kuhn 1978, 
143–44; Thompson 1999, 173).
The ‘great divergence’ Pomeranz (2000) locates at the close of the 
eighteenth century reflected these economic problems. The Qing’s state-
dominated market economy could generate extensive growth through military 
expansion, but was unable to break out into an intensive pattern of growth. 
Importantly, both the British and Qing states were shaped by their distinc-
tive experiences of the increasingly integrated world order. Indeed, as I shall 
show, Britain’s wars with Mysore actually contributed to its victory in the 
Opium War.
THE oPIUM WAR: NARRATIvE AND REALITy
The one-sided nature of the Opium War’s key battles certainly underlines 
the mismatch in capability between the two sides. According to Peter Perdue 
(2010b), a British government report from 1847 put their combat fatalities 
in the war at 69 with 451 wounded and also estimated that Chinese deaths 
were in the region of 18,000 to 20,000. But the issue remains whether it is 
correct to put this down to the technological inferiority of the Qing forces 
alone or if other factors, such as the lack of organisational competency of 
their military, have to be considered. This is not the place to definitively 
answer this question, but one must simply emphasise that the former has often 
been exaggerated and the latter underemphasised. Ironically, Qing success in 
expanding westwards (Perdue 2010a) disadvantaged them for their eventual 
conflict with Britain. Not only did it give rise to problems that typify ‘impe-
rial overstretch’ (Kennedy 1989)—i.e. how to reconcile central control with 
social fragmentation and manage inevitable conflicts between settlers and 
locals over scarce resources (Perdue 2010a, 563)—but it also meant that the 
Qing lacked military threats that could have incentivised state modernisation 
efforts. After their victory in the Sino-Nepalese War of 1788–1792, the Qing 
became focused on internal economic and social problems, not foreign wars 
(Crossley 2010, 58–64). Britain’s trade in opium was draining silver stock 
and creating price instability, but the Qing were divided on how they should 
respond—with one wing of the Court reluctant to take interventionist mea-
sures seen as unnecessarily costly (Crossley 2010, 63–64). Indeed, the opium 
trade only came to be seen by the Qing as a major issue of external security 
once addiction had become rife among imperial soldiers (Perdue 2010b).
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Whereas Britain ran up an eye-watering state debt of 270 percent of its 
national income after the Napoleonic wars (O’Brien 2006, 1), the Qing were 
more cautious and lacked the financial instruments, as well as geopolitical 
imperatives, to undertake such a fiscal-military revolution. Some scholars 
have speculated that, ironically, the Qing ‘would have been much more inter-
ested in articles of trade, such as weaponry, that the British had to offer’ at 
an earlier stage had a Mongolian state continued to trouble its north-western 
frontier in the eighteenth century (Perdue 2010a, 564). Or, similarly, if the 
Ming loyalist, Zheng Chengong, who briefly occupied Taiwan after the fall 
of the dynasty, had succeeded in developing a south-eastern empire (Wong 
2002, 460). In any case, the British state occupied strikingly more conflictual 
geopolitical circumstances. In short, unlike Britain, the conditions the Qing 
encountered between 1792 and the 1830s lacked a ‘whip of external neces-
sity’ (Trotsky 1967, 23) and, as such, were a significant factor for their defeat 
in the Opium War.
Those who stress the technological superiority of the British forces often 
point to the role played in the conflict by British East Indian Company’s war-
ship, the Nemesis (Hanes and Sanello 2002, 65; see also, Adas 1990, 186–87; 
Crossley 1991, 117–18; Rawlinson 1967, 110). This was the first steam 
powered, iron-clad warship to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, which has 
been described as ‘an exemplar of state-of-the-art technology’ (Hanes and 
Sanello 2002, 115) that, in itself, ‘cast further doubt on the already much con-
tested image of China as a powerful and advanced civilization’ (Adas 1990, 
186). Undoubtedly, the ship constituted a real technical achievement that 
was a major factor in British victory. A key advantage the Nemesis enjoyed 
over equivalent Chinese vessels was its shallow draught that ‘allowed the 
ship to thread its way up the winding channels’ of rivers, making possible 
the successful British offensive on Canton (Janin 1999, 114). Nonetheless, 
the prevalent assessment, which sees this as the military culmination of many 
centuries of British technological prowess, is mistaken. Joseph Needham has 
demonstrated how the genuine advances in European nautical technology 
built on antecedent Chinese inventions (Needham 1971, 693–95). The Qing 
junks used in the war were also comparable in quality to the European trad-
ing ships of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Hobson 2004, 
58; Temple 2007, 186–98). Indeed, it was common for European traders 
based in eastern markets to source their ships from Asian shipbuilders in this 
period to reduce costs, which does not suggest they were significantly inferior 
(Mantienne 2003, 531–32).
British sources also imply a more technologically even contest than is often 
imagined in the literature. For example, the colonial force commandeered, 
and made active use of, two Qing war junks during the course of the conflict, 
which does not suggest they were grossly inferior to their own naval forces 
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(Bernard 1844b, 33). The same officer’s account discusses how the Qing had 
also sought to adapt the most advanced European military vessels and arma-
ments in response to the British threat. Intriguingly the officer describes this, 
in terms that anticipated Trotsky’s famous geopolitical formulation, as an 
‘impulse of necessity’:
A large building-yard was discovered, with an immense quantity of timber 
collected in it; and there was a good-sized frigate-junk, of about three hundred 
tons, in course of building, in a regular drydock, something after the European 
model; they had evidently made a great step in advance in the art of shipbuild-
ing: indeed, the longer the war lasted, the more the Chinese found themselves 
led on, by the ‘impulse of necessity,’ to attempt great changes, and, in many 
respects, improvements, not only in their vessels, but in their warlike weapons, 
and other matters relating to the art of defence. (Bernard 1844b, 134)
As this suggests, British superiority was real, but the Qing did undertake to 
catch up in the 1830s. Having enjoyed a half-century of external peace the 
Qing state was badly prepared for the war. Consequently, Britain overcame 
an enemy that was poorly trained, with underfed troops reluctant to fight and 
organised in a deteriorating Manchu banner system—it was these organisa-
tional problems that may have been decisive (Thompson 1999, 173). While 
technology played a role in the Qing defeat, British technical superiority 
emerged over decades, not centuries as has often been imagined. Moreover, 
key British technologies can be directly traced to Asian inventions, under-
mining the Eurocentric view of industrial modernity more broadly. Indeed, 
the focus on the Nemesis has led many scholars to overlook the role played by 
a technology that was equally important for the British victory, the Congreve 
rocket. Far from an invention endogenously generated by British industry, 
the device was based on a weapon the realm’s colonial forces encountered in 
the Mysorean wars.
THE MySoREAN-CUM-CoNGREvE RoCkET
While the Nemesis entered into Chinese popular memory as the ‘devil ship’ 
(Cotterell 2011, 111), this was in no small part due to the vessel being armed 
with the Congreve rocket. At the Second Battle of Chuenpee, the rocket had a 
devastating impact on the Qing forces. Bernard described its terrifying impact 
on the enemy in these terms:
One of the most formidable engines of destruction which any vessel, particu-
larly a steamer can make use of is the congreve rocket, a most terrible weapon 
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when judiciously applied, especially where there are combustible materials to 
act upon. The very first rocket fired from the Nemesis was seen to enter the 
large junk against which it was directed, near that of the admiral, and almost the 
instant afterwards it blew up with a terrific explosion, launching into eternity 
every soul on board and pouring forth its blaze like the mighty rush of fire from 
a volcano. The instantaneous destruction of the huge body seemed appalling to 
both sides engaged. The smoke, and flame, and thunder of the explosion, with 
the broken fragments falling round, and even portions of disserved bodies scat-
tering as they fell, were enough to strike with awe, if not with fear, the stoutest 
heart that looked upon it. (Bernard 1844a, 271)
Remarkably, the picture painted in this extract is highly reminiscent of 
another British officer’s description of an attack on East Indian Company 
forces by Indian rocketeers during the Siege of Seringapatam (1799) in the 
Fourth Mysorean War:
The rockets and musketry from 20,000 of the enemy were incessant. No hail 
could be thicker. Every illumination of blue lights was accompanied by a 
shower of rockets, some of which entered the head of the column, passing 
through to the rear, causing death, wounds, and dreadful lacerations from the 
long bamboos of twenty or thirty feet, which are invariably attached to them. 
(Bayly 1896, 82)
It was, of course, no coincidence that the Mysorean and Congreve rockets 
had a comparable impact on the enemy, as a direct lineage can be traced 
from the latter to the former. Haidar Ali’s rapid and successful upgrading of 
the state’s military power included a battalion of rocketeers as part of a well-
equipped standing army (Habib 2002, xxii). His eldest son, Tipu Sultan, 
took a special interest in the technological aspects to the modernising efforts 
of the regime. Succeeding his father in 1782 he saw the Second Mysorean 
War through to its conclusion on favourable terms. Having partly overseen 
the famous victory at the Battle of Pollilur in 1780, where the Mysorean 
rocket played a decisive role, Tipu expanded the Rocket Corps to some 
5,000 soldiers (Narasimha 1999, 123). These developments all took place 
as a result of the particular constellation of the geopolitically combined 
development between Europe and the Indian subcontinent. In other words, 
for both the Mysorean and British realms technological change was driven 
by a ‘whip of external necessity’. Tipu Sultan’s technological breakthrough 
in rocket technology was, therefore, no accident of history, but reflected 
the sociological transformations elicited by the process of Mysorean state 
formation, itself arising from the impetus for social change generated by the 
threat the colonial activity of European powers posed to the independence 
of Mysore.
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Rockets had a long history on the battlefields of Asia, having originally 
been developed in China under the Song dynasty (Needham 1987, 487–95). 
But the distinctiveness of the Mysorean design lay in its use of cast iron, 
rather than the wood and bamboo tubing found in the original Chinese 
weapon (Needham 1987, 488; Riper 2007, 14). Notably, this use of iron 
reflected the superior quality and efficiency of Indian production of the metal 
in the eighteenth century (Dharampal 1971, 20–24; Hobson 2004, 211). 
While iron made the rockets heavier, it also allowed for greater explosive 
to be added (Riper 2007, 14). The longest potential range of the rockets was 
considerable, reaching up to 2.4 km—a distance without any precedent or 
equivalent in the eighteenth century (Jaim and Jaim 2011, 134; Narasimha 
1985, 6; Narasimha 1999, 123). The chemical mix of the gunpowder height-
ened this fear factor, with the sulphur producing ‘odorous fumes and smoke 
of poisonous and corrosive sulphur oxides in the battle field, causing discom-
fort not only to soldiers but also to the horses and cattle carrying ammunition 
and other logistic supports’—an effect analogous to ‘modern-day tear gas’ 
(Jaim and Jaim 2011, 134). The release of carbon dioxide and carbon mon-
oxide from the charcoal in the gunpowder also gave rise to streaks of blue 
light (Jaim and Jaim 2011, 134), adding further to the visual drama their use 
entailed, and prompting one British officer to describe them as both beautiful 
and terrifying (Bayly 1896, 85). Even once they had hit their target, the rock-
ets remained in a state of high velocity until their fuel was exhausted (Bayly 
1896, 82). While this suggests the rocket was not an easily controlled or pre-
cise weapon, it appears to have added to its effectiveness with British soldiers 
reporting chaos and anxiety in their rank and file: ‘The shrieks of our men 
from these unusual weapons was terrific; thighs, legs, and arms left fleshless 
with bones protruding in a shattered state from every part of the body were 
the sad effects of these diabolic engines of destruction’ (Bayly 1896, 82–83).
These observations describe a deluge of what were, essentially, swords 
attached to firecrackers spinning uncontrollably, and also indicate the respect 
for the capability of their enemy that British army personnel maintained even 
as they defeated the Mysoreans. The description of the scene is nonetheless 
similar to the famous victory of the Mysorean forces at the Battle of Pollilur 
in 1780 where rocket fire blew up two wagons of ammunition held by the 
British army, which saw some 4,000 troops of the British East Indian Com-
pany compelled to surrender (Munro 1789, 146, 154; Wilks 1869, 457–58). 
Importantly, the first-hand accounts of the British victory in 1799 indicate the 
relative parity in military capability which still existed between the two sides 
during their final battle (Bayly 1896, 82). Indeed, British military sources put 
the Mysorean defeat down to tactical mistakes made by Tipu, rather than any 
significant—let alone overwhelming—superiority enjoyed by the British side 
(Brittlebank 2003, 200). While others have suggested betrayals on the part 
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of senior Mysorean military officials may have played a role (Hasan 1971, 
309-10), there is no suggestion that the final conflict was anything other than 
closely fought and evenly matched.
Despite the scale of their earlier defeat in 1780, the British did not make 
moves to develop Indian rocket technology until after the defeat of Tipu and 
the Mysoreans in 1799:
After the capture of Seringapatam and the death of … [Tipu Sultan], the British 
shipped hundreds of rockets home to the Royal Arsenal as spoils of war. The 
point of the shipment was less to equip British troops with Indian rockets than to 
‘reverse engineer’ them: take them apart, study how they were made, and learn 
how to build rockets that were as good or better. (Riper 2007, 15)
The technology transfer of the rocket to the Woolwich Arsenal illustrates the 
overall significance of Britain’s achievement in 1799. Victory over Mysore 
opened the way to the taming of the Indian subcontinent. It also allowed the 
colonialists to appropriate this technology without having to reinvent the 
core design principles. That such a ‘skipping of stages’ took place exempli-
fied how—at least in rocketry and the related iron production techniques—
British equivalent capabilities were not significantly more advanced than 
their defeated foe at the turn of the nineteenth century. However, by applying 
the organisational principles of industrialisation to the rocket’s refinement, 
the British were able to improve further on the original Mysorean design. 
William Congreve Jr., whose father had overseen the modernisation of the 
Royal Arsenal, took on the task of adapting the Indian weapon for British 
purposes. Inventing the ‘Congreve rocket’ in 1805 he downplayed, though did 
not wholly deny, the debt he owed to the original Mysorean device (Congreve 
1827, 15). Congreve’s playing down of the Indian influence is indicative of a 
nationalism that finds its echo in contemporary accounts of the irresistible rise 
of British colonial power. Thinking of Britain’s wars in Asia, whether on the 
subcontinent or with the Qing, as a clash between contending stages of civili-
sation—one advanced, the other medieval—reflects the distorted, colonial way 
that modern Europeans have tended to imagine their own colonial histories.
CoNCLUSIoN
The potential of the theory of uneven and combined development lies in its 
ability to offer a way of thinking about the past that emphasises the multiple 
and diverse linkages present in any historical process. These lineages of 
social and political transformation cannot be reduced to the mere transfer and 
adaptation of technological accomplishments from one society to another. 
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In this sense, the tale of the Mysorean rocket represents much more than a 
piece of ‘object history’. For it illustrates the dynamic interrelation between 
geopolitical compulsions (‘the whip of external necessity’) and the industrial 
transformations of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To not only 
survive but also advance in an international order characterised by military 
conflict over commercial opportunities, the British developed a highly adap-
tive model of state formation with organisational structures that valued inno-
vation and improvement. It was not alone in doing so, either in Europe or 
globally. Both the Qing (less successfully) and Mysorean Kingdom (initially, 
very successfully) sought to learn from and adapt to the wider international 
setting. British hegemony emerged from a combination of good fortune and 
the sheer number of military conflicts—each one replete with lessons and 
experiences—that they became involved in.
At a time in the discipline of international relations when many scholars 
are, quite correctly, revisiting the nineteenth century and emphasising its 
importance as a period of extraordinary transformation (Buzan and Lawson 
2015; Lacher and Germann 2012), the theory of uneven and combined devel-
opment provides the framework to visualise this process in genuinely global 
terms. The non-Eurocentric insight it offers scholars is also matched by its 
causal potential, which stresses the role of geopolitically combined develop-
ment, and specifically the highly militarised and conflictual nature of the 
world-system, as central to generating the epochal shift in human develop-
ment industrial society entailed. Not only does the nature of these conflicts 
indicate the contingency one must recognise in the ascent of British imperial-
ism, but it also serves as a reminder—one more benign accounts of the global 
transformation may find uncomfortable—that the modern world-system was 
very much built on the foundation of colonial violence. The huge advance 
in material wealth achieved by Europe and North America in the nineteenth 
century cannot therefore be separated from the colonial practices pursued by 
the British hegemon in Asia across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
And this violent interaction between the non-capitalist world and the capital-
ist was an essential quality of the new industrial world order.
NoTES
1. Or, as Marx put it in a preface to Capital, ‘The country that is more developed 
industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ (Marx 
1974, 19).
2. Hobson argues that in terms of gross national product China only fell behind 
‘as late as 1870’, even though it fell behind in per capita terms at the turn of the 
eighteenth century (Hobson 2004, 77).
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3. Indeed, in another sign of the sociological and political influence of Mysore on 
the British imperial project, the system of direct taxation of peasant income by sala-
ried state officers he pioneered, which circumvented traditional local elites, would be 
imitated in the British East India Company’s ryotwari system (Habib 2002, xxi).
4. Through its royal grants and charters, which gave domestic political legitimacy 
to its colonial activity, the British East India Company was effectively acting as an 
agent of the British state (‘the Crown’) in these wars (see Cohn 1996).
5. Between the Treaty of Paris (1783) and the Opium War (1839), Britain was 
involved in numerous military conflicts. These included the Second (1780–1784), 
Third (1789–1792) and Fourth (1798–1799) Anglo-Mysore Wars; the War of the First 
Coalition (1793–1797); the War of the Second Coalition (1799–1802), Second Anglo-
Maratha War (1802–1805); the War of the Third Coalition (1803–1805); the War of 
the Fourth Coalition (1806–1807); the Anglo-Russian War (1807–1812); the War 
of the Fifth Coalition (1809); The War of the Sixth Coalition (1812–1814); the War 
of the Seventh Coalition (1815); the Anglo-Nepalese War (1814–1816); the Third 
Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1818) and the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826).
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   126 7/13/2016   9:56:03 PM
127
Chapter 8
Rejecting the ‘Staples’ Thesis 
and Recentring Migration
A Comparative Analysis of ‘Late 
Development’ in Canada and Argentina
Jessica Evans
Within the field of comparative development, a distinct problematic has per-
sisted through attempts to account for the significant historical divergence in 
late developmental trajectories between Europe’s so-called ‘settler colonies’1 
of the ‘New World’ and other colonial formations throughout Africa, Latin 
America and Asia (Armstrong 1985; Fogarty 1985; Solberg 1987; Watkins 
1963). Within these discussions, settler colonies were singled out as a distinct 
form of colonialism, capable of superior developmental successes as com-
pared with other forms of colonialism. While a range of attempted theorisa-
tions have been posited to explain these divergences, the one which became 
dominant within the field of comparative development studies was the staples 
theory of economic development. Yet, while the staples theory of economic 
development could point to some factors distinguishing late transformations 
in settler versus non-settler colonies, a significant lacuna has persisted within 
the body of literature inasmuch as it has been unable to account for the diver-
gent paths of development within settler spaces themselves which emerged 
throughout the twentieth century. It is with this problematic that the present 
chapter is concerned.
Emerging out of Canadian political economy, the staples theory of eco-
nomic development suggested that settler colonies, as with other colonial for-
mations, developed within the context of a dependent integration within the 
world market predicated on commodity export production. However, unique 
to settler spaces was the additional factor of a high resource and land base 
relative to those of capital and labour2
 (Watkins 1963, 143–44). As a conse-
quence, dependent development took place in the absence of demographic 
pressures on scarce resources, as was the case in much of the rest of the 
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colonised world. Indeed, the development of settler colonies, because of these 
‘favourable’ ratios of natural resources to demographic pressures, required a 
massive injection of both European populations and capital into the settler 
space. Given this lack of demographic pressures, staples arguments relegated 
explanatory primacy to the role of the particular resources available within 
the developing economy and the export commodity that served to launch set-
tler colonies into the world market (Innis 1995; Watkins 1963, 143–44). This 
rather singular focus on the commodity itself, however, has meant that the 
pivotal role of massive immigration has received rather cursory examination, 
having been treated as a relatively neutral market input (Palmer 1983, 133).
A focus on the character of the export commodity itself, I argue, has 
been unable to account for how two settler spaces developing on the basis 
of the same export commodity and with remarkably similar resource and 
land endowments could exhibit such divergent developmental outcomes. 
This shortcoming has been most apparent when contrasting Argentine and 
Canadian developmental trajectories predicated on wheat export production, 
which though proximate throughout the nineteenth century, diverged signifi-
cantly throughout the twentieth century. In this chapter I wish to draw atten-
tion to the inadequacy of treating migration as a neutral input and highlight 
the qualitative differences that attended different migrant populations with 
regards to their material strategies of social reproduction. I argue that massive 
immigration served as a potent mechanism of ‘combined development’ which 
contributed significantly to the variable developmental outcomes experienced 
in Argentina and Canada. Indeed, the critical factor in explaining divergent 
developmental outcomes in Argentina and Canada is to be found in the ways 
that different migrant populations’ strategies of reproduction interacted with 
those conditioned by the prevailing social property relations in the colony, 
resulting in different processes of class formation and inducing different 
incentives to revolutionise the production process. In the next section, the 
staples literature on economic development in settler colonies is reviewed. 
I then turn to a brief outline of the theoretical framework I develop in order 
to analyse the role of migration within these two cases of late development, 
drawing specifically on Political Marxism and Trotsky’s concept of uneven 
and combined development (UCD). Following this, I provide a brief histori-
cal sketch of Argentine and Canadian economic development, highlighting 
the shortcomings of staples theory in explaining divergent paths of develop-
ment throughout the twentieth century. In the final two substantive sections, 
I examine the differential impact that large-scale European immigration had 
on processes of class formation and economic development in each case.
In developing the argument of this chapter, I hope to be able to contribute 
to three distinct bodies of literature. First, this argument presents an interven-
tion in the comparative development literature concerning so-called staples 
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producing settler colonies. Second, I hope to intervene in the literature on 
labour migration by inserting a qualitative dimension which suggests that 
the interests and agencies of migrants themselves exerted (trans)formative 
impacts on the recipient space. Far from being a ready, transportable and 
flexible labour force, migrants’ contribution to labour markets depended 
critically on the sets of social property relations conditioning their strategies 
of reproduction both at home and abroad. Finally, through the deployment of 
UCD, this chapter contributes to the further development of this analytical 
concept within the field of historical sociology and international relations in 
its specification of migration as a concrete mechanism of combination.
STAPLES AND DEvELoPMENT WITHIN SETTLER CoLoNIES
The staples thesis of late development in the ‘new countries’ of European 
settlement might be seen as developing first, and primarily, within the tradi-
tion of Canadian political economy through the work of Harold Innis. At the 
core of the staples thesis is a Ricardian political economy which explains 
production and development as the result of technological and geographical 
determinations, and the extension of commercial trade networks as a means 
of accumulating capital and thus stimulating industrialisation (McNally 1981, 
163). These endogenous conditions of technology and geography, however, 
are further situated in an international problematic which sees domestic 
development as being stimulated through the integration of peripheral econo-
mies into the world market on the basis of staples (raw commodity) export to 
Europe (Schmidt 1981, 70). Thus, staples theory brings together elements of 
a technologically deterministic understanding of development with those of 
an internationally situated theory of dependent development.
For the economic historian Harold Innis, Canada’s economic development 
on the basis of staples industries was effected through the increase in mercan-
tile networks and infrastructure required for domestic staples production to 
meet foreign (largely British) demand for raw commodities. However, Innis 
insisted that the mere fact of staples production for export was not enough 
to ensure economic development, as different commodities contained within 
their very nature different capacities to stimulate these kinds of large-scale 
infrastructural projects. It was on this point, Innis argued, that the staple itself 
contained within it certain geographical and technological limits and possibil-
ities for stimulating economic linkages. In Canada, early fish and fur exports 
were unable to stimulate economic linkages conducive to large-scale devel-
opment. The introduction of timber trade, however, would demand far more 
extensive and intensive transport infrastructure, and it was this that would lay 
the foundation, finally, for agricultural and mineral staples production which 
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launched Canada firmly onto the world market as an independent producer of 
commodity goods (Innis 1995, 3–20).
At the core of the staples approach, then, are two sets of determinations. 
In the first instance, there are the unequal terms of trade which exist between 
the hinterland and metropole and which affect the integration of the hinter-
land into the global economy. In the second instance, however, there are the 
geographical, physical and technological characteristics of the commodity, or 
staple, itself, which are said to determine the social and technical organisation 
of production in the economy (McNally 1981, 163; Schmidt 1981, 70). The 
development of capitalism within settler colonies was therefore explained 
through the accumulation of merchant capital, generated by the technological 
and geographical requirements of particular staples’ production. In so much 
as this was the case, no distinction between the character of the production 
and trade of fur, timber, wheat, minerals etc. was required. Each of these 
stages in Canada’s trade relations with foreign markets, were for Innis charac-
terised as capitalist, to lesser or greater degrees. Ultimately, however, Innis’s 
work remained rooted firmly at the level of description. It was only later, 
with the work of Mel Watkins (among others) that a fuller elaboration of the 
staples premises as a theory of economic growth occurred (McNally 1981, 
162; Schmidt 1981, 70; Watkins 1963, 141).
The premises of Innis’s staples account of development, according to 
Watkins, could become a theory of capital formation only upon a fuller 
theorisation of the possibilities for backward, forward and final demand link-
ages, which evolved out of staples industries. These linkages could include 
inducements to invest in industries using the outputs and inputs of the export 
industry as well as for consumer goods in the export sector. While all of these 
factors placed explanatory primacy on demand determinants, Watkins moved 
beyond Innis in his attempt to theorise supply side determinants, or the condi-
tions under which such inducements to investment might be expected to take 
place (Watkins 1963, 145).
In identifying these so-called supply side determinants, Watkins high-
lighted the role played by domestic entrepreneurs in identifying and exploit-
ing market opportunities to invest in expanding industry linkages. The 
propensity of a given economy to produce these ‘entrepreneurial types’ was 
in turn argued to be contingent upon the prevailing social values and insti-
tutions of the society in question. Now, what is crucial to highlight at this 
point is that the staples thesis fundamentally viewed the social and technical 
aspects of society emerging from the very character of the staple resource, 
which was being exploited for export production (Watkins 1963, 146). Thus, 
a tautological explanation resulted, where the ability to exploit a staple for 
economic diversification and industrialisation was itself contingent upon the 
nature of that staple and, hence, the geographical predispositions of a given 
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social formation were ultimately and inescapably determinant. Consequently, 
there has been effectively no room for a consideration of social relations 
(notably, class), except as they were defined in the sphere of circulation. 
As a consequence, the consideration of migration in staples theory has been 
reduced simply to its characterisation as the neutral and necessary inputs 
of factors of production (labour) into a technologically and geographically 
determined production process.
While the revival of Canadian political economy in the 1970s would bring 
about efforts to update classical staples theory through, among other things, 
the addition of concepts of class, these attempts nevertheless remained 
stunted in so much as their ability to actually shift staples theory away from 
its overly technicist and deterministic framework (McNally 1981, 166–68). 
For the most part, these efforts remained bound to a conception of class 
which was defined by social positions within the sphere of circulation. In 
other cases, dominant classes were defined through their relationship with 
the metropole, while subordinate classes were defined by their productive 
relationship with the dominant class (Schmidt 1981, 77). In either case, these 
conceptualisations of class within the revived staples framework completely 
foreclosed a notion of class as formed through processes of social and pro-
ductive struggle. That staples theory has been incapable of conceptualising 
class as a dynamic social force, formulated through historical processes of 
struggle is not surprising given the essentially teleological notion of develop-
ment as a technological process that lies at its core.
SoCIAL PRoPERTy RELATIoNS AND UNEvEN 
AND CoMbINED DEvELoPMENT
In proposing a recentring of migration within the comparative develop-
ment scholarship of settler colonialism, I argue for an understanding of the 
dynamic means through which class forces are produced, and how these 
come to impact the particular characteristics of the production process. To 
do this, I develop an alternative analytical framework which draws upon two 
theoretical bodies within Marxist historical sociology; those of ‘Political 
Marxism’ or the social property relations approach (SPR); and, Trotsky’s 
concept of UCD. Below, I provide a brief review of the basic premises of 
each framework before moving on to lay out my specific application of these 
two in the context of class formation and economic development in Canada 
and Argentina.
The central contribution of the SPR approach to historical sociology is its 
specification of the particular historical processes involved which give the 
capitalist mode of production its foundational dynamics and drives towards 
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competitive accumulation. Within this approach, articulated first in the pio-
neering historical work of Robert Brenner on the transition to capitalism in the 
English countryside, social property relations of reproduction are re-centred 
as the pivotal axis around which the compulsion towards competitive accu-
mulation and, hence, technological and industrial innovation is generated. 
Thus, rather than characterising capitalism as a mode of production emerging 
from either increases in trade or technological innovation, it is the ways in 
which different actors reproduce themselves, contingent upon property rela-
tions, which explains capitalism’s historical specificity (Brenner 1982, 16).
According to Brenner, the origins of the capitalist mode of production 
are to be found in the English countryside and are the unintended result of 
pre-capitalist actors’ rules and strategies of reproduction. Within a structure 
of pre-capitalist property relations, neither exploiters nor producers were 
dependent upon the market and hence were free from the need to produce 
competitively for exchange. The direct producers within the feudal mode of 
production held direct access to their means of reproduction through indi-
vidually or communally held land, while exploiters reproduced themselves 
through the appropriation of part of the product of these direct producers 
through varying forms of extra-economic coercion. Under such a system of 
property relations peasants had no compulsion to sell their labour power or 
land, while exploiters could only increase wealth through a redistribution 
of income away from peasants, namely coercion, a tactic which required 
economic surpluses to be unproductively invested in military and political 
apparatuses (Brenner 1982, 17).
Through the enclosure movements, the separation of direct producers from 
their means of subsistence had the effect of transforming these strategies of 
class reproduction in such a way that both exploiters and producers became 
dependent on the market. Where direct producers no longer held access to 
land and other means of (re)production, exploiters could no longer extract 
surplus directly from peasant producers through political mechanisms of 
coercion and taxation but instead came to rely on the extraction of surplus 
through the labour process. Because the surplus value of such extraction was 
only realisable in the form of exchange value, however, producers became 
dependent on the market (and hence the ‘economic’) for their reproduction. 
Direct producers, on the other hand, ‘freed’ from their means of subsistence 
would for their part become compelled to sell their labour power on the mar-
ket in exchange for a wage. A condition which underpinned this emergent 
market economy was the loosening of political mechanisms of coercion and 
exclusion and the introduction of limited, nominal freedom among many 
(though by no means all) actors in the form of ‘citizenship’. For our purposes 
here, what the SPR approach draws our attention to is the ways in which 
specific property relations condition the parameters within which actors 
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reproduce themselves, which opens up or closes off particular production 
strategies at the macro-level (Brenner 1982).
Now, it is important to note that I have not dwelled on Brenner’s account 
of the particular historical conditions which led to the transition from 
feudal to capitalist social property relations in England. This is a deliber-
ate omission, as for our purposes, the historical dynamics of the transition 
which took place in England cannot be assumed to have been reproduced 
in every subsequent transition to capitalism. Rather, understanding capital-
ist transformations outside of England require that we situate these later 
transitions within the international system and developing global capitalist 
market. For once capitalism took root in England it would later come to 
develop in such a manner which exerted pressure on the production and 
accumulation strategies of other states and these competitive pressures 
would, in many cases, require that other states adapt and transform their 
own strategies of accumulation and production—in short, their entire struc-
ture of social relations. Importantly, we should not assume that such actors 
deliberately sought to undertake a transition to capitalism. Yet the sum total 
of these pressures of competitive accumulation would eventually lead to 
the generation of distinct, amalgam forms of capitalist social relations. To 
understand these processes, I suggest we should look to Trotsky’s concept 
of UCD.
At the core of UCD is the notion that capitalism needs to be thought of 
as an integrated totality which simultaneously incorporates and divides the 
world through the generation of uneven and divergent forms of capitalist 
development (Ashman 2009, 30–31). In its arguably fullest articulation, 
UCD was developed through the work of Leon Trotsky as both an explana-
tory device as well as a concept enabling the development of revolutionary 
praxis. Unevenness, Trotsky proposed, was one of the most general laws of 
the historical process and this was owing to the unevenness of socio-historical 
development arising from the variability across time and space of ecologi-
cally given conditions (Allinson and Anievas 2009, 50). From this general 
law of unevenness, Trotsky argued that a second general law was generated—
that of combined development—which denotes the process by which differ-
ent ‘stages’ of the developmental journey are combined in an amalgam of the 
archaic and modern (Davidson 2009, 11–13).
As a first cut, UCD was a means of explaining the sudden and convulsive 
ruptures which were taking place in ‘backward’ countries such as Russia—
where social development no longer assumed a gradual character but pro-
ceeded at a terribly rapid, conflictual and often unstable tempo (Davidson 
2009, 13). What Trotsky identified in Russia and other ‘backward’ social 
formations was not simply a repetition of the developmental transitions 
that had preceded in Western Europe but something entirely unique, and 
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the uniqueness of these developmental processes was owing to the specific 
character of UCD within the capitalist mode of production. It was only under 
capitalism that unevenness became a qualitatively poignant analytic. The 
sharpness through which unevenness expressed itself arose from the uni-
versalising logic of capital expressed through competitive pressures, which 
necessitated sudden and explosive transformations through a process of inte-
riorising external capitalist relations and technological developments within 
the extant social structures of a given formation (Allinson and Anievas 2009, 
52). This process of transformation carried with it the possibility of skipping 
whole stages of development hitherto assumed in the transition to capitalism, 
though it could also and alternatively serve to reinforce the existing class 
structures and modes of accumulation.
Combined development, then, is the critical component of UCD and this is 
the process wherein the early transitions to capitalism developed on the basis 
of a transformation of social relations which then came to exert pressure on 
other regions of the world. This pressure took the form of the competitive 
logic of accumulation which compelled a process of catch-up in the so-called 
backward regions of the world through a transformation of their own social 
relations.
Yet, despite this process of catch-up being driven by a singular logic of 
capitalist accumulation, the actual course of catch-up and the transformations 
which would result could never replicate those which took place in the earlier 
transitions (Davidson 2009, 11–15). This, for Trotsky, was because the logics 
of the capitalist mode of production must confront the logics of accumula-
tion and reproduction which exist in and are unique to the geographical and 
historical context in which these interactions took place (Davidson 2009, 14). 
These unique interactions resulted in specific processes of class formation 
and struggle which conditioned the transformation of the logics of reproduc-
tion and accumulation. For our purposes here, UCD is an important concept 
that allows us to comprehend differential processes and patterns of class 
formation within the capitalist mode of production, and underlying this is the 
pivotal notion that there is no singular or objective form that class structures 
must take. Class, instead, is understood as being constituted through an ongo-
ing and relational process.3
The core argument of this chapter is that the late-capitalist transformations 
in European settler colonies must be understood within the larger, integrated 
context of world capitalist development. But to assert this in abstract terms, 
pointing to the general transformative pressures that developed from the 
expansionary and compulsive logic of capitalist accumulation in the core 
of the world economy tells us little as to how specifically these compulsive 
pressures were transmitted to the settler colonies and with what effects for 
divergent and particular transformations. Indeed, without a specification as to 
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the precise mechanisms which exerted these abstract competitive pressures, 
analysis runs the risk of falling into a trap of either technological determin-
ism and, hence, a forces of production mode of argumentation, or to see late 
development as being the result of a functional, abstract capital-logic. This 
latter tendency, I argue, cannot adequately account for the necessary element 
of active and dynamic human agency, of class struggle, which operates within 
material and historically given conditions but which nevertheless shapes the 
particular transformations which occur. To this end, I suggest that migration, 
a factor which was a substantial element in settler-colonial development, 
must be drawn into the analysis. The nineteenth-century Atlantic migrations, 
I argue, were a specific mechanism through which settler colonies were drawn 
into the remit of the world market, and which carried with it the ‘advantage 
of backwardness’ in so much as there was an underlying assumption that 
migration would effectively allow settler spaces to ‘skip’ the long process 
of primitive accumulation and proletarianisation, through the importation of 
a ready-made wage-dependent population. The particular combinations of 
migrants within the extant property relations in the colony, however, were 
significant in generating historically and geographically specific class forms 
and strategies, which shaped the parameters and possibilities for late-capitalist 
transformation.
DEvELoPMENT AND DIvERGENCE IN CANADA AND 
ARGENTINA: CHALLENGING THE STAPLES THESIS
In proposing a re-assessment of Argentine and Canadian late-capitalist trans-
formations through the lens of migration, I am seeking to answer a core set 
of questions. Firstly, what were the existing political and class structures 
and the prevalent logics of accumulation and reproduction within Argentina 
and Canada during the 1860s4 when efforts at late development began in 
earnest? Secondly, who were the migrants and what were the material condi-
tions underpinning their emigration from Europe? What were the logics of 
accumulation and reproduction with which they were engaged? Finally, what 
types of struggles were (or were not) produced through the combination of 
migrants with extant class forces and how did these condition the possibilities 
for the transformation of accumulation strategies in each respective setting? 
This latter question speaks to the conditions established for technological 
innovation, and whether accumulation proceeded according to the production 
of absolute or relative surplus value.
Canada and Argentina were both countries that formed part of the first 
wave of transatlantic expansion during the sixteenth century. While both 
spaces were colonised by different European powers (Canada being colonised 
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by Britain and France, Argentina being colonised by Spain), both were the 
recipients of quasi-feudal social arrangements (Schedvin 1990, 536). Devel-
opment had been slow in both places, owing to a number of factors including 
the extensive campaigns of genocide and war waged against the indigenous 
populations and the failure to discover a solid export commodity until the late 
nineteenth century, at which point formal independence from the metropole 
was also achieved (Solberg 1987, 1–3).
In the late nineteenth century, a boom in the global market for wheat 
helped to catapult both Canada and Argentina into the global market and 
accelerate development. The global wheat boom, in turn, led to a massive 
increase in immigration in order to make profitable the ‘barren’ grasslands of 
the prairies and pampas. From the 1880s until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Canada and Argentina were seen to be following proximate paths 
of development, with Argentina eventually outperforming Canada in world 
wheat sales, though the two remained competitive and proximate in their 
internal levels of economic development (Solberg 1985, 53).
Contrary to the expectations of the time, however, from 1910 onward 
Canada began to outperform Argentina with regard to both the quantity and 
quality of its wheat exports. From the post-First World War period and on, 
Canadian agriculture began to expand production through mechanisation, 
while Argentina experienced agricultural decline and eventual stagnation 
(Adelman 1994, 3–15, 263; Solberg 1987, 2). It is on this point that the 
staples thesis is inadequate. The staples thesis would suggest that cereal 
staples contain within them a certain production function which determines 
the technical character of production and which then determines the range 
of possible forward, backward and final demand linkages which can develop 
from staple production. Yet Canada and Argentina developed on the basis 
of the very same staple, wheat, but where Canadian wheat production led to 
the eventual diversification and industrialisation of the economy, Argentine 
wheat production resulted in agricultural decline and a protracted, late, indus-
trial development process. How, then, do we account for these differences, 
given the strikingly similar starting points and conditions of development up 
until the First World War?
Jeremy Adelman has noted that one of the critical issues with staples theory 
is that it tends to assume that the forces of production will automatically adjust 
to market forces. In this sense, technology is seen as something which is 
exogenous, in so much as the chosen technique for production is attributed as 
a quality of the commodity itself. If this were the case, however, the develop-
ment of wheat, irrespective of whether it was in the pampas or the prairies, 
would have resulted in similar processes of mechanisation (Adelman 1992, 
272–73). Yet, Argentina continued to develop its land through the perpetu-
ation of strategies of absolute surplus production whereas Canada, through 
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mechanisation, transitioned to a strategy of relative surplus production, a hall-
mark of industrialised capitalism. According to Adelman, the choice of tech-
nology (the creative power) cannot be attributed to the commodity itself—this 
is precisely that type of commodity fetishism which Marx argued distorts the 
true nature and relations of production under capitalism (Marx 1976, 164–65). 
Rather, the precise technique of production, the technological as well as social 
and material organisation of production, is fundamentally determined by the 
kinds of social relations within which production itself takes place. This is to 
say that production is a social rather than technical relation.
Looking at Argentina and Canada throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the most marked differences one finds are precisely those 
to do with social relations. More specifically, Canada and Argentina differed 
significantly with regard to the forms of property relations that prevailed 
within the colony, constituting an initial condition of unevenness, as well as 
within the countries of origin for the majority of their immigrant populations. 
Thus, social property relations within Canada and Argentina produced differ-
ent class forces and strategies of accumulation and reproduction. At the same 
time, the immigrants who would come to establish agricultural production in 
each space, came from different parts of Europe, themselves characterised by 
uneven social property regimes, so that their motivation for emigrating in the 
first place had been circumscribed by very different conditions of reproduction 
and accumulation. Migrants, therefore, were not simply neutral market inputs 
extended to the colonies as a means of drawing them into the remit of the 
expanding capitalist market. Rather, their very reasons for emigrating owing 
in part to their own country’s property regime, and how such intentions were 
reinforced or reconfigured by the parameters of reproduction that prevailed 
within the colony, bore important consequences on the range of available 
strategies for wheat production within Argentina and Canada, respectively.
In Canada, the enclosure of the prairies, following a series of lengthy wars 
aimed at clearing the grasslands of their indigenous inhabitants, proceeded 
in large part through a state-led settlement project. In a rich, comparative 
historical analysis of wheat development on the prairies and pampas, Jeremy 
Adelman (1994) has argued that the influence of the United States’ Home-
stead Act functioned as an almost unquestioned model for Canadian settle-
ment policy which took shape in the Dominion Lands Act of 1872. Under 
the Lands Act, settlement was to be promoted through the establishment of 
small family owned and operated farms, where deeds to the land were to 
be obtained through at least three years on the land (with at minimum six 
months of each year working the land through cultivation) as well as a $10 
administration fee. While the state also engaged in land sales directly to set-
tlers, it was largely through homesteading that settlement was achieved on 
the prairies. To be sure, the private market for land through large companies 
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such as the Canadian Pacific Railway or the Hudson’s Bay Company oper-
ated in conjunction with homesteading. However, private sales ultimately 
contributed little to the early settlement of Canada’s grasslands. Competition 
with state distributed land, virtually free of charge except for an administra-
tion fee, meant that private companies could not sell land at a profitable rate. 
As a result, the enclosures of the prairies were enacted dominantly through a 
deliberate public settlement scheme (Adelman 1994, 23).
The publicly led rather than private settlement of land had a number of 
consequences on the shape of social property relations resulting and the 
course that agricultural production would take. In the first place, the public 
monopoly on land sales established a ceiling on the price of land which served 
as a check against private sales and the formation of a class of large land own-
ers. Because private land sales could not operate competitively outside of the 
publicly established price of land, settlement and ownership remained open to 
immigrant settlers of varied means, so that prairie land ownership was frag-
mented and diversified rather than concentrated. The combination of public 
land transfers and their attendant requirements for cultivation, along with 
the small-scale and diversified ownership of land on the prairies created the 
conditions under which small-scale, owner operated agricultural production 
predominated. The family farm became the seat of prairie wheat development 
and this, in turn, bore consequences for subsequent patterns of class forma-
tion and technological innovation (Adelman 1994, 24–49).
Because the distribution of land on the prairies militated against the 
development of a landed elite, the Lands Act created mutually reinforcing 
tendencies for existing class structures and nascent wheat development. The 
predominant interests reflected at the national political level were those of 
urban merchants situated in Toronto and Montreal who were dependent on 
the maintenance of market protection from US and British competition. This 
protected economy, however, could only be supported through the earn-
ings made on raw commodity exports, and consequently the political and 
economic elite in Canada were significantly bound to the fortunes of wheat 
production (Solberg 1987, 55–58). As a result, the Macdonald conservative 
government received considerable elite support in its efforts to advance and 
implement a National Policy (1876) on development which hinged on a high 
tariff, massive immigration and public support for a national railway. The 
National Policy, for our purposes, had two main consequences for prairie 
wheat development. First, elite support for the National Policy meant that the 
Canadian government was able to pursue immigration recruitment through 
a series of active policies and strategies, and additionally was permitted to 
control and direct the internal movement of incoming migrants. Second, it 
raised the costs of wheat production as the costs of Canadian produced farm 
implements were higher than imports. These factors served to significantly 
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distinguish prairie wheat development from that on the pampas. As we shall 
see, in Argentina a landed elite blocked the development of any form of 
national development strategy such that both the tariff and active immigrant 
settlement were prevented.
The Lands Act and the homesteading process created a class of farmers 
who were obliged to engage in commercial enterprise by virtue of owning 
their means of production in land. Agricultural wheat production was the 
most attractive option for these farmers as wheat cultivation was uniquely 
well suited to small plots of land and was relatively easy and quick in its 
rates of turnover so as to allow farmers to meet homesteading requirements 
for land ownership. While farmers tended to labour on their own farms or 
hire themselves out to nearby farms for most of the year, the harvest season 
entailed a dramatic rise in the demand for wage labourers. The high seasonal-
ity of labour demand, thus denoted a requirement for a mobile and flexible 
labour force. Yet, the ability to attract wage labourers to the prairies was 
stunted by two key factors. On the one hand, so long as public land remained 
available through the Lands Act, immigrants were far more inclined to settle 
land as farmers than to establish themselves as waged labourers (Adelman 
1994, 40–45; Solberg 1987, 58). However, this in itself cannot fully explain 
the reticence of immigrants to Canada to sell their labour power on the 
market. Indeed, as the choice plots of public land began to dwindle, immi-
grants would continue to choose homesteading over labouring, obtaining both 
credit and land through the private market (Adelman 1994, 40–45). I suggest, 
then, that it is necessary that we look to the motivations of the migrants them-
selves, owing in large part to the conditions of reproduction within which 
they were situated in their country of origin.
The National Policy’s promotion of an active and selective state-led immi-
gration recruitment project resulted in the application of highly selective, 
racist criteria for targeting immigrants. In general, the Canadian state limited 
its active recruitment to the so-called ‘preferred races’ of Anglo-Saxon and 
Nordic origin, while making qualified exceptions for impoverished east-
ern and central European peoples (Avery 1979, 18–23). The origins of the 
Canadian settler population was significant in that all areas under active 
recruitment had themselves undergone a transition from feudalism to capital-
ism wherein market dependence and the sale of labour power had become the 
general means of survival, while ownership over ones means of (re)produc-
tion was increasingly difficult to retain in the home country (Eltis 1983, 257). 
On the one hand, then, the choice of recruitment sought to replace an indig-
enous population with one which had ostensibly been converted to so-called 
liberal values of rational, individual thrift and private labour. At the same 
time, however, emigration appealed to those actually migrating precisely as 
a means of (re)gaining possession over land and, hence over their own social 
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reproduction, without having to submit to the vagaries of the labour market. 
Thus a conflict existed in the objectives of those promoting and those seek-
ing emigration such that migrants sought to begin a life in the New World 
as a means of providing a bridge over the class divide, allowing labourers to 
become owners of capital.
The above assertions are borne out by Adelman’s research which found 
that despite initially trying to promote emigration among the ‘best of the 
Anglo-Saxon agricultural classes’, emigration was difficult to induce so 
long as potential migrants’ conditions of reproduction could be ensured 
through ownership in property at home. Indeed, Canada’s Commissioner of 
Immigration William McCreary, suggested during the early years of active 
immigration policy that rapid settlement would be achieved only through the 
movement of those without capital in their home country, who could then 
see in Canada the prospects of improving one’s lot through homesteading 
(Adelman 1994, 150). Emigrating from a space in which a transition to mar-
ket dependence had already been achieved, Anglo-Saxon settlers saw their 
fortunes at home as that of the subservient waged labourer. Seeking escape 
from such conditions, Canada was a space in which the emigrant could osten-
sibly leap the gulf between owners of capital and sellers of labour through the 
production of staples for the world market.
It is on this point that the peculiarities of Canadian class formation on the 
prairies became significant for the course of development in wheat produc-
tion. While the staples thesis would have it that mass immigration served to 
both settle the land and supply the necessary labour for wheat production, it 
was precisely the difficulty in obtaining an adequate supply of wage labour 
which induced rapid technological advances in the production of prairie 
wheat. Returning to the concept of UCD, let us recall that the Canadian econ-
omy was being developed on the basis of a subordinate integration into global 
commodity markets as an exporter of raw materials. One of the key means 
through which this integration was effected was precisely through massive 
immigration from the core of the global economy which provided the neces-
sary ‘human material’ for production. In part, the strategy of mass European 
immigration was to import a ‘ready-made’ labour force. Indeed, because the 
mass of immigrants were the working-classes of England, Scotland, Whales 
and Ireland, it was often assumed that they would be ready, willing and able 
to perform these same roles in Canada as needed. Yet, the ways in which 
these migrants interacted with the configuration of social property relations 
in Canada itself actually militated against the establishment of a permanent 
rural proletariat.
So long as the agricultural frontier was expanding, the availability of land 
meant that settlers would first and foremost seek to become capital owners and 
small farm operators through both homesteading and, later, through access to 
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credit markets and private land sales (Adelman 1994, 40–45; Schmidt 1981, 
80–82). Farm owners faced significant challenges in turning over a profit as 
a result of the effects of tariffs on farming inputs which raised the production 
costs of wheat. Such wheat could not remain competitive on the world mar-
ket where competitors produced without a national tariff. While the costs of 
production could be lowered through an alteration of the wages paid to farm 
labour, the dearth of waged labour on the prairies meant that farmers them-
selves provided the bulk of labour in wheat production, hiring themselves out 
to neighbouring farms when circumstances required (Adelman 1992, 279–80; 
Solberg 1987, 98). Given that these labourers were not a landless proletariat, 
but rather owners of the means of production, and thus their fortunes were 
tied to the productivity of wheat and its sale on world markets (which itself 
was constrained by the costs of production under the tariff), farmers-labourers 
organised so as to place an upwardly buoyant pressure on the wage rate. In the 
long run, in order for production to take place successfully, the only option 
remaining to make wheat competitive was to revolutionise the production 
process through a rise in the organic composition of capital and a transition 
to relative surplus value production (Schmidt 1987, 80–86). Thus the tech-
nological innovation of wheat production on the prairies was born out of the 
particular interaction of migrants and settler social property relations, which 
led to the formative role of market-based, competitive imperatives.
The enclosure of the Argentine pampas proceeded in a completely differ-
ent manner from that of the Canadian prairies and as a consequence, pro-
duced very different social property configurations. Rather than a dominant 
merchant elite, Argentina was subject to the interests of a landed, ranching 
elite at the time of confederation, a fact of considerable importance within 
the context of the 1863 Constitution that had decentralised political pow-
ers to the provinces (Solberg 1987, 14–17). The provinces, however, were 
financially vulnerable after having waged bloody and costly campaigns 
of genocide throughout the pampas in order to eliminate the indigenous 
populations (Adelman 1992, 274). This financial vulnerability resulted in the 
provinces having to sell off huge swaths of land to the existing landed elite. 
Land ownership and its attendant political influence was thus concentrated in 
a minority ranching elite whose interests were opposed to state-led agrarian 
and industrial development policy (Solberg 1987, 16).
The interests of the landed classes were bound to a practice of extensive 
land exploitation. This meant that the competitive imperatives associated 
with wage intensive production did not apply to the primary reproductive 
strategies of the dominant Argentine classes. Rather, the much more intensive 
cereals production was given secondary status to that of ranching. The pre-
dominance of the cattle industry resulted in land being the key source of capi-
tal investment for the agrarian elite owing to the speculative and productive 
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profits to be reaped (Solberg 1987, 10). Because of this, the settlement of the 
pampas was seen as not only superfluous, but also threatening to the landed 
classes of Argentina who actively stymied state efforts to successfully imple-
ment a homesteading policy of family-farm production. Indeed, following a 
financial crisis in 1890, the state was forced to sell off its remaining tracts of 
land to the estancia owners of the pampas, thus finally closing off the option 
of settlement and development through homesteading (Adelman 1992, 274). 
At the same time, free and open access to world markets for the export of cat-
tle products caused the Argentine elite to organise political pressure against 
the erection of a developmental tariff for the generation of new industries 
(Solberg 1987, 14–17, 28).
To be clear, cereal exports would come to predominate in the Argentine 
economy. Yet the landed elite would continue to reproduce themselves first 
and foremost through ranching and speculative land profits. This class-based 
reproduction and its consequences in the social organisation of land owner-
ship meant that wheat production occurred on the basis of a leasehold or ten-
ancy form of production in contradistinction to Canada’s owner production 
of wheat on the prairies (Adelman 1992, 278–80).
The predominance of tenant-production on the pampas functioned as a 
disincentive for the mechanisation and intensification of wheat production in 
at least two key manners. First, the resilience of the estancieros to fracture 
their landownership meant that they favoured a circular rather than perma-
nent migration scheme. Land tenancy, with its short contracts of three to 
four years, was well suited to these temporary forms of migration (Adelman 
1992, 278). Simultaneously, tenant farmers themselves had little incentive 
to revolutionise wheat production through capital investment, as short-term 
contracts favoured quick turnovers and returns in the short-run over the long-
term intensification of production. Thus, it appears that the social property 
relations particular to Argentina were significant in effectively mitigating 
or staving off the competitive pressures of world market production in the 
short-run. However, as Solberg has noted (1987, 28), looking to the effects of 
elite machinations on farming patterns is itself inadequate. Indeed, had there 
been more permanent migration, or the wish for such settlement, immigrants 
would have been far more likely to organise and lobby for their own interests 
in the form of agrarian development policy, tariff protections etc. It is on this 
point that the strategies of reproduction within which immigrants themselves 
were embedded were critical to the course of Argentine development. Again, 
the developmental outcome of Argentine wheat production was the result of 
the particular combination of extant social property relations and migrants—
the so-called neutral technology that was being imported in order to ‘leap 
stages’ of development was precisely a labouring class that was to arrive 
readily docile and complacent. Yet, as we shall see, the Italian populations 
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that dominated immigration to Argentina in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries did not automatically produce that quintessential perma-
nent class of wage-earners such that profit could only be earned through a 
rising organic composition of capital.
Immigration to Argentina was dominated by Italians, largely from the 
more rural southern regions which persisted in a feudal social structure until 
into the nineteenth century. However, Italians were only settled upon as the 
inevitable though ‘lesser stock’ of European immigrants (Adelman 1994, 
110–11). Initially Argentine officials saw their new country as being the 
European outpost of Latin America, a bastion of ‘white European civilisa-
tion and industrialisation’. As a consequence, early government efforts to 
recruit immigrants to Argentina were targeted at Anglo-Saxon and Northern 
European countries, which sought to entice potential settlement through 
offers of land via a family-farming scheme (Nugent 1992, 96; Solberg 1987, 
30). Ultimately, however, such immigration did not occur. On the one hand, 
Anglo-Saxon and Northern Europeans appeared to prefer immigration to 
Canada and the United States (Nugent 1992, 44). At the same time, however, 
the means of incentivising immigration available to the Argentine govern-
ment were radically curtailed by landowners’ stymying efforts to promote 
family-farm settlement through their progressive monopolisation of the 
land market. As a result, immigration incentives were limited to subsidised 
passages which had little appeal to the Anglo-Saxon emigrants seeking an 
escape from wage labour and the chance to set up their own plot of land to 
farm and make their private fortune on (Adelman 1994, 113–14; Solberg 
1987, 30).
Italian immigration to Argentina became predominant for a number of 
reasons. On the side of endogenous conditions favouring Italian immigra-
tion, the labour needs of immigrants were necessarily short term. A highly 
flexible, mobile and circular migrant population was desirable in the context 
of the monopolised land ownership in the pampas. As a result, the needs to 
be fulfilled by immigrants were either seasonal harvest labour or short-term 
land tenancy, over a period of three to four years. Conveniently, the harvest 
season in Italy was opposite that of Argentina and hence it was possible for 
Italian emigrants to partake in circular labour migration while still maintain-
ing their own livelihoods at home. Additionally, the distance between Italy 
and Argentina was far more conducive to short term and return travels, 
than would be that between the Northern European countries and Argentina 
(Adelman 1994, 112–15).
As indicated above, however, it is not adequate to simply look to the 
endogenous conditions surrounding immigration, as any number of other 
potential countries could have provided for the labouring needs of Argen-
tina and with varied consequences. That Italian immigration was dominant 
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in Argentina was significant owing to the particular strategies and practices 
which motivated emigration in the first place, and conditioned Italians’ inter-
action with the Argentine economy on the pampas.
In contrast to the emigration taking place from Northern Europe where 
the social relations of feudalism had been dismantled and where the insti-
tution of market dependence had taken place, southern Italy throughout 
the nineteenth century remained firmly rooted in feudal institutions and 
social practices. As J.S. MacDonald has argued (1963), the conditions of 
feudal property arrangements in the Italian South favoured a strategy of 
emigration in response to peasant landlessness and poverty. Land customs 
which saw the fragmentation of ownership through inheritance and dowry 
practices resulted in the creation of land plots so small they were unviable 
for agricultural production and therefore had to be sold off to large estate 
owners. Peasants as a result became sharecroppers and were responsible 
for all capital provisions on the land. Consequently, very little capital was 
invested and agriculture yielded uncertain and minimal profits. Permanent 
waged labour had not yet become a convention of reproduction as peasants 
still had access to their means of reproduction, though mediated through 
sharecropping contracts or feudal land relations. Temporary migration was 
thus undertaken as a means of acquiring capital abroad to reinvest in the 
land at home (Macdonald 1963, 69).
As a result of the endogenous property relations and the strategies of Italian 
immigrants on the pampas, then, labour was available in abundance and at a 
high elasticity given its circular nature. Such conditions meant that the press-
ing incentive to mechanise production in order to reduce wages (as occurred 
in the labour scarce prairies of Canada) did not apply to the Argentine 
pampas. Additionally, for short-term land tenants, profits were to be made 
through a rapid turnover in wheat production to be sold on the global market. 
Their strategy was one of maximising profits while meeting the financial 
obligations of landowners, within the short period of their tenancy contract. 
Hence, those Italian immigrants who engaged in tenancy rather than seasonal 
labour had a vested interest in keeping the barriers to trade low and were 
themselves little inclined to invest long-term capital in revolutionising the 
production process (Solberg 1987, 4). All of this meant that wheat produc-
tion on the pampas proceeded through a process where profits were reaped 
through the limited form of extensive agricultural production, which required 
vast (though finite) quantities of both land and labour. Clear disincentives to 
the mechanisation of agriculture were exerted on both migrants and landown-
ers such that both the closing of the frontier and the end to extensive land 
exploitation as well as the onset of war in 1914 and the disruption of immi-
gration served to send wheat production into a crisis from which it would take 
decades to recover (Nugent 1992, 118).
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CoNCLUSIoN
As argued above, the staples thesis of economic development has been inad-
equate in explaining the causes of differential development within settler 
spaces, and this is owing to the essential commodity fetishism which lies at 
its core, and its understanding of production as a technical rather than social 
relation. Both Argentina and Canada were integrated into global capitalist 
markets on the basis of export wheat production, and yet the ways in which 
wheat did or did not stimulate endogenous processes of industrial growth 
were markedly different, with Canada ‘taking off’ in the twentieth century 
and Argentina falling behind. As a result, a focus on the commodity being 
produced in itself is inadequate.
A significant element in the development of both spaces (and this holds 
for settler colonies generally) was that global market integration and capi-
talist transitions were initiated through massive immigration intended to 
make profitable the ‘barren’ grasslands of the prairies and pampas. In effect 
immigration was to function as an imported capitalist technique—the institu-
tion of waged labour—as overseas immigration by its very nature meant that 
new arrivals were dispossessed of their means of production. However, how 
immigration actually functioned in each setting was dramatically different, 
such that the establishment of a rural proletariat was far from certain. Yet, the 
staples thesis completely ignores this fact treating immigration as a neutral 
input to the production of wheat; that immigration provided the labouring 
needs of wheat appears an unquestioned truth.
The differences I have suggested above for how immigrants as a supposed 
technology of production interacted with the extant social arrangements in 
both Canada and Argentina, however, provided for completely different 
strategies of reproduction of both immigrants and owners of capital such 
that pressures to engage in a transition from absolute to relative surplus 
value production in wheat were present in Canada but not in Argentina. 
Migration, in this sense, functioned as a mechanism of UCD. Combined 
in so much as it was intended to draw into the global market both spaces 
through the ostensible importation of a ready-made proletariat. Uneven in 
that the interaction of dispossessed immigrants within each settler space was 
conditioned by varying social property relations and therefore produced radi-
cally different consequences for the paths of wheat production and broader 
patterns of national development which ensued. At the heart of this analysis 
as contrasted to the staples thesis, is the fundamental assertion that production 
is a social rather than technical relation and, as such, the materially grounded 
agencies and interactions of the human beings involved are of absolute sig-
nificance in explaining divergences in the developmental fortunes of Canada 
and Argentina.
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1. Here I am referring to the so-called ‘white settler colonies’ which were charac-
terised by the dispossession and marginalisation of indigenous populations, the mass 
importation of European populations to ‘settle’ the land and a high ratio of land rela-
tive to population. Included in this category would be Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, New Zealand, the United States and Uruguay (Willebald and Berola 2013).
2. That settler spaces were ‘void of demographic pressures’ is itself a matter of 
social and political economic determination rather than geographical fortune, as the 
staples thesis would posit. While the mass genocidal displacement of indigenous 
peoples’ physical and cultural presence was a historical precondition of these spaces, 
this does not confirm the idea of terra nullius inasmuch as there remained significant 
indigenous presence. That these populations continued to be externalised, rather than 
absorbed, into the nascent development of a capitalist political economy (as labour or 
otherwise) is an issue beyond the scope of this present chapter, but which I address 
more fully elsewhere.
3. It should be noted that the contemporary application of UCD to international 
relations takes its starting point from the work of Justin Rosenberg, whose work also 
constitutes a point of division amongst scholars using the concept. Precisely, this 
division concerns the historical specificity of UCD versus its potential transhistorical 
application. Drawing upon Trotsky’s initial formulation, Rosenberg has attempted to 
develop the idea of UCD to explain the very fact of the ‘international’ system itself 
(as opposed to Trotsky’s more limited concern with explaining variable capitalist 
development). This move has required a conceptual stretching of unevenness and 
combination beyond the remit of the capitalist mode of production, a move which has 
been met with a considerable degree of resistance.
In their contribution to the inaugural debate on UCD within the Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, Jamie Allinson and Alexander Anievas take up the prob-
lem of general abstractions within Rosenberg’s deployment of UCD (Allinson and 
Anievas 2009). While agreeing with Rosenberg that there is a latent, if mundane, 
way in which we can read UCD transhistorically, the authors argue firmly that its 
causal significance is only fully activated under the conditions of capitalist competi-
tion. For the authors, UCD can be used as a transhistoric general abstraction only if 
it is used to create historically specific, concrete categories for analysis. In contrast 
to this, Rosenberg has used UCD as a transhistoric abstraction which is both that 
which explains and from which all other explanations derive. This method of abstrac-
tion is argued to be fully at odds with the methodologies of Marxist sociological 
theory. Instead, the authors argue that as per Marx’s methodology, a general abstrac-
tion should be utilised as the basis from which to posit a presupposition, which can 
then account for a concrete general condition whose historical form is nonetheless 
explained by further categories and concepts. In this more nuanced sense, UCD can 
be posited as a transhistoric general abstraction only if it is situated in a mode of 
production analysis, which gives us the historical material with which to make sense 
of its particular operation within a given historical juncture (Allinson and Anievas 
2009).
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I take seriously Allinson and Anievas’s argument that UCD can only attain explan-
atory capacities within a mode of production theory. To this end, I propose that the 
SPR approach of Brenner et al. is a promising means of situating UCD within con-
crete tendencies owing to the material configuration of social relations. The strength 
of the SPR approach is that it provides for an understanding of the specificity of a 
mode of production in terms of its laws of motion or rules of reproduction, contin-
gent upon a particular, historically specific arrangement of social property relations. 
This, however, is not the same as asserting a totalising and universalising schematic 
of social relations absent of agency. Specifically, as concerns the capitalist mode of 
production, I suggest that the SPR approach allows us to understand capitalist expan-
sion not only as the expansion of impersonal laws of accumulation and reproduction, 
but rather as the expansion of particular configurations of social relations. Though 
these social relations produce their own logics of accumulation and reproduction, the 
fact of their connectivity with human subjectivity and agency renders them malleable 
(within particular historical parameters) rather than absolute. By understanding the 
relationship between different historical and geographical configurations of social 
property relations, subjectivities and agencies, it is possible to comprehend how 
the interaction (or combination) of different (uneven) social property regimes will 
produce novel forms of political, class and labour organisation such that capitalist 
modernity is never manifest in a singular and universal form, but is always variable 
in its concretely combined character.
4. It is important to note here that I am dealing with the period starting from 
confederation in each case. As such, existing indigenous social property relations 
had already been largely displaced and in each space, owing to the nature of such 
displacements, a new configuration of social property relations had been erected by 
early settlers. In beginning from the point of confederation, I am examining the period 
in which a distinctly ‘national’ development project was undertaken in contrast to the 
explicitly dependent settler development that had taken place prior to this point. This 
process of national development involved what is critical for my analysis here—an 
attempt to develop a national labour market through mass immigration.
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Chapter 9
Navigating Uneven and 
Combined Development
Britain’s Africa Policy in 
Historical Perspective
William Brown
The early years of the twenty-first century saw a renewed focus on Africa 
within Britain’s foreign policy. Although not a major feature of Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s initial years in office, a series of events and trends—
from increasing emphasis on development cooperation and global poverty 
reduction to intervention in Sierra Leone—pushed Africa up the policy 
agenda. The continent was declared a major focus of Blair’s second admin-
istration culminating in the Commission for Africa and the G8 summit at 
Gleneagles in July 2005. Policy priorities shifted somewhat in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis and with the advent of Conservative-led governments 
from 2010. Yet even so, by 2015 Africa was still a key focus of a much-
enlarged UK development cooperation effort—Africa being the largest 
regional recipient of UK aid—and declared ‘at the heart’ of UK foreign 
policy on development and security issues (Duddridge 2015).
The renewed focus on Africa, from Blair onwards, brought forth a host 
of historical parallels. For some, Blair’s liberalism and desire to transform 
and ‘heal’ Africa, resurrected Victorian liberal ideals of progress in the ‘dark 
continent’ (Brown 2006; Williams and Young 2009; Duffield and Hewitt 
2009). For others, the ideational importance of Africa continued the deeply 
embedded British conceptions of Africa as an ‘empty space’ where Britain 
could ‘do good’ (Gallagher 2013). For others still, the focus on Africa and the 
increasing challenge to Western influence posed by Chinese engagement with 
the continent presaged a ‘new scramble for Africa’ (Carmody 2011). Indeed, 
Africa’s very rise up the policy agenda, coming after a period of relative 
neglect in the 1980s and early 1990s in which Africa was of marginal con-
cern to UK governments (Ireton 2014), was itself redolent of a shift in British 
policy that occurred in the late nineteenth century. Africa had moved from a 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   149 7/13/2016   9:56:03 PM
150 William Brown
landmass whose significance ‘lay in the transitory importance of its shores to 
the enterprises flowing past them’ to taking centre stage in a rapid expansion 
of colonial control (Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 2015, 14).
However, if we look at the aims and prospects of recent British policy 
towards Africa, we find that such parallels do not by themselves grasp the 
dynamic and changing nature of interaction between Britain and Africa. Indeed, 
the legacies of the past weigh heavily on the present as revitalised aims for lib-
eral transformation in Africa come up against the legacies of past interaction. 
This chapter explores the historical evolution of Britain’s policy towards Africa 
using ideas drawn from the theory of uneven and combined development. I 
argue that we can understand shifts in British policy towards Africa as attempts 
to navigate problems thrown up by the developmentally highly uneven nature 
of the relationship and the contradictory developmental outcomes of combined 
development. As such, it posits the key location for understanding changes in 
British policy as the point of interaction between Britain and Africa. In doing 
so the chapter also draws on the ideas of Ronald Robinson in locating the vicis-
situdes of British imperial policy as reactive and interactive manoeuvres with 
non-European political actors (Robinson 1972, 1986).
The chapter has two main aims. First, and most substantively, it seeks to 
outline an evolving dynamic in relations between Britain and Africa whereby 
the legacies of past processes of combined development shape and constrain 
current and future policy choices. Second, at a broader level, by locating the 
point of analysis on relations between British and African actors it seeks to 
investigate ways of developing less Eurocentric accounts, creating space 
for understanding the impact of non-European agency, even while the focus 
remains on British, and wider Western, policy. It seeks to do this by using 
both the more general depiction of international relations provided by uneven 
and combined development and the more specific ‘excentric’ analysis of 
imperialism developed by Robinson.
The chapter is organised around three key phases in British Africa policy: 
the advent of colonial rule; the evolution of colonial development policy prior 
to independence; and the resurgence of liberal transformatory aims within 
British policy this century. The chapter briefly sets out some of the theoreti-
cal and conceptual issues on which it draws in analysing these three periods 
before taking each in turn.
UNEvENNESS AND ‘ExCENTRIC’ IMPERIALISM
This chapter draws on Justin Rosenberg’s work on uneven and combined 
development to frame an account of the evolution of, and challenges facing, 
British Africa policy.1
 It does this in two main ways . First, it uses uneven 
and combined development to characterise evolutions in British policy as 
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attempts to navigate a highly uneven and interactive relationship with Africa. 
Uneven and combined development posits international relations in general 
as social processes of interaction between unevenly developed societies.2 
The world is and always has been composed of multiple societies that are 
unevenly developed across a range of economic, social, cultural, technologi-
cal and political dimensions; they all have to engage with the ‘outside world’ 
in some way and have institutions and processes relating to managing diplo-
macy in its ‘broadest sense’ (Rosenberg 2006, 320). The development of any 
one society over time therefore is inherently a process of combination—a dia-
lectical, dynamic and intersocietally interactive unfolding of multiple causal 
factors. However, the advent and expansion of industrial capitalism acceler-
ated and intensified these processes of interaction making ‘development’ as 
a whole a world-wide, combined and in many respects increasingly uneven, 
process. Seen through this lens, British policy towards Africa, from the nine-
teenth century onwards, represents an extremely uneven case of intersocietal 
interaction, driven initially by the expansion of British and wider (uneven) 
European capitalist industrialisation. However, both in the early period of 
colonisation and more recently, this unevenness played out in ways that have 
often limited the successful realisation of British policy aims.
The second use of uneven and combined development is to explain why 
British Africa policy aims have often been frustrated. The theory argues 
that rather than producing a homogeneous international system, intersocietal 
interaction produces successive novel, hybrid and heterogeneous develop-
mental outcomes and forms of state among ‘catch-up’ or ‘later developing’ 
countries. This insight is of key importance in understanding the evolution of 
British policy in Africa over time. At various points—in the pre-colonisation 
period, the early years of colonisation, in the late colonial promotion of 
‘development’ and more recently—liberal transformatory aims have ani-
mated British policy towards Africa. Yet at each point, the heterogeneous 
outcomes of combined development have frustrated liberal ambitions. British 
policy as a result shows phases of advancing and then stepping back from the 
pursuit of liberal change in Africa. As with other historical and contemporary 
policy examples, where universal liberal principles collide with a highly dif-
ferentiated world,3 processes of uneven and combined development in Africa 
have presented to British policy makers an evolving set of dilemmas.
Recognition of the importance of European development and expansion 
has been a mainstay of both orthodox and more radical accounts of the 
European role in Africa in the colonial and post-colonial eras. However, in 
those accounts not only is the direction of interaction almost entirely one-way 
traffic—European or Western expansion into or impositions on Africa—but 
the role of unevenness is cashed in largely in terms of European technologi-
cal, economic and military advantage over Africa. The Africanist historian 
Frederick Cooper noted this very point:
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Scholars have been too quick to leap from the unevenness of power, which 
reached an extreme in the nineteenth century, to an assumption that capitalism, 
Europe, or colonialism was necessarily an overwhelming force in the world…. 
Scholars have trouble conceptualizing asymmetrical relationships, which none-
theless do not imply total power of one side over the other. To explore such 
relationships is to see the limits of power as well as its extent and above all to 
look at how people on the weaker end of the connection pushed back…. (Cooper 
2014, 9)
Acknowledging the role of ‘people on the weaker end’ is a crucial step if 
we are to move away from more Eurocentric accounts and to explain the 
production of the varied and divergent outcomes from interaction. One of 
the promises of the theory of uneven and combined development is that 
it provides more scope for doing just this (Hobson 2011; Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu 2015).
It was a critique of orthodox and radical theories of imperialism, and their 
failure to acknowledge the role of non-European actors in accounts of impe-
rialism, that characterised Ronald Robinson’s work (1972, 1986).4 In it, and 
in his work with John Gallagher (Gallagher and Robinson 1953; Robinson, 
Gallagher and Denny 2015), Robinson sought to give an ‘excentric’ account 
of British Africa policy, one which located the causal dynamic at the point of 
interaction between an expansionist Britain and the non-European societies it 
came into contact with. According to Robinson (1986, 271), ‘when imperial-
ism is looked at as an inter-continental process, its true metropolis appears 
neither at the centre nor the periphery, but in their changing relativities’.
Perhaps most interestingly for our purposes, Robinson developed an 
account in which a key role is played by the variation (perhaps read ‘uneven-
ness’) that existed among the non-European societies which Britain encoun-
tered; the varied reactions of those societies to European expansion; and the 
different economic and political outcomes that resulted from such interac-
tions. These elements are most clearly seen in Robinson’s account of the 
period of British colonisation of Africa in the late nineteenth century and the 
following section draws heavily on that account. As we will see, these varied 
processes laid the basis for later challenges facing Britain’s Africa policy. 
However, as Robinson himself did in later work, the chapter will bring for-
ward key insights of this account of colonisation into the post-colonial period 
as well.
SCRAMbLING oR ‘fUMbLING To ADjUST’?
Britain’s accelerating industrial development and international expansion in 
the mid- to late nineteenth century meant that its interaction with Africa was 
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characterised among other things by two important trends: increasing inten-
sity and increasing unevenness. The combination of both resulted in a mas-
sive expansion of British territorial possessions in Africa. However, the route 
by which that outcome was arrived at was neither straightforward nor dictated 
by trends in Britain alone. ‘The most striking fact about British history in the 
nineteenth century’, Gallagher and Robinson noted, ‘is that it is the history of 
an expanding society’ with industrialisation causing an extended and intensi-
fied impact overseas (Gallagher and Robinson 1953, 5).
However, in marked contrast to the mercantilist era, while British power 
was deployed to enforce the pax Britannica, ‘liberation’ rather than acqui-
sition was the goal, and free trade rather than monopoly was the means to 
achieve it (Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 2015, 4). For the mid-century 
Victorians, empire assumed a moral purpose, not to rule the world but to 
redeem it (Ferguson 2003). And it was thought that commerce, perhaps 
accompanied by the other C’s—Christianity and civilisation—would by 
itself liberate other peoples from their ‘backward’ and ‘despotic’ societies 
(Pakenham 1991). In contrast to some other accounts of the Scramble for 
Africa, Robinson and Gallagher argued that the eventual acquisition of ter-
ritory at the end of the century was not driven by a sharp change in British 
policy per se. Rather, policy was relatively consistent across the century, 
seeking to encourage and protect British commercial expansion and political 
influence by whatever means were needed but with a preference for avoiding 
territorial expansion (Gallagher and Robinson 1953, 13). As Robinson later 
framed it (1986, 281): ‘By informal means if possible, by formal means if 
necessary, imperialism integrated new regions into international capitalist 
economy, providing local pax and strategic protection’.
Indeed, the focus of British expansion was often not within the formal 
empire. Just prior to the Scramble, over half of British investment and two 
thirds of exports went to areas not under British political control (Robinson, 
Gallagher and Denny 2015, 8). In Latin America, for example, integration 
into British-dominated international trade meant that the need for political 
and military intervention by Britain was limited. Nevertheless, continued 
industrial expansion ‘made new demands upon British policy’ as new and 
varied underdeveloped areas came within the British orbit (Gallagher and 
Robinson 1953, 7–8). The unevenness of the world Britain was encountering 
also meant that a whole range of strategies were deployed, from commercial 
treaty (the main form by which Britain gave formal recognition to other 
polities), to anti-slavery treaties signed with African leaders, to protectorates 
and outright colonisation, creating a patchwork liberal empire of formal and 
informal relationships (Gallagher and Robinson 1953, 11).
Colonisation, furthermore, only occurred where it was seen as both neces-
sary and possible by British policy makers. ‘Not all regions will reach the 
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same level of economic integration at any one time’, Gallagher and Robinson 
wrote (1953, 6), ‘neither will all regions need the same type of political 
control at any one time’. This unevenness among non-European societies, 
and the ways in which they reacted to British expansion, therefore had a 
key role in shaping the strategies Britain deployed. Formal political control 
was sought only when informal influence was not sufficient to secure eco-
nomic or geopolitical aims, but also only where it was politically or military 
feasible. Often these two conditions did not obtain. In Latin America and 
areas of British settlement, it was often regarded as unnecessary. In parts of 
Asia—China and the Ottoman Empire—greater political control might have 
been seen as desirable, given the barriers to British and European commerce 
that remained stubbornly in place, but there were severe limits to achieving 
it (Gallagher and Robinson 1953). In Africa, meanwhile, political takeover 
did eventually come to be seen as necessary (Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 
2015; Robinson 1986).
Three key points are worth noting at this point. First, although takeover 
came to be seen as ‘necessary’ in Africa, from a British point of view, it was 
possible only in a restricted sense—through the construction of very par-
ticular forms of political rule centred on a limited commitment of resources 
and military force combined with a creation and strengthening of what were 
represented as ‘traditional’ African political structures (see following sec-
tion). This bequeathed deeply problematic legacies for those societies once 
independence was won, and indeed for later British policy makers.
Second, the ‘need’ for colonisation manifested itself in very different ways 
in different parts of Africa, at least from the British perspective. Unevenness 
within Africa, and the fluidity of the wider geopolitical pressures on Britain, 
meant that the establishment of colonies should not be seen as a mono-causal 
process. The British entry into Africa, in this view, arose from disparate 
situations, all ‘products of different historical evolutions, some arising from 
national growth or decay, others from European expansion…. All of them 
were changing at different levels at different speeds’ (Robinson, Gallagher 
and Denny 2015, 466).
Third and more generally, we should note that this understanding of coloni-
sation makes a decisive move away from Eurocentric accounts and establishes 
a critical role for the societies and peoples ‘a the weaker end of the connec-
tion’ (Cooper 2014, 9). It was precisely those non-European agents who the 
British at the time regarded as ‘without history’ (Wolf 1982), and the varied 
patterns of resistance and accommodation they pursued, who shaped whether, 
where, when and how the British resorted to formal imperialism. Colonisation 
and British policy choices were shaped by indigenous politics as well as 
European: ‘From beginning to end imperialism was a product of interaction 
between European and extra-European politics’ (Robinson 1972, 119).
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The unevenness of ‘extra-European politics’ that confronted the British in 
the late nineteenth century was itself, of course, the product of multiple prior 
processes of combined development too complex to trace here. Nevertheless, 
two factors are worth highlighting briefly for their role in subsequent British 
expansion in Africa: the impact of the slave trade and African reactions to 
earlier phases of European expansion.
The collaborative informal imperialism that Britain pursued for much of 
the nineteenth century in Africa was itself not new but rather had been at the 
core of the slave trade which ‘combined European initiative with African 
collaboration’—Europeans financing and organising the trade and Africans 
dominating the capture and delivery of slaves prior to transportation (Wolf 
1982, 204). Leaving the unimaginable human impact to one side, the political 
effects were also important though collaboration had highly divergent politi-
cal impacts on African polities (Wolf 1982; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015). 
Some, such as Benin, were for a time able to strengthen and consolidate 
their existing structures. In others, such as Asante, Oyo and Dahomey, the 
trade helped to fuel state formation itself, giving rise to new and increasingly 
powerful polities. In other regions, notably the Congo, the increasing reach 
of slaving into the interior ultimately weakened existing political structures 
to the point of collapse. The supply from Europe of firearms, as well as other 
elite goods, added to the dynamic processes of change, radically altering the 
balance of power in many regions, and allowing the emergence of new com-
bined forms of state (Wolf 1982; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015).
Despite Britain abolishing the slave trade in 1807, 2 million slaves were 
transported from Africa between 1810 and 1870 (Wolf 1982, 196). The 
British expectation had been that ‘legitimate commerce’ would naturally 
eclipse slave-based production. ‘The actual course of events’, Bernard Waites 
notes (1999, 109), ‘was very different’. Indeed, not only did slavery con-
tinue but the very products of legitimate trade, such as palm oil, came to the 
market on the backs of slave labour (Waites 1999). In trying to curtail what 
Britain had earlier done so much to bring about, and address the slavery that 
Livingstone referred to as ‘an open sore of the world’ (Pakenham 1991, 1), 
Britain was drawn into ever deeper involvement in African politics.
The second factor to note is what Pablo Idahosa and Bob Shenton (2004) 
have called the national developmental responses in Africa to the ‘wave 
of European modernity’. In places as diverse as Tunisia and Madagascar, 
existing elites initiated processes of reform, state building and development 
designed to fend off increasing European influence. In Asante, ruling elites 
actively sought to draw on European expertise and training in consolidating 
the state and implement a policy of ‘peace, trade and open roads’ with the 
Europeans (Idahosa and Shenton 2004, 78–79). And in Ethiopia, attempts at 
modernisation and military reorganisation were able to hold off colonisation, 
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despite military defeats by the British, until the arrival of Italian fascism in 
the 1930s (Idahosa and Shenton 2004; Makki 2011). The key importance of 
these efforts was not that they were successful—most were not. Rather, it was 
that they were emblematic of the manoeuvring, resistance and accommoda-
tion to European expansion seen across Africa.
Two further cases were of crucial importance to the unfolding of the 
Scramble for Africa—Egypt and South Africa. Of overriding importance to 
British concerns in the late nineteenth century was India, the economic gains 
from which kept Britain abreast of its increasingly powerful rivals in Europe 
and America (Wolf 1982, 312). Yet, for most of the nineteenth century, 
Britain sought to ensure the safety of routes to India, via the Cape in South 
Africa and later Suez in Egypt, through informal influence or, in the case of 
Cape Colony, limited territorial acquisition. But in both cases, the strategy 
came unstuck, leading not only to occupation of both areas but successive 
occupations in the upper Nile Valley in Sudan and Uganda, and in southern 
Africa in Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 2015).
Following Napoleon’s defeat and removal from Egypt, Mehemet Ali over-
saw a centralisation of government finance, modernisation of the military 
and Egyptian territorial expansion and national economic regulation (Idahosa 
and Shenton 2004; Gallagher and Robinson 1953). Increasing integration 
with Europe followed, notably through investment in the Suez Canal and 
extensive lending from European banks. Bankrupt by 1876, political revolt 
in Egypt aimed at limiting European influence and threatened both the canal 
and European bank loans and led eventually to British occupation in 1882 
(Gallagher and Robinson 1953, 14). Though designed as a temporary expedi-
tion, so difficult was the task of recreating a collaborative political settlement 
that the British remained in Egypt until 1956.
In South Africa, British occupation had been limited to the Cape Colony, 
seeking to have enough presence there to secure the coast and exert influ-
ence over the Boers to limit their political ambitions and prevent them from 
provoking a revolt among the Africans expelled or subjugated by the Boers’ 
march into the interior. Already antagonistic and unstable, these informal and 
semi-formal arrangements—with Boer republics and African polities—were 
ultimately destroyed by the huge expansion of economic interaction occa-
sioned by the development of the Kimberley diamond mines. This altered 
‘all the conditions of South African politics’ according to one British official 
(quoted in Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 2015, 58) showing how intensified 
economic interactions could ‘tear down, as well as build up a system of colo-
nial collaboration’ ultimately leading to the Boer War (Robinson 1972, 125).
There were important consequences of both the Egyptian occupation and 
the ever deeper immersion in South African politics. After Egypt, Britain 
ceded ground to European rivals in West Africa and to Germany in East 
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Africa but in the official mind at least it created a pressing need to secure the 
upper Nile Valley. The difficulties of doing this informally—given the Mahdi 
rebellion in Sudan and the absence of viable collaborative arrangements 
in East Africa—prompted further colonial expansion (Pakenham 1991). 
Following a very different dynamic, the economic expansion of South Africa 
led to Rhodes’s expeditions northwards, overcoming the resistance of the 
Ndebele and establishing new British protectorates, later to become colonies, 
in southern Africa.
Even in West Africa, attempts to rule through informal means ultimately 
came up against the difficulties posed by African polities creaking under pres-
sure of an intensifying European presence. In Gold Coast, collaboration with 
Asante eventually broke down as other European powers pressed their inter-
ests with the until then powerful Asante elite, leading to the (failed) assertion 
of a British protectorate in 1891 and final colonisation in 1901 (Warner 1999; 
2001). In Lagos, the frustration of British attempts to remove rulers engaged 
in slavery led ultimately to annexation. In both cases, the move towards colo-
nisation in one location had further consequences leading to ‘an inexorable 
British advance inland’ (Havenden and Meredith 1993, 52–60).
Thus while the ‘Scramble for Africa’ is often presented as a relatively 
coherent and uniform process of colonisation it was in fact an uneven and 
differentiated set of events even just within the British case (German, French, 
Portuguese and Belgian expansion each had their own dynamics). While 
occasioned by the intensification of increasingly uneven interactions between 
Britain and a variety of African polities, British policy showed itself to be a 
reactive and evolving response to the varied situations across Africa. The per-
ceived need for imperialist relations to take the form of colonial empire rested 
on the absence or collapse of viable collaborators (Robinson 1986, 271–73; 
1972). Yet, too often the Europeans forced indigenous elites to play for too 
high stakes, cutting them off from traditional bases of support and forcing 
Europeans to change tack. ‘More often than not’, Robinson concluded, ‘it 
was this non-European component of European expansion that necessitated 
the extension of colonial empires’ (1972, 130).
From an earlier belief in the power of the informal ‘empire of liberty’ to 
transform the world, the realities of the late nineteenth century expansion 
into the diverse polities of Africa presented a far more difficult prospect 
to the British. The reality of expansion ‘shocked’ policy makers into a 
realisation that ‘the growth of communities into harmonious commercial and 
political partnership with Britain was not after all a law of nature’ (Robinson, 
Gallagher and Denny 2015, 469). The unplanned acquisition of a succession 
of African colonies was the result. And yet, as Frederick Cooper notes (2014, 
10), ‘Empires … had to make their power felt in particular contexts. Conquest 
was usually the easier part of empire building: administering an empire—let 
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alone transforming societies—was the hard part’. By the start of the twenti-
eth century, the difficulties of ruling and developing the regions now under 
British control posed a new set of dilemmas.
DEvELoPMENT AND CoNTRoL
If the British acquisition of an African empire can be seen as the outcome of 
its attempts to manage the increasing intensity and unevenness of the emerg-
ing economic and political relations it now had with African societies, its 
approach to governing and developing the colonies it now possessed was no 
less easy to navigate. A key constraint on policy was the continuing influence 
of the Victorian unwillingness to commit large amounts of men and money 
overseas. As a result, Victorian ambitions of liberal transformation were 
curtailed and the British ‘became less concerned to liberate social energies 
abroad and concentrated on preserving authority’ (Robinson, Gallagher and 
Denny 2015, 470; Mamdani 1996). Even if resources had been available, the 
Indian mutiny had left an ‘indelible mark’ on the Victorians, demonstrating 
that Westernisation was a ‘dangerous and explosive business’ (Robinson, 
Gallagher and Denny 2015, 10). One colonial governor in West Africa argued 
against more ambitious aims of transformation: ‘If we allow the tribal author-
ity to be ignored or broken, it will mean that we, who numerically form a 
small minority in the country, shall be obliged to deal with a rabble…. There 
could only be one end to such a policy, and that would be eventual conflict 
with the rabble’ (Sir P. Girouard quoted in Lugard 1965, 216). Pacification, 
and pacification on the cheap at that, became the overriding goal (Idahosa and 
Shenton 2004; Robinson 1972).
The key collaborative mechanism utilised to achieve this end was what 
became known as ‘indirect rule’ codified in Lord Lugard’s The Dual Mandate 
in British Tropical Africa (1965). Colonial states operating along these lines 
can be seen as a particular combination of different forms of rule. Mahmood 
Mamdani (1996, 19) described them as ‘bifurcated’ states: ‘The colonial 
state was a double sided affair. Its one side, the state that governed a racially 
defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of 
rights. Its other side, the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-
economic coercion and administratively driven justice’. That is, one side of 
the state, concentrated on urban areas, approximated the impersonal, ‘civil’ 
political form of rule of modern capitalist states based on law, albeit racially 
defined; the other side consisted of various forms of customary and personal 
rule, non- or only partial separation of labour from the land, extra-economic 
coercion and exploitation, and concentrated in rural areas. They were two 
arms of a single polity within an over-arching colonial authority.
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Moreover, each side of these bifurcated states was itself a form of com-
bined development. The rural side of the state was based on supposed African 
‘customary rule’. Yet, according to Mamdani (1996), customary rule was 
neither an authentic expression of Africanness, nor an entirely European 
invention. It was the product of the colonial imagination and the articula-
tion of colonial power with pre-colonial societies which were in any case in 
a state of flux. Imperialists gave recognition to ‘native’ traditions ‘to build 
up a tribal authority with recognised legal standing’ (Lugard 1965, 217) and 
accentuated and refashioned existing communities and polities. In many 
places this preserved or enhanced rather than transformed the ‘tribal’ or eth-
nic basis of what Europeans saw as the essential basis of African societies, 
strengthening ‘ethnic compartmentalisation’ and reinforcing the authority 
(and authoritarianism) of rural elites (Robinson 1972, 136; also see Mamdani 
1996; Havinden and Meredith 1993, 75).
In the urban centres of power, while a racialised form of ‘civil rule’ was 
constructed, fiscal pressures meant that it was a state shaped by their particu-
lar colonial conditions. The principle that colonies should be self-financed 
from revenue or self-financed commercial loans was a tenacious one in 
British policy (Ireton 2013, 5–6). Though direct taxation was at times used, 
either in kind, in labour, or money, indirect taxation of imports and exports 
was the chief means of raising finance for infrastructural development and to 
pay administrative costs of colonies. It was both cheap to collect and avoided 
more extensive intrusions into the newly tribalised rural populations (Idahosa 
and Shenton 2004, 82). Where direct taxation was used, collection was often 
farmed out to the chiefs and headmen who utilised their mediating role to 
enrich themselves as well as fund the colonial administration (Idahosa and 
Shenton 2004, 82; Robinson 1986). Cooper (2002) labelled the states that 
grew out of these constraints ‘gatekeeper states’ sitting astride the ‘gate’ 
through which imports and exports flowed in order to raise finance by the 
least troublesome means they could. They too can therefore also be seen as 
products of combination: neither African nor European ‘they emerged out of 
a peculiar Euro-African history’ (Cooper 2002, 160).
In some respects, indirect rule, itself a form of collaboration, allowed the 
British to re-establish control in place of the systems that had broken down 
prior to the Scramble. Rural authorities served as intermediaries between the 
urban centres of authority and the mass of the population in the countryside. 
This made ‘playing’ African politics easier for the British because govern-
ment patronage—honours, contracts and social services—was easier to dis-
pense (Robinson 1972). Also, in order to sustain their own administrations, 
colonial authorities began to develop infrastructure in places such as Nigeria 
and Ghana if for no other reason than to facilitate the flow of trade which 
could be taxed (Havinden and Meredith 1993, 101–3).
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Nevertheless, pressures grew to do more than simply sustain colonial 
administration on the cheap. By the early twentieth century, there were 
already policy differences emerging. So-called ‘social imperialists’ saw in 
colonial expansion a means of serving British interests as well as providing 
moral and social improvement to indigenous populations while remaining 
conservative with regard to initiatives aimed at capitalist development in 
rural areas (Gallagher 2013). On the other hand, ‘imperial reformers’, led 
most notably by Joseph Chamberlain, were more ambitious (Gallagher 2013, 
38). ‘We are landlords of a great estate’, Chamberlain proclaimed, ‘it is the 
duty of a landlord to develop his estate’ (quoted in Havinden and Meredith 
1993, 88). The idea that British rule would benefit Africans had been around 
for some time but, as Gallagher points out, the idea that it would be the state 
actively driving this, whether through Chamberlain’s imperial assistance or 
Lugard’s indirect rule, was a new idea (Gallagher 2013, 49).5
However, shifts in British policy to more fully address the idea of develop-
ment of the colonies were typically slow and reactive. In 1924 and again in 
1926, concessions on loans for capital projects were made available to colo-
nies in Africa and in 1929 parliament passed the Colonial Development Act 
providing funding for capital projects in those colonies without ‘responsible 
government’—mainly the West Indies and Africa (Ireton 2013, 7; Morgan 
1980). However, even here motives were mixed. Gladstonian principles of 
avoiding long-term financial commitments still prevailed and British interests 
to stimulate British employment through increased trade were key factors in 
passing the Act.
Between the wars, British policy never fully resolved the tension inherent 
in Lugard’s dual mandate, pulled as it was between the need to organise the 
empire for home benefit at a time of high unemployment and the increasing 
focus on trusteeship that flowed from the Paris Peace conference (Havinden 
and Meredith 1993, 138). Hopes were raised in the colonies of development 
and social spending that could only be delivered through injections of public 
money while back in London the Treasury maintained a commitment to self-
financing ‘empire on the cheap’ (Havinden and Meredith 1993, 138). Though 
imperial preference was increased between the wars, other initiatives to 
promote trade within the empire (for example, through the empire marketing 
board) were half-hearted (Havinden and Meredith 1993).
By the mid- to late 1930s, a number of factors began to push Britain to 
reconsider its policy. First, demands increased from Nazi Germany for the 
return of its colonies mandated to Britain after the First World War. The 
demand was rejected but it increased pressure on Britain to show that it was 
living up to its commitments on ‘trusteeship’ in all its colonies (Morgan 
1980). Second, the failure of Britain, along with the rest of the League of 
Nations, to take any meaningful action against Mussolini’s invasion of 
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Ethiopia seriously undermined British standing in the colonies and helped to 
fuel nascent nationalist movements (Havinden and Meredith 1993, 194–7). 
Third, the colonies themselves were struggling to maintain their finances. 
Having allowed colonies to borrow, the depression meant most struggled 
to increase exports sufficiently to generate the surpluses necessary to ser-
vice their debts (Havinden and Meredith 1993, 179). Finally, and perhaps 
most dramatically, labour riots in the West Indies and labour unrest in some 
African colonies prompted a resurgence of debate about the social and eco-
nomic conditions within the colonies (Havinden and Meredith 1993, 194–7). 
Numerous publications, including several on the anti-colonial political left, 
drew attention to the poor economic and social conditions in the colonies and 
the government itself commissioned Lord Hailey of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs to address the absence of basic statistical information 
in his An African Survey published in 1938 (Morgan 1980). In presenting his 
report in 1938, Hailey said of the commitment to trusteeship, ‘I sometimes 
wish that we could place our hands on our hearts a little less, and set them to 
explore our pockets a little more’ (quoted in Morgan 1980, 28).
One outcome was the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act pro-
viding a much-enhanced fund for colonial development and for research 
into the colonies. The shift from the 1929 Act was notable, with a much 
more explicit focus on colonial development (Ireton 2013, 7–8). There was 
also a new commitment to work towards self-government within the British 
Empire. Nevertheless, funds under the CDW Act remained small in compari-
son to the developmental needs of the colonies (Ireton 2013, 17). Moreover, 
post-war conditions were so dire in Britain that there were severe limits on 
the level of public investment in the colonies and a need to address the severe 
shortages in Britain, somewhat blunting the commitment to ‘new standards 
of trusteeship’.
Perhaps more fundamental was the continued drag on ambition that arose 
from concerns with maintaining British authority. Development threatened to 
weaken the ‘traditional’ authorities on which British rule rested. As Robinson 
put it: ‘The less the pro-consuls demanded of their mediators in the way of 
reform, the safer they were; and the more they tried to develop societies into 
modern, secular shapes, the harder it became to solve collaborative equa-
tions’ (Robinson 1986, 280). Consequently, even with a greater commitment 
to development from London, many governors dragged their feet. In places, 
colonial authorities ‘followed policies that were directly and indirectly inimi-
cal to the development of colonial capitalism … where development seemed 
to lead away from a peasant-based society, local officials were far more 
cautious’ (Havinden and Meredith 1993, 158). Policy ought to ‘preserve the 
social organisations we have inherited and modify them only gradually … 
within the limits set by the tolerable pace of social change’ as Arthur Creech 
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Jones put it (quoted in Havinden and Meredith 1993, 312–13). The growth of 
a waged urban working class was ‘universally feared’ (Idahosa and Shenton 
2004, 84).
Complicating matters further, development also threatened to build up the 
proto-nationalist forces in the colonies. Increases in social expenditure led to 
expanding administrations and, particularly at the local level, a growing cadre 
of educated Africans. This not only generated conflict with the chiefs, who 
feared the loss of their pivotal position between colonisers and rural popula-
tion, it also brought colonial administrators up against the newly emerging 
African ‘political class’ who used staffing and financing of local govern-
ment as resources for nationalist party-building (Dorman 2015; Gabay 2015; 
Idahosa and Shenton 2004; see also Allen 1995). Further moves to strengthen 
the position of ‘moderate Africans’ by devolving power, and developing 
electoral representation, merely increased these trends. The result, as Cooper 
noted, was that the developmental colonialism of the 1950s had decreasing 
room for manoeuvre (Cooper 2002, 53). The Mau Mau rebellion and growing 
opposition in Gold Coast and Nigeria further raised the costs of maintaining 
a developmentalist empire.
Speaking in 1940, Lord Hailey had presciently claimed ‘History will look 
back on this period as being the most critical stage of African development; 
errors made now … may well create situations which the future can rectify 
only at the cost of great effort and much human distress’ (quoted in Havinden 
and Meredith 1993, 204–5). And indeed, the legacies of Britain’s often falter-
ing attempts to manage its relations with Africa left long legacies for both the 
states that eventually emerged independent in the 1960s and 1970s and for 
later British policy makers.6
THE LATE REPRISE of LIbERAL TRANSfoRMATIoN
For much of the period after independence, Britain’s relationship with Africa 
was characterised by ‘disengagement, withdrawal and damage limitation’ 
(Porteus 2008, 7). Conflict in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, where the 
majority of Britain’s commercial and strategic interests were focussed, was 
the main priority in African diplomacy (Porteus 2008, 8). By the 1990s, even 
the Cold War-driven concerns in southern Africa had faded and commercial 
ties with other regions had further eroded Africa’s importance to Britain as 
well as to other European countries. The limited but important powers that 
independence brought had been well deployed by African governments to try 
to limit external influence over domestic politics. Conservative governments 
had proven keen to leave the manifest developmental and peace-keeping 
and humanitarian challenges to multilateral organisations and the European 
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Commission and after 1979 aid budgets were under severe pressure (Ireton 
2013). And yet, by the turn of the century, Africa was not only rising up the 
policy agenda in Britain, absorbing ever more prime ministerial attention, 
but was also the focus of a revitalisation of a British policy agenda aimed at 
liberal transformation.
The reasons why Africa should have become such an important issue 
under the Labour governments after 1997 are varied. Labour’s pledge to 
create a new international development department and to have an ethical 
dimension to foreign policy, together with the increasing influence of large 
development-oriented NGOs, were key factors. A series of political and 
military crises in Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone added to the focus on 
Africa. Internationally, moves to address African states’ unsustainable debt 
burden, and a greater emphasis on poverty reduction as a shared international 
goal, laid the foundation for a fuller engagement with ‘Africa’ as a policy 
issue (Gallagher 2013; Porteus 2008). Concerns about security, especially 
after 9/11, and migration, added to a perception that the pre-existing ‘hands-
off’ approach to Africa policy could not last.
Britain’s re-engagement with developmental challenges in Africa coin-
cided with a widespread rethink among donors about how to promote 
development and the role of overseas aid.7 Fundamentally, this was a debate 
about how to achieve economic growth in Africa through liberal political 
and economic change. This emerging post-Cold War policy discourse suited 
Labour’s values, rooted as it was in the positive developmental role of human 
rights, democracy and better governance (Gallagher 2013, 6). It added a more 
political dimension to development discourses while also softening some of 
the harsher edges of the extant ‘neoliberal’ focus on economic liberalisation 
(Carothers and De Gramont 2013). Moreover, the new policy consensus 
chimed with the political orientation of the prime minister who famously 
drew Africa into the centre of foreign policy in the wake of the attack on 
the World Trade Centre, proclaiming in his 2001 Labour Party Conference 
speech that ‘The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But 
if the world as a community focussed on it, we could heal it’ (Blair 2001).
Blair’s own approach to Africa was morally driven in a way that was 
strongly redolent of the early twentieth-century imperial reformers (Gallagher 
2013). Inderjeet Parmar (2005, 222–23) has traced the links between Blair’s 
liberal internationalism and turn of the twentieth century imperial visions. The 
influence on Blair of ‘New Liberal’ social reformers such as J. MacMurray 
and T.H. Green, and Christian socialists such as R.H. Tawney, shaped his 
view of politics and history as a moral striving for societal improvement. 
This tradition also influenced Blair’s international vision and especially his 
favourable view of ‘imperialist’ humanitarian actions abroad (Parmar 2005, 
225). Julia Gallagher too notes how under New Labour, Africa policy was 
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‘set aside’ from other policy areas, an imagined space, untrammelled by the 
complexities of domestic politics, where Britain could ‘do good’ (Gallagher 
2013, 4). The terrorist attacks on New York gave a compelling strategic argu-
ment to add to this moral focus on Africa’s ‘problems’ (Porteus 2008, 42).
Like Victorian visions of an expansive realm of liberty and prosper-
ity, New Labour’s approach was one of liberal transformation in Africa. 
As with those earlier periods, it required available collaborators on the 
African side. The result was a kind of ‘liberal bargain’ (Brown 2006), an 
exchange of aid, debt relief and policy changes on trade and other issues by 
the developed world, on the one hand, for radical liberal reform of the way 
in which African states govern and pursue economic development, on the 
other. It was neatly summed up by Blair in his 2001 Labour Party confer-
ence speech: ‘On our side: provide more aid, untied to trade; write off debt; 
help with good governance … access to our markets … on the African side: 
true democracy, no more excuses for dictatorship, abuses of human rights; 
no tolerance of bad governance … Proper commercial, legal and financial 
systems’ (Blair 2001).
Such a bargain tied in closely with the prevailing donor approach to 
development aid which insisted that having the right political, legal and 
policy conditions for aid was an essential prerequisite for aid to be effec-
tive (Kelsall et al. 2013). Importantly, it also dovetailed with, and helped to 
reinforce, African initiatives led by South Africa and Nigeria, pushing in the 
same direction (Landsberg 2011). Most notably the formation of the African 
Union in 2001 and the launch of the New Economic Partnership for African 
Development (OAU 2001)—in which Blair had a significant hand too—
seemed to provide the requisite partners on the African side of the bargain.
The high-water-mark of Blair’s pursuit of this deal came in 2005 with 
the publication of the Commission for Africa report, Our Common Interest, 
and the G8 summit at Gleneagles. Despite its subsequent lack of impact, the 
report was closer to a comprehensive statement of British policy towards 
Africa than anything else produced in recent decades (Porteus 2008, 62). Its 
vision for change in Africa set out the need for
the right economic, social and legal framework which will encourage economic 
growth and allow poor people to participate in it … establish[ing] an economic 
environment that encourages investment … security, setting sound economic 
policies under the law, collecting taxes and delivering adequate public services 
like health and education … legal systems to protect basic property rights, 
human rights, and respect for contracts. (Commission for Africa 2005, 24)
Even the G8, rather more in the real political world than the Commission, 
were cajoled into pledging enough by way of aid increases and debt relief 
to suggest the West was interested in furthering the liberal deal (G8 2005).8
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Any aid relationship is in some respects both an expression of, and an 
attempt to deal with, unevenness (Brown 2009). However, when the policies 
around aid move from more limited aims of ameliorating the effects of under-
development through social and welfare spending, to far more ambitious aims 
of social transformation, the unevenness of the relationship becomes far more 
problematic. On the one hand, is a disjunction between what are perceived 
to be the ideal—liberal—conditions for growth and development and the 
historical realities of the forms of state and society that exist. On the other, is 
a disjunction between a ‘one-size fits all’ policy prescription of donors and 
the varying social, political and developmental trajectories among societies 
on the receiving end of aid. New Labour’s Africa policy was beset by both 
of these problems.
Taking the first disjuncture at face value, the kind of change that Britain 
sought to achieve in Africa was massively ambitious. Richard Sandbrook 
argued (2005, 1120) that the Commission for Africa was calling for ‘noth-
ing less than a Great Transformation’ in African societies. ‘In reality’, he 
concluded (2005, 1123), ‘the triumph of economic and political liberalism 
in many countries represents, not mere reform, but revolutionary change’. 
The problem for British policy was that to a large extent Africa was con-
ceived within it as a ‘blank sheet’ onto which, for the first time, Britain was 
inscribing a grand design, ignoring much previous history (Porteus 2008, 
133; also see Gallagher 2013). Policy makers wished to draw a new picture 
of British Africa policy as if on a clean sheet of paper: ‘Floating free of dif-
ficult historical implication, British officials fashion their relationship with 
Africa as if virtually from scratch’ (Gallagher 2013, 118). This construction 
of policy involved a highly simplified view of the ‘Other’ (often idealised as 
an undifferentiated African poor) which could not admit to conflicts of inter-
ests, messy and complex relationships and the need to address distributional 
conflicts (Gallagher 2013, 22).9
What was lacking, some noted (Lockwood 2005), were the tools with 
which to bridge this gap between aims and reality. Just as in asymmetrical 
relationships of the colonial period (Cooper 2014), so too in aid relation-
ships, politics at the ‘non-European end’ matter a great deal. And while in 
the colonial period, Britain could seek to influence internal politics by inter-
vening directly in collaboration (Robinson 1972), post-independence, the 
international posed a much greater obstacle. If what was driving policy was 
the aim of ‘social transformation at a distance’ (Williams and Young 2009) 
then it was a distance not just of geography but of political independence, 
and histories of combined development too (see Brown 2006; 2013). The 
limited tools of British leverage (Porteus 2008) and the limitations imposed 
by Blair’s ideational construction of Africa (Gallagher 2013) both served to 
temper the reality of policy.
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As with other liberal interventions (Anievas 2014b), the second disjuncture 
between uniform policy prescriptions and the diversity of political realities 
on the ground, merely exacerbated the problem. Donor policy from the mid-
1990s had increasingly centred on a kind of ‘one-size fits all’ programme for 
governance reform through which to lay the necessary basis for development 
to take off (Kelsall et al. 2013). As Thomas Carothers and Diane De Gramont 
noted (2013, 27), ‘The aid landscape was soon populated by projects attempt-
ing full-scale transfer of Western models, navigated by visiting Western 
experts with little knowledge of local contexts’. Britain’s new Africa policy 
suffered similarly. Even the lengthy Commission for Africa report, while 
acknowledging unevenness and the need to pay constant regard to Africa’s 
diversity—‘every country has a mix of social and economic realities that 
differ from other countries’ it noted (Commission for Africa 2005, 126)—it 
nevertheless addressed issues of governance through broad generalisations. 
Nowhere did it show the detailed, nuanced understanding necessary if exter-
nal leverage was to have any political purchase (Porteus 2008, 76–77; Kelsall 
et al. 2013).
As Tom Porteus argues (2008, 134), fifty years earlier Britain had aban-
doned an empire that it knew relatively well after concluding it lacked the 
resources to maintain much less transform it; now it was embarking on an 
ambitious and costly programme of transformation with far less knowledge 
and expertise. Furthermore, policy was run by a department (DfID) special-
ising in development policy rather than diplomacy and, one might add, one 
which had grown in size and importance somewhat at the expense of the 
Foreign Office and its country knowledge and diplomatic tools. While DfID 
shared other donors’ view as to what the problems were in Africa, it relied on 
finding examples that worked and ‘scaling them up’, ignoring the diversity 
of conditions on the ground and difficult questions about whether generalised 
developmental approaches were appropriate to different African contexts 
(Porteus 2008, 132–33).
The Conservative-led governments in power from 2010 might have been 
expected to enact a revision of British policy towards Africa, particularly in a 
context of austerity. The response, however, was mixed. On the one hand, the 
coalition government of 2010–15 sustained Britain’s financial commitment 
to overseas development, reaching the symbolic ODA commitment of 0.7% 
of GDP in 2013. Prime Minister Cameron also continued the liberal commit-
ment to good governance as the basis for development. In several speeches 
going back to 2005, Cameron committed to a ‘golden thread that links 
property rights, free markets, free trade, the rule of law, honest government, 
sound finances, economic progress and social advance’ (Cameron 2005).10
 
However, while this formulation re-states the disjuncture of previous Labour 
policy between desirable conditions and a diverse reality, and did little to 
AQ: Should 
“DfID” be 
spelled out?
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identify any means by which it could be resolved, it was accompanied by 
more pragmatic shifts in policy.
Both in the Conservative-led coalition and the majority Tory government 
that followed in 2015, three shifts in particular were important. The first, in 
partial recognition of the difficulties of persuading countries to liberalise, was 
a concentration of bilateral aid on countries seen to be providing some of the 
necessary ‘golden’ conditions for development (DfID 2011). A second shift, 
driven by poor economic conditions in Britain and burgeoning commercial 
relations between Africa and China, was to alter the balance between ‘doing 
good abroad’ and British self-interest. Whereas Labour had denied any real 
tension between these two, the Conservative-led governments made a more 
overt priority of British trade development and investment interests. Finally, 
there was a continuation of longer-standing trends (Woods 2005) in using 
overseas development aid in security-related ways. The emphasis on the need 
for stable government in Africa served both development and security agen-
das and meant that development funding and security-driven projects around 
failed states overlapped with each other.
In recognition of the difficulties of seeking to promote ‘social transforma-
tion at a distance’ development policy analysis also took a more pragmatic 
turn. Donor policy had sought to promote ‘ideal’ (liberal) conditions for 
development through political and economic reform. The patent difficulties 
of achieving this in the context of diverse African politics which had their 
own dynamic and purpose, prompted some to argue that donors needed 
greater understanding of the complexities involved (Barder 2012b). Others 
argued that ‘good enough’ and ‘second best’ conditions for development—
which might include clientelist corrupt practices and even human rights 
abuses—might have to be tolerated (Kelsall et al. 2013). Whether this sig-
nalled a wider repetition of the colonial era retreat from liberal aims in favour 
of support for more authoritarian forms of rule remains to be seen.
CoNCLUSIoN
The ironies of history weigh heavily on British Africa policy. The resurgence 
of ‘missionary zeal’ (Parmar 2005) in British dealings with Africa was one 
thing; the fact that it was conducted with such apparent neglect of its histori-
cal antecedents was quite another. As this chapter has shown, contemporary 
British policy towards Africa is hedged on all sides by its past efforts to 
manage its long-standing, deep and highly uneven relationship with Africa. 
The policy trajectory that we see is therefore not simply a contemporary 
reprise of an earlier liberal imperialism. While Britain’s long-term prefer-
ences remained broadly consistent—for liberal transformation of Africa and 
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integration into the world economy—the policy changes in pursuit of that aim 
have been more dynamic. The alternations in policy—from informal relations 
to colonisation; a transformative civilising mission to securing authority; 
developing the ‘great estate’ to curtailing the extent and pace of reform—all 
reveal an imperial power forced to tack in the face of the complex patterns of 
developmental unevenness it had helped to bring about.
This chapter has used the theory of uneven and combined development to 
reveal this dynamic and dialectical evolution. It has shown how British policy 
choices continually have had to confront the complexities of previous phases 
of combined development which themselves have been heterogeneous. 
Greater historical awareness of these processes might enable greater clarity in 
the evaluation of contemporary policy choices. The disjuncture between aims 
and realities, and the diversity of different political and economic circum-
stances within Africa, were themselves products of processes of uneven and 
combined development established through the interaction of British liberal 
imperialism and African politics a century before.
The analysis presented here has also explored in a tentative way the poten-
tial synergies between the general framework for understanding international 
relations provided by uneven and combined development and the more 
focussed substantive analysis of colonialism and theorising about imperial-
ism of Ronald Robinson. In both, the intent has been to begin to shift the 
emphasis of explanation away from a narrative driven entirely from European 
interest and calculation and to create space within which to see the impor-
tance of those ‘on the weaker end of the connection’. For, as Cooper (2014) 
notes, the ‘African problems’ Britain and other Western actors now seek to 
address are not simply African, they are the co-productions of a deeply inter-
twined history.
NoTES
1. Some key sources in this expanding literature are: Rosenberg 1996, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2013a, 2013b.
2. This is a commonplace but often overlooked and ‘surprisingly consequential’ 
fact, Rosenberg notes. It is one that is recognised—empirically if not theoretically—
by writers such as Eric Wolf who wrote, ‘Human populations construct their cultures 
in interaction with one another, and not in isolation’ (Wolf 1982, xv).
3. For example, see Anievas’ (2014b) examination of Wilsonian diplomacy.
4. I do not explore aspects of what has been termed the Robinson-Gallagher 
debate in this chapter (for example see Louis 1976; Porter and Holland 1988). There 
is also a short but interesting evaluation of Robinson’s work in Brewer’s Marxist 
Theories of Imperialism (1990) where he states ‘I see little or nothing in [his work] 
that is incompatible with Marxism (if that matters)’ (1990, 258).
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5. These influences, with an emphasis on how states could actively ‘do good’, 
were also absorbed by the early Labour Party. As we will see, New Labour’s return 
to Africa in this guise was a resurrection of these older ideas (Gallagher 2013, 39).
6. As Robinson noted, ‘All the national movements that won independence were 
more or less functions of neotraditional politics organised in the form of modern 
political parties’, they worked well as an opposition to colonial rule, much less well 
as developmental agent for the country as a whole (Robinson 1972, 138).
7. The creation of DfID in 1997 saw the first UK white paper on development for 
22 years, followed by the International Development Act of 2002 and further White 
Papers in 2000 and 2006 (Ireton 2013, 49–52).
8. Trade concessions were a continual sticking point and in the event only Britain 
stuck to its aid pledges.
9. There were things that went with this, including a denial of any fundamental 
conflict between British self-interest and African welfare. Some key politicians, 
including International Development Secretary, Claire Short, denied the relevance of 
empire to the contemporary period (Gallagher 2013, 82).
10. In 2012 Cameron repeated the point: ‘You only get real long-term develop-
ment through aid if there is also a golden thread of stable government, lack of corrup-
tion, human rights, the rule of law, transparent information’ (Cameron 2012; also see 
Barder 2012a).
AQ: Should 
DfID be 
spelled out? 
Also, should 
“for 22 years” 
be changed to 
“in 22 years” 
in note 7?
AQ: Please 
supply miss-
ing words: 
“There 
things” and 
“denial of 
fundamental 
between”
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   169 7/13/2016   9:56:04 PM
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   170 7/13/2016   9:56:04 PM
171
Chapter 10
The Impact of the ‘Global 
Transformation’ on Uneven and 
Combined Development
Barry Buzan and George Lawson
This chapter focuses on the ways in which the nineteenth-century ‘global 
transformation’ impacted on uneven and combined development (UCD).1 
The first section sets out our general understanding of UCD. The second sec-
tion argues that the intensification of UCD by the global transformation led 
to a highly centred, core-periphery global order during the nineteenth century 
and much of the twentieth century. This was expressed first as a Western-
colonial international society lasting up to 1945, and subsequently by a 
Western-global international society. The third section sketches briefly how 
since 1945, and more obviously since the early part of the twenty-first cen-
tury, world politics is increasingly characterised by a decentred international 
order, still intensely combined, but also demonstrating a marked diffusion in 
the distribution of power, status and wealth. The result is a less uneven, but 
more intensely combined world order.
In general terms, this chapter supports two of the main contributions made 
by this book. First, as with the volume as a whole, our account rejects an 
emphasis on, let alone any autonomy of, either ‘inside-out’ or ‘outside-in’ 
explanations. All the sites where modernity took root were particular combi-
nations of local and global dynamics—as discussed below, British industri-
alisation was fuelled by the de-industrialisation of India, while imperialism 
‘over there’ fed into state-formation ‘at home’. The relational sensibility that 
underpins this chapter—and this book—sees social sites such as ‘foreign’ and 
the ‘domestic’, ‘East’ and ‘West’, and ‘metropole’ and ‘colony’ as neither 
analytically separable, nor empirically discrete (also see Go and Lawson 
2016).
Second, like many other contributors to this volume, we enlist uneven 
and combined development in order to generate a non-Eurocentric account 
of macro-historical change. We examine the intersocietal interactions, 
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especially trade, technology transfers, imperial extraction and exchanges 
of ideas, which generated the global transformation. And we stress the 
‘entangled histories’ and ‘multiple vectors’ that combined to vault Western 
states into a position of pre-eminence during the nineteenth century (De Vries 
2013, 46). Such an account stands in contrast to Eurocentric approaches, 
which see the emergence of modernity as conditioned by forces both internal 
and unique to Europe (Jones 1981; Landes 1998; North et al. 2009). In our 
view, modernity was not self-generated through the unfolding of particularly 
European economic practices (such as double entry bookkeeping), institu-
tions (such as representative governance) or symbolic schemas (such as the 
Enlightenment). Rather, modernity was forged through the co-constitution 
of the local and transnational, and its core vectors were intersocietal, from 
capitalist expansion to imperialism. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries, a relatively thin international system sustained forms of interac-
tion that were crucial to the development of global modernity (Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu 2015). From the nineteenth century onwards, global interactions 
became more unbalanced as a major mode of power gap opened up between 
the European (and later American and Japanese) ‘leading-edge’ and most 
other polities.2 These dynamics allowed a small number of mostly Western 
states to project their power around the world. But this power projection did 
not produce a world of homogeneous social orders. Rather, as we explore 
below, it led to diverse amalgams of old and new, and indigenous and foreign 
(Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 48-53). Core and periphery were intensely 
locked together even as their entwining fuelled a stark unevenness in terms 
of power differentials and in terms of how social orders were constituted. 
Modernity was a global process both in origins and outcomes.
In one important way, however, we depart from most other contributions to 
this book: our use of UCD is analytical-heuristic rather than causal-explanatory. 
Using UCD as a framing device allows us to construct a relatively straightfor-
ward account of macro-historical periodisation: during the early phases of 
the global transformation, development became both much more uneven and 
much more combined; in recent years, there has been a (partial) reduction of 
the former and a (powerful) intensification of the latter. We are not concerned 
with deploying specific causal dynamics associated with UCD theory. Rather, 
we see global modernity as generated by the interplay between three macro-
dynamics: industrialisation (and associated processes of de-industrialisation), 
rational statehood (and imperialism) and ideologies of progress (liberalism, 
socialism, nationalism and ‘scientific’ racism). It is the configuration generated 
by the intersection of these three macro-dynamics that produced the global 
transformation, not any specific causal wager associated with UCD. For our 
purposes, UCD is most usefully seen as an analytical shorthand rather than as 
a theoretical schema containing a set of auxiliary causal claims.
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UNEvEN AND CoMbINED DEvELoPMENT
Like Justin Rosenberg (2010; 2013a), we understand ‘unevenness’ to be a 
basic fact of historical development, even if degrees of unevenness vary con-
siderably across international orders. There are three drivers that lie behind 
the universality of uneven development: first, the diversity of geographical 
endowments; second, the physical separation of political units; and third, the 
differential impact of ‘combination’, whether this takes the form of the spread 
of ideas, the transfer of technologies, trading networks, security alliances, or 
practices of subjugation and emulation. ‘Combination’, by which we mean 
the ways in which social orders trade, coerce, emulate, borrow and steal from 
each other, is also intrinsic to any international order and, like unevenness, 
can vary greatly in degree. Before the nineteenth century, degrees of combi-
nation varied mainly with geography, which facilitated deep connections in 
some environments (most notably where there were available sea and river 
routes), but obstructed it in others (particularly in the case of land barriers). 
Available technologies, most notably the quality of ships and knowledge of 
navigation, and up to a point the construction of roads, also made a major 
difference to degrees of combination. By contrast, degrees of combination 
since the nineteenth century have been heavily determined by industrial 
technologies. Under the impact of steamships, railways, highways, aircraft, 
spacecraft and electronic means of communication from the telegraph to the 
internet, the importance of geography falls away, and combination intensi-
fies rapidly, and probably permanently. Combination therefore increases 
directly with the third element of UCD: ‘development’. Combination is both 
a homogenising force, as seen in pressures to conform with, or measure up to, 
standards of ‘modernisation’, ‘Westernisation’ or ‘civilisation’, but also one 
that promotes differentiation, as in the multiple responses around the world 
to these pressures.
In this perspective, UCD stands as an alternative to Kenneth Waltz’s (1979, 
76) formulation of homogenisation into like units through ‘socialization and 
competition’. Both Waltz and Rosenberg see socialisation and competition 
as consequences of combination. But they disagree about their effects, with 
Waltz favouring homogenisation into ‘like units’, and Rosenberg stressing 
that the particular timing and circumstances of socialisation and competi-
tion produce variable outcomes. The extreme conditions created by macro-
historical transformations such as the one that took place during the long 
nineteenth century expose the logic of the latter with great clarity. Major 
transformations of this kind have a distinct point or points of origin in which 
a particular configuration emerges and is sustained. This configuration is pro-
duced and reproduced through intersocietal interactions. Ian Morris (2010, 
chapter 2), for example, charts how in an earlier macro-transformation, settled 
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agrarian communities spread from the hilly flanks of Mesopotamia northwest 
into Europe, and from other originating cores, as in China, to wider zones. 
Further changes spread outwards from this leading-edge (or edges). The pace 
of spread varied according to the mediating effects of social and physical 
environments. Agriculture was slow to spread to less productive soils and cli-
mates, and some modes of social order were more receptive to it than others. 
If unevenness was—and is—a basic fact of historical development, different 
peoples and places encounter macro-transformative pressures at different 
times and under different circumstances (Rosenberg 2010; 2013a).
The spread of a new ‘mode of power’ thus produces diverse outcomes.3 
Each social order that encounters the new configuration has its own way of 
adapting to it. The ‘whip of external necessity’ (Trotsky 1997, 27) produced 
by a new mode of power is often coercive, occurring through force of arms. 
But intersocietal dynamics also take the form of imitation. Some social 
orders do not take on the new configuration at all, either because of internal 
resistance to the changes it requires, or because of attempts by leading-edge 
polities to maintain inequalities between them by denying access to elements 
of the transformation. Others succeed in developing indigenous versions of 
the new configuration. ‘Late’ developers are not carbon copies of the original 
adopters, but develop their own distinctive characteristics. In this sense, the 
interactions between different social orders produce not convergence, but 
(often unstable) amalgams of new and old. For example, during the nine-
teenth century, German industrialisation was not a replica of British develop-
ment, but took distinct form, even as it borrowed from the British experience. 
Likewise, Soviet and, more recently, Chinese development also maintained 
their own ‘characteristics’, combining new technologies and productive 
forces alongside inherited social formations. Through the analytic of UCD, 
it becomes clear that development is multilinear rather than linear, proceeds 
in fits and starts rather than through smooth gradations and contains many 
variations in terms of outcomes. One indicator of the ways in which polities 
adapted in diverse ways to the nineteenth-century global transformation is 
the variety of ideologies that have emerged to define different assemblages 
of economy, politics and culture in the modern world: liberalism, social 
democracy, conservatism, socialism, communism, fascism, patrimonialism 
and more. These ‘contradictory fusions’ aver that historical development is 
jumbled, and often compressed (Rosenberg 2010).
Because global transformations are generated through multiple revolutions 
from new political formations to the advent of new technologies, they amplify 
the link between development and combination. Such transformations typi-
cally generate increases in productivity and population, plus increases in the 
complexity of social orders and physical technologies, consequently pro-
ducing a denser, more deeply connected international order. The expanded 
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scale, complexity and technological capacities of agrarian polities meant that 
they had more intense relationships with both their neighbours and peoples 
further away than their hunter-gatherer predecessors. Those relationships 
were military, political, economic and cultural, or some mixture of these. 
In this way, the scale and intensity of combination within the international 
sphere increased, meaning that every society became less self-contained and 
more exposed to developments elsewhere. As social orders became larger in 
scale and more complex in terms of their internal organisation, differences 
between them were accentuated and interactions between them intensified. 
Late developers cannot escape the influence of earlier adopters, but neither do 
they reproduce them. The mutual constitution of unevenness and combination 
is thus intensified by development, producing larger, more complex and more 
diverse social orders bound together in denser, more interdependent ways.
CENTRED GLobALISM
During the nineteenth century, a ‘global transformation’ intensified the mean-
ing of development, and therefore the logic of UCD, to an unprecedented 
degree, resulting in the formation of a highly centred core-periphery interna-
tional order. As discussed above, we see the global transformation as consti-
tuted by a concatenation of three interlinked processes: industrialisation, the 
rational state and ideologies of progress. Once this concatenation had formed, 
it constituted a new mode of power with massive transformative potential. 
Some of the roots of this mode of power went back centuries. But it was only 
in the nineteenth century that the whole package coalesced in a small group of 
polities from where both its effect (a revolutionary configuration in the mode 
of power) and its challenge (how other societies responded to this configura-
tion) became the principal dynamic through which international relations was 
conceived and practiced. In this context, development not only took on a new 
form and meaning, but also became highly dynamic, driven by seemingly 
endless cycles of technological innovation.
Because the global transformation initially took root only within a rela-
tively small number of polities,4
 and because its new, complex and highly 
dynamic mode of power was extremely difficult to copy, global unevenness 
was intensified to an unprecedented extent. During the nineteenth century, 
the development gap between societies opened more widely than ever before. 
Global modernity encountered peoples living in a variety of political, eco-
nomic and cultural formations, from hunter-gatherer bands to city-states and 
empires. In size, these social orders varied from groups of a few dozen to 
empires consisting of tens of millions of people. This variety meant that the 
power gap between core and periphery, and the challenge posed by the global 
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transformation to those in the periphery, prompted quite different experiences 
of modernity. A relatively even distribution of global power among several, 
mostly lightly connected, agrarian empires was replaced by a radically 
uneven global distribution of power in favour of a handful of mostly Western 
polities. Some peoples and polities were able to resist or adapt to the global 
transformation’s multiple assault; others were consumed by it. At one end of 
the spectrum were the many indigenous peoples in settler colonies who were 
all but obliterated; at the other were those like the Japanese who adapted the 
modern mode of power to indigenous social formations.
The Japanese case is particularly interesting because for a century it was 
the only major example of a non-Western people acquiring the revolutions of 
modernity quickly, and using them to overcome the power gap established by 
the global transformation. With the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, Japan 
formally joined the ranks of the great powers, and its development went on 
to outpace many European laggards. In effect, Japan was the first mover in 
what we now think of as the ‘rise of the rest’ that began in earnest during 
the 1970s. Why Japan was able to do this so early is as difficult a question 
as why modernity first took root in northwest Europe. Jamie C. Allinson 
and Alexander Anievas (2010a, 479–85) offer useful explanations in terms 
of a conjuncture of: an unusual Japanese class structure (especially the fluid 
position of the samurai); fortuitous timing (having a first encounter with the 
West in the 1850s rather than the 1880s); being less attractive than China and 
India in terms of extractable resources; and being able to turn the multiple 
challenges of global modernity into the stimulation of a developmental state 
rather than a retreat into feudalism. Japan also had some other notable advan-
tages. Unlike China, it was able to provide a cultural bridge between ‘mod-
ern’ and ‘archaic’ by retaining its emperor and its Shinto religion. When the 
Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, China’s political continuity was broken and 
the country fragmented into decades of warlordism and civil war. And again 
unlike China, Japan was able to appropriate nationalism as a unifying idea 
to help it through the turbulence of modernisation. Because the Qing were 
Manchu, they could not use nationalism without threatening their ruling posi-
tion in relation to the Han majority. Japan, of course, also had the advantage 
of warning time. A decade before it was forced to respond to Commodore 
Perry’s black ships, it could observe closely what was happening to China 
during the Opium Wars.
The extremely rapid emergence of a modernising core, including both 
Western powers and Japan, during the nineteenth century meant that never 
before had unevenness been felt on this scale, with this intensity, or in a con-
text of such close, inescapable interdependence. Those convinced of their cul-
tural superiority and with access to advanced weapons, industrial production, 
medicine and new forms of bureaucratic organisation gained a pronounced 
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advantage over those with limited access to these sources of power. After 
around 1800, these dynamics fostered a substantial power gap between a 
small number of Western polities and other societies around the world (Buzan 
and Lawson 2015, chapter 1). In principle, this power gap could be closed: 
those with access to the configuration that sustained the global transformation 
could move from periphery to core. In practice, this move was made excep-
tionally difficult not only by the depth of the transformative package, but also 
by practices of imperialism and other forms of interventionism that reinforced 
the advantages of the established core. Japan was the exception that proved 
the rule. The result was a shift from a ‘polycentric world with no dominant 
centre’ to a core-periphery international order in which the leading edge was 
located in the West (Pomeranz 2000, 4). This hierarchical international order 
lasted from the early nineteenth century until the early years of the twenty-
first century.
The first phase of this centred global order took the form of a Western-
colonial international society, and this form remained dominant until 1945. 
Western-colonial international society was global in scale, but extremely 
unequal. Its core comprised most European states, their now independent for-
mer settler colonies in North America, and from the late nineteenth century 
Japan. Its periphery was a mixture of colonies, largely absorbed into the 
sovereignty of their metropoles (most of Africa, South Asia and Southeast 
Asia), the decolonised polities of Latin America, and a handful of classical 
agrarian powers still strong enough to avoid colonisation, but weak enough 
to be treated as unequal (China, Iran, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire). Although 
there was a trickle of erosions of inequality between core and periphery 
before 1945, Western-colonial international society broadly endured until the 
end of the Second World War.
Western-colonial international society was the starkest possible expression 
of the uneven and combined character of global modernity. Because imperi-
alism was the outward expression of the new mode of power, it exemplified 
the unevenness between the haves and have-nots of the global transformation. 
At the same time, imperialism was one of the principal means through which 
polities and peoples were combined on a global scale. During the long nine-
teenth century, European powers sought to exert control, both directly and 
indirectly, over most of the globe. If the bulk of European imperialism took 
place during the ‘Scramble for Africa’, which saw European powers assume 
direct control of large parts of Africa, the extension of imperialism went well 
beyond the ‘Scramble’. Between 1810 and 1870, the United States carried 
out 71 territorial annexations and military interventions (Go 2011, 39). The 
United States first became a continental empire, seizing territory from Native 
Americans, the Spanish and Mexicans. It then built an overseas empire, 
extending its authority over Cuba, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
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Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa and the Virgin Islands. 
Other settler states also became colonial powers in their own right, including 
Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific. Japan, the only non-Western state to 
fully incorporate the revolutions of modernity during the nineteenth century, 
constructed an empire in East Asia. Russian expansionism accelerated during 
this period, both southwards to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
and eastwards to Sakhalin and Vladivostok. Imperialism, therefore, was a 
central vector within the uneven and combined character of global modernity 
and an equally central tool of the core-periphery international order that arose 
from it. Politically, militarily, economically and demographically, a relatively 
small group of mostly Western polities created a colonial international order 
that privileged their treasuries, their strategic interests and their people. They 
subordinated the rest of the world while, at the same time, coercively extend-
ing to planetary scale the configuration that underpinned global modernity.
A central feature of Western-colonial order was the uneven extension of 
industrialisation, production and finance, which generated a core-periphery 
order in which the ebbs and flows of metropolitan markets, commodity 
speculations and price fluctuations controlled the survival chances of millions 
of people around the world. The global transformation produced a single, 
highly combined, world economy for the first time. This global economy 
was enabled by improved technologies of transportation and communication, 
technologies that also made war and politics global, producing an integrated, 
yet hierarchical, global order. Accelerating market integration amplified both 
unevenness and combination (Bayly 2004, 2). On the one hand, commodities 
increasingly flowed from the periphery into the core: by 1900, Britain was 
importing 60% of its total calories and the average distance travelled by the 
fruit, vegetables and animals it imported was 1,800 miles (Schwartz 2000, 
105). At the outbreak of the First World War, Britain imported 87% of its 
food and a similar proportion of its raw materials (Ruggie 1982, 401fn69). On 
the other hand, capital and manufactured goods flowed from the core into the 
periphery. These two-directional flows, however unequally constituted, could 
increase both trade and growth. West African trade, for example, centred on 
palm oil, groundnuts, timber and cocoa, increased by a factor of 4 between 
1897 and 1913 (Frieden 2006, 74). In Latin America, economies grew at 
four times the rate of Asian polities and at six times the rate of Central and 
Eastern European states between 1870 and 1913 (Frieden 2006, 73). In some 
sectors, peripheral states led the world: by 1900, Brazil produced 80% of the 
world’s coffee exports; by 1913, Chile provided half of the world’s copper 
and Malaya produced half of the world’s tin (Frieden 2006, 73–5).
During the initial phase of the global transformation, therefore, the devel-
opment gap between polities opened more widely than ever before and, at the 
same time (and for the same reasons), the planet was bound together more 
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tightly than in previous eras. This dynamic vaulted a few Western states into 
a period of unprecedented, if temporary, dominance over other parts of the 
world (Hobsbawm 1962, 15, 44). On the basis of the new mode of power, 
the West became hegemonic over many aspects of international relations, 
projecting new forms of organisation and new ideas that destabilised existing 
social orders, both at home and abroad. During the nineteenth century, the 
West broke open and overwhelmed the remaining bastions of the classical 
world (the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan), and overcame the environ-
mental barriers both of disease (that had restricted Europeans to coastal 
enclaves in Africa) and distance (through the advent of railways, steamships 
and the telegraph). As Eric Hobsbawm (1962, 365) notes, ‘nothing, it seemed, 
could stand in the way of a few western gunboats or regiments bringing with 
them trade and bibles’. This configuration enabled new organisational forms 
to emerge such as the nation state, the modern firm, intergovernmental organ-
isations (IGOs) and, more broadly, proto-global civil society in the guise of 
transnational social movements ranging from anti-slavery campaigners to 
advocates of free trade. For better or worse, and often both together, the long 
nineteenth century saw the transformation of the daily condition of people 
nearly everywhere on the planet. The nineteenth century was, therefore, the 
beginning of what we might call ‘the Western era’, setting loose revolutions 
in terms of both material capabilities and symbolic schemas.
Rosenberg (2013a) argues that the Great War of 1914-18 was the culmi-
nation of the uneven and combined development of global modernity, and 
the industrialisation of violence that had been unfolding for more than eight 
decades. There is some truth in this claim. But the highly unequal Western-
colonial order nonetheless endured throughout the interwar period, after 
which it gave way to Western-global international society. By adopting the 
term Western-global, we take a position on how to understand contemporary 
international society and how to deal with the legacy of its colonial origins. 
The idea that there is a global international society rests on the view that it 
emerged from the expansion of Western international society to planetary 
scale, with decolonisation producing states that were homogenous, if only in 
the sense of being sovereign equals. The price of independence, or for those 
not colonised the price of being accepted as equals by the West, was the adop-
tion of Western political forms and the acceptance of the primary institutions 
of Western international society: the market, the legalised hegemony of great 
power management, positive international law and suchlike. ‘Modernisation 
theory’ held out the prospect of the ‘Third World’ becoming more like the 
‘First World’ (Rostow 1960), while polities around the world were catego-
rised as ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, or ‘advanced’ and ‘emerging’. In each 
of these classifications, the Western mode of economic, political and cultural 
organisation was taken to be both natural and pre-eminent. In significant 
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respects, therefore, the post-1945 era saw the maintenance of a hegemonic, 
core-periphery structure in which a Western core was surrounded by regional 
international societies that existed in varying degrees of differentiation from, 
and subordination to, that core.
This second phase of centred globalism was defined by the delegitimation 
of racism and colonialism, the abandonment of divided sovereignty in favour 
of sovereign equality, and the dismantling of empires. Yet many features of 
Western-colonial order remained, from the discourse and politics of develop-
ment, aid, intervention and migration, to structural inequalities in the world 
economy. During this period, the mode of power that underpinned the global 
transformation remained predominantly sited in a small number of mostly 
Western states plus Japan, and later South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, thus 
perpetuating a core-periphery order, albeit with a reduced degree of formal 
imperialism. The end of the Cold War even strengthened the position of the 
Western core by valorising economic strands of liberalism (reconstituted as 
‘neo-liberalism’) as the prototypical feature of modernity (Lawson 2010).
Such dynamics, along with rapid technological changes, helped to foster 
increasing levels of combination. Yet while the shift from Western-colonial 
to Western-global international society still reflected a centred global order, 
this period also saw the beginning of a decline in levels of unevenness. The 
shift from divided sovereignty to formal sovereign equality reduced differ-
ences in political and legal (and racial) status, and this shift was reinforced 
by a proliferation of IGOs. In some ways, these IGOs perpetuated the core-
periphery inequality of status by legitimising what Gerry Simpson (2004) 
calls the ‘legalised hegemony’ of the great powers. But, in general, they sup-
ported sovereign equality, and the great power principle saw a non-Western 
state (China) take up a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Coun-
cil. Several other states, most notably the Asian Tigers, developed rapidly. 
So too, from the 1980s onwards, did China, thereby greatly expanding the 
core of the modern global economy. The military gap narrowed in a number 
of ways, particularly with the widespread diffusion of light infantry weapons 
(making territorial occupations extremely expensive), and the much nar-
rower diffusion of nuclear weapons to some developing countries (Buzan and 
Lawson 2015, chapter 8).
These first two phases of the global transformation brought to an end the 
long period in which human history was mainly local and contact between 
distant polities mostly fairly light. From the nineteenth century on, human his-
tory became increasingly global, contact among far-flung peoples intense and 
development both more uneven and more combined. Driving these changes 
was the global transformation from predominantly agrarian to primarily 
industrial societies, and from absolutist orders to rational states, along with the 
emergence of novel symbolic schemas sustained by ideologies of progress.
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DECENTRED GLobALISM
The revolutions of modernity are still spreading and intensifying—
‘globalisation’ refers to their outward expansion (Giddens 1990, 45–54). As 
modernity continues to spread and intensify, Western dominance is being 
increasingly challenged. In the early twenty-first century, we are living in the 
beginning of the end of this highly unequal phase of the revolutions of moder-
nity: centred globalism is giving way to decentred globalism. Decentred refers 
to the ways in which the configuration that marks the global transformation 
is no longer concentrated in a small group of polities, but is increasingly 
dispersed. Globalism marks both a basic continuity and an intensification 
of earlier phases of the global transformation in which the configuration of 
modernity assumed planetary scale. In the contemporary world, power and 
development are increasingly less unevenly concentrated and more combined 
than in previous periods of global modernity. Those polities that were once 
on the receiving end of the global transformation are employing its mode of 
power to reassert their position in international society.
Slowly and unevenly, but at an accelerating pace, the massive inequality 
across the planet that was established during the nineteenth century is being 
eroded. The mechanism behind this closing of the power gap is the same 
one that created it in the first place: the revolutions of modernity. Politically, 
legally and demographically, the gap has narrowed significantly; economi-
cally and militarily it has narrowed less, but still appreciably (Buzan and 
Lawson 2015, chapter 7). This is both changing the composition of the core 
(making it larger, more diverse and less white/Western) and changing its 
relationship to the periphery (as the core and semi-periphery get bigger, and 
the periphery smaller). The revolutions of modernity began by producing an 
unprecedented degree of inequality in a context of highly uneven and com-
bined development. Development remains highly combined and that is likely 
to increase rather than decrease. It is still uneven, but in many key respects 
that unevenness is diminishing. Some parts of the former periphery have 
either caught up with and joined the old core, or are on their way to doing 
so. However, as noted above, combination is both a homogenising and dif-
ferentiating force. So, while the diffusion of modernity reduces unevenness in 
some respects (most obviously power, status and wealth), it sustains it in oth-
ers. For example, while there has been a narrowing of ideological bandwidth 
compared to the twentieth century—virtually all states around the world are 
now organised around capitalist logics—this homogenisation comes with 
what looks like a quite stable diversity of political forms, from ‘liberal demo-
cratic’ (e.g. United States, United Kingdom), through ‘social democratic’ 
(e.g. Germany, Japan) and ‘competitive authoritarian’ (e.g. Russia, Malaysia) 
to ‘state bureaucratic’ (e.g. China, Saudi Arabia) (Buzan and Lawson 2014a). 
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The diffusion of modernity is only homogenising up to a point. Thereafter, it 
is diversified by distinct cultural and political formations.
The economic crisis that began in 2008 may well come to be seen as the 
tipping point at which the extreme unevenness and centredness of the period 
of Western domination began decisively to give way to a less uneven, more 
decentred global order (Buzan and Lawson 2014b). The distribution of power, 
status and wealth in the contemporary world is becoming less uneven and 
more diffuse among states (though not necessarily or even probably within 
them). In general, this means that the West will lose its privileged position in 
international society. This is already visible in the emergence of new sites of 
global governance (e.g. the G20), economic formations (e.g. the BRICs) and 
security institutions (e.g. the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). The diffu-
sion of power is being accompanied by a diffusion of legitimacy, making it 
difficult for the United States to hold onto its sole superpower status.
The age of superpowers was a particular consequence of the highly uneven 
distribution of power created by the Western-colonial phase of global moder-
nity and sustained by its Western-global phase. During these two periods, 
polities like Britain and the United States amassed sufficient relative power 
to be world dominating. That level of capability is no longer possible. With 
many states becoming wealthy and powerful, no single polity will be able 
to accumulate sufficient relative power to dominate international society. 
Decentred globalism will remain highly combined but will also be increas-
ingly less uneven in terms of power, status and wealth. It is both the successor 
to the Western-dominated era of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, 
in a way, marks the restoration of the classical order in which the distribution 
of power was fairly even. The difference between the contemporary era and 
that before the nineteenth century is that, whereas much of the world before 
the nineteenth century was only lightly combined, the contemporary era is 
one of intense—and intensifying—combination.
CoNCLUSIoN
To sum up, our argument is that the global transformation strengthened the 
impact of UCD in two ways. First, the global transformation opened up a very 
large and difficult to close gap between those in possession of the modern 
mode of power and those without access to it. Second, the global transforma-
tion hugely increased degrees of combination. The new mode of power largely 
swept away the geographical-environmental determinants of unevenness and 
combination, and replaced them with a redefined version of development. By 
producing massive increases in both unevenness and combination, the global 
transformation generated an international order characterised by centred 
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globalism. In the early years of the twenty-first century, a more decentred 
global order is emerging in which unevenness is diminishing but levels of 
combination are intensifying. This is not to say that unevenness will disap-
pear—it was both produced by the global transformation and also productive 
of it in that a much smaller ‘core’ appropriated the vast resources of the 
‘periphery’. But in the contemporary world, the Western-led order enabled 
by the early unevenness and combination of global modernity is beginning to 
erode. In its place is emerging a more decentred and more globalised order, 
one that comes clearly into view when viewed through the analytic of uneven 
and combined development.
NoTES
1. In this chapter, ‘global transformation’ is used synonymously with ‘global 
modernity’. For a full discussion of these terms, see Buzan and Lawson (2015, 1–10).
2. By ‘leading-edge’, we mean those polities in which the configuration of the 
modern ‘mode of power’ first assembled. We discuss the concept of the ‘mode of 
power’ below.
3. By ‘mode of power’, we mean the material and ideational relations that are 
generative of both actors and the ways in which power is exercised. As noted above, 
during the global transformation, three dynamics (industrialisation, rational state-
hood and ‘ideologies of progress’) combined to generate a new basis for how power 
was constituted, organised and expressed—we refer to this as a shift in the ‘mode of 
power’. Contra most IR approaches, changes in the mode of power are more signifi-
cant than changes in the distribution of power, affecting not just outcomes, but the 
basis for how interactions take place and are understood.
4. As already suggested, this is not to say that the sources of the global transfor-
mation were endogenous to these polities. To the contrary, global modernity was 
forged from intersocietal, often coercive, interactions between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. 
To take one illustration, Indian textiles were either banned from Britain or levied 
with high tariffs, while British manufacturing products were forcibly imported into 
India without duty. Between 1814 and 1828, British cloth exports to India rose from 
800,000 yards to over 40 million yards, while during the same period, Indian cloth 
exports to Britain halved (Goody 1996, 131).
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Chapter 11
The Ethiopian Revolution
A World-Historical Perspective
Fouad Makki
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, two distinct but interconnected 
revolutions profoundly transformed state and society in late imperial Ethiopia. 
A social revolution in 1974 overthrew the imperial dynasty and abolished the 
tributary order that had sustained an age-old agrarian aristocracy. The politi-
cal charge released by this popular upheaval detonated the rigid connections 
between class and ethnic hierarchies that was a conspicuous feature of the 
imperial formation, unleashing a series of ethno-nationalist insurgences that 
culminated in a second political revolution in 1991 that replaced the unitary 
state with a Federal Republic. While each of these revolutions had its own 
specific temporality and social character, they were arguably intertwined with 
each other through a series of social and national conflicts that intervened 
between them. This gave the entire period a certain unified character so that 
it is possible to see the successive revolutions as two moments of an over-
arching revolutionary transition from an ancien régime empire to a modern 
republic. Once the enormous turmoil generated by these revolutions had sub-
sided, the stabilised social order that issued from them differed greatly from 
the expectation of its makers. Radicals by conviction and hostile to the order 
of capital, the revolutionary actors that instituted the second republic found 
themselves the unwitting agents, and later committed architects, of a political 
and social order conducive to the spread of capitalist commodity relations.
What accounts for this disjuncture between subjective intentions and objec-
tive outcomes? And what does it tell us about the character of the revolutions 
and the epochal consciousness of the revolutionary actors? How might we 
make sense of the sharp turn in ideological and political commitments without 
invoking a metaphysics of modernity impervious to human agency, or a ruse 
of reason set in store by the cunning of history? Rather than invoking, by way 
of explanation, a zeitgeist of modernity or the workings of some specious iron 
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laws of history, my intention in this chapter is to suggest an interpretive and 
explanatory socio-historical account by situating the Ethiopian revolutions in a 
world-historical context of material and cultural connections. This international 
premise departs sharply from the analytic frameworks that most previous stud-
ies have brought to bear on the subject. For the most part, these were beholden 
to a national unit of analysis and neo-Orientalist representations of Ethiopia as 
an insular and ancient kingdom, home to the legendary Queen of Sheba and the 
Prester John, a biblical land ensconced in a mountain fortress ‘forgetful of the 
world, by which it was forgotten’ (Gibbon 1776 [1907]). This orientation was 
reinforced by Ethiopia’s sovereign status at the height of European colonialism 
in Africa, and subsequent nationalist scholarship internalised and exalted this 
presumed insularity as a sign of historical antiquity and civilizational integrity. 
Twentieth century Ethiopia was thus largely conceived as an entity whose 
connections with world history had no more than an incidental bearing on its 
otherwise wholly internal dynamic of continuity and change.
This national circumscription of the effective force field of social change 
is paralleled by recent analytic trends that tend to reduce the complex 
spatiotemporal configuration of revolutions to sharply delimited ‘events’. In 
one sense, it is of course undeniable that ‘Revolution is a term with a precise 
political meaning: the political overthrow from below of one state order, and 
its replacement by another. Nothing is to be gained by diluting it across time, 
or extending it over every department of social space’ (Anderson 1984, 12). 
But this does not mean ‘events’ and ‘structures’ are mutually exclusive and 
juxtaposed to each other; they actually co-determine and presuppose each 
other. Complex social phenomena such as revolutions are concatenations of 
events generated by a ‘conjuncture of structures’ in which structure ‘is both 
the medium and outcome’ of social practice (Sewell 2005, 127, 121). 
Analytically, these observations imply a critique of methodological nation-
alism and modes of social inquiry that take the national state, or a set of 
delimited events, as the natural boundaries of analysis. They suggest instead a 
relational conception of social change in which the international is an integral 
dimension of social reality that ‘arises specifically from the co-existence 
within it of more than one society’ (Rosenberg 2006, 308).1
 From this vantage 
point, the international is not a contingent facet of discreet national entities, 
but a constitutive and causally consequential dimension of them. A central 
dynamic of the international over the past few centuries has been the expan-
sion of capitalism and the momentous political and subjective transforma-
tions it brought in its train. The unparalleled force of modern industry made 
capitalism a universal dissolvent of the pre-existing social world, subverting 
and disregarding inherited beliefs and boundaries and compelling societies 
the world over to respond and adapt to its imperatives at the risk of political 
extinction (Marx and Engels 2002).
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This profoundly transformative historical system emerged between the 
sixteenth and twentieth centuries in the process of European colonial expan-
sion overseas, a process that forcibly conjoined separate world regions 
into an unequally integrated world-system that made the advent of a world 
market possible. With the European partitioning of Africa at the end of 
the nineteenth century, the whole world was entangled in the material and 
ideological dynamics unleashed by this colonial form of capitalist modernity. 
The new world-system, with Europe situated at its centre, was structured by 
a multi-dimensional polarisation, and as the relations between its core and 
peripheries changed, so did the terms in which its constitutive hierarchies 
were conceived. Over the centuries, these relations were framed in terms of 
a series of antithetical oppositions: civilised/primitive, modern/traditional, 
advanced/backward, and First World/Third World. By the mid-twentieth 
century, with the disintegration of the European colonial empires, they were 
once again recast and the mastery over nature that was central to the Western 
scientific ethos became the new key to the legitimation of global inequalities. 
Drawing on Enlightenment ideals that better knowledge could help forge a 
better society, science and technology offered a seemingly more plausible 
basis for the continued assertion of Western hegemony. The notion of ‘devel-
opment’ acquired global significance in this context, providing a powerful 
framework through which relative inequality and the promise of a future 
beyond it could be imagined. Unlike the ideology of the civilising mission, 
‘development’ was also a project nationalist and anti-colonial leaders could 
embrace (Cooper and Packard 1997, 1–44).
Once global inequalities were reframed in this way, structural compari-
sons between different kinds of societies could be hierarchically ordered to 
produce a scale of progress in which the present of the West represented the 
future of the rest (Osborne 1991, 17; Ferguson 2005). This unilinear vision 
of modernisation was reinforced by the restless dynamics of the capitalist 
world market. Capitalist industrialization involves a continual transforma-
tion of nature and an accelerating restructuring of the social world that gives 
rise to a sense of historical movement as unidirectional. And it is within this 
homogeneous conception of historical time, and the temporal ideologies of 
progress and modernization it gives rise to, that the idea of development 
emerged as a widely accepted framework for bringing global hierarchy and 
interdependence into a stable relationship. Capitalist development has of 
course never been a purely national or linear process as the paradigm of 
modernization implied. While societies across the world invariably came into 
contact with the dynamics of capitalism and its systemic pressures, they were 
not thereby transformed into mere mirror images of its industrial core. The 
expanded reproduction of capitalism inevitably encountered distinct social 
and cultural configurations that were differentially integrated into its evolving 
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dynamics. The concrete historical forms these took across the uneven social 
terrain of the international varied greatly and built on the pre-existing social 
and cultural forms in non-linear and contradictory ways. This interactive and 
differentiated process of capitalist development effectively foreclosed the 
formation of a homogenised global modernity or purely autarkic forms of 
national development.
The political and social implications of this contradictory unity of world 
capitalist development were the subject of a politically charged controversy 
within Russian Marxism from the turn of the twentieth century. Situated 
on the eastern edge of an industrializing West, the Russian intelligentsia 
was preoccupied with the problematic of ‘backwardness’, and it was in an 
attempt to understand the resulting peculiarities of Tsarist Russia’s belated 
industrialisation that Leon Trotsky first developed his theses on uneven and 
combined development. Proceeding from the observation that capitalism 
was a word-historical formation in which societal interdependence, rather 
than independence, was a key determinant of social change, Trotsky argued 
that under pressure from a militarily and economically more advanced West, 
societies situated on its expanding frontier would be compelled to respond by 
embarking on projects of catching-up. In so doing, they could take advantage 
of a ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ generated by historical unevenness, 
adapting the latest technical advances and thereby ‘skip a whole series of 
intermediate stages’ of development. This, however, did not mean they could 
simply reproduce the developmental trajectories of the industrial pioneers. 
The fact that industrialisation had occurred somewhere necessarily changed 
the conditions of its emergence elsewhere, so that a mere repetition of 
developmental forms was ruled out. While societies like Russia could make 
use of existing advances in science and technology, these were typically 
grafted onto non-capitalist social forms so that the overall pattern of their 
development necessarily took a combined form: ‘From the universal law of 
unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we 
may call the law of combined development—by which we mean a drawing 
together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, 
an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms’ (Trotsky 1960, 4–5). 
Instead of a linear succession of predetermined stages within discrete bound-
aries, capitalist development was a relational and differentiated process that 
precluded the serial reproduction of independent processes of industrializa-
tion. This interactive dynamic implied, moreover, that no single composite or 
normative model of development would emerge, since many different social 
articulations were possible. This made capitalist development not only inter-
active but also multilinear (Makki 2015).
Uneven and combined dynamics are of course not confined to the economic 
and political spheres alone. They also operate at the level of culture and forms 
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of historical consciousness.2 Given that an organic evolution of societies was 
precluded by the intersocietal dynamics of social change, uneven and com-
bined development generated contradictory tensions that made late develop-
ing societies acutely vulnerable to periodic social and political convulsions. 
These contradictions acquired explosive dimensions from modern forms of 
historical consciousness, including a profound sensibility of relative ‘back-
wardness’ that was generated by material and cultural unevenness in the con-
text of capitalist expansion. Reinhart Koselleck has argued that this epochal 
form of historical consciousness was informed by:
the nonsimultaneity of diverse but, in a chronological sense, simultaneous 
histories. With the opening up of the world, the most different but coexisting 
cultural levels were brought into view spatially and, by way of synchronic com-
parison, were diachronically classified. World history became for the first time 
empirically redeemable; however, it was only interpretable to the extent that 
the most differentiated levels of development, decelerations and accelerations 
of temporal courses in various countries, social strata, classes, or areas were 
at the same time necessarily reduced to a common denominator. (Koselleck 
2002, 166)
The meta-narrative of world history this apprehension of modernity made 
possible had a profound impact on the imagination of people across the 
world, and world history since the onset of the French and Industrial revolu-
tions came to be seen as the unfolding of a single inexorable process of ratio-
nalisation and secularisation. Social change was consequently understood as 
a contradictory process of adaptation to these forces of modernity. And it 
was in relation to the underlying empty, homogeneous conception of histori-
cal temporality, and the sense of historical movement as linear and progres-
sive, that modern social actors became preoccupied with their place in ‘an 
unequal world and the shape of their pasts and futures’ (Donham 1992; 1999). 
Nation-states – the paradigmatic institutional forms of modernity – were 
henceforth viewed as situated ahead or behind each other along a single axis 
of historical time, and it was within the terms of this hierarchy of modernity 
that vernacular modernisms, ‘attempts to reorder local society by the applica-
tion of strategies that have produced wealth, power, or knowledge elsewhere 
in the world’, can be properly located:
Without uneven development, without increasing capitalist competition and 
commodification across world markets, without the unidirectional and univer-
sally present pressures created by technological advance, and perhaps most of 
all, without capitalist media, it would be impossible to understand why intel-
lectual vanguards the world over have posed the problem of ‘backwardness’. 
(Donham 1999, xviii)
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The social stratum most haunted by this consciousness of relative ‘backward-
ness’ was the bilingual intelligentsia of the peripheral societies. Intellectuals 
were central to both nationalism and revolution not least because uneven and 
combined development augmented their strategic political position relative to 
that of the other main social classes. The turn to radicalism was in part gener-
ated by the impossibility of repeating the developmental pattern of the core 
countries within the terms of the classical modernization paradigm. There 
was no way to simply evade the handicaps that Western industrialization 
imposed on late developing societies. Social progress and catching-up would 
have to be a conscious revolutionary project against the wider structures 
of power that reproduced the condition of ‘backwardness’. Revolution was 
thus conceived as a ‘way to jump “ahead” by ‘cutting history off at the pass’ 
(Anderson 1991, 156–57; Donham 1999, 2). While not devoid of normative 
commitments to justice and equality, revolutions became essentially instru-
ments for mobilising subaltern populations and constructing a more interven-
tionist state capable of hastening the project of modernity.
The particular alliance of social forces that comprised these revolutionary 
movements, and the ideological orientation of its leading strata, varied greatly 
from one revolutionary context to another. But for all this heterogeneity and 
the hybrid ideological registers in which the politics of catching-up was 
articulated, a central impetus informing the consciousness of revolutionary 
actors was a deeply felt sensibility of ‘comparative backwardness’.3
 In this 
respect, these revolutions can in part be understood as conscious efforts to 
meet the challenges posed by the uneven and combined dynamics of capitalist 
world development. To define the chain of revolutionary transformations in 
the global periphery in this way is to obviously emphasise only one of their 
dimensions, and is by no means intended to minimise their emancipatory 
impulse. Nor does such a characterisation exhaust the complex social integu-
ments, discursive registers and cultural meanings of each revolution. To 
imply otherwise would be to impose a reductively static and abstract category 
on what are in fact dynamic processes of change, and greater appreciation of 
local circumstances and forms of consciousness is required in any specific 
historical analysis. But to neglect their imbrication with and conditioning 
by the uneven and combined dialectics of capitalist modernity, and the con-
tradictory developmental and political syndrome it typically generates, is to 
commit no less a violence of abstraction.
This political dialectic of the revolution against backwardness was 
refracted in distinctive ways in different countries, and my intention in this 
chapter is to examine the momentous revolutions in Ethiopia within its sug-
gestive analytic framework. The revolutions in Ethiopia afford a fascinatingly 
intricate illustration of a more general process not least because the ancien 
régime remained sovereign in the age of high colonialism in Africa.
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As a result, the Ethiopian social formation did not experience the sorts of 
transformations commonly associated with colonial capitalism elsewhere. 
But for all the idiosyncratic survival of its articulated political and cultural 
institutions, it could not escape the geopolitical and economic pressures of 
the international order, and particular social groups within it have at different 
times felt the imperative to respond to these challenges. As the following sec-
tions illustrate, the key turning points in the political and historical trajectory 
of twentieth century Ethiopia were decisively shaped by these uneven and 
combined dynamics of the international.
IMPERIAL ETHIoPIA AND THE TRIbUTARy oRDER
The backdrop for the distinctive trajectory of the Ethiopian state lay in the 
anterior evolution of the Abyssinian social formation. From at least the 
twelfth century, we know that social stratification in the agrarian polity was 
articulated around rights derived from persons on the land. Peasants were in 
principle free with secure access to land known as rist that was reckoned on 
a kinship basis. Superimposed on this communal form of tenure were gult 
(tributary) rights asserted by a class of lords, the bala-gult (those with rights 
to tribute), in the form of a portion of the peasant produce and various kinds 
of labour services. This social property complex had important consequences 
for the developmental dynamics of the Abyssinian polity (Donham 1986; 
Tadesse 1972). Since the class of agrarian lords did not necessarily own the 
land tilled by the peasants, they exercised no control over the production pro-
cess and could do little to augment production and the agricultural surplus. 
Peasants likewise had little incentive to enhance productivity since all surplus 
was subject to predatory appropriation by the lords (Wolde-Aregay 1984). 
The long-term structural effect of this social property relationship was a 
sharply reduced potential for technological innovation or productive advance 
more generally. With no social impetus for intensive gains in productivity, 
and unable to overturn the customary rights of the peasants, warrior lords 
found extensive territorial expansion to be the best means of increasing the 
social surplus. This expansionary territorial dynamic required coercive appa-
ratuses to suppress the peasantry and to counter competing warrior lords. And 
it was in this process of constructing ever-larger machineries of coercion that 
tributary states were formed or torn down.4
 The fundamental rationale for the 
expansion of the Abyssinian state lay in this particular social property con-
figuration, and it was the sinews of imperial expansion that at the end of the 
nineteenth century enabled Menelik II to transform the Abyssinian kingdom 
into the Ethiopian Empire and to defeat Italy, the aspirant colonial power, at 
the Battle of Adwa in 1896.
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The new empire incorporated a population and territory more than double 
that of historic Abyssinia and was able to respond to the challenges posed 
by the new international constellation of forces from a position of relative 
political autonomy. But formal sovereignty was no decisive measure of the 
empire-state’s insulation from international geopolitical and economic pres-
sures. However much its social and political form appeared to defy historical 
time, insofar as it could not survive without the world market and interna-
tional strategic alliances, it necessarily encountered the limits of relative 
autonomy and was forced to respond to the dynamics of the international 
order. Ethiopia’s rulers thus felt compelled to transform the tributary order 
through a project of modernisation from above. This reform project went 
through two distinct phases before the accumulating contradictions it gener-
ated exploded in a profound social revolution in 1974. In the first of these 
periods, from roughly the turn of the century to the Italian occupation in 1935, 
adaptation to international pressures and prevailing norms took the form of a 
selective appropriation of ostensibly modern institutional forms on a structur-
ally non-modern tributary state. Late nineteenth-century territorial expansion 
was essentially a straightforward extension from adjacent geographical bases, 
and in the absence of an elaborate bureaucratic administration to accompany 
it, the new imperial power basically reproduced relations of personal delega-
tion. But once the avenue for lateral expansion was closed off by the pres-
ence of adjacent European colonial states, augmentation of the social surplus 
could only take place through intensive appropriation rather than extensive 
absorption of new territories and regional peasantries. The resulting system of 
surplus extraction reduced the peasantry to a status akin to serfdom (Tibebu 
1995; Crummey 2000). And without any significant remaking of the tributary 
order, the institutional and social grounds for a more enduring centralisation 
were fundamentally absent (Donham 1986, 37–44; Markakis 1974, 106–7).
It was this weakly integrated political structure that collapsed abruptly in 
the face of Mussolini’s aggression in 1935. The occupation over the next 
five years reconfigured various aspects of the imperial system through poli-
cies designed to undermine the legitimacy of the emperor (Donham 1994, 
36–37). By weakening the regional nobility, the Italians inadvertently cre-
ated propitious conditions for the emergence of a more centralised absolutist 
monarchy in the post-restoration period (Rahmato 1988; Zewde 1984). In the 
subsequent three decades, Haile Selassie appropriated various administrative 
functions that were the mainstay of the regional nobility through the creation 
of a central treasury, an integrated court system, a centralised bureaucracy 
and a professional army (Zewde 1991, 91). Graduates from the expanding 
system of higher education were recruited into these new institutions of the 
state, and by the early 1970s some twenty thousand secondary school gradu-
ates had joined the civil service and standing army.
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As their traditional privileges were eroded, the nobility turned to the greater 
powers of the central state to protect their interests. Their integration into the 
state apparatus, and the diminishing institutional basis of their autonomy, 
meant that they no longer required private retinues to enforce tributary rela-
tions, and resources once used to enlarge the number of followers could now 
be directed towards commerce or real estate. But only a handful of the regional 
nobility were interested in pursuing a new vocation as merchants or capital-
ist farmers.5 So unlike absolutist state formation in post-Renaissance Europe, 
where the expansion of commerce and commodity relations provided the tech-
nical and economic basis for the consolidation of dynastic states, royal abso-
lutism in Ethiopia was enabled by international, particularly United States, 
material and technical assistance. As Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux 
rightly observe, it was this exogenous determinant ‘that enabled the archaic 
regimes to prolong their suspension in the historical time of pre-capitalist 
monarchy, then wrenched them forward into the historical time of social revo-
lution in the post-colonial world’ (Halliday and Molyneaux 1981, 20).
These pre-emptive reforms from above were not just economic or political 
but entailed cultural transformations as well, and the elaboration of a state 
sponsored ‘official nationalism’ was in this respect a crucial accompaniment 
to dynastic centralization. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Ethiopian 
Empire had evolved with a largely Orthodox Christian cultural ensemble at 
its core and numerous ethno-religious communities on its peripheries. By 
right of conquest and the assertion of divine right, the emperor ruled sub-
jects in a hierarchy that reinforced cultural and social difference. Faith and 
dynasty were considered adequate foundations of imperial power and the 
monarchy was largely indifferent to the principle of nationality. At the core 
of this imperial complex were the ethno-religious community of the Habesha 
(Abyssinians), an Orthodox Christian community with their own Church 
and sacred script. This sense of a wider religious community and identity 
was consolidated in the relational space formed by the regional expansion of 
Islam from the tenth century onwards, becoming in time a source of terrestrial 
identity as much as it was a force of spiritual salvation. 
This cultural nexus experienced a steady if uneven transformation dur-
ing the post-1941 process of dynastic centralisation, the establishment of an 
administrative language-of-state, the extension of modern schools and the 
formation of a mass media. It was during this period that the identity of the 
imperial state became permeated by the regional culture of the politically 
dominant Shewa Amhara. Amhara culture supplied the state’s language, its 
myths of origin, and its most ubiquitous symbols. The boundaries of what 
it meant to be Ethiopian came to be shaped by this culture, and much like 
the official nationalisms of the Russian and Magyar nobilities before it, the 
Ethiopian dynasty sought to naturalise itself through a ‘willed merger of 
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nation and dynastic empire’ (Anderson 1991, 86, 110). The term zega that 
eventually came to designate the category of citizenship had historically 
referred to an uprooted person and thus a subject. Its subsequent interpella-
tion as a hybrid subject/citizen category was emblematic of the essentially 
conservative and preemptive nature of the state-sponsored nationalism that 
emerged under the international impetus of post-war decolonization and the 
spreading norm of the nation-state (Mengestie 2004).
All these changes inaugurated a major reconfiguration of the markers of 
imperial identity from a primarily ethno-religious to an increasingly ethno-
linguistic one. Its first casualty was logically enough the cultural ensemble of 
the Habesha itself, which now fractured along Amhara and Tigrinya ethno-
linguistic lines. Language and ethnicity increasingly came to condition access 
to high office, which presumed a relatively fluent command of Amharic 
(Markakis 1984, 4). If nationality and ethnicity had hitherto been of little 
concern to the imperial regime, dynastic centralisation and official national-
ism had made the choice of administrative language, and the cultural identity 
of the state, a profoundly contested political issue. But this was a relatively 
late phenomenon in imperial Ethiopia. Prior to this period, the lisane negus, 
the king’s language, meant little to subaltern social strata. Material backward-
ness, the absence of a developed apparatus for the dissemination of ‘national’ 
culture, and limited social and geographical mobility all reinforced separate 
social and cultural spaces and insured that the inhabitants of the empire 
retained their primary adhesion to local face-to-face communities and an 
imagined religious community (cf. Levine 1965). It was only in the transition 
to modern forms of power that language acquired political efficacy, and the 
one social group most directly impacted by it was the intelligentsia, a stratum 
produced by the process of monarchical modernisation and fated by history 
to administer its denouement. 
THE INTELLIGENTSIA AS MoDERNIST vANGUARD
Throughout the twentieth century, the Ethiopian intelligentsia was haunted 
by the spectre of capitalist modernity. Its leading figures wrestled with its 
significance and searched for a specifically Ethiopian path to modernity 
(Zewde 2002; 2014). Before the 1960s, they were mainly aligned with the 
modernising monarchy to promote administrative and educational reforms. 
But by the turn of the 1960s, as the project of a gradual path of reform from 
above entered into crisis, the political centre of gravity within the intelligen-
tsia shifted to the left, and its active members began to envisage a revolution-
ary transformation of Ethiopian society. The monarchy was hence the very 
symbol of backwardness, a feudal relic and a dead weight on society.
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The opening of the Haile Selassie I University in 1960, and the gradual 
expansion of the state bureaucracy, enhanced the social weight of the intel-
ligentsia. And as the institutional scope of their activities increased, their 
symbolic power took on a new meaning, further amplified by the awe the 
written word commanded in a largely illiterate society. The newspapers they 
published and the radio programs they ran provided powerful mediums for 
the propagation of new ideas. During the 1930s, they looked to Japan as a 
model of a non-Western emperor system that had successfully ‘modernised’. 
They were instrumental in drafting the 1931 Constitution along the lines 
of the Meiji Constitution, and helped promote administrative reforms that 
strengthened the centralising dynasty at the expense of the regional nobility. 
But some leading figures of the intelligentsia, haunted by awareness of the 
Ethiopia’s position in the hierarchy of power and wealth, began to question 
the significance of political sovereignty itself. Afawarq Gebre Iyassus, who 
had collaborated with the Italian occupation, was later to confess that, ‘I did 
what I did because I believed that if Italy took over Ethiopia, civilized it and 
made it prosperous, the day will then come when the Ethiopians, having 
become civilized, strong and prosperous, will free themselves from Italy, just 
as the United States did with England’ (Zewde 2002, 56).
With the advent of decolonisation in Africa and Asia and the post-war 
boom in the world economy, this sensibility of being behind became even 
more acute, and was a decisive element in the political motivations informing 
a failed coup attempt in 1960. As Brigadier General Mengistu Neway—the 
leader of the aborted coup—explained, ‘I ruminated over why the Ethiopian 
armed forces were so easily broken by the forces of the enemy [the Italians in 
1935] and I realized that it was fundamentally because of our backwardness’ 
(Greenfield 1965, 199). This feeling was also echoed in the statement the 
Crown Prince was forced to read over the radio: ‘The Ethiopian people have 
a history of more than 3,000 years, but in that long history no progress was 
made in agriculture, commerce or industry…. While the newly formed inde-
pendent nations of Africa are making progress, Ethiopia is lagging behind, 
and this fact is now realized’ (Balsvik 1985). By the end of the decade, a 
more radicalised intelligentsia had emerged as the most vocal opponents of 
the ancien régime outside the armed nationalist rebellion in Eritrea. Ascribing 
the ease with which the failed coup was put down to the strategic failure of its 
sponsors to mobilise popular sectors behind it, they turned to a new form of 
radical politics that combined opposition to the imperial order with an ethical 
concern for the poor. They saw themselves as the vanguard of a coming revo-
lution conceived as a vehicle for hastening the project of modernisation and 
catching-up. And if a model of such a revolution was needed, world history 
had already supplied it: ‘the Bolshevik revolutionary model has been deci-
sive for all twentieth century revolutions because it made them imaginable in 
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societies still more backward than all the Russias. It opened the possibility of, 
so to speak, cutting history off at the pass’ (Anderson 1991, 156–57).
What the radical intellectuals found particularly attractive about Marxism-
Leninism was not so much the abstract promise of universal emancipa-
tion and individual self-actualisation, but the demonstrable example of the 
Russian and Chinese revolutions as models of an alternative and accelerated 
path to modernity (Donham 1999, 122–30). This broadly diffused concep-
tion of revolutionary politics was a manifestation of the manner in which 
Marxism-Leninism was appropriated in conditions of late-twentieth-century 
Ethiopia (Woldegiorgis 1989, 10–11). Largely untouched by any direct expe-
rience with capitalist factories and farms, or a wider liberal public sphere and 
representative form of government, their Marxism was essentially academic, 
incubated in the space of the university. Armed with an ostensibly scientific 
theory of history, they set out to radically uproot the old order and forcefully 
hasten the forward march of history – whatever its costs. This developmen-
talist orientation downplayed basic questions of democracy, civil liberties 
and political pluralism as expendable luxuries Ethiopia could ill afford. The 
country had to first go through a phase of socialist primitive accumulation 
which required great sacrifice and effort. For this archetype of the revolution-
ary vanguard:
To be a socialist therefore is to recognize the inevitable and to speed it up with 
the help of a scientific outlook and a disciplined admiration for the leaders and 
prophets of socialism who marked out the future road. To be a socialist is to help 
remove obstacles from the road of inevitable progress, that is, to fight for the 
defeat of backwardness in institutions, backwardness in humans, and humans 
who are backward…. This is the frame in which the view that ‘freedom is 
recognition of necessity’ made perfect sense. Ethics becomes but a recognition 
of and service towards the inevitable progress. Any other attitude to morality is 
utopian sentimentalism and/or a legacy of pre-scientific thought and hence, of 
course, ‘petty-bourgeois’. (Shanin 1990, 72)
Denied any legal or institutional space for independent political expression 
and organisation, the radical intellectuals took their concerns to the streets, at 
first discreetly, but by the late 1960s, more openly and audaciously, heralding 
the emergence of a new kind of political activism.
REvoLUTIoN fRoM bELoW AND THE fIRST REPUbLIC
By the early 1970s, the post-restoration project of modernisation was run-
ning out of steam, and the more the monarchy attempted to reform the state, 
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the more it encountered a structural contradiction. Modernisation required a 
degree of mobilisation without putting at risk the legitimacy of the monarchy 
itself. This set critical limits to dynastic modernisation from above, and after 
almost three decades of reform, the mass of the rural population remained 
mired in abject poverty, while unemployment and social marginalization 
made daily life for the plebeian sectors in the towns exceedingly difficult 
and challenging. Economically, there was little discernible dynamic of com-
mercialisation and the rate of agricultural output steadily declined between 
1957 and 1973 (Clapham 1988, 187). Politically, the aristocracy that domi-
nated the upper house of the nominal parliament repeatedly blocked the 
modest proposals for land reform. The unilateral dismantling of the federal 
arrangement with Eritrea in 1962, which was to prove fatal for the empire, 
reflected the deeply conservative mindset of the nobility that viewed even 
limited forms of representative government and civil liberties as anathema 
(Retta 2000).
The accumulating contradictions of this imperial amalgam started to sur-
face in the early 1970s. The most consequential catalyst of the rising political 
unrest was the mass famine of 1973, which was to claim an estimated one 
hundred thousand lives. The absence of any discernable response to avert 
the famine, the impact of the 1973 international oil crisis, and opposition 
to proposed higher education reforms fired-up pent up tensions among stu-
dents, taxi drivers, rank-and-file soldiers and civil servants that erupted in 
a series of spontaneous demonstrations, mutinies and strikes. The scope of 
the mass mobilisations took the imperial regime by surprise. Besieged on 
all sides, and with the army neutralised by a clandestine committee of junior 
officers known as the Derg, the emperor made one concession after another, 
emboldening the popular mobilizations. In the months preceding the fall of 
the monarchy, the Derg removed the concentric circles of power around the 
throne before unceremoniously deposing the isolate emperor on the 12th of 
September 1974 (Halliday and Molyneaux 1981; Lefort 1983; Tiruneh 1993). 
The growing opposition to the regime was encapsulated in the language of 
a revolt against huala-qerent or ‘backwardness’. As Colonel Mengistu, who 
emerged victorious in the faction fights within the ruling Derg, later recalled: 
‘It seemed as though “fire” was coming out of the mouths of the speakers 
when they were making speeches about the backwardness of Ethiopia, the 
history, the suffering of its people and the progress made in other countries’ 
(Donham 1999, 19).
Shortly after the Derg seized state power, however, its repressive policies 
split and polarised the radical opposition along the twin axis of class and 
nationality. Simplifying somewhat, it can be argued that those intellectuals 
most assimilated into the core imperial culture tended to emphasise the class 
character of the state and to give priority to cross-cultural class alliances; 
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while those coming from the peripheries of the empire put equivalent 
emphasis on the cultural identity of the empire-state as an essential feature of 
the prevailing pattern of social inequalities. Both positions were articulated 
in a discourse of Marxism-Leninism, and several of the leading figures of the 
student movement had debated over these issues in exile before returning to 
Ethiopia to face each other as bitter rivals.
Socially, the most consequential measure enacted by the new Republic 
was the land reform of 1975. The reform granted peasants use-rights of up 
to ten hectares per household and banned the selling, mortgaging, exchang-
ing or leasing of land, and the hiring of wage labour. Tenancy and related 
forms of subordination were done away with and the few large commer-
cial farms were turned into collective or state farms. Long-entrenched 
common-places concerning the place of the poor in the social order were 
undermined and peasant households experienced a relative expansion in 
income in the immediate post-reform years. In the regions incorporated 
into the empire at the end of the nineteenth century, the land reform was 
also experienced as a form of cultural emancipation, transforming the 
oppressive ethnic hierarchies that accompanied the spread of imperial 
rule and the tributary order. The reform created a relatively homogeneous 
tenure system with small variations in the quality and size of individual 
allotments. But if the peasantry largely welcomed the land redistribu-
tion as an end in itself, it could only be a transitional arrangement for the 
post-revolutionary state. Redistribution was viewed as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for removing the structural fetters on productivity, 
which required mechanised state farms or producer cooperatives as the 
productive socialist analogues of capitalist agriculture. The threat to small-
holder tenure was consequently never far and following the Great Famine 
of 1984 the regime embarked on large-scale projects of resettlement and 
villagisation, as peasant households from the turbulent north were resettled 
in regimented villages in the south (Berriso 2002, 117). This high modern-
ist scheme proved basically counterproductive. By the end of the decade, 
production levels had declined to levels below those of the early 1970s, 
and given the failure to realise anything approaching the expected level of 
producer cooperatives, the state turned to coercive means to extract surplus 
from rural households.
The forced march to modernisation was combined with the ruthless sup-
pression of all manifestations of politicised ethnicity, and the young officers 
that seized state power refused to hand it back to the people constituted as 
a sovereign body. The state became the embodiment of the ‘nation-to-be’, 
substituting bureaucracy for democracy and passive obedience for active citi-
zenship. And by alienating the peasantry and the ethnic intelligentsias, it set 
in motion the conditions for various peasant-based armed ethno-nationalist 
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movements. A peasantry burdened by state exactions and an intelligentsia 
alienated by military rule and the project of official nationalism, joined forces 
to launch a sustained assault on the state. In May 1991, in a dramatic reversal 
of the pattern a century earlier when forces from the imperial core conquered 
and subjugated the peripheries, a coalition of nationalists from the peripheries 
now marched triumphantly on the centre. As Eritrea became a sovereign state 
following a United Nations supervised referendum, a Federal Republic based 
on ethnic administrative units was established in Ethiopia over the debris of 
the post-1974 unitary state (Tareke 2009; Young 2006).
REvoLUTIoN fRoM THE PERIPHERy 
AND THE SECoND REPUbLIC
The 1974 Revolution had transpired in an international conjuncture marked 
by a rising political ferment—from Vietnam to Cuba, from the Algerian revo-
lution to the radicalisation of post-1967 Arab nationalism, from anti-colonial 
struggles in Portuguese Africa to the anti-apartheid movement in South 
Africa, and from May 68 in Paris to the revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua a 
decade later. This conjuncture was formative for the radical intelligentsia in 
Ethiopia and found political expression in a proliferating revolutionary and 
radical nationalist discourse. But by the time the second republic was estab-
lished in 1991, the international situation had altered completely. The Cold 
War was over as Perestroika and Glasnost paved the way for the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, while post-Mao China 
was in the process of embracing the capitalist world market. In the rest of 
the world, the long recessionary wave in the global economy that started in 
the mid-seventies was accompanied by a neoliberal offensive fixated on the 
deregulation of the market, the privatization of public assets, and the rolling 
back of social gains secured during the immediate post-war and post-colonial 
decades. In Ethiopia, the negative example of the post-revolutionary state 
further tarnished the political appeal of socialism, effectively alienating broad 
sectors of the intelligentsia from it.
It was in this altered international context that Eritrean nationalist forces 
assumed complete control over Eritrea while a coalition of nationalist forces, 
under the hegemony of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), seized 
power in Addis Ababa. The latter proceeded to transform the unitary republic 
into a federal state along the lines of the then unraveling Soviet Union. This 
restructuring went some ways in reconfiguring the empire-state, generating 
among other things a reactive Amhara nationalism that like its Russian and 
Turkish precursors was the last to emerge in the empire. If the new regime— 
whose social and political base was in the northern region of Tigray—was 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   199 7/13/2016   9:56:05 PM
200 Fouad Makki
to stabilize the volatile political situation and secure its legitimacy, it needed 
to make various political concessions. These concessions made possible a 
relative political opening within a largely restricted public sphere. And given 
the changed international ideological context, the TPLF rapidly discarded its 
pro-Albanian Marxist-Leninist discourse in favor of an articulated ideology 
of developmentalism which now came into its own – without ambiguity or 
circumlocution – as the expression of a radical nationalist ‘revolution against 
backwardness’. Opposition to the new order would hereafter be dismissed 
simply as ‘anti-developmentalist’.
This political reorientation led to the elaboration of a new strategy of 
accumulation mediated by market mechanisms and a regulated opening to 
the world market. It subsequently brought to the fore the crucial question of 
the land tenure system inherited from the 1974 Revolution, to which the new 
rulers were initially committed. But under pressure from the Bretton Woods 
institutions and demands for the restitution of property rights by returning 
émigres and newly emergent local capital, they started to backtrack from 
their previously pro-smallholder stance. While formally upholding the land 
law, they allowed local land markets to emerge and used market imperatives 
to bear on smallholder farming with the aim of generating an expanded social 
surplus for an industrialisation drive. Peasant households were progressively 
subjected to a criteria of market efficiency in a strategy that gave primary 
consideration to the mobilisation of land and labour for enhanced capital 
accumulation. 
The transformation of agrarian social relations was facilitated by the 
1975 land reform law that by vesting all land in the state had juridically 
expropriated the peasantry and endowed state authorities with plenipoten-
tiary powers to reallocate land in the ‘public interest’. With the turn to the 
market, this state monopoly of land was deployed to facilitate a spatially 
differentiated tenure rearrangement. In the densely populated highland core, 
the remaking of agrarian social relations primarily relied on the integration 
of smallholder farmers into the market through various mechanisms; while 
in the sparsely populated lowland peripheries, an archipelago of large-scale 
mechanised farming is emerging facilitated by the enclosure of the com-
mons and the eviction of villagers from their ancestral land. In one of the 
great ironies of history, the radical nationalists that had fought to dismantle 
the core-periphery hierarchies of the ancien régime empire were now over-
seeing its reconstitution in new capitalist form. While so far limited in its 
reach, the expropriations are nonetheless creating the condition for a real 
subsumption of land and labor to capital, and might constitute the initial 
testing grounds for a much more extended process of dispossession in the 
highlands, making apposite for Ethiopia today Marx’s nineteenth century 
warning to German producers: De te fabula narrator – Of you this story is 
told! (Marx 1976 [1867]).
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THE DIALECTICS of ‘bACkWARDNESS’ AND ‘PRoGRESS’
Viewed in terms of their long-term structural outcome, the successive revolu-
tions in Ethiopia had effectively cleared the path for the expansion of capital-
ist commodity relations. The decisive factor in this outcome was the epochal 
shift in the international situation at the turn of the 1990s, a historical con-
juncture marked by the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War. The speed with which revolutionary actors adapted to this changed inter-
national environment is partly explained by the epochal consciousness of rela-
tive ‘backwardness’ that was a basic element of radical nationalist ideology. 
This recasting of political commitments did not entail a total disavowal of the 
earlier Marxist-Leninist orientation. While much of the rhetoric of Leninism 
was discarded, the organisational forms it gave rise to—a centralised van-
guard party and mass associations under its control—were redeployed for 
consolidating the new state power and for promoting a manifold business 
empire under the control of the party. Instead of nationalising the command-
ing heights of the economy as was the case with the 1974 revolution, this new 
market-based strategy was augmented by a corporatist type state exercising 
control over national labour federations and peasant associations.
What does this outcome suggest about the social and political character of 
the combined ‘long revolution’ in Ethiopia? Can it be conceived as a ‘bour-
geois revolution’? From the world-historical perspective adopted in this essay, 
such a characterization is not entirely implausible. But it is not without its own 
analytic limitations and conundrums. For if a ‘bourgeois revolution’ presup-
poses a corresponding bourgeois class subject and world view to bring it into 
being, then the revolutions in Ethiopia were categorically not bourgeois. But if 
we put the emphasis on its objective outcome – the establishment of a political 
and legal framework for the development of capitalist social relations– it argu-
ably constitutes a bourgeois revolution even if only by proxy and in a highly 
mediated sense. But rather than a peculiarity of the Ethiopian revolution, this 
non-correspondence between social subject and historical tasks appears to be a 
general feature of bourgeois revolutions, virtually none of which represented a 
straightforward contest between a rising bourgeoisie and a declining aristocracy: 
none of the great turbulences of the transition to modernity has ever conformed 
to the simple schema of a struggle between a feudal aristocracy and industrial 
capital of the sort presupposed in the traditional Marxist vocabulary. The porous 
pattern of feudalism above, the unpredictable presence of exploited classes 
from below, the mixed disposition of the bourgeoisie within, the competitive 
pressure of rival states without, were bound to defeat this expectation. In that 
sense, one could say that it was in the nature of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ to be 
denatured: these transformations could never have been the linear project of a 
single class subject. Here the exception was the rule – every one was a bastard 
birth. (Anderson 1992 [1975], 112–13).
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This disjuncture between social agents and structural outcomes is arguably 
a feature of the uneven and combined dynamics of capitalist world develop-
ment whereby international geopolitical pressures can press different social 
agents to the task of removing the structural obstacles to the expansion of 
capitalist commodity relations. One of the ways this occurs is through revo-
lutionary projects of ‘catching-up’ which are framed by a linear conception 
of historical development and the temporal ideologies of modernization and 
progress (Ferguson 2005, 161–81). From this perspective, unevenness is read 
under the exclusive sign of backwardness, and revolutions become a means 
of catching-up and accelerating the transition to modernity. This worldview 
has provided a seemingly secure ground from which particular modernist 
futures could be imagined in different societies across the world and an 
instrumental relationship of means to ends could be justified.
Today, in the second decade of the new millennium, when virtually all 
the revolutionary projects of the twentieth century have been defeated or 
reversed, a critical reevaluation of such ‘revolutions against backwardness’ 
has become a necessity. And any consequential critique will have to come to 
terms with two central themes that were constitutive of them: the ideology 
of Progress and a normative model of the future derived from an abstracted 
history of the West. The notion of progress that was integral to these revolu-
tions was subjected to a particularly illuminating critique by Walter Benjamin 
in the context of the bloody conflagrations of the Second World War and the 
descent of European civilisation into barbarism. Criticising the conventional 
conception of history as progress and as automatic and continuous improve-
ment, Benjamin reconceived capitalist development as a steady accumula-
tion of disasters that ‘keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage’. Revolutions, 
rather than accelerating history, would thus have to constitute a redemptive 
‘interruption’ of it, a pulling of the fire alarm before the heedless lurch of 
human civilisation into the abyss (Benjamin 1969, 263; Löwy 2006). 
If the critique of a blind faith in the telos of modernity is one essential 
point of departure for emancipatory struggles today, the other is the central-
ity accorded a model of the future derived from an abstracted history of the 
West with all its Eurocentric assumptions of unidirectional change. Writing 
in a conjuncture marked by anti-colonial struggles, and in terms that have lost 
none of their force of conviction, Frantz Fanon gave powerful expression to 
this emergent sense of anti-Eurocentrism:
Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which 
would be almost an obscene caricature. If we want to turn Africa into a new 
Europe and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the destiny of our 
countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted 
from among us. But if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want 
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to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we 
must invent and we must make discoveries…. For Europe, for ourselves and 
for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new 
concepts, and try to set afoot a new man. (Fanon 1963, 315–16).
These critiques by Benjamin and Fanon occupy different analytic registers 
and are not without their internal tensions. But they provide a necessary 
antidote to all naïve ideologies of progress as well as positivist and evolution-
ary conceptions of history derived from Eurocentric assumptions. Together, 
they suggest a political orientation that is in some sense Janus faced, with 
one face turned towards the condition of relative ‘backwardness’ and the 
terrible reality of absolute scarcity; and the other towards the seemingly end-
less ‘progress’ of capitalist commodification and over-accumulation, and the 
social and ecological threat generated by its recurrent dynamic of creative 
destruction. Separated by a huge gulf in wealth and power, these contrasting 
conditions might appear unconnected. But they are in fact outcomes of the 
same historical process of capitalist world development. The condition of 
the one was largely the creation of the other, and any meaningful interna-
tionalism today requires a dialectical conjoining of the ‘revolution against 
backwardness’ with a ‘revolution against progress’. 
NoTES
1. For recent studies of revolutionary change informed by the idea of uneven and 
combined development, see Matin (2013c) and Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015, 
174–214).
2. In a critical survey of Western Marxism, Perry Anderson has argued that the 
‘law of uneven and combined development governs the tempo and distribution 
of theory too: it can transform laggard into leading countries, benefiting from the 
advantages of latecomers, in a comparatively short period’ (Anderson 1976: 102). In 
a recent illuminating study, Robbie Shilliam (2009) has examined the ‘international 
dimension of knowledge production’ and the specific problematic of ‘comparative 
backwardness’ in shaping the thought world of German intellectuals, including Kant, 
Hegel, Weber and Morgenthau.
3. In many respects, this was a dynamic akin to that of feudal Europe. See for 
instance the characterization of feudalism in the seminal essay by Robert Brenner 
(1985).
4. By the time of the 1974 Revolution, the enclaves of commercial agriculture 
amounted to just 2.3 percent (320,000 hectares) of the total area under cultivation, 
contributing no more than seven percent of the gross value of agricultural production. 
(Rahmato, 2008: 83)
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Chapter 12
Uneven and Combined 
Development in the Sociocultural 
Evolution of World-Systems
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Marilyn Grell-Brisk
The comparative world-systems perspective advances the idea of semiperiph-
eral development as a set of processes that have been important in sociocul-
tural evolution since the first emergence of interpolity interaction networks 
(world-systems).1 Whole world-systems are conceived as systemic interaction 
networks based on intensive exchange, cooperation and conflict. Very small 
world-systems are compared with larger continental and global ones. The 
notion of core/periphery relations is a fundamental concept in this theoretical 
approach. Uneven development and co-evolution are conspicuous features of 
the emergence of complexity and hierarchy within and between human poli-
ties. Polities that were in the middle of core/periphery structures were more 
likely to be the locus of the implementation of new technologies and new 
forms of organisation that facilitated conquest and empire formation and that 
expanded and intensified exchange networks. Sociocultural evolution then 
can only be explained if polities are seen to have been in important interaction 
with each other since the Palaeolithic Age (Rosenberg 2010). This idea was 
inspired by Leon Trotsky’s concept of ‘uneven and combined development’ 
(Trotsky 1932).
Semiperipheral marcher states and semiperipheral capitalist city-states have 
been important agents of sociocultural transformation in world history since 
the Bronze Age. Studies of the growth of cities and of the territorial sizes of 
polities confirm the importance of semiperipheral development as a cause of 
scale changes in human sociocultural evolution. And the contemporary global 
system continues to show signs of this phenomenon. In this chapter we advance 
the idea that polities that have held intermediate positions in core/periphery 
structures (the semiperiphery) have often been the locus of the implementation 
of new technologies and forms of organisation that have facilitated conquest, 
empire formation and the expansion and intensification of exchange networks.
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Core, periphery and semiperiphery are relational concepts that depend on 
the nature of interpolity interactions and the nature of the polities that are 
interacting. The semiperiphery is in between the core and the periphery, but 
the specific meaning of that ‘in between-ness’ depends on the structure of 
the larger system and the nature of the polities that are its parts. Christopher 
Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1997) made an important distinction between 
core/periphery differentiation and core/periphery hierarchy. Core/periphery 
differentiation exists when polities with different levels of population density 
are systemically interacting with one another (making war, alliances or trade). 
Core/periphery hierarchy exists when some polities dominate and/or exploit 
other polities. Chase-Dunn and Hall do not assume that all world-systems 
(networks of systemic interpolity interaction) are organised as core/periphery 
structures. Rather they see core/periphery hierarchies as having emerged and 
evolved as capabilities for domination and exploitation of distant peoples 
have been developed. The inclusion of prehistorical small-scale polities in 
the scope of comparison allows for the study of the emergence and develop-
ment of interpolity differentiation and hierarchy. The distinction between 
differentiation and hierarchy is important because it allows for the analysis of 
known cases in which less population dense polities (e.g. the Mongols) have 
exploited higher density ones (e.g. China), and for the study of possible cases 
of semiperipheral development in situations in which core/periphery differen-
tiation, but not core/periphery hierarchy were present (see below). The nature 
of the semiperiphery thus depends on the nature of the interpolity system. 
In practice we can use population density differences (settlement sizes) and 
differences in modes of production (foraging, farming, pastoralism, etc.) to 
identify polities that are likely to have been semiperipheral to other polities.
Semiperipheral development has taken different forms. A kind of semipe-
ripheral development occurred in prehistoric California in two small world-
systems composed of sedentary and hunter-gatherer polities. And there were 
semiperipheral marcher chiefdoms in the Pacific that conquered other polities 
and formed island-wide paramount chiefdoms (Kirsch 1994). Semiperipheral 
and peripheral marcher states were the most frequent agents of the formation 
of large empires in world history (Inoue et al. 2016). Semiperipheral capital-
ist city-states encouraged the production of surpluses for exchange and com-
mercialising since the Bronze Age. Europe was a semiperipheral promontory 
of Afroeurasia that rose to global hegemony because the weakness of its 
tributary empires allowed the emergence of capitalist states (Chase-Dunn and 
Hall 1997, 90–3). All the modern hegemons (Netherlands, United Kingdom 
and the United States) were formerly semiperipheral states before their rise 
to hegemony (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013). 
And the contemporary global system continues to demonstrate signs of semi-
peripheral development both in terms of upward mobility and transformation. 
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The concept of uneven and combined development in the writings of Leon 
Trotsky has played a significant role in the formation of the idea of semipe-
ripheral development.
In his studies of the 1905 Russian Revolution (Results and Prospects and 
Our Revolution which he wrote in 1906 and 1907, respectively), Trotsky 
contended that Russia could not reproduce the kind of capitalism that had 
emerged in Western Europe. Rather, Russian development would need to 
be constructed in the context of the already existing Europe-centred world 
economy. Trotsky explained this by proposing his twin laws of uneven and 
combined development: ‘Unevenness, the most general law of the historic 
process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of backward 
countries…. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives … the law 
of combined development—by which we mean a drawing together of the 
different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam 
of archaic with more contemporary forms’ (Trotsky 1932, 5–6). For Trotsky, 
development was uneven because history had already established that dif-
ferent countries grew economically at different rates and development was 
combined because backward countries, like Russia, would simply import, 
implement and execute the most advanced aspects of technology and organ-
isation from Western Europe. However, this was not done ‘slavishly’ as ‘a 
backward country does not take things in the same order’ (Trotsky 1932, 4). 
Countries could move decades ahead of the developmental process by sim-
ply taking advantage of the knowledge and experience of the more advanced 
and developed countries, the result being an interlacing of backward and 
advanced processes of development—combined development.
Trotsky’s twin laws have been a source of inspiration for the formulation 
of new ideas and concepts across disciplines such as the economic historian, 
Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1962) idea of the advantages of backwardness 
as a boon for rapid industrialisation, cultural anthropologist Elman Service’s 
(1971) concept of adaptivity as a spur to adaptive evolutionary change and 
historian Carroll Quigley’s (1979) notion of a semiperiphery that mixes 
cultures to gestate new combinations that lead to competitive success. More 
recently, world historian and ethnographer Philippe Beaujard (2005) has con-
tended that core, peripheral and semiperipheral polities co-evolve with one 
another despite interpolity exploitation and domination. Trotsky’s twin laws 
have also been developed into a transhistorical and non-Eurocentric theory of 
international relations (Matin 2013a, 2013b) and an explanation of the emer-
gence of hegemons (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013). For Justin Rosenberg 
(2010), archaeological evidence shows that transitions to agricultural societies 
were uneven in time and space depending upon environmental differences. 
And so uneven and combined development preceded the international but was 
important in the emergence of geopolitics. The case for uneven and combined 
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development informing a theory of international relations based on historical 
sociology is advanced by Rosenberg (2010) and by Kamran Matin (2007). For 
instance, Matin (2007, 432) contends that ‘the high mobility, predatory and 
war-attuned nature of nomadism were of the utmost importance in shaping 
the outcome and forms of the interrelation between the nomads and sedentary 
societies’. He applies this idea to pre-modern Iran. According to Matin, the 
use of a nomadic institution called the uymaq (a political-administrative unit 
consolidated in Iran under Tamerlane), produced the underdevelopment of 
private property. This was in part because of pre-modern Iran’s relations with 
nomadic peoples and the resulting form taken by the Persian sultanates. All 
these scholars inform the central idea of this chapter, which is that much of 
socio-historical systemic transformation occurred in, and was fuelled by, 
peoples and polities who were in semiperipheral, and sometimes peripheral, 
locations within the world-systems in which they lived.
The semiperiphery lies between the core and the periphery. Given its posi-
tion in the core/periphery hierarchy, the semiperiphery includes regions that 
mix both core and peripheral forms of organisation. Semiperipheries may 
also be spatially located between two or more competing core regions. And 
they may be regions where mediating activities link core and peripheral poli-
ties. They may also include regions in which institutional features are inter-
mediate in form between those found in the core and periphery (Chase-Dunn 
and Hall 1997, chapter 5). So many semiperipheral polities are likely to be 
engaging in some form of combined development. The intermediate position 
between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ explains why semiperipheral polities are most 
capable of reaping what Trotsky termed the ‘privileges of backwardness’. 
This implies that the roots of those processes of developmental ‘catch up and 
overtake’ that Trotsky associated with combined forms of development stem 
mainly from the structural specificities of each world-system.
But it is important to note that engaging in transformational activities in the 
semiperiphery is not a guarantee of advancing into another phase or stage of 
development or of upward mobility into the core. Conceptualising the semipe-
riphery as being a stage in development ignores the relational and hierarchical 
aspects of interpolity relations in a larger world-system. The possibility of 
moving up into the core or down into the periphery is dependent not just on 
the activities being engaged in, but also on the relations that are operating in 
the world-system of which the semiperipheral polity is a part (Babones 2005).
World-systems have taken rather different forms depending on the 
predominant modes of accumulation (kin-based, state-based, capitalist). 
Furthermore, upward mobility into the core and transformational activity are 
not necessarily the same. It is possible for a semiperipheral polity to change 
the logic of social action within a world-system (as semiperipheral capitalist 
city-states did for thousands of years) without moving into the core.
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Before proceeding with our argument that the semiperiphery should be 
seen as a wellspring of sociocultural evolution, we should first define, and 
therefore reimagine, the spatial boundaries of world-systems. Immanuel 
Wallerstein conceived of the semiperiphery as an essential and permanent 
element of the modern world-system (Wallerstein 1974; 1976). He sees the 
world-system as trimodal, with multicultural economies and a structurally 
unequal division of labour in the production of necessary goods for everyday 
life. An anthropological framework of comparison that considers both the 
prehistory and the history of world-systems is possible by defining whole 
systems as interpolity interaction networks in which the interactions (trade, 
warfare, communications, etc.) are important for the reproduction of the 
internal structures of the composite units and cause changes that occur in 
these local structures (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Examinations of small-
scale world-systems show that Wallerstein’s notion of ‘reciprocal minisys-
tems’ in which polities interact within a single homogenous cultural context 
(Wallerstein 1984) are actually rather rare. Most small-scale systems are 
multicultural and so spatially bounding them must focus on interactions such 
as alliance formation, warfare and trade that often occur between polities that 
have different languages and cultures.
Human polities have evolved from bands to tribes to chiefdoms to states, to 
empires and then to the modern interstate system of republics and hegemonic 
leadership. In Rise and Demise, Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) contended 
that there have been three predominant modes of accumulation since the 
Stone Age: kin-based, tributary and capitalist (Wolf 1982). The qualitative 
transformations involved in the emergence of state-based and then capital-
ist logics of integration have often involved initiatives taken by actors from 
semiperipheral locations. Some types of semiperipheral development lead to 
upward mobility of the polities that implement innovations, while others do 
not do that but they do contribute to transforming the institutional structure 
of the whole system.
Hub theory scholars contend the innovations are most likely to occur in 
the core where information crossroads promote the recombination of ideas 
(e.g. Hawley 1950; McNeill and McNeil 2013; Christian 2004). Others claim 
that the semiperiphery, or even the periphery (Lattimore 1980), are important 
loci of new organisational, ideological and technological developments. Our 
position is that the most important thing for uneven and combined develop-
ment is not where innovations occur but in what places they are implemented. 
Semiperipheral polities have a greater incentive and less disincentive to 
devote resources to new forms of organisation and technology than do most 
core polities. This is what Trotsky referred to as the ‘penalties of priority’ 
whereby earlier developed and dominant states suffer from a certain conser-
vatism in adopting new technological and organisational innovations.
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CoMbINED DEvELoPMENT IN PREHISToRIC CALIfoRNIA
The sedentary foragers of indigenous late prehistoric California provide two 
interesting examples of semiperipheral development in kin-based world-
systems. Indigenous California has been the focus of intensive ethnographic 
studies mapping cultural, linguistic and material characteristics of native 
Californians (Kroeber 1976; Voegelin 1942), and of systematic studies by 
archaeologists (Jones and Klar 2007). In The Wintu and Their Neighbors, 
Chase-Dunn and Mann (1998) presented a study of late prehistoric Northern 
California as a system of interaction networks that linked small-scale polities 
(tribelets) across major linguistic divides. That study revealed that the Northern 
California systemic interaction networks were formed by warfare, trade and 
intermarriage ties that extended for many kilometres around the Sacramento 
River Valley and that linked Northern and Central California into a single 
prestige goods network based on the exchange of clam-shell disk beads. Chase-
Dunn and Lerro (2014) note that the Northern California core/periphery hier-
archy was very slight, but that there was an important degree of core/periphery 
differentiation constituted as interaction between valley-dwellers (Wintu) with 
larger villages and hill-dwellers (Yana) with smaller villages.
Northern California displayed an interestingly different version of what 
some anthropologists (Schneider 1977; Peregrine 1992) have called pres-
tige goods systems. In most prestige goods systems, a local elite used its 
monopoly on the importation of prestige goods to reward and control local 
subalterns. You could not get married if Uncle Joe did not provide you 
with a special kind of pot or other ritually necessary exotic item. In North-
ern California local headmen were the ones who carried out inter-village 
exchange. This interpolity exchange was mainly organised as gift-giving 
among village heads who were competing with one another to establish and 
maintain reputations of generosity. This was not a commodified trading sys-
tem, but this gift-giving was an important institutional substitute for raiding 
during periods of scarcity. These exchange networks were facilitated by the 
use of ‘protomoney’ in the form of clam disk shell beads, a storable symbol 
of value that allowed village headmen to accumulate wealth that could be 
exchanged for food or other goods. This kind of prestige goods system was 
not very hierarchical, but the facilitation of exchange networks across tribelet 
boundaries reduced the impetus to raiding, creating the conditions for greater 
population density and a relatively pacific structure of interpolity interaction. 
So, where is the semiperipheral development in this? It turns out that the 
Pomo, who lived adjacent to Clear Lake in Central California, were the main 
manufacturers of clam disk shell beads. They obtained clam shells by trad-
ing with the Coast Miwok that lived at Bodega Bay and they devoted a large 
amount of family labour time to producing round beads with a hole in them 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   210 7/13/2016   9:56:05 PM
 Uneven and Combined Development of World-Systems 211
for stringing into the ‘protomoney’ that was used in the large down-the-line 
trade network linking Central and Northern California, including the Wintu 
and their neighbours (Vayda 1967). But were the Pomo ‘semiperipheral’ in 
any important sense?
First we shall describe a similar, but also somewhat different, instance of 
this kind of interpolity economic specialisation that existed in late prehistoric 
Southern California. The Chumash were sedentary foragers who lived along 
the Southern California coast in what is now Santa Barbara and Ventura 
Counties. They built and used a distinctive plank canoe (tomol) that allowed 
them to fish offshore and to develop a trade network that linked those living 
on the Northern Channel Islands with the villages on the mainland. The large 
coastal villages were also connected by trade in food items with smaller inland 
villages in the mountains and valleys adjacent to the coast. As population 
increased on the Northern Channel Islands the islanders increasingly special-
ised in the production of olivella shell beads that came to function as proto-
money in a rather large down-the-trade network that linked the Chumash with 
the Yokuts in the San Joaquin Valley and the Gabrieleno (Tongva) peoples in 
what became Los Angeles and Orange Counties. The island Chumash came 
to devote a rather substantial portion of their labour time to the production of 
shell bead money, which gave them something to exchange for food from the 
mainland (Arnold 2004). The natural resources of the islands were somewhat 
depleted by population pressure, which encouraged the islanders to specialise 
in the production of shell beads in order to have something to exchange for 
food from the mainland. Was this semiperipheral development?
As with Northern California, there is no evidence of interpolity exploita-
tion or domination between island and coastal villages. Neither the Pomo 
nor the island Chumash lived in a core/periphery hierarchy in which some 
polities were exploiting and/or dominating other polities. But they did live in 
a situation of core/periphery differentiation—in which systemic interaction 
was occurring among polities with different degrees of population density. 
Studies of village sizes in late prehistoric California show that both the 
Pomo and the island Chumash had villages that were smaller than the village 
sizes that existed in adjacent polities. In Southern California the biggest vil-
lages, and the biggest concentration of villages, were on the mainland coast. 
In Northern California the biggest villages were those of the Patwin in the 
southern Sacramento River Valley (King 1978, 60). The island Chumash 
example also suggests another aspect of semiperipherality. Some natural 
locations contain more resources that are useable to humans than do others. 
One cause of uneven social development is simply the uneven geography 
of natural capital. Core polities are those that occupy the best locations and 
non-core polities occupy less fecund sites. The island Chumash had less 
access to land-based resources such as deer and acorns, than did the mainland 
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Chumash and so their villages were smaller. And the Pomo had less access 
to riverine resources (anadromous fish runs) than did the Patwin who lived 
along the Sacramento River. If these were cases of semiperipheral develop-
ment, the specialised activities of the protomoney manufacturers facilitated 
the emergence and intensification of the interpolity gift exchange network. 
This activity allowed a larger population to live on the islands and facilitated 
a regional world-system that had relatively more peaceful exchange and rela-
tively less warfare.
SEMIPERIPHERAL DEvELoPMENT: 
UPWARD MobILITy AND/oR TRANSfoRMATIoN
Arnold Toynbee (1946) contended that the ecologically marginal locations 
that semiperipheral polities occupy are a motivating factor in their imple-
mentation of risky new technologies and strategies that often cause social 
change. Owen Lattimore (1980) also argued that non-core polities were often 
the source of important investments in new organisational and technological 
innovations. Innovations are often developed within core polities, at central 
nodes in transportation and communications networks, but semiperipheral 
polities are more likely to implement these than core polities are because they 
are less risk averse. Again, this is reminiscent of Trotsky’s concept of ‘penal-
ties of priority’ that afflict older sclerotic core polities.
Geographical unevenness is also important in Patrick Kirch’s (1984) model 
of island settlement and the rise of semiperipheral marcher chiefdoms in the 
Pacific. The first arrivals to an island occupied the best locations with fresh 
water and good soil, usually on the windward side that received the most 
rainfall. Later arrivals populated the less desirable locations and so the coni-
cal clan system of closeness to the ancestors came to match the ecological 
unevenness of the island locations. The oldest, most senior, lineages occupied 
the best locations. But it was usually a junior chief from the leeward side of 
the island that conquered the rest to form an island-wide paramountcy, chang-
ing the scale of political organisation and facilitating greater organisational 
complexity—both upward mobility and transformation.
Semiperipheral capitalist city-states, on the other hand, long performed 
transformation without much upward mobility. These were states out on the 
edge of core regions that specialised in interpolity trade. Most often they 
were maritime enterprises (Dilmun, the Phoenician city-states, Melaka) but 
sometimes they organised trade over land (the Old Assyrian city-state). These 
trading states expanded exchange networks and incentivised the production 
of tradable surpluses since the Bronze Age, but they did not take power in 
the core until a concentration of them in one region, Europe, coincided with 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   212 7/13/2016   9:56:05 PM
 Uneven and Combined Development of World-Systems 213
the relative weakness of tributary empires. As was the case in late prehistoric 
California, the capitalist city-states did not move into the core for a very long 
time, but they did make it possible for larger, more complex and hierarchical 
world-systems to emerge by expanding and intensifying exchange networks.
MARCHER LoRDS
Semiperipheral marcher states—semiperipheral polities that conquer older 
core polities and form larger empire states—are both upwardly mobile and 
transformative. Examples include the Qin dynasty, the Neo-Assyrians, the 
Persians, the Macedonians, the Romans, the Inka and the Aztecs (Inoue et al 
2016). The Akkadian empire is one of the oldest empires produced by a 
conquest of states. Prior to its unification by Sargon of Akkad, the Sumerian 
city-states had existed for well over seven centuries. These city-states inter-
acted through a complex economic network with a definitive core-periphery 
hierarchy. The core had a written language, theocratic government and irri-
gated agriculture. The periphery consisted of pastoralists, horticulturalists and 
specialised quarrying and manufacturing villages. An exchange network is 
known to have existed among the core and peripheral polities with both ‘back-
wash and spread effects’ (Myrdal 1963, 152). If the network dynamic between 
the core cities and the rest of Sumer was mostly a prestige good network 
with the older core dominating most resources, as Friedman and Rowlands 
have claimed (1977), a spread effect would be understandable. However, 
metalworking throughout the Bronze and Iron Ages has been attributed to 
mountain societies. Additionally, some amount of manufacturing occurred 
in the remote villages near large soapstone deposits. Both co-evolution and 
‘the development of underdevelopment’ (Frank 1967) were occurring in the 
Mesopotamian system before the rise of the Akkadian Empire.
Sargon the Great, the eventual conqueror and unifier of the Sumerian 
city-states, was a cupbearer to the king of Kish, one of the core Sumerian 
city-states. Sargon was a servant belonging to a class of Semitic-speaking 
non-Sumerian immigrants who had long been present in the Mesopotamian 
heartland of cities. Sargon was able to unify all of Sumer through a military 
campaign creating a very large empire-state. He was described as a ‘marcher 
lord’ and a pioneer of hegemonic empire (Mann 1986). In chapter 5 of The 
Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann argues that the Akkadians were suc-
cessful in their war effort and at unification of the city-states because they 
combined the Sumerian core-type military strategy (the use of heavy infantry) 
with a pastoralist military technology (composite bows). While the idea that 
Sargon used a combination of core and peripheral organisational and military 
technologies to conquer Sumer has been supported (e.g. Diakonoff 1991; 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   213 7/13/2016   9:56:05 PM
214 Christopher Chase-Dunn and Marilyn Grell-Brisk
Mann 1986), other scholars have proposed other factors such as class and 
ethnic rebellion as having been important to the Akkadian rise (Yoffee 1993).
Typically, polities and interpolity systems cycle through centralisation (by 
conquest or incorporation) and decentralisation resulting from the decline 
of centralised power. When a polity within a region sustains a significant 
increase in size from the largest previous polity size in the region, it is called 
an ‘upsweep’ (Inoue et al. 2010). The Institute for Research on World-
Systems Polities and Settlements (SetPol) Research Working Group at the 
University of California Riverside has quantitatively identified most of the 
major upsweeps in the territorial sizes of polities since the early Bronze Age 
in the world regions in which evidence is available about the changes in the 
territorial sizes of the largest polities. The SetPol Research Working Group 
identified twenty-one such upsweeps in five world regions since the early 
Bronze Age.
We examined these to determine whether or not they were the result of 
semiperipheral marcher conquests (Inoue et al. 2016). We found that over 
half of the polity upsweeps were produced by marcher states from the semi-
periphery (10) or from the periphery (3). This means that the hypothesis of 
semiperipheral development does not explain everything about the events in 
which polity sizes significantly increased in geographical scale, but also that 
the phenomenon of semiperipheral development cannot be ignored in any 
explanation of the long-term trend in the rise of polity sizes.
The semiperipheral capitalist city-states promoted trade and commodifica-
tion for millennia, increasingly linking Afroeurasia into a connected multi-
core world economy. The relative weakness of tributary empires in the West 
in the context of a commodified institutional matrix allowed a strong regional 
trade matrix of autonomous city-states to emerge, and then the emergence of 
larger states that were under the control of capitalists. The rise of the West 
was another instance of uneven and combined development that occurred on 
a promontory of Eurasia.
And the spiral of development within the modern Europe-centred system 
continued to display uneven and combined development. Alexander Anievas 
and Kerem Nişancioğlu (2015) have argued that the developmental trajec-
tory of European capitalism was significantly affected by the thirteenth- to 
fourteenth-century Pax Mongolica. In particular, Europe benefited signifi-
cantly from what Trotsky called ‘the privilege of historic backwardness’. 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015, 87) write, ‘Arising late on the periphery 
of this world-system, European development had the most to gain from the 
new intersocietal links being forged, particularly through the diffusion of 
new technologies and “resource portfolios” spreading from East to West’. 
And all of those capitalist nation states that were forereachers of the emerg-
ing capitalist world-system (the United Provinces of the Netherlands in the 
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seventeenth century, the United Kingdom of Great Britain in the nineteenth 
century and the United States in the twentieth century) were all formerly 
semiperipheral powers who led in the deepening and expansion of capitalist 
economic development. The twentieth-century peasant wars and revolutions 
that challenged the core of the capitalist world-system attained their greatest 
power in semiperipheral Russia and China.
CoNTEMPoRARy SEMIPERIPHERAL DEvELoPMENT
In the contemporary global system, the semiperiphery continues to push 
the boundaries in terms of both upward mobility and innovative systemic 
change. The economic and political development of the semiperipheral 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) represent global chal-
lenges to the centrality of the United States, Europe and Japan. Contemporary 
semiperipheral polities are contributing to social change by implementing 
organizational and ideological forms that facilitate their own upward mobil-
ity and that transform, to some extent, the logics of social reproduction and 
development. The form of state capitalism that has emerged in China con-
tributes a new note to the complex music of the varieties of capitalism in the 
global system. Giovanni Arrighi (2007) contended that the form of Chinese 
diaspora capitalism emerging in East Asia represents a somewhat progres-
sive improvement over the financialised, bellicose and work-destroying 
Western version. Whether or not the Chinese version of foreign investment 
and resource extraction turns out to be better or worse than that of the West is 
still being played out in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America (Bergesen 
2013; Grell-Brisk 2015).
Core–periphery interactions continue to evolve with the development of 
increasingly sophisticated digital and military technologies from the core, and 
organisations and institutions like ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of Our America), the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) from the Asian and Latin American semiperiphery. 
The increasing economic and political power of the semiperipheral challengers 
drives a certain amount of reorganisation of the global political economy. Many 
see US hegemony as being in slow decline and the emergence of the multipolar 
world that the BRICS say that they want (e.g. Chase-Dunn et al. 2011).
It is indisputable that deindustrialisation and financialisation have been 
major trends in core polities since the 1970s. This is most evident in the 
United States, where financialisation has been pushed to its limits and has 
been widely viewed as the main cause of the global economic recession of 
2008. To a lesser extent there has also been a move towards financialisation 
among the semiperipheral polities. Some of the BRICs are becoming wise 
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to the diminishing advantages of rapid export-oriented industrialisation. One 
could go so far as to state that the BRICS are in fact engaging in combined 
development. With its continued focus on economic growth and develop-
ment through manufacturing while concurrently engaging in high finance (as 
with the AIIB), China is a good example of a semiperipheral country that is 
confronting the new twists of globalisation flexibly, combining elements in 
new ways. For instance, China could be seen as engaging in a form of com-
bined development in the management of its economy. The Chinese approach 
has been termed anything from ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’ 
(Yasheng Huang 2008) to ‘state-controlled capitalism’, ‘socialist market 
economy’ and ‘Chinese capitalism’. All these phrases suggest that China has 
combined and applied the different elements of the economies of advanced 
countries to its own socio-historical and political condition.
It has been noted by some scholars that the contemporary semiperipheral 
polities are not hot-beds of progressive revolution or even evolution. The 
‘pink tide’ reaction against neoliberalism in Latin America led by President 
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela spread to most Latin American countries, but not 
to other regions of the world (Chase-Dunn et al. 2015). Many semiperipheral 
countries are under the control of reactionary elements and others are just 
trying to move up the food chain of global capitalism. Patrick Bond’s (2013) 
article in the journal Links goes as far as to call the BRICS sub-imperialist 
powers that peddle and reaffirm neoliberal policies, and that help maintain the 
modern capitalist world-system and its institutional power structures. Bond 
points to, among many things, the numerous corporations such as DeBeers, 
Gencor (later BHP Billiton) and Liberty Life Insurance that benefited from 
South Africa’s financial deregulation and the transition from ‘racial to class 
apartheid’ in the 1990s. Bond also reminds us about Ruy Mauro Marini 
(1972) who developed the concept of sub-imperialism in the 1970s. Marini 
saw Brazil to be the most prominent example of sub-imperialism. He con-
tended that Brazil’s expansionist policy in Latin America and Africa was 
driven by a quest for new markets, an effort to gain control over sources of 
raw materials and was intended to prevent potential competitors from having 
access to such resources.
Bond claims that South Africa has pursued these same kinds of sub-
imperial policies, as have most of the other BRICS. In fact, according to 
Bond, the 2013 BRICS summit held in South Africa declared support for 
corporate land grabs, worsened Africa’s retail-driven de-industrialisation, 
and revived the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) pro-
gramme—the embodiment of neoliberal policies in Africa, and of course, 
the BRICS bank.
Bond is not alone in his view that these semiperipheral polities are mainly 
engaged in propping up the existing power structure. William I. Robinson 
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(2015) decries the state-centric view of now globalised capitalism. He notes 
that the rise of China has been mainly due to foreign investment in manu-
facturing that uses cheap Chinese labour, and he stresses the extent to which 
China is an integrated part of global capitalist accumulation and an impor-
tant player in what he calls an emergent transnational state. Ho-Fung Hung 
(2015a) and S.S. Karatasli and Sefika Kumral (2015) claim that China has 
pursued economic and political policies that primarily maintain the global 
status quo. In a recent New York Times article, Hung (2015b) contends that 
the China-backed AIIB has become a multilateral organisation that can only 
serve to buttress the prevailing global economic structures. Although China 
provided the initial financial support for the AIIB, in order to garner the sup-
port of most of the allies of the United States China had to forgo veto power 
over the actions of the new bank (Wei and Davis 2015). Hung points out that 
US hegemony at its height exerted huge power over the bilateral and multi-
lateral institutions it helped to found after the Second World War. Hung also 
notes that the AIIB’s capacity for influence and power in the global economy 
is limited given its multilateral nature and that it is unlikely to provide China 
with the means to supplant the United States as a global leader.
Still, the extent to which China and/or the other BRICS countries are 
shoring up the current core–periphery hierarchy is a point of contention. 
Bond sees the BRICS as mainly reproducing the hierarchical structures of 
the system because he has another world in mind—an egalitarian, coopera-
tive and sustainable world society. Upward mobility in the system does not 
necessarily challenge the basic logic of the system or reduce its injustices. 
Bond is right about that. But this approach ignores the changes compelled 
by the rise of the BRICS. A shift of economic power away from Europe and 
North America towards the semiperiphery changes the equation with regard 
to global racial stratification. It makes global culture even more multicultural 
than it has previously been. It probably does not lower the magnitude of 
global inequality, because inequality within the BRICS countries has been 
increasing.
The idea that China could replace the United States as a global hegemon 
has been suggested by some scholars (e.g. Frank 1998; 2014; Arrighi 2007b), 
but few now really believe this. The rise of BRICS portends a more multipo-
lar, less US-centric system. That is a big change from what has existed since 
the Second World War. Despite arguments that the AIIB will not help in 
China’s rise to hegemonic power, the bank could serve as a serious alternative 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for develop-
ment funding and foreign aid in the Global South. China has been praised by 
many African governments as being more attuned to the needs of the Global 
South. Writing for the Financial Times in 2008, the President of Senegal, 
Abdoulaye Wade, explained, ‘China’s approach to our needs is simply better 
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adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of 
European investors…. Economic relations are based more on mutual need…. 
[And] China, which has fought its own battles to modernise, has a much 
greater sense of the personal urgency of development in Africa than many 
western nations’ (Wade 2008). The AIIB is in direct competition with the 
World Bank. The semiperipheral and peripheral polities are creating new 
anti-systemic and reformist institutions that facilitate a certain amount of dis-
engagement with the old core. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) 
is intercontinental. The Development Bank of Latin America, the Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the African Development Bank and 
a myriad of other new institutions have been organised in the Global South 
to counter the prevailing global structures of power. The most influential of 
these are those from the semiperiphery such as the NDB and the AIIB. The 
discourse about the need for an alternative to the US dollar in the global 
economy continues to persist. The dollar alternative issue may become more 
feasible if AIIB and NDB grow in size and influence despite the arguments 
made by Hung (2015a) and Bond (2013a; 2013b).
Many people in the Global South, especially the urban poor, have been 
under siege from the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal structural 
adjustment programmes of the IMF. The imposed structural adjustment pro-
grammes have been very unpopular and have not resulted in improved lives 
for the vast majority of people. This has resulted in populist reactions in many 
semiperipheral and peripheral states. The World Social Forum emerged in 
2001 as a popular response to neoliberal policies. The semiperiphery, where 
so many of the impacts of neoliberal policies have been felt, has nurtured 
this kind of anti-systemic thinking. With its history of uneven and combined 
development and empowering transnational social movements, the semiper-
iphery has the potential to reshape the trajectory of global system.
NoTE
1. Thanks to Dmytro Khutkyy for helpful criticisms and suggestions on an earlier 
version.
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Chapter 13
Navigating Non-Eurocentrism and 
Trotskyist Integrity in the New 
Trotskyist IR of World History
John M. Hobson
This chapter will hone in on the problems of Eurocentrism and potential 
ahistoricism that infect parts of the New Trotskyist International Relations 
(NTIR); an exciting approach (or more precisely a variety of approaches), 
which has emerged in the last decade within the discipline of IR.1 These range 
from the orthodox approaches advanced by the likes of Neil Davidson (2009) 
and Sam Ashman (2010) to the more unorthodox approaches advanced by the 
likes of Justin Rosenberg (2006; 2007; 2008; 2010), Kamran Matin (2007; 
2012; 2013a; 2013c), Alexander Anievas (2014a), Kerem Nişancioğlu (2014) 
as well as Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2014; 2015), Robbie Shilliam (2009a, 
2009b) and Cemal Burak Tansel (2015). Probably the key pioneer of this 
unorthodox approach is Justin Rosenberg. The immediate difference between 
the orthodox and unorthodox approaches concerns the scope or depth of the 
historical terrain that is broached. The former tends to focus on the period of 
British industrialisation and its aftermath, whereas the latter works on a much 
deeper world-historical terrain that goes back before the period of Western 
European industrialisation and, at least in Rosenberg’s work (2010; and this 
volume), reaches all the way back to Ancient Sumer (3,500 BCE). Rosenberg 
is currently working on a book-length treatment of this project, the findings of 
which are likely to be really exciting as this could well open up a genuinely 
original take on both IR and world history.
However, my twin-primary concern in this chapter is not simply to inter-
rogate the scope of the historical terrain analysed but to consider the issue 
of Eurocentrism/non-Eurocentrism, on the one hand, and whether non-
Eurocentric Trotskyism retains or breaks with Trotsky’s original conception 
of uneven and combined development, on the other; something that for the 
sake of convenience I will refer to as ‘Trotskyist integrity’. I ask the latter 
question precisely because many orthodox Trotskyists might well assume 
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that applying uneven and combined development (UCD) to the pre-industrial 
era to effect a non-Eurocentric break with Eurocentric Trotskyism inherently 
breaks with Trotskyist integrity (e.g. Ashman 2010; Davidson 2009). But a 
primary upshot of my reading of the key non-Eurocentric works is that it is 
perfectly possible to apply UCD to the pre-industrial era in a non-Eurocentric 
manner while retaining Trotskyist integrity, for pre-industrial whips of exter-
nal necessity took largely different forms to that which prevailed after British 
industrialisation.
To be more specific, there are several key claims that I advance in this 
chapter. First, those neo-Trotskyists in IR who contend that UCD is unique 
to the post-industrial era tend to fall into the trap of Eurocentrism. This is in 
essence because they treat the ‘original’ transition to capitalism in Europe 
as a wholly intra-European phenomenon—or put differently, as a ‘virginal 
birth’ or ‘European miracle’ (see Hobson 2011). By contrast, those who 
depict the existence of UCD as preceding industrialisation are capable of 
avoiding Eurocentrism in that they factor in non-Western influences in the 
rise of capitalism in Europe or equally when explaining the political devel-
opment of non-Western countries—specifically Iran in Matin’s work (2007; 
2013c). This leads onto a second core claim which derives from an initial 
conundrum: the question as to whether one has to negate Trotskyist integrity 
in order to transcend Trotskyist Eurocentrism. For the orthodox approach 
insists that UCD is unique to the post-industrialisation era such that this 
process did not properly exist prior to then (and while I recognise that the 
orthodox Trotskyist approach deployed by Neil Davidson (2003) highlights 
an earlier instantiation of UCD this is confined to the specific case of Scotland 
in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, therefore, the role of 
UCD in the context of the non-Western world remains out of bounds).2
Trotsky essentially argued that the capitalist mode of production is respon-
sible for ushering in the full logic of UCD. By contrast, the non-Eurocentric 
approach, which narrates the existence of UCD in the pre-industrial era, 
necessarily undermines the unique relationship that UCD has with the capi-
talist mode of production that Trotsky largely imbibed it with, leading to the 
question as to whether it has broken with Trotskyist integrity in advancing 
its non-Eurocentrism. But, as alluded to already, because this logic takes 
slightly different forms in the pre-industrial era then this poses no major prob-
lem in terms of retaining Trotskyist integrity. Either way, though, the core 
ramification is that the perceived gap which is thought to exist between these 
two wings of Trotskyism is much narrower than is commonly presupposed, 
thereby suggesting that the quest for a non-Eurocentric Trotskyism is nowhere 
near as fraught with the theoretical dangers that orthodox Trotskyists imagine.
The chapter proceeds through four sections. In the first section I outline 
the essential Eurocentric properties of the orthodox neo-Trotskyist approach 
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to IR. The second section then considers the efforts of Alexander Anievas 
to advance a non-Eurocentric approach in his seminal prize-winning 2014 
book, while the third section does the same for the equally seminal work that 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu have jointly undertaken on the rise of the West. The 
fourth section examines the pioneering efforts of Kamran Matin to break with 
Eurocentrism, focussing specifically on his 2013 book on Iran. In each of 
these sections I shall argue that when non-Eurocentrism is achieved it is done 
in such a way as to retain Trotskyist integrity. And finally, in the Conclusion 
I claim that while the presence of UCD can certainly be accounted for in 
the pre-industrial era, nevertheless, in agreement with Matin, Anievas and 
Nişancioğlu, it takes on largely different forms to that of the modern era.
PRobLEMATISING THE HISToRICAL TEMPoRALITy 
of UCD AND THE PRobLEM of EURoCENTRISM
Within the neo-Trotskyist approaches that have emerged in the last decade in 
IR an internecine debate quickly followed concerning the issue of the tem-
porality of UCD. This was largely prompted by concerns with Rosenberg’s 
seminal effort to extrapolate the concept of UCD back in time, well before 
the Western industrial-temporal watershed. To this end the more orthodox 
Trotskyists, following Trotsky (1967) in this matter, insist that UCD only 
cuts in across the international system once capitalism has emerged in 
Western Europe.3 Neil Davidson, for example, asserts that ‘[t]he immense 
difference between industrial capitalism and previous modes of produc-
tion meant that, from the moment the former was introduced, combination 
became possible in a way that it had not been hitherto’ (Davidson 2009, 
18). Similarly, Sam Ashman insists that UCD should be used sparingly and 
should be applied only within the temporal confines of the last few hundred 
years of world history in which industrial capitalism has predominated. As 
she puts it:
[a] danger with Rosenberg’s analysis of uneven and combined development 
as a transhistoric phenomenon is that it loses sight of the ‘great transforma-
tion’ brought about by capitalist relations and political forms…. [UCD] is not 
a theory of the initial or first transition to capitalism, but of ‘late’ capitalist 
development—that is, of development which occurs in the context, and perhaps 
also as a consequence, of capitalism’s pre-existence elsewhere. Once capital 
exists in one small corner of north-western Europe, development for all others 
is immediately transformed. (Ashman 2010, 184, 194)
However, Ashman’s point that UCD does not apply to the ‘original’ birth of 
capitalism, which she assumes occurred spontaneously in Britain, constitutes 
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the problem that comprises the tip of a very large, submerged Eurocentric 
iceberg. Because I have discussed all this elsewhere (Hobson 2011), I will 
move quickly here in making my point.
The orthodox Trotskyist point that the phenomenon of UCD is unique to 
the post-industrial moment represents an ‘ultra-historicist’ reading that buys 
into what I call the Eurocentric ‘big bang theory’ of world politics (BBT). 
This is a two-step narrative of world politics wherein the first step Europe 
makes itself is through the Eurocentric logic of immanence as a result of its 
own exceptional qualities. That is, Europe is viewed as sui generis such that 
it is not merely self-constituting but that it is capable of self-generated or 
independent auto-development. Given its exceptionalism so it is presumed 
that the breakthrough to capitalist industrialisation was an historical inevi-
tability and that this outcome was always immanent within Europe’s social 
structure; that it was pre-ordained or foretold. In such a way, the transition 
to capitalism within Western Europe is portrayed in effect as a ‘European 
miracle’ or as a miraculous virgin birth. Moreover, according to Karl Marx, 
Europe’s self-generating dynamic is considered to be exceptional on the 
grounds that no such autonomous development into modernity was possible 
in the (unexceptional) East, where the Asiatic mode of production ensured 
that economic development is strangled at birth, owing to the economically 
repressive Oriental despotic nature of Eastern states (Hobson 2012, 52–58; 
see also O’Leary 1989; Turner 1978; Said 1978/2003). Interestingly, my 
critique of this Eurocentric problematique of development dovetails with 
that of Rosenberg’s (2010) when he argues that the problem with tradi-
tional social theory is that it falls into the trap of ontological singularity 
(i.e., methodological nationalism) and fails to recognise the ‘international’ 
origins of domestic social change/development (even if he largely shies 
away from deploying the term ‘Eurocentric’). All in all, in Eurocentrism 
no external non-Western influences are considered to play a part in the rise 
of Europe.
The second step of the BBT flows on ineluctably, for having made itself in 
the absence of any external help or pressures, and having risen to the top of 
the world distribution of power, Europe subsequently projects its global polit-
ical will-to-power through formal imperialism in the first instance and infor-
mal imperialist globalisation in the second in order to remake the world—so 
far as is possible—in its own image. So to summarise the metaphor: with 
the ‘big bang of modernity’ having spontaneously exploded within Europe, 
the new social and political Western structure of power expands or diffuses 
outwards to remake the earthly universe. Key here is the orthodox Trotsky-
ist emphasis on the emergence of UCD following British industrialisation, 
whereby all non-Western societies are forced to catch up with the West 
primarily so that they can militarily defend themselves from the impact of 
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Western neo-imperial rapaciousness; an argument that is central to Trotsky’s 
explanation (1967) of Tsarist industrialisation after 1861.
Regardless as to whether this marks a ‘realist moment’ or not (a problem 
which opens up a separate debate),4 the key point is that because the global 
logic of UCD follows Western European industrialisation we are left with an 
approach that reconvenes the familiar properties of the standard Eurocentric 
explanation of the rise of the West. That is, the complete absence of non-
Western influences in the rise of the West—and hence the impossibility of 
Europe’s ability to combine with non-Western developmental initiatives—
means logically that the West broke through spontaneously into modernity as 
a result of its own exceptional properties (see Hobson 2011; Bhambra 2011). 
Or, put differently, precisely because the intersocietal logic that underpins 
Trotsky’s concept of UCD is absent in the account of the rise of the West so 
the breakthrough can be explained through the standard endogenous intra-
European ontology that is the hallmark of Eurocentrism. Thus, when Ashman 
(2010, 189) concludes that only ‘once capitalism is established [spontane-
ously] in one part of the world [i.e., north-western Europe], it affects and 
changes the form of transition to capitalist development elsewhere’ so, in 
refusing to apply the concept of UCD to the so-called ‘original transition’ to 
capitalism, Europe is deemed ipso facto to be sui generis, developing accord-
ing to the Eurocentric logic of immanence that presupposes the assumption of 
European exceptionalism. In this way, I argue that orthodox neo-Trotskyism, 
as does its liberal counterpart, narrates not so much the rise of the West but 
the Eurocentric Ruse of the West.
However, an unorthodox neo-Trotskyist approach has also emerged that 
seeks in various ways, either implicitly (as in Rosenberg) or explicitly (as in 
Matin, Anievas and Nişancioğlu), to break with this Eurocentric problema-
tique, above all, by bringing the logic of UCD squarely into the explanation 
of the original transition. In essence, some of the scholars working within this 
approach might well appear to be breaking the original Trotskyist Gordian 
Knot that ties UCD with the post-industrialisation phase by advancing the 
idea that UCD not only preceded, but was constitutive of, the rise of modern 
European industrial capitalism. This, I believe, is a fundamental requirement 
of a properly non-Eurocentric approach, Trotskyist or otherwise. In what 
follows I shall consider the most prominent recent publications of those neo-
Trotskyist writers who have sought to break with Eurocentrism, beginning 
with a reading of Anievas’s 2014 book before proceeding onto the work that 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2013; 2015) have done in terms of applying UCD 
to the rise of the West, closing with a reading of Matin’s 2013 book on Iran. 
So to reiterate the key questions posed earlier: how effective are these inter-
ventions in breaking with Eurocentrism on the one hand and to what extent 
do they retain Trotskyist integrity on the other?
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ALExANDER ANIEvAS’S CAPITAL, THE STATE, AnD 
WAr: A NoN-EURoCENTRIC bRIDGE Too fAR?
Anievas’s seminal and indeed excellent book, Capital, the State, and War, 
parries with the problem of Eurocentrism in world politics. However, it 
is important to note at the outset a certain temporal disjuncture that this 
book creates with respect to the argument that I made above. For this book 
considers the 1914–1945 era and therefore does not seek to extrapolate 
the concept of UCD back before the moment of British industrialisation 
(whereas the writings that I examine in the subsequent two sections all go 
back before 1700). I mention this because this book offers a potential break 
with Eurocentrism even though it focuses on the post-1850 era, thereby in 
turn suggesting that a non-Eurocentric Trotskyism does not have to go back 
in time before industrialisation.
One of the themes of the book is to restore what Anievas calls ‘the lost 
history and theory of IR’:
[f]oregrounding the ineluctably intertwined and co-constitutive nature of impe-
rial rivalries, social revolutions, and anti-colonial struggles evident to policy-
makers during the decades of crisis but subsequently lost in academic analyses, 
the study seeks to demonstrate how standard interpretations and assumptions 
about the period have been incomplete and often mistaken. (Anievas 2014a, 2)
This involves the inclusion of processes that are specific both to Marxism and 
to non-Eurocentrism. While I want to argue that retrieving such a lost history 
contains many important cues for a non-Eurocentric approach, ultimately 
delivering on this promised theoretical mission constitutes a bridge too far in 
this book. For what is missing is a sufficient account of non-Western agency, 
given that the European theatre of action and European agency constitute the 
central analytical gaze.
Chapter 3, which looks at the uneven and combined developmental ori-
gins of the First World War, opens with a promising insight with regards to 
non-Eurocentrism. There he sets out to examine three spatial vectors; first, 
a West-East plane of unevenness which looks at the successive phases of 
industrialisation mainly within Europe but also beyond; second, a transat-
lantic vector that links North America with Europe in general and the British 
Empire in particular; and third, a North–South vector/constellation interlink-
ing and differentiating the multi-ethnic empires from Central and Eastern 
Europe to the Asia Pacific (especially India and China) into a dynamic of 
asymmetrical interdependency with the capital-industrial powers. He then 
proceeds to consider the role of the Ottoman Empire in the causes of the 
First World War, focussing specifically on the issue of Ottoman decline. His 
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argument is that in the face of superior Western economic and military power 
the Ottoman Empire was unable to respond in an effective way such that its 
subsequent disintegration phase led to the problem of ‘blocked development’. 
The Ottoman Empire then became immersed in the Balkans War; something 
which constituted a direct prelude to August 1914. But for Anievas, the real 
significance of the retreat of the declining Ottoman Empire is that it created 
a vacuum into which various European powers flowed; in particular, the out-
ward expansion of the aggressive Magyar nobility of the Hungarian half of 
Austria-Hungary, which now came to be a crucial player in Central Eastern 
Europe and, moreover, following the 1878 Berlin Conference, Austria-
Hungary came to govern over the provinces inhabited by Croatians, Serbians 
and Muslims. As Anievas put it:
A further consequence of the Habsburg’s eastward drive was the conclusion 
of the Dual Alliance of 1879 contributing to closer Franco-Russian relations. 
Though originally conceived as a defensive strategy by Bismarck, the alli-
ance over time turned into yet another factor undermining international order. 
(Anievas 2014a, 93)
The Hungarian nobility’s aggressive policy of Magyarisation poisoned 
Austria-Hungary’s relations with its southern neighbours which also fed into 
the causes of the First World War. However, the problem here is that the 
Ottoman Empire in effect is treated as a passive arena rather than a pro-active 
agent such that what matters most are the actions of the European powers and 
subsequent changes in the balance of power that in turn led onto the inception 
of the First World War.
While Anievas also seeks to bring India and China into the analysis in his 
quest for a non-Eurocentric set of causes of the First World War, neverthe-
less a similar Eurocentric trope is applied here. Thus with the opening up 
of a massive power disparity between Europe and India/China, on the one 
hand, and the absolute decline of both these non-Western societies, on the 
other, so this led onto the restructuring of the direction and dynamics of inter-
imperial rivalries between the European great powers. The Chinese power 
vacuum sucked Russia in and thereby re-channelled the direction of Russian 
imperialism, while simultaneously effecting a partial alleviation of European 
rivalries in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, this also served 
to relieve the tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia and enabled an 
entente in 1897 to secure the Balkan status quo, while also enabling a kind 
of ultra-imperialist moment of European great power cooperation through 
its collective intervention in the Boxer Rebellion. And finally, the decline of 
the Qing effectively sucked Russia into war with Japan over Manchuria that 
led to Russia’s humiliating defeat which, in turn, led onto the 1905 Russian 
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revolution while simultaneously effecting a westward shift of Russian for-
eign policy. Accordingly, he concludes (2014, 95), ‘the disintegrating Qing 
Dynasty effected a dramatic reconfiguration of the European balance of 
power’. But while this analysis does indeed chart the relevance of a North–
South vector in the analysis of the causes of the First World War, neverthe-
less it is the case that once again the actions of the European great powers 
remain central to Anievas’s narrative, with the decline of China, India and 
the Ottoman Empire constituting, in effect, passive backdrops to the headlin-
ing story of European agency.5 In essence, non-Western agency in its own 
right is effectively ruled out of the analysis, thereby reconvening the standard 
strictures of a Eurocentric approach, even if the spatial terrain has been most 
usefully extended beyond the limited confines of Europe in the explanation 
of the origins of the First World War.
There are various other aspects concerning the issue of Eurocentrism, 
though because these have been developed elsewhere in some detail (Hobson 
2016), I shall confine my discussion to a few points. First, while Anievas 
makes a compelling case for including the ‘Bolshevik threat’ when analysing 
the inter-war period nevertheless the omission of non-Western agency con-
stitutes a Eurocentric lacuna. While he is surely correct to highlight the issue 
that the Bolshevik threat constituted in the minds of Western state leaders, 
I argue that they were at least as worried by the ‘Eastern threat’. Year 1919 
was a significant moment, not just concerning Versailles and the fear over 
the Russian Revolution, but also because it was this very year when the 
anti-imperialist movements across the colonial world burst onto the scene of 
global politics. For the first time Western hegemony in the world appeared 
to be under direct threat. Moreover, this intersected with Versailles and the 
Bolshevik Revolution. For it was Vladimir Lenin, more so than Woodrow 
Wilson, who made so much of the idea of self-determination for the colo-
nial societies, given that Wilson’s pronouncements applied only to Eastern 
Europe and even then he later expressed regret that he had articulated the 
idea given the fillip that it had provided for the anti-imperialist nationalist 
cause; and in any case, Wilson was a keen supporter of the League of Nations 
Mandate System which allowed for the continuation of Western imperialism 
(see Hobson 2012, 167–75; Levin 1973; Ambrosius 2002; Seymour 2012). 
Thus whether Bolshevism was viewed in Lord Milner’s terms as ‘the great-
est danger of the civilized world’ as Anievas insists (2014a, 131), is a moot 
point given that many Westerners, whether they be IR scholars such as Alfred 
Zimmern and Gilbert Murray or political representatives at Versailles such as 
Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, Billy Hughes and Lord Robert Cecil, viewed 
the ‘Eastern (anti-colonial) threat’ that emerged with a vengeance in 1919 
as a colossal challenge to Western hegemony and white racial supremacy 
(Hobson 2012, chapter 7); notwithstanding the point that the Bolshevik and 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   226 7/13/2016   9:56:06 PM
 Navigating Non-Eurocentrism and Trotskyist Integrity 227
‘Eastern’ threats tended to be treated holistically as a combined twin-threat in 
the minds of many Westerners.
Thus in Anievas’s narrative we encounter an uneven treatment of the 
North-South vector. For its presence in the pre-1914 era is inversely related 
to its exclusion concerning the inter-war period. Once again, then, this returns 
us to the Eurocentric problem that was highlighted above in that it is the 
European arena which is treated as the real theatre of agency. This is perplex-
ing because Japan was a formative actor in the Second World War and, of 
course, its invasion of Pearl Harbor in 1941 was a key factor that brought the 
United States into the war and thereby changed its dynamic altogether. And 
as even Niall Ferguson (2009) argues, arguably the Second World War began 
with the war between China and Japan in 1937. Thus the omission of the 
North–South vector is doubly perplexing given that it could be such a fruitful 
area of analysis both for a non-Eurocentric approach, on the one hand, and as 
a means to flesh out his important conceptual analysis of the development of 
world politics, on the other. And to sum up the overall discussion I conclude 
that while Anievas makes a bold attempt at bridging Europe with Asia in a 
non-Eurocentric way, nevertheless in the end it seems that arriving at the non-
Eurocentric promised land constitutes a bridge too far. That said, though, as 
I argue in the next section, Anievas’s work on the rise of the West does suc-
ceed in delivering on his non-Eurocentric promise, though the question then 
becomes whether he has had to sacrifice Trotskyist integrity in the process.
ALExANDER ANIEvAS AND kEREM NIşANCIoğLU’S 
WoRk oN THE ‘RISE of THE WEST’: bUILDING A 
NoN-EURoCENTRIC bRIDGE of THE WoRLD
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, one of the key ways in which 
the non-Eurocentric agenda within neo-Trotskyist IR is being advanced 
is via the location of the process of UCD in the pre-industrial era. To this 
end, Anievas and Nişancioğlu have developed a framework for rethinking 
the rise of Western capitalism in a global context. Here I examine two of 
their journal articles (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013; Nişancioğlu 2014), 
and I also draw on their excellent 2015 book, How the West Came to Rule 
(Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015). Their essential strategy is effectively to get 
behind the moment when UCD is conventionally thought to have cut in by 
making the claim that the rise of Western capitalism can only be understood 
through the application of UCD in various non-Western contexts. Given that 
my own work is situated within a non-Eurocentric problematique and given 
its many similarities with the recent work of Anievas and Nişancioğlu (see 
Hobson 2004; 2011), I might be forgiven for applauding their efforts in this 
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regard and for declaring that they have indeed succeeded in advancing a non-
Eurocentric approach! Nevertheless, the issue at stake is whether they have 
thrown the Trotskyist-baby out with the Eurocentric bathwater by insisting 
that the existence of various external whips of necessity pre-date the era of 
capitalist industrialisation. Here it seems to me that in advancing a more 
nuanced analysis of pre-industrial UCD they have succeeded in retaining 
Trotskyist integrity.
In their 2013 article, they set out the strictures of a non-Eurocentric 
approach, critiquing orthodox Marxism, found for example in the work of 
Robert Brenner, for its internalist approach that they rightly see as symptom-
atic of Eurocentrism (see also Blaut 2000, 45–72; Bhambra 2007, chapter 6; 
Tansel 2015; Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, chapter 2). For as I have also 
argued, Eurocentrism focuses on the ‘exceptionalism’ of Europe and it is 
this that generates the idea of the Eurocentric ‘logic of immanence’ wherein 
the breakthrough into modernity is seen as but an historical inevitability as 
a result of Europe’s innate ability to self-generate into capitalist modernity 
(Hobson 2004, chapter 1). And they rightly point out that only by factoring 
in externalist logics that are issued from the non-Western world can we begin 
to overcome Eurocentrism. In their explanation of the rise of Europe they 
focus on three extra-European sources in the origins of the rise of the West: 
the benefits of the Mongol Empire and the unintended consequences of the 
Black Death (wherein the bubonic plague was transmitted along the sinews 
of this empire); the enabling effects of the Americas; and the enabling and 
constraining effects of the Ottoman Empire. I shall take each briefly in turn.
The Mongols were important, they argue, in that they unified the Eurasian 
economy thereby enabling trade to diffuse all the way across from China in 
the East to Europe in the West. Indeed, the Pax Mongolica provided a con-
ducive environment not just for the diffusion of long-distance trade but also 
for the diffusion of the more advanced non-Western ideas, institutions and 
technologies from East to West. This interconnected space, however, exhib-
ited a proliferation of different modes of production: the tributary mode in 
the east, nomadic in the Steppes and feudalism in Europe. But each society’s 
conditions of existence were imbricated in this nascent interdependence that 
the Pax Mongolica enabled (see Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, chapter 3). 
Accordingly, they argue that nomadic expansionism constituted an archaic 
form of UCD, which in turn enabled the development of Europe via the fil-
lip that enhanced inter-continental trade provided (though simultaneously it 
impeded growth in China).
They also focus on the effects of the spread of the Black Death. The origins 
of the bubonic plague stem back to China (in 1331), before it diffused across 
to Christendom courtesy of the trade routes that were stimulated by the Pax 
Mongolica. When the plague hit Christendom it had a major transformative 
Anievas & Matin_9781783486816.indb   228 7/13/2016   9:56:06 PM
 Navigating Non-Eurocentrism and Trotskyist Integrity 229
impact, serving to raise wages (given the decimation of the working popu-
lation) and shifting social relations towards the peasants. The seigniorial 
reaction that this prompted differed across Christendom. In contrast to the 
situation in France where the state sided with the peasantry as part of its 
efforts to enhance its power vis-à-vis the landlords, nevertheless in England, 
where the state was much more intimately tied in with the aristocracy, the 
latter was able to consolidate and enclose peasant landholdings thereby pro-
moting the development of market forces and agrarian capitalism. And here 
they mention a point that they develop later: that England’s isolation from the 
geopolitical turmoil of the continent enabled the consolidation and unification 
of the state and ruling class (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, chapter 4).
They also develop an argument that narrates the transatlantic sources of 
European capitalism, all of which is most useful and none of which I find 
problematic so far as a non-Eurocentric approach is concerned (Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu 2015, 97–100). The key point is that the Americas, in their 
argument, constitute an enabling force for the advancement of European 
development. Here, however, I shall consider and interrogate the third vector 
that they emphasise: Ottoman/Habsburg rivalry during the Long Sixteenth 
Century. The Ottoman Empire was heavily imbricated within the ‘European’ 
balance of power, serving ultimately to prevent a Habsburg unification of 
Christendom thereby enabling the reproduction of a pluralist multiple-polity 
system. Here special emphasis is accorded to the origins of capitalism in 
England. Specifically, they argue that in strong contrast to much of the 
continent, England enjoyed a buffer from the Ottoman military threat such 
that this ‘breathing space’ enabled an unprecedented coherence of English 
customs, laws and the market. Coupled with the point that this buffer enabled 
the English state to avoid building a large standing army meant that the 
aristocracy could concentrate on commercial activities rather than providing 
military service. Here it is also worth noting Nişancioğlu’s argument that it 
was the Ottoman ‘whip of necessity’ which socialised and conditioned the 
development of English capitalism (2014, 344–6).
The key question that all this throws up is whether this argument breaks 
with, or retains, Trotskyist integrity. I shall take each of the different argu-
ments in turn. First, they claim in effect that the impact of the Mongol Empire 
was double-edged. Thus, so far as the Pax Mongolica provided a conducive 
environment within which transcontinental trade could flourish, coupled with 
its ability to diffuse non-Western inventions from the East to West, so it con-
stituted a kind of helping or enabling hand that comprised the antithesis of the 
external geopolitical whip of necessity; or what in their book they refer to as 
a ‘gift of external opportunity’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 73, 76). How-
ever, they also focus on the impact of the spread of the Bubonic Plague which, 
inter alia, provided a permissive environment for the rise of English agrarian 
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capitalism. This, once again, points to an enabling external hand rather than 
an external whip of geopolitical necessity. Finally, they focus on the impact 
of the Ottoman Empire wherein the first instance, the fact that its place in the 
European state system prevented the latter’s transcendence by a Habsburg 
suzerainty once again equates the Ottoman impact with a helping hand, since 
the maintenance of the anarchic European system was conducive to the later 
development of capitalism. Finally, it is clear that it was the very absence 
of an Ottoman whip of external necessity that enabled the development of 
English capitalism. Moreover, they argue that across much of the continent, 
where the Ottoman whip of external necessity did cut in, the development 
of capitalism was stifled. This seems to be precisely the inverse logic to that 
which we would expect from an approach which seeks to place the Ottoman 
whip-hand at the centre of the causal origins of agrarian capitalism in 
England. For despite Nişancioğlu’s (2014, 333) insistence that ‘[t]he various 
forms of unevenness entailed both an Ottoman “whip of external necessity” 
and a European “privilege of backwardness” which I argue were crucial pre-
conditions for the eventual emergence of capitalism within Europe’, it seems 
clear that it was precisely its absence that accounts for the English transition.
However, it would be unfair to entirely dismiss their brave efforts at dem-
onstrating the presence of an Ottoman whip of external necessity in particular 
and various geopolitical whips more generally as existing in the pre-British 
industrial era. To this end the following claims are significant. First, the 
Ottoman whip enabled the development of European agrarian capitalism as 
a necessary but not sufficient condition because it redirected the geopolitical 
centre of gravity away from England and, equally, the Dutch in their break-
away from the Habsburgs. So, while English development did not, in this 
sense, constitute a fully combined development, the argument they make 
in the book is that it was rather a particular outcome of combined develop-
ment: ‘the developmental outcomes of an intersocietal condition rooted in 
the uneven relation of England to the Euro-Ottoman geopolitical milieu’ 
(Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 119). Second, they show in their book 
the effects of the Ottoman whip in provoking a structural shift away from 
traditional Mediterranean trade routes towards the Atlantic which thereby 
provided immense economic opportunities for North-Western states (notably 
the Dutch and English). And, furthermore, that Ottoman geopolitical policies 
both intentionally and unintentionally proved a crucial contributing factor in 
the origins and expansion of the Reformation throughout Europe. In addition, 
they argue that the geopolitical whip of external necessity was crucial to both 
the making of the Dutch Revolt and the English Civil Wars/Glorious Revolu-
tion—both of which, of course, preceded British industrialisation by almost 
two centuries. Moreover, in chapter 7 in their discussion of Dutch colonisa-
tion in South Asia, they reveal the geopolitical and commercial rivalries (i.e. 
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the whip) among the Portuguese, English and Dutch in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, which drove Dutch merchants to increasingly take control 
over the production process in the colonies and southern India, thus leading 
to the transformation of extant social relations in a capitalist direction. These 
are all significant instantiations of geopolitical pressures, though it is notable 
that they do not conform to the precise Trotskyist definition of the whip of 
external necessity insofar as they were regional rather than fully global.
However, this opens up the point that UCD is multi-factored, sometimes 
comprising an external whip of geopolitical necessity (especially after 
the British industrial revolution) and at other times comprising largely an 
enabling logic (as is often the case before British industrialisation). This 
is reinforced in the conclusion to their book where they suggest that there 
were huge differences in the forms that UCD take over time. That is, UCD 
articulates differentially across time and across modes of production. They, 
correctly in my view, concede that UCD takes on its most intensive form once 
European capitalism has emerged, thereby confirming the orthodox Trotsky-
ist position. Poignantly, they claim with respect to pre-industrial UCD that 
‘[t]he external pressures did not systematically require societies to take on 
the developmental achievements of more advanced societal forms. However, 
such intersocietal pressures did necessitate changes in the social reproduction 
of societies’ (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 101). All of which means that 
we need to think not simply about ‘uneven development’ but also about how 
the combination process and the ‘whip of external necessity’ are themselves 
deeply uneven processes that articulate differentially in different eras. Or, to 
paraphrase Trotsky (1970, 15), we need to recognise that combined ‘historical 
development of different countries and continents is itself uneven’.
All in all, I conclude that their more careful empirical treatment of pre-
industrial UCD suggests that they have in fact produced a fascinating and 
viable neo-Trotskyism which simultaneously breaks fundamentally with 
Eurocentrism. That their arguments are not only insightful, with which I am 
in full agreement I might add, but also they are in my view to be congratu-
lated for a superb achievement.
MATIN’S rECASTIng IrAnIAn MoDErnITy: 
A NoN-EURoCENTRIC APPRoACH To UCD 
THAT RETAINS TRoTSkyIST INTEGRITy
Matin’s Recasting Iranian Modernity is the first neo-Trotskyist IR book-
length treatment that explores non-Eurocentric world history, simultaneously 
spanning the pre-industrialisation era and the period that concludes at the end 
of the twentieth century. Unlike the other books and articles discussed above, 
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this one traces UCD as a key socialising phenomenon in both the modern 
(post-1850) and pre-modern eras. Picking up on the point above concerning 
the nature of UCD in the pre-modern era, Matin posits an interesting claim. 
As noted above, Anievas and Nişancioğlu suggest that while UCD was 
indeed important in the pre-modern era nevertheless its constraining intensity 
was of a much lower scale to that which is associated with modern capitalism. 
Matin, though also insistent that UCD operates before European industrialisa-
tion, poses this problem in the following way:
In the pre-capitalist epoch … uneven and combined development occurs within 
an international context where in the absence of a globally dominant capitalist 
logic, the interactive nature of unevenness does not regularly generate forms of 
combined development that involve a fundamental transformation of the social 
fabric of the interacting polities. In other words, general reproductive processes 
of the interactive societies do not undergo qualitative change. (Matin 2013c, 29)
In thereby retaining a good deal of Trotskyist integrity from the outset by 
refusing to extrapolate back in time the precise nature of modern capitalist 
UCD, he prefers to talk about the pre-modern process of geopolitical rather 
than capitalist accumulation. The key difference between modern and pre-
modern UCD is that in the latter case societies are largely similar in economic 
terms (contra Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2013; 2015) but politically differenti-
ated. Thus, the process of UCD applies mainly at the political level, leading 
to what he calls ‘amalgamated state-formations’. Of particular interest here, 
however, is his claim that this should not be understood as meaning that pre-
capitalist forms of combined development are of lesser historical significance 
than capitalist ones. While this is an important point that reinforces the per-
tinence of the existence of UCD prior to the temporal watershed of c.1850, 
nevertheless an orthodox Trotskyist might well rest assured safe in the knowl-
edge that the primacy of UCD and the unique existence of the whip of exter-
nal capitalist-geopolitical necessity in the modern capitalist era remains intact 
owing to the fact that it is modes of production (rather than political modes of 
domination) under conditions of economic unevenness that lie at the core of 
their preferred conception of UCD. In short, nothing that Matin argues about 
pre-industrial UCD disturbs orthodox Trotskyist integrity.
One of the favoured old chestnuts of Marxism lies in the fetishised concep-
tion of the ‘bourgeois revolution’. Matin certainly breathes fresh critical life 
into this concept by departing from the standard internalist, methodological 
nationalist approach that is offered by the vast majority of Marxists. Chapter 
3 hones in on what he refers to as the Iranian ‘revolution of backwardness’ via 
his analysis of the Constitutional Revolution (1906–1911). Taking on those 
Marxists who relate this in terms of (albeit an abortive) bourgeois revolution 
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he shows how Iran lacked the existence of a sufficiently strong bourgeoi-
sie at the time. Instead, he argues that this revolution reflected the process 
of ‘defensive accumulation’ and ‘defensive modernization’, which was a 
response to Iran’s backwardness in the face of external capitalist-geopolitical 
pressures under conditions of uneven and combined development. This led 
to a peculiar amalgamation wherein this revolution modernised Iran’s politi-
cal structure via the adoption of a written constitution and the initiation of a 
parliament, to wit: this revolution ‘superimposed the political institutions of 
capitalist-based liberal democracy on a substantively non-capitalist socio-
economic structure, [thereby constituting a] peculiar amalgamation [which] 
was the first acute expression of Iran’s experience of modern uneven and 
combined development’ (Matin 2013c, 146, emphases added). A similar 
approach is applied in chapter 4 to what he calls ‘nationless nationalism’, 
where he focuses on Raza Khan’s reforms and Mossadeq’s revolt (covering 
the period from 1921 to 1953). There he argues against conceiving the phe-
nomenon of nationalism as something that causally emerges internally within 
states by showing how Khan’s ‘defensive modernization’ was pursued under 
the whip of external necessity.
It is also interesting to note that chapters 5 and 6 point up a role for non-
Western agency, the presence of which can provide a counter to Eurocentrism 
which reifies Western agency in world politics. To this end, Matin argues 
that the Shah’s reaction to various non-Western developments—specifically 
the peasant revolutions in China and Latin America—led to the implementa-
tion of a passive revolution in Iran which entailed the initiation of extensive 
land reforms. In chapter 6 he shows how Iranian Muslim intellectuals like 
Ruhollah Khomeini and especially Ali Shariati proactively and creatively 
combined Western and Islamic discursive and ideological resources and 
ideas to craft the potent new ideology/discourse of ‘revolutionary Islam’, 
which outperformed all secular/leftist (Western) competitors and became 
the hegemonic form of the revolution. Moreover, the Islamic revolution had 
and continues to have a significant impact in terms of reconfiguring not only 
the region but also the global order not least because it became the source of 
ideological-political inspiration for almost all subsequent ‘political Islamist’ 
movements across the world including, in a paradoxical way, ISIS—the 
effects of which are relayed in our Western newspapers and on our TV 
screens on a daily basis today.
Finally, let me turn to Matin’s treatment of Marxist theory. One of the 
interesting aspects of his book lies in Matin’s ability to overcome some of 
the blind-spots of orthodox Marxism. Matin and others are critical of the 
internalist approach that marks standard Marxist work. In their book, Anievas 
and Nişancioğlu (2015, chapter 2) take Robert Brenner to task for his endog-
enous approach (see also Tansel 2015). However, Matin produces a critique 
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of Brenner but with a novel twist, arguing that Brenner’s account of the rise 
of capitalism in England factors in empirically various external logics—for 
example, the Norman Conquest—though Matin’s complaint is that none of 
this enters into Brenner’s theoretical schema (Matin 2013c, 53–54). Even 
so, of course, such external logics that Brenner points to empirically are all 
intra-European, thereby confirming or dovetailing with the critique levied by 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015) and Tansel (2013).
Of particular import to my own argument is that in Matin’s final chapter he 
claims that not only is it necessary to revise the basic premises of Marxism 
so that it can take into account the international causes of social change 
but, moreover, that there are numerous cues for this found in various scat-
tered comments in Marx’s writings. There is the well-known claim made 
in Capital where Marx claims that the moments of primitive accumulation 
of capital began outside of Europe in the colonies (a claim reminiscent—or 
pre-emptive—of the decolonial writings of the likes of Quijano (2000) and 
Mignolo (2000)). For this qualifies the generic point that the origins of capi-
talist development outside of the West lay with the export of capital to the 
colonies throughout the world courtesy of European imperialism. There is 
also the first draft of a letter that Marx wrote to Vera Zasulich towards the 
end of his life which in essence pointed up the international origins of social 
change. In this way, Matin lays out the challenge to conventional Marxism 
more generally, suggesting clearly in turn that whatever Eurocentric cues 
there are in Marx’s basic theory these need not constitute an impediment to 
reformulating Marxism on non-Eurocentric lines; that is, a non-Eurocentric 
Marxism is not a non-sequitur. And to return to the argument made above, 
it seems clear that while Matin certainly demonstrates the salience of UCD 
prior to British industrialisation, nevertheless its modality was such that it 
does not disturb orthodox Trotskyist integrity. Accordingly, I conclude that 
he too provides a superb non-Eurocentric inflection of Trotskyism which 
simultaneously retains Trotskyist integrity in particular as well as Marxist 
integrity more generally.
CoNCLUSIoN
Although I have questioned the success of Anievas’s attempt at overcoming 
non-Eurocentrism in his undeniably important 2014 book, nevertheless I have 
argued that the work which he has undertaken with his co-author, Kerem 
Nişancioğlu (2015), clearly succeeds in this objective. I have also argued 
that their nuanced analysis of pre-industrial UCD enables them to retain 
Trotskyist integrity. In support of their argument I would like in this conclu-
sion to produce a non-Eurocentric conception of UCD which, like theirs’, 
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retains orthodox Trotskyist integrity (even though at the risk of sounding 
like I am contradicting myself I should confess that my Marxist credentials 
are hardly impeccable!). My argument is that there was no singular global 
logic to UCD in the pre-industrial era and that instead it operated at various 
regional and trans-regional levels, on the one hand, and that it took a more 
informal modus operandi, on the other.
One obvious candidate here would be the Middle East. The long histori-
cal relations between ‘Europe’ and Islam would at first sight appear to fit the 
bill. Standard (Eurocentric) histories often place much emphasis on the 
early Islamic pretensions to conquer Europe. And given the non-Eurocentric 
claim that Islam was more advanced than Europe at least until 1500 (if not 
until the eighteenth century) then taken together this might well appear as a 
strong potential instance of an Islamic whip of external necessity. One of the 
most oft-cited examples of this constitutes the Muslim attempt at conquering 
Europe in 733. But the problem here is that this instance was not in fact one 
of an attempted conquest of ‘Europe’ (or rather of Christendom) for the mun-
dane reality was that this was simply a raiding party that comprised a small 
band of Muslims intent on stealing the gold from the wealthy shrine of St. 
Martin’s. And it was repelled by Charles Martel not by the deployment of the 
shock cavalry, as we are conventionally told, but rather by a hail of arrows 
and javelins. In general, it was not the gaining of Western Christendom 
that the Muslims were interested in, particularly given its backward nature, 
but Eastern Christendom—especially Constantinople. It is partly for this 
reason that the ‘defeats’ incurred at Tours and Poitiers were ignored in the 
Muslim histories whereas the defeat at Constantinople in 718 CE was openly 
lamented. Marc Bloch’s observation, therefore, remains pertinent: that of all 
the ‘enemies of Western Europe, Islam was certainly the least dangerous…. 
For a long period neither Gaul nor Italy, among their poor cities, had anything 
to offer which approached the splendour of Baghdad or Cordova’ (Bloch 
1961, 3). So, despite the perceptions of the Western half of Christendom there 
was no objective Islamic whip of external necessity.
I would, however, argue that while Middle Eastern Islam did not pose 
an objective geopolitical threat to Western Christendom, nevertheless, the 
Christians chose to perceive Islam as a major threat and it did not take long 
before they acted upon it in no uncertain terms. For it was precisely this 
perception that launched the ‘first round’ of the Crusades between 1095 and 
1291. Moreover, it was during the era of the Crusades that the Christians 
began to enquire into the secrets of Islamic civilisation, with Spanish and 
Portuguese monarchs in particular employing Jews to translate the Islamic 
scientific texts (because to employ Muslim translators at the time of the 
Crusades would have appeared contradictory to their mission and in any case, 
it would have given the game way that after all, the Christians were looking to 
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emulate the superior knowledge of the ‘barbarous’ civilisation that they were 
at war with). As a result of all this the acquiring of Islamic knowledge played 
a massive role in stimulating the Renaissance and later on the Scientific 
Revolution (Hobson 2004, chapter 8). And this partly state-led combination 
process was complemented by the Crusaders themselves who learned much 
about Islamic civilisation when fighting there and brought back various ideas 
upon their return. Three points by way of conclusion here are notable: first, 
that Islam was perceived as a threat does not confirm the material, objective 
presence of an Islamic external whip of necessity. Second, Islam turned out 
to comprise an enabling rather than constraining factor in the development of 
Western Europe; a point that remained the case right down to the sixteenth 
century at the very least. Third, though clearly not an objective whip, never-
theless that it was perceived as one which prompted a combination process 
suggests that there was an informal Islamic whip of external necessity. What 
then of the Ottoman Empire as constituting a potential candidate for an exter-
nal whip of necessity? Here we need look no further than the arguments of 
Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015) which provide a rich source in this respect 
as already noted.
Another potential candidate for a non-Western external whip of necessity 
would be the Mongol Empire. Certainly it entered into geopolitical conflict 
with significant swathes of what later came to be called Eastern Europe in 
general, and Russia in particular. Arguably though, the impact of Mongolian 
interactions with Russia was to effect a shift away from the mercantile centre 
of Kievan Russia towards the autocratic centre of Novgorod which, though 
certainly a highly significant shift, is nevertheless one that does not accord 
with a Mongolian whip of external necessity. And, in any case, nothing in 
what Anievas and Nişancioğlu (2015, chapter 3) have argued for in relation 
to the Mongol Empire would evidence such a presence. Once again, a more 
likely interpretation is that the ‘Europeans’ perceived, or constructed, the 
Mongols as a threat. Strengthening Christendom as a response did occur but it 
was a function of a constructed rather than an objective threat. So I conclude 
that there was an informal rather than an objective Mongol whip of external 
necessity.
All in all, then, it is hard to register even in the most relevant regional 
cases, the existence of an objective external whip of necessity, never mind the 
presence of a singular global whip, in the pre-industrial era. Which is most 
probably why, in the end, applying the logic of UCD to the rise of the West is 
certainly plausible but not something that can be conflated with the presence 
of a global pre-industrial whip of external necessity. Thus, by allowing for the 
presence of a pre-industrial presence of UCD in the absence of a pure, objec-
tive external whip of geopolitical necessity, means that orthodox Trotskyists 
need not worry about non-Eurocentric efforts at identifying the presence 
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of UCD prior to capitalist industrialisation but why, at the same time, they 
might reflect further on the need to develop a genuinely non-Eurocentric take 
on Trotskyist IR and world history by considering the informal non-Western 
whips of necessity, safe in the knowledge that this need not entail a break 
with Trotskyist integrity. Accordingly, the onus of the burden, I believe, now 
falls on orthodox Trotskyists to break with Eurocentrism.
NoTES
1. I would like to thank both of the editors for their excellent suggestions though, 
of course, I remain responsible for the final product.
2. I also accept the point that Trotsky was somewhat ambivalent about this, imply-
ing that UCD had played a role in stimulating Russian development well before the 
time of the British industrial revolution, as indicated in the first chapter of The History 
of the Russian Revolution. I am grateful to Alex Anievas and Kamran Matin for this 
insight.
3. Nevertheless, Trotsky did note with respect to Russia that UCD operated as far 
back as the eleventh century (Matin 2013c, 17).
4. See especially: Callinicos and Rosenberg (2010), as well as several of the other 
chapters in Anievas (2010).
5. For excellent discussions of war in the context of Eastern agency, see Barkawi 
(2006) and Laffey and Barkawi (2006).
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Chapter 14
The Stakes of Uneven and 
Combined Development
David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah
Exploration and colonisation brought Europeans into increasing contact with 
far-flung peoples. Some were difficult to incorporate into received categories 
of difference, offering special interpretive problems and spurring intellectual 
efforts to manage difference within the nascent human sciences (Hodgen 
1964, chapter 9; Pagden 1982; in relation to international relations (IR), see 
Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, chapter 2, and international political economy 
(IPE), see Blaney and Inayatuallah 2010, chapter 2). With the extension of 
empires and the rising availability of experiences with, and ‘knowledge’ of, 
different societies, Enlightenment thinkers developed ‘philosophical and 
historical methods to rethink and account for the diversity of ways of liv-
ing and the historical development of societies’ (Mantena 2010, 13). Most 
important, we have argued (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 46), Enlightenment 
social theory performs a temporal displacement: societies different from the 
Europeans are exiled into a developmentally prior past with Europe placed 
at the pinnacle of human achievement. In short, space is converted into time 
(see Anievas and Matin, this volume).
Marx, as heir to this tradition, offers a similarly totalising and assimila-
tive project, where he, as Teodor Shanin (1983, 4) puts it, uses a ‘[d]iver-
sity of stages’ to explain ‘the essential diversity of forms’. We flag Marx’s 
Eurocentrism (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, chapter 6), and we suggest 
that this is an integral, not contingent, feature of his work: it is built right 
into his method such that Marx’s musings about the empirical specificity of 
Russian or other non-Western European modes of production or trajectories 
serve as observations that are difficult to integrate seamlessly into the logic 
of capital. We see the recovery of Trotsky’s UCD as one in a line of efforts, 
briefly reviewed below, to integrate what is not seamless into large theoretical 
abstractions about capitalism.
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Anievas and Matin (this volume) indicate that UCD allows scholars to 
capture what is often erased: ‘alterity, hybridity, and non-linear forms of 
development’ and ‘the central role’ of ‘extra-European societies … in the 
making of world history’. They pit the work of the contributors to Historical 
Sociology and World History against the practice of ‘methodological inter-
nalism’ where scholars conceive of ‘the birth of the modern world [as] 
endogenously and autonomously emerging within Europe’. These dominant 
narratives and ‘theoretical understandings of world history’ unfold ‘with 
non-European societies and agents largely absent’. Embracing UCD eschews 
incorporating difference only via a ‘comparative method’, that treats ‘the dis-
tinct forms and paths of European development … as ideal-type abstractions 
and/or normative benchmarks’ that serve as a universal register within which 
all difference can be managed. Trotsky’s UCD directs us to a theoretical 
understanding of world history as ‘intersocietal’ that, by the editors’ testi-
mony, prompts us to see the direction of ‘human development’ as governed 
by processes that are ‘neither unilinear nor homogenous/homogenising but 
interactively multilinear’. We read their claim that recovery of Trotsky’s 
UCD involves ‘a fundamental redefinition of the very logic and concept of 
development’, linked they say to ‘a ‘more-than-one’ ontological premise’, as 
an even bolder and somewhat doubtful claim about UCD. We believe that 
invoking ontological difference points beyond the intersocietal interactions 
that are the mainstay of UCD and, as we will argue, towards thinking about 
cultural encounters across more radical differences.
We nonetheless recognise the power of UCD as a mode of ethical/political 
engagement and also acknowledge our own kinship with efforts to break the 
spell of atomistic or ‘internalist’ explanations of development that implicitly 
or explicitly justify inequality and domination (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 
chapter 4; 2015; 2016). Armed with the ‘intersocietal’ as ‘unit of analysis’ 
(Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 53), UCD highlights the interrelations nec-
essary to understanding structured inequalities but repressed by those who 
order their thinking according to an atomistic political economy. Stressing 
that parts cannot exist apart from wholes draws us also to negate claims that 
insist either that parts can be understood by severing them from wholes or 
that parts bear full responsibility for their position in the (repressed) whole. 
UCD appears as among a family of social theoretical perspectives that reveal 
the whole that is presumed and repressed by methodological individualism 
and other atomised unit-level doctrines.
We believe this is an important and powerful move, though the contribu-
tors to this volume underplay this political/ethical moment in their work, 
emphasising instead the relative superiority of UCD to competing modes of 
historical sociology (see Hobson 2011 and this volume; the editors’ introduc-
tion, Brown, Makki, Evans and Cooper in this volume). Authors stress that 
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UCD uniquely allows us to hold together fairly grand theoretical abstractions 
about capitalism or human development with the dictates of the messy and 
seamless empirical realities of actually existing historical processes. Other 
modes of historical sociological inquiry, we are told, falsely attribute primary 
causal power to intra-societal factors, thereby vindicating a story of heroic 
and unique European agency, or degenerate into culturalism/relativism when 
they construct extra-European agency as an internal capacity to generate mul-
tiple modes of capitalism or modernity. In short, by erasing the more central 
and ubiquitous ‘intersocietal’ interactions, competing modes of inquiry are 
judged guilty of factual, conceptual and explanatory failures.
Despite this characterisation of the failures of Eurocentric scholarship, we 
believe a political/ethical concern about assigning responsibility for one’s 
fate—as oppressor or oppressed, as developmental success or failure—remains 
embedded in UCD scholarship. Where the contributors to historical sociology 
and world history ascribe ‘a certain unity’ to either capitalism or human devel-
opment writ large as ‘an intelligible (albeit contradictory) object of analysis’ 
that they are empowered to describe and explain (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 
2015, 9), we sense that the authors also hold onto capitalism or human devel-
opment as processes of achievement and creation as well as oppression and 
destruction for which moral responsibility might be (and usually is) assigned. 
To avoid charges of European superiority, then, they believe they must assign 
agential responsibility or any claims of human historical achievements widely, 
dispersing the causal processes generating capitalism and modernity (or any 
‘development’) beyond any individual society’s bounds. The impulse to dis-
solve claims of European super-agency and diffuse agency to non-European 
actors also implies non-European complicity for oppression and destruction. 
The recovery of extra-European agency may be important, but may not fully 
capture what we see to be at stake in claims about the achievements and 
destructiveness of capitalist or colonial modernity. It is not just whose sweat, 
intelligence, creativity, or subjugation was involved but, to invoke the editors’ 
reference to multiple ontologies, whose cosmologies, histories and forms of 
life were suppressed, subsumed or destroyed by a process that seems to have 
been centred but not localised in certain European powers.
Drawing on Robbie Shilliam’s work and our own efforts, we want to 
focus less attention on the combined and unequal material processes that 
distinguish capitalism (or maybe human development). We would focus 
more on the constitutive role of cultural encounters that perhaps offered 
prospects of mutual learning but resulted instead in processes of cultural 
subordination and degradation. Invoking the language of culture refers us to 
the human capacity to construct, inhabit and aesthetically express forms of 
life. An emphasis on culture highlights the weight of linguistic and visual 
representations in shaping human existence into forms of life, including their 
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role in constituting groups’ specific identity in relation to others and to the 
cosmos. We see the interactions stressed by UCD as encounters of differ-
ent, if always also overlapping, visions and traditions (see Inayatullah and 
Blaney 2004, introduction). In our view, then, the claims of European uni-
versalism that fuelled cultural subordination and degradation are not simply 
a mis-description of historical realities or a faulty theoretical conception but 
a constitutive feature of the encounters that shaped capitalist modernity. We 
believe that the form of the attack on Eurocentrism mobilised in this book 
underplays this constitutive role and therefore misses an opportunity to stake 
out a stronger anti-colonial position that indicts the cultural erasures central to 
modernity. The point is not that cultural destruction is unique to the modern 
period, but that modern imperialism is consistently hostile to difference. A 
serious anti-colonial stance would involve reimagining IR as a site for the 
study of difference and recovering erased voices as collaborators in political 
and ethical reflection.1
We move towards that final claim in the remainder of this essay. We 
discuss two earlier attempts by Marxist scholars to redress the erasures of 
extra-European realities risked by stage theories or historical narratives 
driven by the imperatives of the logic of capital. The idea of the articulation 
of modes of production and Dipesh Chakrabarty’s critique of historicism 
share with this volume’s contributors the motive of recovering the role of 
extra-European actors in the construction of capitalism. Despite interesting 
insights, these efforts display problems that help us think about the limits 
of UCD’s challenge to European colonial ideology. Two stand out. First, 
we see no necessity to the claim that attending to the differentia specifica 
of capitalism is Eurocentric. Second, we believe that replacing the logic of 
capitalism with a notion of human development risks effacing the presence 
of multiple cosmologies and forms of life in the encounters making and made 
by capitalist modernity. In closing, we draw on our work and the work of 
Robbie Shilliam to suggest alternative formulations that highlight the cul-
tural encounters and destruction specific to capitalist modernity as a way of 
moving to a stronger anti-colonial stance.
MARxISM AND THE CHALLENGE of 
NoN-EURoPEAN DIffERENCE
The rise of dependency and World-System Theories placed the problem of 
the periphery at the centre of debates about the logic of capitalism. Were 
the concrete conditions in capitalism’s peripheries a sign that capitalist rela-
tions had yet to fully overcome backwardness (as in Bill Warren’s somewhat 
later book [1981] and Marx’s essays on India) or was underdevelopment a 
function of dependency relations central to capitalism as a (combined and 
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uneven) system (Foster-Carter 1978, 1–2)? A growing number of contribu-
tors to this debate were practicing anthropologists, who struggled to reconcile 
their field notes and their theoretical conceptions of peripheral social forma-
tions with a claim about the global spread of the logic of capitalism. Marxist 
scholars generally, as Foster-Carter (1978, 3) suggests, were bedevilled by 
their observation that many of the features of Third World social formations 
were recognisable as remnants of earlier modes of production, as residual to 
the main game and destined for eclipse by developmental forces. Yet, these 
differences seemed crucial to the social formation and were quite resilient. 
Drawing on Anievas and Matin’s introduction to this volume, a comparative 
method trading in Eurocentric ideal-types founders when confronted with the 
facts of ‘alterity’ and ‘hybridity’.
The formulations designed to negotiate this paradox, as Foster-Carter 
reports them, seem precursors of those contemporary practitioners of UCD 
that centre their work on the uneven and combined character of capitalism. 
The earlier debates likewise began with the assumption that conditions in 
the Third World were ‘indeed capitalistic’, that is, part of a combined his-
torical system, but that the ‘whole’ is both ‘structured and differentiated’. 
And the differences from the logic of capital displayed in its centres are not 
‘exogenous to capitalism’, but ‘an intrinsic and structured part of the wider 
system’ (Foster-Carter 1978, 3, here paraphrasing Laclau). Various writers, 
‘working over a wide variety of sources of material and levels of analysis’, 
redefined capitalism’s unfolding as contradictory processes of ‘dissolution 
and conservation’ (as in Poulantzas), where, as in Meillassoux, ‘pre-capitalist 
social forms are “being undermined and perpetuated at the same time”’ 
(Foster-Carter 1978, 3). The concrete social formations might be described 
then as different and hybrid, but not beyond the grasp of Marxist tools to 
comprehend.
But these tools needed to be refined. Many in economic anthropology 
turned to the Althusserian language of ‘articulation’ which they used to ‘indi-
cate relations of linkage and effectivity between different levels of all sorts 
of things’ (Foster-Carter 1978, 5). And they resisted simplistic teleological 
claims about successive modes of production by suggesting that specific 
social formations need to be understood as in ‘process’—as having a trajec-
tory defined by their ‘own periodization’ (as in Rey; Foster-Carter 1978, 6), 
an intriguing term that might prefigure contemporary UCD’s emphasis on 
multilinear development trajectories, but might militate against use of the 
term development itself.2
 
But, as Foster-Carter (1978, 9–10) argues, the ‘articulation’ formulation 
largely remained an ‘internal’ account of the trajectory of a social formation, 
and, as some UCD scholars also emphasise (Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 
31), downplays the central role of coercion and violence in institutionalis-
ing capitalism across space. It also leaves us with an ‘inside/outside’ puzzle 
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(Foster-Carter 1978, 11, 14): Is capitalism transferred having been fully 
formed elsewhere, so that capitalism is exogenous to Third World social for-
mations with their articulated modes as the ‘deformed progeny’? Or are the 
social formations that emerge historically to be understood as ‘relational and 
interactional’, so that Trotsky’s language of ‘combination’ becomes pertinent? 
Or is it somehow both? The internecine debates among UCD scholars seem to 
turn on a roughly similar ‘inside-outside’ issue of when and how something 
might be counted as ‘combined’ (Davidson, Buzan and Lawson, Allinson, 
Hobson and Anievas and Matin, all in this volume), including dissension over 
whether uneven and combined development is specific to capitalism.
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s later intervention similarly resists Eurocentric histori-
cism and, on this basis, merits reference in the editor’s introduction. But we 
find a hint of a notably different ontological understanding. Chakrabarty (2000, 
7, 29; our stress) indicts European historicism not simply as a misrepresentation 
of the facts of history or a mistaken theoretical conception, but as a force that 
‘enabled European domination’ by placing the rest of the world into a position 
of backwardness relative to a purportedly universal Europe. In this reading, 
Marx himself is culpable in European domination given his characterisation 
of ‘European history [as] an entelechy of universal reason’. But, Chakrabarty 
(2000, 47) reminds us, Marx and Marxist thought were central to the Subal-
tern Studies movement and, in parallel to the contributors to this volume, he 
attempts to recover some elements of Marxist historiography as a resource for 
the postcolonial project while resisting other Eurocentric formulations.
Chakrabarty re-reads Marx’s historiographical reflections to indicate com-
mitment to both a grand theory rooted in the logic of capital and sensitivity to 
the messier specificity of historical processes. He quotes Marx in Grundrisse 
(1973, 460–1; stress original) to suggest that the logic of capital points 
us also ‘to the real history of the relations of production’—to ‘empirical’ 
realities ‘which point towards a past lying behind this system’. We find here, 
Chakrabarty (2000, 63) claims, reference both to ‘the universal and necessary 
history we associate with capital’, forming ‘the backbone of the usual narra-
tive of transition to the capitalist mode of production’, and moments of differ-
ence. Thus, a second and competing history opens us to different elements in 
the past: antecedent to capital, which might be part of a story of its ancestry 
but are not strictly necessary for the ‘being’ of capital (Chakrabarty 2000, 64).
It is not clear how much space Chakrabarty opens for ‘alterity’ or the 
‘multilinear’ processes UCD wishes to recognise with this move. In some-
what tortured language and confirming our suspicion that alterity is about to 
be effaced, Chakrabarty (2000, 64) explains that the contemporary ‘being’ 
of capital faces elements of past societies that are not posited by capital in 
the form that they assume in its ‘own life process’. These ‘older forms’ must 
be transformed, subjugated, converted or appended to (or into) the logic of 
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capital. Social practices we may find in the present, that we might associate 
with capitalism, like the exploitation of unfree labour, are not necessarily 
‘central to capital’s reproduction’, yet they ‘are not pasts separate from capi-
tal’. Rather, ‘they inhere in capital and yet interrupt and punctuate the run of 
capital’s own logic’.
The language of ‘inhere in’, ‘interrupt’, and ‘punctuate’ reinforces the 
temptation to override the details of history with the logic of capitalism. As 
Chakrabarty (2000, 65; our emphasis) stresses, the messy historical process 
of capital’s ‘becoming’ need not ‘be thought of as a process outside of and 
prior to its “being”’. Holding together the messy historical process of its 
becoming and its being destroys
the usual topological distinction of the outside and the inside that marks debates 
about whether or not the whole world can be properly said to have fallen under 
the sway of capital. Difference, in this account, is not something external to 
capital. Nor is it something subsumed into capital. It lives in intimate and plural 
relation to capital. (Chakrabarty 2000, 65–6)
Where non- or a-capitalist elements cannot be relegated to the outside of 
the unit constituted by capitalism, they function within this ‘combined’ his-
torical capitalism to constantly and only interrupt ‘the totalising thrusts’ of 
the ‘being’ of capital. Though the narrative of the logic of capital is thereby 
interrupted by the diversity of historical elements that make it up as a com-
bined unit, as Chakrabarty also suggests, ‘[c]apital brings into every history 
some of the universal themes of the European Enlightenment’. The open-
ing to a diversity of historical becoming is quite limited when this diversity 
always only works to ‘modify’ the totalising thrusts of the logic of capital 
(Chakrabarty 2000, 66–7, 70–1; our emphasis; see a similar critique in Matin 
2013a, 363–5).
But what kind of space is there for difference or multilinear processes if 
the ‘becoming’ only modifies the being of capital? It seems that the dialecti-
cal unfolding of the logic of capital can be interrupted but not refused. In 
language we favour, this is a cultural encounter of modern capitalism and 
various other modes of life, the outcome and direction of which is already 
known, though the details of the transition to capitalism are messy.
bEyoND INTERSoCIETAL INTERACTIoNS 
To CULTURAL ENCoUNTERS
Contemporary UCD scholars also attempt to negotiate this inside/outside 
of capitalism problem, resisting formulations where ‘the rest’ seem only to 
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modify capitalism’s being or logic. Rosenberg (2013a, 2013b) and Hobson 
(2011 and this volume) translate this issue as a problem of Eurocentrism. 
Excessive emphasis on modes of production, particularly the distinctively 
‘combined’ and ‘uneven’ complexly articulated capitalist social formations 
unfolding in various parts of the world, lends aid and comfort to Eurocentric 
scholars with their comparative methodological internalism. More precisely 
perhaps, emphasising the ‘being’ of capital, in Chakrabarty’s terms, requires 
a ‘logic of immanence’ that trades in capitalism’s ‘exceptional qualities’ 
(Hobson 2011, 154). With capitalism so centred, Europe appears as ‘sui 
generis’: ‘capable of self-generated or independent auto-development’ 
(Hobson 2011, 154). Recourse not to capitalism, but to ‘human development’ 
as our object of analysis (as in Hobson 2011 and this volume; Rosenberg 
2013b; and Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015) perhaps does inoculate us against 
placing non-Europeans outside of our historical narratives, since there seems 
no outside to human development.3 Yet, it is unclear to us that attending to 
the differentia specifica of capitalism or modernity necessarily aids and abets 
Eurocentricism, as we shall suggest below. Resolving this inside/outside 
problem by displacing the logic of capitalism with the logic of human devel-
opment is worrisome. What we see as cultural encounters of differing modes 
of life now appear as entangled in universal processes of human develop-
ment, albeit with multilinear trajectories.4
We imagine a protest: Trotsky’s UCD offers us a vision of a more-than-one 
ontology. We want to take that idea seriously and see where it leads us. When 
we restore extra-European forms of life to our stories, we find distinctly 
non-developmental cosmological visions. Some envision and reproduce 
the cosmos as cyclical. Others envision social life as marching backward to 
recover a harmony, now fractured by human oppressions (Shilliam 2015, 
introduction). Others may orient themselves around reproducing a minimally 
surplus-producing form of life (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, chapter 6). 
James Tully (1993, 138–9) suggests that the modern ‘problem space’, defined 
by Locke and inherited by Marx, presumes a mode of political ‘society’ 
and advancing human productive capacities. Other forms of life are erased 
from our reckonings of human existence and hence suitably colonised and 
destroyed in the name of human advance. It is a small step to imagine the 
‘problem space’ of human development as ‘intersocietal’ interactions.
Perhaps we (and Tully) nostalgically ignore that developmental processes 
go on behind the backs of our extra-European actors. But we do not ignore the 
interactions and mutual influences. Starting with the idea of more-than-one 
ontology leads us to highlight the centrality of cultural encounters: the pos-
sibilities of learning, but also of subordination, assimilation and destruction. 
Restoring these modes of life to our stories of cultural encounter also might 
be a protest against the way modern notions of development, including UCD 
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in our estimation, assimilate all under their register, and how the processes 
or forces unleashed attempt to subordinate and destroy other forms of life in 
the name of development.5
Ashman (cited by Hobson 2011, 156) and Davidson (this volume) share 
this concern: embracing human development as the object of analysis risks 
missing the historical specificity of capitalist modernity. Perhaps different 
than them, we would stress the risk of missing the constitutive centrality 
of Eurocentrism in not only legitimating European dominance, but also in 
enabling capitalist modernity’s assimilative and destructive project.6 The lan-
guage of ‘combined’ or ‘uneven’ hardly captures the constitutive impact of 
dividing of humanity into advanced and backward, universal and particular. 
Whether focusing its historical materialist lens on the unevenness of capital-
ism or human development as an uneven and combined process, we fear that 
the attempt to marry ‘alterity’ and ‘development’ puts UCD on capitalist 
modernity’s side in cultural encounters. Indeed, its historical sensibility is 
itself a product of modernity (Lundborg 2016, 103–4, 110).
A different emphasis better captures the constitutive or enabling role of 
modernity/colonialism/capitalist and its creative, violent and fracturing con-
sequences. Robbie Shilliam’s article on the ‘Atlantic Vector’, though cited by 
the editors as within the UCD tradition, is remarkably diffident. Like UCD, 
his move to make Atlantic slavery central to any discussion of the ‘differen-
tiation of European and Western hemispheric trajectories’ replaces a story 
of the ‘rise of capitalism, nation, and class within England or Europe’ with 
a deep appreciation of the ‘international sociality’ at the heart of New World 
social formations and identities (Shilliam 2009a, 72). But he resists embrac-
ing UCD’s rather abstract grand narrative, opting instead for regionally 
grounded and more penetrating notion of ‘creolization’: more ‘organically 
linked to Atlantic slavery’, more attuned to the specific political grammar, 
forms of social organisation and racial meta-identities involved and, therefore 
a ‘more apposite concept for exploring New world development’ (Shilliam 
2009a, 71, 83). His survey of the rich literature on Atlantic slavery suggests 
that the ‘international sociality’ constituted by Atlantic slavery might lead 
us to see a ‘combined’ space, but that this was a ‘paradoxical and frictional 
union’ (Shilliam 2009a, 83).
Read in relation to his later work, we might read this interconnection less 
as a combined process of human development, however tension-filled our 
notion of development might be, and more as a process both of cultural era-
sure and destruction and the establishment of a new, hierarchically structured 
modern order. Shilliam (2015, chapter 1) describes the modern era wrought 
by colonialism as establishing a fundamental breach or fracture in human 
relationality: Europeans and their modern science locate them in a position 
separate from (outside and above) the others they can know and presume 
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to govern. The consequences of this act of separation includes the relations 
of power and production we might characterise as combined and uneven 
development, but these are intertwined with a deep fracturing of human 
relationality—a violence at once epistemological and ontological.7
Drawing on Shilliam’s terms, we would argue that a distinctive mod-
ern/capitalist political and economic grammar coalesces in certain sites in 
Western Europe (though not autonomously or without Eastern influences to 
be sure) and in relation to broader spaces beyond Europe. This political and 
economic grammar works to fragment the world by effacing other gram-
mars and social relations and subjecting people and peoples within Europe 
and beyond to systems of domination. To translate into terms we have used 
elsewhere, we understand capitalism as cultural, political economy as cultural 
political economy, and interaction as cultural encounter, offering myriad pos-
sibilities of violence and subjugation, assimilation, complicity, and, we hope, 
mutual learning (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). 
And we would stress, along with Shilliam (we believe) and Chakrabarty that 
these colonial/capitalist political and economic grammars are not simply 
false explanations or representations but practices of knowledge central to 
and constitutive of cultural encounters as moments of learning and violence.
It is worthy and helpful to denaturalise the Eurocentrism of IR by widening 
the frame so that it incorporates the extra-European. But if we widen the frame 
by embracing ‘human development’, we downplay and potentially reinforce 
the very practices of exclusion and erasure central to notions of development 
that made modern cultural encounters so violent and destructive. A different 
sort of engagement seems to be required if IR is to be cultivated as a deeper 
anti-colonial practice. This engagement would not displace into the past those 
effaced by the cultural encounters that constitute modernity—as superseded 
by capitalist or human development. Rather, these visions and traditions 
would be available as sources of historical understanding, as contributions to 
political and ethical reflection in the present and as alternative possibilities as 
we imagine how we might live in relation with others.
NoTES
1. We make this case in Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) and Blaney and Inayatullah 
(2010).
2. This reading resonates with authors like Nederveen Pieterse and Arturo 
Escobar, referenced in the introduction, as critiques of Eurocentric scholarships, but 
not as critics of developmental cosmologies.
3. Others like Davidson (this volume) challenge the extension of the logic of 
uneven and combined development to any social forms beyond capitalism. Though, 
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as the editors have warned us, there are a range of formulations possible within the 
frame of UCD, including the idea that particular modes of production produce their 
own ‘historically-bound forms and dynamics of UCD’, our impulse is to resist any 
invocation of the idea of ‘human development’.
4. Lundborg (2016, 103–4, 110, 113–14) lays something like this charge at the feet 
of historical sociologists, including those who protest against Eurocentric histories. 
Brown’s answer (this volume) to a similar charge from Bhambra (2011) illustrates 
the way that multilinear trajectories of development are substituted for a simple stage 
theory without, however, displacing a generally modernist claim that history has a 
developmental direction.
5. Our sense is that the ‘savage’ serves as the constitutive outside of human devel-
opment (see Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). Rosenberg’s efforts (2010, 171–75) to 
place hunting and foraging societies within UCD largely confirms our sense. Hunt-
ing and gathering societies move towards the ‘international’ only when processes of 
vertical stratification and differentiation are unleashed. And still these moves beyond 
hunting and gathering bands are ‘many steps’ removed from an ‘“international” 
political system’.
6. See, however, Anievas and Nişancioğlu 2015, 123–9.
7. Note the resemblance to the critique of the coloniality of power and knowledge 
found in Escobar (2012) and Quijano (2007).
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Conclusion
Rethinking Historical Sociology 
and World History
Beyond the Eurocentric gaze
Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin
Historical sociology and world history are distinct academic fields with a 
shared concern for large-scale historical processes of social transformation. 
Historical sociology has focused on providing ‘historically sensitive, yet gen-
erally applicable’ accounts of the emergence of capitalist industrial societies, 
or capitalist modernity more generally (Hobson, Lawson, Rosenberg 2010, 
1). World history, especially since its rebirth in the late twentieth century, 
has in turn sought to ‘establish a historical context for the integrated and 
interdependent world of modern times’ (Bentley cited in Mazlish 1998, 386). 
Moreover, both frameworks partly emerged as a reaction to the nationalist 
and comparative methodologies of their home-disciplines of sociology and 
comparative history from which they have self-differentiated.
Yet, despite the similarity of historical sociology and world history’s 
intellectual genesis and the significant overlap between their basic analyti-
cal concerns, there remains relatively little dialogue and explicit intellectual 
exchange between the two fields. One obvious reason for this mutual neglect 
is the scepticism that the practitioners of world history, like all historians, 
tend to have towards the types of grand-scale theory characteristic of histori-
cal sociology. However, there is arguably a deeper reason for this disconnect 
between historical sociology and world history. It concerns different concep-
tions of ‘the international’ in the two fields.
As an internally diverse research programme, historical sociology’s intel-
lectual vocation closely resonates with the tradition of classical sociology 
more broadly. That tradition anchored its theory of modern social orders in a 
dialectically configured tripartite framework consisting of (social) structure, 
history and totality. The basic premise is that human agency, its possibilities 
and constraints, and hence the results of its conduct, are shaped by their nec-
essary implications in specific configurations of social relations and political 
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orders, which themselves are historically congealed constellations of prior 
exercises of human agency (structure); that these structures are intrinsically 
historical in that they both differ in, and change over, time (history); and that 
an adequate account of the historical evolution of human societies ought to 
avoid compartmentalising social reality involved in the modern disciplinary 
division of knowledge. For the real-world referents of disciplinary sciences are 
organically and intrinsically interrelated (totality) (Rosenberg 2016, 295–96).
Thus, the epithet ‘historical’ in historical sociology arguably indicates a 
restorative reaction to contemporary sociology’s shift towards more abstract 
and ahistorical forms of theorisation which deviated from classical sociolo-
gy’s original intellectual project (e.g. Parsons 1991). Indeed, this was the cir-
cumstance to which historical sociology emerged as a response in the 1970s 
and 1980s. While in this early stage historical sociology sought to expand 
upon classical sociology’s historical and spatial scope, in part by moving 
beyond the methodological internalism of that tradition, it largely rested on 
a proto-realist conception of states and geopolitics (e.g. Skocpol 1979; Mann 
1986; Tilly 1992). Later, during the 1990s and early 2000s, historical soci-
ology emerged at the critical fringes of disciplinary international relations 
(IR) as an explicit critique of realist IR’s reification and fetishisation of ‘the 
international’ demonstrating the variety of historically distinct forms of inter-
national relations, which was in turn derived from spatio-temporally specific 
forms of social structures (e.g. Rosenberg 1994; Spruyt 1994; Teschke 2003). 
Thus, the fin de siècle historical sociology not only challenged contemporary 
sociology but also involved an indirect critique of its immediate precursor.
It is however the most recent contributions to historical sociology that 
have laid the fundamental intellectual foundations for a mutually beneficial 
dialogue with world history, a goal with which this volume has been cen-
trally concerned. For these latest works of historical sociology in IR have 
been seeking to complete the dialectics of the earlier literature’s focus on the 
social substratum of international relations by demonstrating the causal and 
constitutive significance of ‘the international’ for the rise and development 
of specific social orders. To this end, uneven and combined development has 
emerged as an important intellectual idiom in which this latest strand of his-
torical sociology has been articulated.1 For as the contributions to this volume 
have shown in their different ways, the framework of uneven and combined 
development involves an explicit theoretical and methodological recognition 
and comprehension of ‘the international’ as a distinct but organic dimension 
of the social world.
Crucially, the plural and relational ontology that underpins uneven and 
combined development both resonates with the key concerns of world history 
and addresses its main limitations: namely, Eurocentrism and methodologi-
cal imprecision. For even though contemporary world history was a reaction 
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to the universalist assumptions of earlier approaches to world history, which 
constructed their basic categories by extrapolating from the European 
experience, much of the literature has nevertheless not been able to fully 
overcome the problem of Eurocentrism at its source; with some approaches 
even partially reproducing it through an insufficiently radical break from 
civilisational analysis in which western civilisation supplied the ‘ideal types’ 
through which other civilisations were studied (Gran 1996; McNeill 1995; 
Geyer and Bright 1995). This Eurocentric tendency was reinforced by the 
new world history’s focus on ‘trans-civilizational’ phenomena as opposed to 
‘inter-societal’ ones. The former, it must be noted, arise despite societal mul-
tiplicity while the latter occur because of it. This focus therefore reproduced 
the ‘diffusionist’ analytical trope of earlier forms of world history, which 
methodologically downplayed the role of violent encounters and confronta-
tions in history, a circumstance that reached unprecedented levels with the 
emergence of colonialism and capitalist modernity.
The centrality to world history of the concept of civilisation—broadly 
understood as a culturally shaped ‘style of life’—also involved the problem 
of methodological imprecision (McNeill 1995, 16). For ‘civilization’—the 
central unit of analysis for much of existing scholarship on world history—
remains conceptually inchoate: it is socioculturally diverse and politically 
conflictual internally, and spatially amorphous externally. This problem 
underpins a number of key and still unresolved questions regarding the spa-
tial delimitations of cultures and civilisations. William McNeill has sought to 
address this problem by positing the ‘common subjections to rulers’ (McNeill 
1995, 16) as the fundamental integrative element of civilisations as internally 
diverse units. This overtly political conception of civilisation brings world 
history close to historical sociology. However, the methodological value-
added of this move is diluted by some world history approaches’ loyalty to an 
‘ecumenical’ global analytical framework. Indeed, as the editors of a major 
work on world history note, ‘the lust for coverage is world history’s deadliest 
sin and has constantly to be restrained’ (Embree and Gluck 1997, xvii). While 
it would be surely haphazard to claim that all of contemporary world history 
remains trapped within the Eurocentric cage given the wealth of recent stud-
ies explicitly seeking to break with Eurocentrism (see, inter alia, Gran 1996; 
Bayly 2004), the intellectual sources of the problem nonetheless persist.
There are, of course, no easy solutions to such a deeply engrained, political 
and institutionalised dilemma. Yet, we argue that the framework of uneven 
and combined development can provide a theoretical ‘first-step’ to address 
these problems. It confronts the issue of Eurocentrism by replacing classi-
cal sociology’s ontologically singular conception of the social with a plural 
social ontology, which has radical implications for the mode of concept for-
mation and method of explanation. Uneven and combined development also 
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provides a methodological procedure that unites the advantages of a holistic 
perspective with the methodological rigour of historical sociology. This is so 
because the three constitutive elements of the approach are invested with dis-
tinct yet interrelated methodological functions: ‘unevenness’ directs attention 
to both the wider conjunction of different developmental temporalities and 
dynamics in which the society under investigation, or a given feature thereof, 
is implicated, and the specific historical pressures, constraints and opportuni-
ties that this circumstance generates; ‘combination’ highlights the particular 
sociological fusions that arises from this intersocietal condition; and ‘devel-
opment’ foregrounds the distinct dynamics of socio-historical change that 
results from these two interactive circumstances (Rosenberg in this volume). 
In other words, uneven and combined development dialectically supplants the 
Eurocentric universalist terms of traditional world history approaches and the 
particularistic assumptions of classical sociology through a strategic theoreti-
cal and analytical emphasis on ‘the international’. And it does so by recasting 
social contexts as ‘neither bounded to a particular society, nor universal in 
scope, but rather delineated in and through a specific society’s interaction 
with other, differentially developed societies’ (Shilliam 2009b, 5). To varying 
degrees of systematicity and explicitness, this intellectual position is discern-
ible in all the contributions to this volume.
In conclusion, we would like to emphasise that while we believe uneven 
and combined development is a highly fertile and vital research programme 
we are also keenly aware that it is also a young project and will definitely ben-
efit from further reflexive engagements and critical refinement. For instance, a 
recurrent criticism of the contemporary IR literature on uneven and combined 
development has been that it is too abstract and preoccupied with (meta)theo-
retical questions (Teschke 2014). Addressing this issue is a key aim of this 
volume. But there are also more substantive issues such as the normative and 
political dimensions of uneven and combined development raised by David 
Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah in the last chapter. And, indeed, the precise 
political and normative implications of uneven and combined development 
are a significant topic in need of much further debate and discussion.2
Moreover, while it would be incorrect to criticise uneven and combined 
development as intrinsically antithetical to analytically capturing and articu-
lating agential processes (cf. Teschke 2014)—as many of the above contri-
butions well demonstrate—a more direct engagement with the question of 
precisely how ‘lived agency’ relates to structure in different historical epochs 
from the perspective of uneven and combined development is a promis-
ing avenue for future research. So too is the issue of whether uneven and 
combined development entails a distinct approach to history-writing itself: 
a unique way of thinking about history as a particular ‘form of knowledge 
and experience’ which, in different times and places, provides differential 
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frameworks for conceiving the relations between past, present and future, 
as well as demarcations in time and space (Davenport 2016, 263). For if 
historical consciousness can be said to constitute, as Andrew Davenport 
suggests (2016), a distinctively modern form of the relationship to ‘the past’ 
itself inextricably tied to the rise of modern sovereign authorities—and thus 
by extension the fractured space of ‘the international’—then what might the 
framework of uneven and combined development mean for critical reflecting 
upon the (geo)political meaning of history in rethinking the relation of past, 
present and future?
While this volume has been oriented around an engagement with history, 
perhaps the next step is a critique of history, to which we believe the perspec-
tive of uneven and combined development might indeed prove useful. In one 
way or another, we hope that this volume can act as catalyst for further criti-
cal and constructive debate around the various issues raised here and through-
out the volume in opening up new and exciting avenues for future research.
NoTES
1. For an extensive bibliography visit www.unevenandcombined.com.
2. For a brief discussion of some of these issues, see Anievas and Nişancioğlu 
(2015, 274–82).
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